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P RECIS 
Conceived in a climate of public opinion suspicious 
of foreign investment, this thesis was originally in-
tended to assist in assessing whether or not Australia 
receives net benefit from the foreign investment with-
in its borders . To this end, a case study was made of 
American direct investment in Australian manufacturing 
industry . 
Chapter I briefly examines public attitudes to 
foreign investment in Australia and describes the 
conduct of the survey. In combination with Appendices 
A and B, Chapter II notes the rapid growth of American 
direct investment in Australia and attempts an assess-
ment of its quantitative importance in 1962. In 
Chapter III, the reasons for the capital inflow are 
discussed, bothin terms of the answers given by 
companies participating inthe survey and in terms of 
theories of international capital movement . 
Chapter IV covers a number of related subjects, 
but is primarily concerned with the ownership of 
American- affiliated companies and the extent to which 
t h ey draw on the Australian capital market for funds 
for expansion . In particular, the argument that 
wholly-American subsidiaries should be compelled (or 
even encouraged) to take Australians into share partner-
ship is criticized . 
Chapters V, VI, and VII form a group: they 
attempt to gauge the extent of American control over 
the decision- making of the local firms , the access which 
American- affiliated companies enjoy to the managerial 
and technical e pertise of their parent companies, 
and the effect of these factors on their growth and 
productivity . The costs involved in dependence on 
American technical know- how are also discussed . 
The impact of foreign subsidiaries on domestic 
Australian incomes can only be seen in its entirety in 
a general theoretical framework , but to the e tent that 
it is susceptible to fairly simple empirical observation, 
this is discu ss d in Chapter III . Special attention is 
devoted to th effect of American investment on the 
pric s of produ ts sold on the Australian market and 
th tent to which merican subsidiaries transmit 
iv 
know-how to their Australian suppliers. 
Logically, American control over the markets in 
which local affiliates buy and sell and the profitability 
of these companies should be discussed in Chapters V, VI, 
and VII . Because export franchise restrictions and 
the profitability of American subsidiaries are matters 
of particular public interest , a discussion of the 
xports and imports of participating companies is de-
ferred to Chapter IX, and of their profitability to 
Chapter X. 
The eleventh and final chapter attempts a theoretical 
summing-up . It is probably the most important chapter 
of all because it suggests that the original intention 
_ to assess whether foreign investment benefits 
Australia - was to some extent misdirected. In fact, 
. it is hard to imagine circumstances in which foreign 
investment as such makes theincomes of Australians lower 
than they would be in the absence of foreign investment, 
at least in the short run . Whether or not foreign 
investment increases incomes in the long-term, and 
whether or not it improves the country's balance of 
payments, depends on its relative effects on Australian 
incomes and expenditures . The most important question 
is not 'Does foreign investment benefit Australia?' but 
'Is Australia maximizing the benefits from foreign in-
vestment?' 
PREFACE 
By a rath r remarkabl turn of fat , my introduction 
to the subject of foreign inv stment in Australia, and 
the intense feelings which it generates, began on 22 
December 1959. On that day , I was among a small group 
of people in th visitors' gallery of the Sydney Stock 
Exohange when it was announced that General Motors 
Corporation of the U . S. was making a bid for the 
Australian-held preference sha e s (th only Australian 
interest ) in General Motors-Holden's Ltd . 
Less than three years later, after writing a 
Masters thesis in ew Zealand on the problems posed 
by international investment income for the balance of 
payments of that, my native, country, I was examining 
possible subjects for a Doctoral thesis at the 
Australian ational University when Professor Sir John 
Crawford invited me to conduct a survey of American 
corporate investment in Australian manufacturing. 
I have never held 'extremist' views on foreign in-
vestment. But it is fair to admit that, knowing some-
thing of the hostility generated by for ign capital 
both in this century and th last, I began this project 
very conscious of the disadvantages of foreign investment . 
Th survey was therefore framed substantially in sympathy 
with Australian public sentiment. In particular, 
special attention was devot d to such matters as the 
quantitative importance of American capital in Australian 
industry, the extent to which American-affiliated 
companies share ownership with Australians, the depend-
ence of such companies on the Australian capital market, 
the pricing of imports bought from affiliates, the 
importance of export franchise restrictions, and the 
ff ct on Australia's balance of payments of the growth 
of profi~ accruing abroad . 
Data were gathered for the most part in a direct 
firm-by-firm study . As explained in the Introduction, 
the response by the American-affiliated companies 
approached was good, particularly in view of the con-
sid rable quant·ty and sensitiv nature of the informa-
tion sought. Echoing Southard's comment made after a 
similar surv Y of Am rican investm nt in Europe at the 
b ginning of th thO ties, ' I tru st that the suspiciou s 
attitud of thos oth r companies who r f us ed to 
cooperate has not been justified by the contents of 
1 th book. I 
As the survey progressed, I became increasingly 
consc'ous of th benefits Australia derives from 
foreign investment and this view was confirmed by a 
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th oretical analysis of the factors involved . (Because 
Sir John Crawford had approached many American sub-
sidiaries in Australia for their cooperation in the 
survey before I was asked to conduct it, the time -
table of the project was to some extent 'exogenous '. 
For this reason, the theo~etical analysis of foreign 
investment was carried out in large measure after the 
completion of the empirical work . ) The conclusion 
eventually reached was that the most important question 
to be asked is not 'Does foreign investment benefit 
Australia?' but 'Is Australia maximizing the benefits 
from foreign investment?' In all but most unusual 
circumstances, Australia must benefit from foreign 
investment . 
It is possible that in reporting on the empirical 
evidence gathered, I have been unduly influenced either 
by the friendliness of many of the executives inter-
viewed (though many of them also were conscious of the 
'dangers' of foreign investment) or by the theoretical 
conclusion reached. It is possible, in other words, 
that I have under-emphasized the costs involved. It will 
almost certainly appear that way, in the context of 
public uneasiness about foreign investment . But if I 
have been favourably 'swayed' by the friendliness of 
many companies, I have been almost equally antagonized 
by the hostility of others. I have tried to be object -
ive - something which is extremely difficult when 
dealing with such a mass of imprecise and often con-
flicting items of evidence. As my colleague Mr . J .A. 
Dowie warne d early in the survey , it is easier to 
write an anthology of anecdotes than a coherent summary 
of American investment as a '\vhole. 
It is no consolation that the conclusions of 
the th sis may w 11 be unpopular with both Right and 
Left - in th cont t of Australian politics , with 
th Liberal and Country Parties on the one hand and 
with the Australian Labor Party on th other . The 
L ft may b e the mor offended b what may appear a 
1 . Frank A. Sou ha d, Jr . , Am rican Industry in Eu rop 
( Boston: Houghton Miffl'n Co., 1931 ) , p. iii. 
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'defenc ' of foreign investment, but the Right may be 
hardly less so by th tentative suggestion that 
directional planning should apply to all investment , 
wh ther domestic or foreign . Those on both sides of 
the political fence may resent several implied 
criticisms of Australian tariff policy. But, since 
the publication of my own Masters thesis in 1964 
(warning ew Zealand against t oo much reliance on 
foreign capital), I can share at least some of the 
embarrassment . 
The number of people who assisted in this pro -
ject is far too large to permit individual mention of 
all of them . The survey would have been quite 
impossible without the time and effort which the 
executives of participating companies so generously 
donated, an~ in response to an appeal by P rofessor 
Sir John Crawford, some companies even provided 
financial s u pport for the project . 2 In addition to 
these , there were a great many companies, both 
American- affiliated and Australian- owned , which pro -
vided some information on their operations, not to 
mention cou ntless people in all walks of life who 
offered comments and opinions on all aspects of 
American investment . Executives of six of the largest 
American subsidiaries provided not merely statistics 
on the operation of their own companies but also de -
tailed advice on the wording of the questionnaires 
used in the survey and general advice on the conduct 
of the project. 
Members of several Federal Government departments 
were also of material assistance , both in advising on 
special aspects of foreign investment and in assisting 
in the interpretation of official statistics . Of 
particular assistance in this regard were the Depart -
m nt of Trade, the Taxation Branch of the Treasury 
D partment, and th Commonwealth Bureau of C nsus and 
Statistics . The Res rve Bank of Australia pro ided 
office accommodation and secr tarial assistance in 
both Sydn y and M lbourne to facilitate the task of 
int rviewing the 
in th s u r v ey . 
cutiv s of companies participating 
I s h ou ld a l so IiI to t h ank the American Cons u lates -
G n ral in M lbou rn and Sydn y for s u pplying lists of 
2 . A list of compani s , hich compl t d at least t h e 
fOrst main qu stionnaire u sed in th s u rv y and of those 
wh och con trObu t d financially is gi en in Appendi D. 
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Am rican-affiliated companies known to be operating in 
Victoria and New South Wales, and the U.S . Department 
of Commerce for providing copies of their overseas 
investm nt questionnaires and revised information on 
American investment in Australia for a number of 
years . 
Among those who must be thanked by name, none 
contributed more to the succes s of the project than 
did Professor Sir John Crawford. Without his 
initiative the project would not have been started 
and I am acutely conscious of how important his back-
ing was in securing the cooperation of so many 
American-affiliated companies . Dr Alan Hall exercised 
a fatherly control over the survey as a whole, and to 
his guidance and understanding of the Australian economy 
I owe much. Early in the project Professor H.W . Arndt 
gave valuable advice on the issues involved, while at 
a later stage Professor T.W . Swan commented on the 
theoretical analysis in Chapter XI. At the very 
outset, Dr J . H. Dunning of the University of Southampton 
and Professor A.E. Safarian of the University of 
Saska tchewan provided copies of questionnaires used 
by them in similar surveys in Britain and Canada, as 
well as useful comments on the conduct of surveys of 
this kind. P erhaps more than in most circumstances, it 
is only fair to say that none of these men bear 
responsibility for the views expressed . 
I would like to thank the Australian ational 
University for providing a generous scholarship and 
congenial surroundings, which together contributed much 
to the satisfaction of conducting the survey. Thanks 
are also due to Miss Susan Hadfield and Mrs Susan 
Tresadern for typing the thesis . 
To my wife must go the most profound thanks of all for 
suffering with almost endless patience the strain which 
my writing this thesis under considerable pressure has 
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Private foreign investment has been of major import -
ance in Australia's post-war i ndustr i al deve lopment . 
1 
While it is impossible to compare what has actually happened 
in the Australian economy with wha t might have happene d in 
the absence of a capital inflow, it seems clear that s ince 
1945 privat e foreign investors have not only added sub-
stantially to the funds available for investment in the 
private sector,l but have also provided access to much of 
the technical knowledge and managerial skill deve loped in 
the more industrially advanced countrie s of Europe and 
North America. The rapid g rowth of those sectors in which 
foreign capital and for e ign skills are combined in fruitful 
harmony has been a vital force impelling growth throughout 
the economy. 
The importance of the contribution made by foreign 
investment to Australia is widely recognized. Popular 
concern at the extent to which foreign-owne d companies now 
appear to dominate the economy has neverthel e ss been growing 
throughout the fifties, aroused to a considerable extent by 
the well publicized profitability of the largest foreign-
ownBd company in Australia, General Motors - Holden's Pty Ltd . 
As Dr. Penrose has observed, G.M.H. 'raised a hornet's nest 
of controversy about its corporate ears' wi±h th publica-
tion of its Annual Report for 1954.2 Since that date, the 
annual profit of this company has frequently taken the record 
for th largest profit ever declared in Australia. Late in 
1959, General Motors annQunced its intention to buyout the 
Australian hold rs of preference shares in the company : the 
purchas was widely felt to be a thinly disguised attempt to 
avoid th necessity of publishing profit figures and did 
littl to improve the public relations either of G.M.H . or 
of foreign-owned o ompanies in general . Indeed, on of the 
forces b hind the nactm nt of legislation in 1961 which 
comp 11 d many propri tary companies to publish the~r annual 
1 . 
Pri 
n stm nt 
2. Edith TOlton P nros , ' Foreign Investm nt and th Growth 
of th FOrm ' , Economic Journal, LXVI ( 1956), p . 220 . 
results for the first tim was just this determination to 
r veal the results of for ign-owned ompani s . 
2 
Th official Federal Gov rnm nt attitude to for ign 
capital is one of w lcome, particularly where that capital 
' is of a kind likely to help in the balanced development of 
Australia ' s resources and brings with it the skills and 
' know-how ? n ee ded for th successful fulfilment of the pro -
ject in which the investment is mad .,3 This is a policy 
which has been frequently reiterated by the Prime Minister, 
Sir Robert Menzies, and the Federal Treasur r, Harold Holt, 
in the Hous of Repres ntatives and on other occasions. 
S tate Governments, both Liberal and Labor , implicitly 
s upport th Federal policy: the P remiers of both ew South 
Wa l es and South Australia, for example, journeyed abroad in 
1963 on tours which were confessedly designed in large 
measure to ncourage foreign capital to their States . 
But criticism of this 'open door ' policy has been grow-
ing increasingly vociferous . On the Government benches , the 
Deputy P rime Minister and Leader of the Country Party, 
J . McEwen, has kept up an almost constant stream of criticism 
of the present policy for some years . Addressing the 
annual meeting of the Australian Assoc iation of Advertising 
Agencies in 1962, he commented: 
Many of you will r alise how Australia has bene -
fit d from the establishment in this country of 
industries from overseas - the capital, the 
know-how , the marketing techniques, and on some 
occasions, actual mark ts. All are a benefit 
from capital inflow , This is very good - but 
not very good if th whol nation becomes geared 
to a d p ndency upon apital inflow .• . •• It has 
been perilously clos to that on some recent 
occasions . 4 
In 1963 he criticized excessive foreign investment in 
AustralOa at th annual conf rences of the Country P arty in 
bo th w S outh Wal s and Victoria, commenting at the 
Victorian conferenc that ' we ar selling a bit of our 
h eritag a h y ar , • 5 H has criticiz d on many occasions 
the tak - ov r of isting Australian companies by foreign 
capital and the restriction of the e port franchise of 
3. Ov rs as Investm nt in Australia ( Canb rra : Commonwea l t h 
T reasury , 1960 ) , p . 3 · 
4. Australi n Finan cial R view , 23 October 1962 , p. 37 · 
5. Ibid . , editor Oal , l8 Aprol 196J , p . 2. 
3 
for ign-affiliat d companies . 
Other recent indications of Federal Gov rnment concern 
are not hard to find. In 1964 , the Minister for Territories 
indicated that there must be provision for Australian 
participation in any project to develop the bauxite deposits 
at Gove p eninsula , 6 and lat r in the same year even the 
Pr im Minist r made a comment which was widely interpreted 
to be a hardening of the Governme nt ' s attitude : 'W e have 
no t reached the point at the mom n t a t which we can frown 
on investm nt into Australia . But I would be happier if 
Australians could be given some share in the equity of these 
companies . , 7 At the Stat e level, there have been s tirrings 
of dissatisfaction with the present policy in the governing 
p arties of at least two of the States .
8 
The Federal Labor P arty, the official Opposition, has 
been hostile to uncontrolled foreign investment for many 
years. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that some of the 
criticism levelled by Labor politicians is more emotive than 
scientific , as when one Labor Member of Parliament wrote of 
' the Frankenstein that foreign investment has become. t9 
But it was the Leader of the Federal Labor P arty, A.A. 
Calwell, who stated early in 1963 that Australia ' s 'reliance 
on the flow of capital from abroad to meet a substantial part 
of our annual imports bill is tantamount to mortgaging the 
house to pay the grocery bill ., lO In the Federal election 
camp aign later that year , the Labor Party committed itself 
to introduce legislation designed to give Australians a 
c rtain p ercentage in the ownership of foreign subsidiaries 
and to discourage th take - over of stablished Australian 
companies . 
Am ong academic conomists, attitudes to foreign invest -
ment diff r widely . In recent years , the most frequently 
quot d 'def nce ' of for ign investment has been that of 
J.O .. P erkins , ll whil H .W . Arndt, at the end of an artic l e 
in wh'ch h s urveys post-war foreign investment in Australia 
6 . Morning Herald, June 1964, p . 4 . 
7. :;.::...:;;.=...::-=....=.::..:l::.:·a:::.n:.::, 5 Octob r 1964, p . 1. 
8 . S th Sydn y Daily Mirror, 3 Oc tober 196}, p . 16 ; a nd 
th M lbourn ~, 30 August 1963, p . 7 · 
9 . Tom r n, M. H.R., in a 1 tt r to th Australian Financial 
~~~w~, 23 April 1963, p . 2. 
10 . Sydn y Morning H rald , 1 F bruary 1963 , p . 4. 
11 . J.O .. P r l ins, 'Som Fallaci s about 0 rseas Borrow-
ing ' , Australian Quart rly, XXXI I ( 1960 ) , 0 . 2 , 74-
4 
in som d tail, conclud s : 'I think it is quite possible 
that the benefits, direct and indirect, of overseas investment 
during the past decade have greatly outweigh d the costs, 
direct and indirect, and will continue to do so. My point 
is that I do not know and that I cannot see how anyone can 
find out.,12 Representing the more sceptical is E.L. 
Whe lwright , who feels that it 'is now possible to argue 
that Australia has less need of fo reign capital than form-
erly, and that a little domestic innovation and ingenuity 
in the manipulation of our balance of payments could pro-
vide most of the necessary foreign exchange resources for 
future development t • 1J 
Editorial comment in Australian newspapers is almost 
uniformly critical, if not of foreign investment per se, 
of various aspects of the operation of foreign- controlled 
companies . In one important financial newspaper alone, 
ther were more than a dozen editorials critical of some 
aspect of foreign investment in the three years ending 
1964. After the action of the British and ew Zealand 
Governments in mid-1964 to establish some control over 
foreign investment, the financial editorial of the Sydney 
Morning Herald called for similar action in Australia under 
the headline 'Australian Cast eeded for Third Act,.14 
The hostility of the press is also shown in the 
frequently irresponsible way in which the profits of foreign 
companies ar reported : Dr Penrose noted that the profits 
of G.M . H. in 1954 w re reported as being equal to 560 per 
cent on the paid-up ordinary capital of the company, though 
return on shareholders' funds or n t worth was only J9 per 
c nt .15 Such distortion is not unusual. Under the headline 
'Bonanza By Colgate!, one paper reported that 'Colgate-
Palmolive Pt~ Lt~ the wholly-owned Australian subsidiary 
of Colgate-Palmol~ Co., of the U .S. , achieved a 447.6 
p r c nt arning rat on capital' in the year ended December 
1962,16 whil anoth r paper described the earning rate on 
12. H.W. Arndt, 
Economic Record, 
lJ. 
'0 rseas Borrowing - the 
XXXIII (1957), p.260 . 
14. Ope cit., JO Jun 1964, p .14. 
15. Ope cit., p . 22l . 
ew Model' , 
16 0 Austr lian Finan w, 2 July 196J, p .160 
5 
capital of Gilbert £ Barker Manufacturing Co . (Aust . ) Pty 
Ltd as '516 per cent' in 196J, failing to point out that 
the company ' s earning rat on shareholders ' funds was only 
17 10. 1 P r cent . 
P ress opinion does seem to reflect a remarkably wide-
spread concern . Some of the comments of the man in the 
stre t, even the educated man in the street, border on the 
mercantilist in their preoccupation with foreign companies 
' taking money out of the country'. But it is by no means 
only the man in the street who is concerned. At least one 
major Australian company, Australian Paper Manufacturers 
Ltd, has disfranchised non-Australians who acquired shares 
after a certain date. Statements urging foreign companies 
to accept a minimum percentage of Australian equity have 
become commonplace in recent years. Among those pressing 
for action of this kind are such highly respected leaders 
of the business community as Staniforth Ricketson, a leading 
Melbourne broker; M. John 0' eill, chairman of the City 
Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd; C.G. Crane, chairman of 
the Australian Mutual Provident Society; Sir James Kirby, 
a prominent industrialist and chairman of the Manufacturing 
Industries Advisory Council; L . J . Hooker, a leading real 
estate agent; and P.L. Alroe, chairman of the Brisbane 
18 Stock Exchange . Sir Ian McLennan , chief general manager 
of the Broken Hill P roprietary Company Ltd, has expressed 
the view that it must be of some importance to any country 
that its basic resources and its basic industries 'have a 
substantial domestic content as to investment and as to 
direction ' . 19 Sir John crawford, Deputy Chairman of the 
17. Australian, lJ August 1964, p . 19 . In defence, of 
course, for ign-o\~ d companies have sometimes resorted to 
th ir own misrepresentation of profitability. ore than 
one, for xample , have introduced royalty payments to 
par nt companies since th enactment of legislation to 
comp 1 prof".t disclosur , in order to reduce the published 
profit figur. On v ry profitable company makes a habit 
of including its divid nd provision in its statement of share -
holders ' funds , probably to reduce 'apparent profitability '. 
And in another cas , th local company includes a loan to 
an affiliat in its stat m nt of shar hold rs ' funds when 
this is mad a ailable to the public but not when report -
ing to its par nt ompany, again to reduce 'apparent 
profitabil"ty ' . 
18 . For typical stat m nts by th se m n see r sp ctiv ly 
Sydn y Morning H raId, 19 F bruary 196J, p . ; ibid. , J 
Jun 1964, p . 25 ; ibid . , 9 May 196J, p . 12 ; ibid ., 7 ovember 
196J, p . lJ ; ibid . , 8 July 196J, p . 4 ; Australian D 25 August 
1964, p. 14 . 
19 . Australian, 2 0 tob r 1964 , p. 12. 
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Some Australians regard foreign investment with misgivings, as this reaction to a speech by the Prime 
Ministe~ in 1964 indicates. 
0\ 
Government-appointed Committee of Economi Inquiry and 
Dir ctor of the Research School of Pacific Studies in the 
Australian National University , has urged Australians to 
7 
' pay more attention to th problem of overseas control of 
Australian industries - especially on the rights of local 
s u bsidiaries to compete in export markets against overseas 
p arent companies ., 20 This problem of the restriction of 
the right to export has been described by W S . Johnston, 
manager of the Trade and Commerce De partment of the 
International Division of the Bank of e w South Wales, 
as 'the major hurdle facing Australia and without question 
.... detrimental to the future development of our export 
21 trade . ' Even Americans have urged modification of the 
present policy : J.S . Ewing of the Graduate Business School 
of Stanford University, California, stated that if 
Australia ' does not provide for some restriction on the 
flow of capital it will not be long before it finds itself 
in the same position as Canada - dominated by American 
interests., ..• Domination is not good for your economy no 
matter how great the capital inflow.,22 A similar comment 
has been made by Hoyt Ammidon, chairman of the United States 
Trust Company . 23 
Enough has been said to indicate a very general feeling 
in Australia that some change should be made in the present 
policy of unqualifi d welcome for all private foreign capital . 
Even the most persist nt critics of for ign investment 
rarely deny the benefits Australia has gained from this 
investment, though these benefits are usually alluded to in 
very gen ral terms and it has become almost as fashionable 
to stress the strat gic advantages of having a large body of 
investm nt from powerful political allies as it is to dwell 
th t o tl ° d t 24 Th to on e mor s rlC y conomlC a van ages . e ques lon 
20 . Australian Financial Review , 4 September 1962, p. 10. 
21 . Ibid. , 27 ov mber 1962, p. 11 . 
22. M lbourn ~, 19 August 1963, p. 9 · 
23 . Australian Financial Review, 7 September 1964 , p . 1 . 
2 4. In an °nter i w with the Australian Financial Revi w, 
r ported in th 16 0 tob r 1964 issu of that pap r , 
F d ral Tr asurer mad this point: 'Australia i ery 
fortunat , you know , in th t th two principal sources of 
[for ign] in stm nt ar both countri s with which w have 
th los st of fri e ndly as ociations , and both ha a strong 
i n t r st in maintaining Au tralian pro p rity and s curity . 
It should b ob ious that th inflow of capital from th se 
Sourc s wOll str ngth n that int rest in Australian security,' 
(p . 4.) 
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that s most often asked is; Might not the admltt d current 
b nefits of foreign investment be mor than outweighed by 
the long-term costs of this investment? Might not the 
' great profitability of for ign investment ' , coupled with an 
all g d t ndency for for ign companies to hold all the 
equity of their Australian subsidiari s , pose a mounting 
problem for the Australian balance of payments in futlJ.re 
years? Might not restrictions on the right of foreign-
affiliated compani s to export hinder Australia ' s export 
drive in industrial goods? Many who would not question the 
des ° rability of foreign investment when it establishes new 
industries in Australia, yet ask: Should ov rseas companies 
be allowed to take -over established Australian-owned companies? 
The sophisticated worry l e st fluctuations in capital inflow 
make management of the economy more difficult or lest foreign 
companies absorb local loan funas which would otherwise be 
available to locally-owned companies. Concern is expressed 
that foreign companies may do insufficient research locally, 
or that loreign oil companies may artificially maintain 
prices for crude oil purchased from their overseas affiliates 
at a level high r than the 'open market value' . For the man 
in the street, concern may merely be expressed in the basic 
fear of being 'controlled by foreigners'. 
In this situation of widespread concern, surprisingly 
little is known of the operation of foreign-affiliated 
companies in Australia . The Commonwealth Bureau of Census 
and Statistics has published annual figures for private 
capital inflow into Australian companies only since 1947/48 
and since no census of foreign capital already invested in 
the economy was made at that time (and non has be n made 
since), no accurate estimate of the total of forei~L 
capital in est d in th economy is possible~25 A r asonably 
satisfactory br aI-up of private overseas investment in 
Australian compani by country of origin has b n published 
by the Burea1.l for the whol p riod from 1947/4 ,lut an 
industrial classification of this inflow is available only 
sinc 1956/57 . The D partm nt of Trade has p riodically 
publish d i ts of companie belie d to ha e for ign 
ff °1° to 26 a 1 la ~ons and similar lists are a ailable from some 
25. Th for ign apital inflow 
rsea Inv stment: 
value of 
9 
embassies . The results of a Department of Trade survey of 
export franchise restrictions have also been publishedo 27 
Little else is available from official Australian sources . 
R.O. Block has compiled lists of Australian companies having 
foreign affiliations , with an indication of the extent of 
28 
the foreign equity interest in each , but apart from that 
there is little information even in unofficial Australian 
sources . 
A combination of strongly held op inions and little 
factual information on which to base them is an explosive 
situation and there is a real danger in Australia of an 
o therwise insignificant occurrence triggering hasty or ill 
considered action. The purpose of this study is to add to 
the meagre stock of information currently available on the 
subj ct of foreign investment and to attempt answers to 
at least some of the questions being asked in the field . 
The study was orientated to the Australian economy but it 
is hoped that it may also be of some relevance in other 
countries faced with similar problems o 
For reasons of time, th survey had to be limited to 
consideration of direct 29 United States investment in 
Australian manufacturing industry . The limitation of the 
270 H .W. Arndt and D. R. Sherk, 'Export Franchises of 
Australian Companies with 0 erseas Affiliations', Economic 
Record, XXXV (1959), 239-42. 
28 . The first list of this kind was published in the 
Au stralian Financial Review, 18 ovember 1963 . A subsequent 
list, published in th Australian, 26 October 1964 , showed 
that of the 50 largest companies ( ranked by shareholders ' 
funds) engag d in manufacturing, mining or primary pro -
duction in Australia in 1963 no fewer than 23 were 51 per 
cent or more foreign- o\med. 
29. For the purpos of this study, investment is regarded 
as ' direct' when a foreign company or affiliated group of 
p ersons owns an int rest of at least 25 per cent in the 
voting stock of a locally-incorporated company or an 
equivalent i~terest in a nonincorporated nterprise operat -
ing in Australia . With only one ception (where the foreign 
equity was v ry nearly 25 per cent and contact with ~he 
foreign company was lcnown to be close), all other foreign 
inv stm nt has b n r gard d as 'portfolio' and is of no 
concern in the surv y. For some information on corporate 
p ortfolio in estment , how ver, see App ndi C. 
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surv y to dir ct investm nt n gligibly aflects its useful -
ne ss sinc th great majority of capital inflow into the 
Australian economy since 19 45 has been private capital and 
th greatest part of that in turn has been direct investment . 30 
To limit th study to American investment is more serious 
since in total British capi tal in Australia is still of 
substantially greater size than American. There are never-
theless good r asons for studying American rather than 
Briti sh comp anies . 
Thanks to the U. S. Department of Commerce, considerably 
mor e publi shed information is available on American inv st -
ment in Australia than on that of any other nationality . 31 
Mor important , American capital is already second only to 
British cap ital in 1 vel of annual inflow and, as Table I-l 
shows, has be n growing more rapidly than British investment . 
In the 17 years after 1947 / 48, the sum of the annual inflows 
of p rivat overseas investment in Australian companies, ex-
pr ss d in current prices and including both direct and 
port folio inv stment , was £1 , 966.9 million,3 2 of which the 
or th American share was £674.1 million, or 34 . 3 per cent . 
Bu t this aggregate figure disguises the growth of the American 
shar : while the total private capital inflow in 1963/ 64 
wa s a little less than six times that in 1947 / 48, the 
American share of the 1963/ 64 inflow was fifteen times 
greater than th American investment in 1947 / 4. Whereas 
American investors provided only 1 .9 per cent of the total 
privat foreign investment in the four y ars 1947/48 to 
1950/51, they p rovid d 42.4 per cent in the four years ended 
1963 / 64 . (The capital inflow being referred to as 'American ' 
30. In the 16 years 194 / 49 to 1963/6 4 , the total current 
account deficit in the Australian balance of payments was 
£1,774 million. 0 er the sam p eriod, the sum of the annua l 
inflows of all privat for ign inv stm nt in Australian 
compani s was £1 , 929 million, and of direct inv stment £1 ,689 
million. (Australian ational Accounts : ational Income and 
Exp nditur 1948-49 to 1963-64, and Annual Bulletin of 
Ov rs a Investment : Australia 1963-64.) 
31. S ee, lor in Forei n 
Countri s , by Samu 1 P iz r Washin gt on: 
Offi of Business Economi s, U.S . D p artment 01 Commerce, 
1960), and annual articl s in the Surv y of Current Business 
(Offi of Busin ss E conomics , U. S. D partm nt of Comm rce ). 
32. Annual Bulletin of Ov rsea In estm nt: Au s ralia 1963- 64 . 
Throughout th study, th symbol ' , should be tal n to read 
'pound Austral 'an' or ' £A'. Its p ar alu, and the on used 
h r wh n v r on rsion from dollars is r qui r d, is $US 2 . 24 . 
Thi s has b n th p r aJ_u sinc S pt mb r 1949 wh nit fell 
from $US 3.224 with th d aluat'on of sterling . 
11 
actually repr s nt s capital from both th United States and 
Canada, though capital from th U. S. certainly represents 
t h great bulk of the combined figures. Mor over, a con-
siderable part of th inflow which is classified as 
'Canadian ' by the Commonwealth Bureau of Census and 
S tatistics is, for th purpos of ultimate control, in 
reality American: one of the larg st American companies in 
Australia, th Ford Motor Company of Australia P ty Ltd, is 
classifi d as a Canadian investm nt because the immediate 
parent company of the Australian subsidiary is resident in 
Canada . To the xtent that the combined figures in the 
tabl still overstate the strictly American part of the 
inflow, this is almost certainly fully offset by other 
cas s of 'indirectly Am rican' investments, classified by 
the Bureau as 'British' or ' Other' investment . This is 
particularly likely in view of the tendency for quite a 
n umb r of American- owned companies in Australia to have 
immediat parent companies resid nt in tax-haven countries . ) 
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BY DOMICILE OF INVESTOR 
£A (million) 
and United Other Total 
Kingdom 
29 . 7 2. 3 38 . 4 
35 . 2 3. 2 42 . 5 
53 . 1 5. 1 68 . 5 
43.3 4. 9 68 . 5 
47 . 0 8 . 6 86 . 2 
21.1 2. 3 25 .4 
44 . 3 7. 3 68 . 9 
57 . 0 8 . 6 105.1 
71.9 13 . 3 117 . 1 
61.5 15 . 7 104 . 7 
61.1 15 . 2 103 . 5 
66 . 0 12 . 5 125 . 3 
105.1 25 .8 193 .8 
112.0 35 . 0 234 . 7 
62 .8 14.1 148 . 4 
103 . 4 26 . 0 221.5 
96 . 5 21.9 214 .4 
SOURCE : Annual Bulletin of Oversea Investment : Australia 1963- 64 
It is int r sting to not th t not only has American 
capital b com mor important to Australia: Australia has 
also be om r lati ly mor important s a field of invest -
m nt for Am rO an capital in the ear sin e the War . 
B tw n 1950 and 1962, total dir ct Am rican in estm nt 
a b ro d pand d a littl mor than th fold. Th valu of 
Am rican d Or ct in stnl nt in Au::>tralia, how er, e panded 
b y 5 46 p r nt dur ng that p riod. JJ This, though not the 
JJ. Sur y of Curr nt Busin ss, August 196 4 , p . 10. 
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fast st rate of growth recorded, was gr ater than the in-
cr as r ord d for the United Kingd om (451 per ent) and 
substantially gr ater than the JJ9 p r cent recorded by 
Canada , both ar as of major American inv stment interest in 
th last d ecade . By 1962, only Canada , the United Kingdom, 
Venezuela, and W st Germany had mor American direct invest -
ment within their borders than did Australia . Brazil was 
on a par with Australia, but in that y ar France had less 
American dir ct inv stment than did Australia and Japan 
had only one-third as much . On a per capita basis , corpor-
ate Am rican investm nt in Australia was almost four times 
that in Germany and was substantially greater than that in 
th United Kingdom. Only Canada and Venezuela , of the major 
American investm nt fields, surpassed Australia. 
There are as yet no indications that the rate of 
American investment in Australia will slacken. One leading 
Am rican banker has been quoted as saying : 'Ther are so 
many fine potentials in Australia that they call for invest -
m nt not by th millions of dollars, but by multiples of 
$100 million .' J 4 
Th r is a further reason for studying American rather 
than any oth r foreign investment in Australiat a very large 
p art of the popular controversy on foreign investment has 
centr d around American investment, not least, as already 
noted, b cause of the profitabilit of on particular 
company . E . T . Hamilton , presiden 01 the American Chamber 
of Comm rce in Australia , could be excused a certain bitter-
ness wh n he commented : 
A · sitor to Australia might be pardoned for r aching 
th conclu sion that overseas in estment in this 
ountry is a synonym for American investm nt _ for 
such a conclusion is to be drawn from ditorials 
and 1 tters from correspond nts ... ~ What is the 
p culiar ingredi nt that mak s Am rican in est-
m nt susp ct whil in stment capital emanating 
from Britain , France, G rmany, Switzerland and 
oth r ar as attracts unto its If no special nomen-
latur ?J5Is U.S . money, then, ~ ome kind of 
monst r? 
ot all American corporate investment in Australia is 
in manuf turing . In mining, h American Smelting and 
Refin·ng Comp any has a m jorit inter st in the giant 
copp r-silv r-lead-zin nt rprise Mount Isa Mines Lt d , 
wh·l Cl v 1 nd Cliff Iron Company nd Kaiser S t el Corpo r a -
tion r just two of a numbe 01 Am 
J 4. wsw k , 10 Augus 1964, p . 
wr·tt n b for th nnoun 
arly ·n 1965 of m a u 
m nt broad, but s of Jun 
mod·1y th onclusion · n th 
J 5. 
can ompani s ngag d 
J. Th·s paragraph was 
h Am ri an Go ernmen t 
du e Am ri an in st -
m n o reason to 
Ma 196J, p. 2 . 
IJ 
in the d v lopm nt of vast iron ore d posits in W stern 
Australia. It has b en r ported that up till 196J, ov r -
seas inv stors had m t 57 per cent of the cost of Australia ' s 
oil ploration programme J6 and a major part of this total 
would c rtainly hav been from Am rican sources. Th re is 
even American inv stment in the coal industry. 
While Am rican 'nv stment in Australian mining is of 
rapidly growing significance at present, perhaps the 
larg st American investment outside manufacturing is still 
in distribution. There, American-owned oil companies have 
investments of many millions of dollars and other American 
firms engage in a wid variety of activities as diverse as 
the distribution of office equipment, the leasing of 
electronic computers, and the provision of after-sales 
service for industrial chemicals imported from the U.S. 
One of the biggest food retailers in the U.S., Safeway 
Stores, has also begun operations in Australia, though 
direct retailing of consumer goods by Am rican-owned 
companies is uncommon~ 
In many oth r fields, too, Am rican capital is well 
repres nted . With the influx of Am erican manufacturing 
compani s have com compani s accustomed to providing 
servic s to them in the U.S.: by early 1964, three of the 
stimat d top four advertising ag ncies in Australia, for 
exampl , had substantial Am rican investm nt in them,J7 and 
in 1963 it was stimated that the ight largest American 
accounting firms all had some kind of partnership arrange -
m nt with counterparts in Australia . J8 There are also quite 
a number of American compani s engaged in engineering de -
sign or construction work, Utah Construction and Engineer-
ing P ty Ltd, Morrison-Knuds n of Australia Ltd , Aus tin-
And rson (Aust. ) P ty L td (a di ision of the Austin 
Company of th U.S.h B chtel Pacifi c Corporation Ltd and 
the ar'ous sub idiari s of the D' 11ingham Corporation be-
ing mong the best known. Investment in primary production 
by Am ricans is limit d, though ther are som significant 
ind'vidu 1 proje ts such as that of he Chase Manhattan 
Balli, whi h is engag d in the agricultural r dev lopment 
of l~ mill'on acr s of land in W stern Aus tralia in part -
n rsh'p with an Austral 'an compan. In anoth r e ample , 
J6 . Ibid ., 22 April 1964, p . 6. 
37 . Ib'd . , IJ March 1 64 , p. 24 . 
38. b'd., 16 July 1963, p . 3. 
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an Am ric n syndicate i~ engaged in large cotton-growing 
ventur "n t h arrabr" di s rict of ew South Wales. 
Am ri an-own d fi ms even do ~ ome publ ishing in Austr lia : 
both Tim and Readers ' Digest, for exampl , re prjnted in 
Aust rali for p art of the Asian a ea. P robably more 
important than man of th - oth ctiviti s i~ the very 
larg number of licensi ng agreements which have been con-
cluded b tween American and Austral "an companies,39 but 
th s do not a s uch fall within th d .linition of 
'American inves t ment in Australla ' • 
Australian official sources do not p rmi~ an estimate 
of th value of American capital in AU3tralian manufactur -
ing , and th U. S. Department of Commerce figure for 1962 , 
which i ndicates that a total of $582 million wa3 invested 
in that s ctor , out of a total U.S . investment of $1 ,0 97 
million, 40 do not include in estment in oil refining or 
metal s m lting , bo h of which are taken h r to be 
ess n tially 'manufac uring'. If American investment in 
both oil r fining and metal smelting were included, it is 
certain that at leas~ up till 1962 the great bulk of U. S. 
i n estment in Au tralia was in manufacturing. It is pro -
bable indeed, though the figures n eces2ary to prove it are 
lacking, that the p roportion of American i nvestment in 
manufacturing activi ie i much higher than the correspond-
ing proportion for Bri i~h in estm .nt , which is heavil 
rep r sented in banking, insuranc , real 8 ate , and 
pastoral tr~ding. 
It should be clear, hen, that whil direct Ame rican 
inv stm nt in manufa turing i.:: but a p art of th total 
foreign "nvestme nt in Au tralia ? an examination of that 
part may s r e as a fruitful cas t udy. Most of the is sues 
raised should appl t o oth r direct in tm nt , in manu-
facturing t 1 ast, though if the beh viour of American-
Own d compani s do app ar to di erg significantly from 
that of oth r fore "gn-own d omp nie , thi will b note d 
wher v r po · ble. 
II 
A total of 3 4 o mp ni s whl~b we b ie e d to b at 
1 ast p tially Am ' can-own d and to be ngag d i n ma nu-
fa turing a ' v' t' s 30 Jun 1~62 wer . ppro ched i n 
h ir nam s we e g ther d from th ours of th 





sld nt or th m rican Ch mb r of 
t t d in 1963 t hat ' t h r ar mor 
turing Am ri an products 
m n ts with U.S. fi . ms .' (Austral ian 
Ap ' 1 963, p ._ .) 
s upp i d b h U.S. D P t m .n t of Commerce . 
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lists published by th Department of Trade and th American 
Consulat s G neral in Sydney and M lbourne, and from the 
financial press. Each company was "nitially s nt a postal 
qu stionnair designed to gain as much background, ' non-
s nsitive ' , information about the company as possible. 
(To those companies which were thought to be 1 ss than 25 
p r c nt American in ownership an alternative questionnaire 
was also sent . Since the primary concern of the study was 
with companies which w re more than 25 per cent American 
in own rship, this alternative questionnaire was quite 
short and the information gained therefrom is contain d in 
App ndix C . ) Wh n companies had completed the fir t postal 
questionnaire, they were sent a second and longer one, deal -
ing with questions which required a greater degree of 
executiv discretion to answer . This second questionnaire 
was collected from each of the participating companies by 
the writ r in person, a practice which permitted the 
clarification of points arising from replies to the first 
questionnaire, the detailed discussion of many of the 
questions in the second, and reference to other questions 
not included in either questionnaire . By using two question-
nair s in this way it was hoped both to make the b e st 
possible use of e ecutives ' time by permitting th delegation 
of the work invol ed in th first, and to secure at 1 ast 
a minimum of information from companies which might be 
ofl nd d by some of the questions in the second . By 
colle ting the s cond questionnaire in person, it was hoped 
to apitalize on th frequent willingness of executiv s to 
discuss v rbally questions that th y would not b prepared 
to answ r in writing. Finally, compani s which refus d 
to answ r either qu stionnaire wer ent a v ry short Ii t 
of qu stions d sign d to permit an stimat to be mad of 
th r spons to th sur y . 
o sci ntific sampl of American-own d manufac uring 
compani s was att mpt d . It was f It that th v ry gr at 
industria di rsity, th on iderabl range of ~ompany 
siz , and th r lativ ly mall number of companf~ ligibl 
to parti .ipat in th sur y preclud d any such cour~e . 
All In nul' tu ing ompani in which the r was b Ii ed to 
b a orpo at Am i an in estment in th ordinary 
capi al at 3 0 J'un 1962 w re approached. For the 
purpos 1 th study, ' Americ n ' was tal n to include 
oting) 
compan "es whos imm diat par nt was in orporated in th 
u.S. nd also vhos whos mm diat par nt was incorporated 
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in some third country but whose 'ultimate' affiliation wa s 
with an American company. 
Even with th scope of the study confin ed to direct 
American investment in manufacturing , it is important to 
r eali z e s ome additional limitations_ To begin with , some 
questions which can be asked about foreign investm nt are 
not suitable for firm-by- firm study : mo st of these are 
discussed in the concluding chapter of the book. Further , 
though six large American companies provided d etailed 
comm nts on drafts of the questionnaires , the importance 
of some questions which might have been asked in a micro-
economic study wa s not fully realised at the outset . 
P erhaps surprisingly , the reliability of the answers pro -
vided by executives doe s not seem to set any serious limit 
to the us fulness of the survey. To a quite remarkable 
exten t, the attitudes of the executives interviewed mirrored 
the prevailing attitudes in the community a t large. Com-
paratively few executives saw foreign investment as an 
unqualified good . One said h e was 'categorically in 
favour of foreign investment' and another observed that 
'overs as investment since the war has been the main factor 
in our curren t industrial status '. Much more general were 
comments like : 'W e don't want the Canadian situation to 
develop here but their knowledge and xperience h e lp us a 
lot ' or, more coherently : 
I'm g tting more and more nationalistic every year . 
I think t h re must be an incentive for foreign 
companies to com to Australia ~ we ne e d foreign 
in stment not merely for the economy - it ' s a 
qu stion of survival . Our friends of today 
may not be t ho se of tomorrow. But I don't like 
too much inv stment from one country . Th r e is 
the danger of a large - scale liquidation of 
Australian investments i f an economic calamity 
o rto ol the in esting country . I think t here 
should b some legislat ion and this should b 
r strictiv . 
The latt r quotation was unusual only in its reference to 
l eg·slation. In a small number of cases there was even 
op n ho stility to American investment : on executive 
comm n t d that ' Amer i can ompani s are not doing us any 
good tall - only taking our money out of th countr . 
They mi ght hav h Ip d us years a g o, but now we can turn 
out our own cars • .. • I ' ve always vot d Country Party but 
you can s ympathiz w'th Castro can 't you? ' And anoth r 
descr'b d t h company in which he h Id a senior position as 
' an out st nding ampl of what American investment shouldn ' t 
b ' , I was clear from most int r i ws that ther was no 
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r ason whatso v r to suspect the reliability of the informa-
tion provid d. Th great majority of companies which 
participated in the survey were unstintingly generous in 
th ir help. 
Only in one special sense did it become apparent that 
som answ rs were generally unreliable: to a few questions, 
executives gave answers which were not intentionally in-
corr ct but which were so heavily conditioned by prevailing 
social attitudes that they had little meaning . This 
applied most particularly to questions relating to 'Aust-
ralian content ' and company purchasing policy, to which the 
not very helpful answer 'we buy locally-made materials 
wherever possible' was frequently given . 
American companies held no ordinary shares in 27 of the 
345 companies approached. Eight of these had once been 
partially American-owned but the others had been approached 
in error. (Thre of them, however, did have preference 
shares h ld by an Am rican company and another had an 
arrangement under which it anticipated that an American 
company would take up an equity interest subsequently.) 
Thirty-three companies approached had some corporate American 
investm nt in their equity but this amounted to less than 
25 per cent . Seventy were found to be not engaged in manu -
facturing at all as of the middl of 1962, though at 
least ]_4 of th se were preparing to commence production 
within two years of that date and several others sub-
contracted manufacturing operations to outside companies . 
The remaining 215 companies made up the total of those 
'eligible ' to participate in the survey. 
ot all of the 215 wer fully ind pendent units . Some 
wer ' secondary nterprises', or subsidiaries of companies 
incorporat d in Australia which wer themselves in turn 
controlled from th U.S. Others were subsidiaries of the 
sam U . S. par nt c mpany . The concern of this sur y was 
primar Oly with th unOt of control so that ' s condary 
nt rpri es t w r in most cas s amalgamat d with the 
' prom ry ' units ~ It was not possibl to b absolutely 
consOst ntin this: on secondary organisation r fused to 
particlpat On th survey d spit the participation of the 
primary organisatOon, possibly b caus of a slightly 
diff r nt own rship pa t rn in th se ondary organisation. 
In anoth r as , th s ondary organisation not only had a 
diff r nt own rship patt rn than th primary , it was also 
in dOff r nt industr , which further complicated the 
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amalgamation process . Companies which wer the direct 
affil'at s of the same American company w re in some cases 
p art of th sam managerial unit and in these cases the 
s p arate entit ' s were m rged for the purpose of the survey . 
But in oth r cas s the sister subsidiaries were quite 
clearly independent so far as management was concerned : 
in fo u r cases of this kind, one company participated in 
th survey while the affiliate did not . When the process 
of amalgamation was complete , a total of 208 c ompanies re -
main d o 
Th response of these 208 companies to the survey is 
difficult to summarize . All but nine agreed to provide at 
least an employment figure for 1962, but at the other 
extreme very f w were willing or able to provide compara-
tive cost figures for American and Australian production . 
In Tables 1-2 and 1 - 3 , as throughout the study, companies 
which answered all the first questionnaire (and usually 
mo st of the second) are described as 'participating', while 
thos which answered only part of the first questionnaire 
(and usually none of the second), 13 in all, and those 
which answered neither of the two main questionnaires are 
indicat d as ' non-participating' . Whether or not a company 
answer d th first questionnaire was in most cases a good 
m asure of willingness to participate in the survey: with 
only one e c ption, answers to questions in it were readily 
acc ssibl to all companies, but involved divulging con-
fid ntial information on matters s uch as sales, wages and 
gross manufacturing profit margins. 
R asons for non-participation varied gr atly . In a 
minority of cas s pressure of work appeared to be the 
genuin ly d t rmining factor . In a somewhat larger number , 
ther s m d to be a r al fear of pubIic reaction: one 
e cut'v 
only us 
commented that ' if I give you anything, you will 
it to hit us' and with the background of public 
con rn 0 r fo r eign inv stment , this fear may have been 
b hind many r fusals. In a few cases there was a desire to 
avoid publicizing th r sults of a v ry profitable opera-
tion , but in som oth rs th motive may well have been a 
des'r to onc al an unsucc ssful operation. It is felt , 
how r, that b far th largest numb r of non- participants 
refus d to tak part in th sur y for r asons of company 
pol i y un onn t d with this p articular stud 0 It is not 
surpris ng, for ampl that on ompany which had a policy 
of n ling orporat sal s figur s v en from its own 
di ' s'onal s did not parti ipat 'n th sur yo 
TABLE 1- 2 : RESPONSE TO THE SURVEY , BY INDUSTRY 
Companies Employment in 1962(b) 
Industry Partici- Non- parti- Total 
Response Partici- Non- parti- Total Response 
pating cipating (per cent) pating cipating 
(per cent) 
(a) (a) 
Plant , equipment , machinery 20 12 32 
63 4 , 293 2,756 7 , 049 61 
Agricultural equipment 1 5 6 
17 90 662 752 12(c) 
Motor vehicles 5 2 7 
71 34 , 609 96 34 , 705 100 
Motor accessories 5 1 6 
83 1 , 184 123 1 , 307 91 
Metal manufactures , n . e . i . 7 11 18 39 
5 , 205 1 , 600 6 ,805 76(c) 
Electrical equipment , instruments , etc . 15 7 22 68 
8 , 056 2 , 072 10 , 128 80 
Gramophone records 3 3 
389 389 
Food and drink 8 9 17 
47 5 , 164 3 , 633 8 , 797 
59( c) 
Sausage casings 1 3 4 
25 61 387 448 14(c) 
Industrial chemicals and plastics 11 6 17 65 
3 , 582 733 4 , 315 83 
Inks , polishes , adhesives , etc . 6 6 
574 574 
Pharmaceutical and toilet preparations 10 10 20 50 
3 ,865 1 , 524 5 , 389 n(c) 
Cosmetics 8 8 
1 , 045 1 ,045 
Oils , mineral 3 2 5 
60 1 , 506 725 2 , 231 68 
Paper products 2 7 9 
22 815 761 1 , 576 52 
Rubber products 2 2 
3 , 671 3 , 671 
Plastic products 1 2 3 33 
54 126 180 30 
Abra sives 2 2 4 
50 420 987 1 , 407 30 
Clothing and fabrics 3 3 6 50 
1 , 067 455 1 , 522 70(c) 
Furnishings 1 1 2 
50 427 204 631 
68 
Writing instruments 2 1 3 67 
52 86 138 38 
Miscellaneous 3 5 8 38 
2 , 797 637 3 , 434 81 
Total , excluding ' Motor vehicles' 95 106 201 47 . 3 
38 , 638 23,150 61 , 788 62 . 5(c) 
Total , all industries lOO 108 208 





[Notes to Table 1- 2 ] 
(a) Participating companies are defined as those which completed 
virtually all of the first main questionnaire used in the survey . 
See t ext . 
(b) Companies were asked to show their tota l employment at 
either 30 June 1962 or their 1962 balance date . Most companies 
provided figures for 30 June , but some large ones provided figures 
for later in 1962 and the figures presented thus form a somewhat com-
posit e picture . One company even gave figures for 1961 . 
In a f ew cases , companies gave employment figures inclusive of 
employees outside Australia but these are insignificant in the total . 
In the case of three companies judged to be not primarily 
manufacturing in intent - a difficult and therefore arbitrary 
criterion to apply - only the employees actually engaged in manu-
facturing have been included in the figures shown. Two of these 
companies were primarily marketing , and one primarily mining . 
Their total 1962 employment was 7 , 768 but only 1 ,802 of this has been 
included in the above figures . In all other cases the total employ-
ment of the companies concerned has been shown. It should be 
especially noted that this alone renders these figures not comparable 
with factory statistics published by the Commonwealth Bureau of 
Census and Statistics . The two sets of figures are also not com-
parable because the figures shown in the above table are based on 
an ent erprise or company classification under which each company 
is classified according to its predominant activity , while the 
Bureau publishes figures on an establishment basis . 
(c ) Employment figures for nine companies , in the industries 
thus marked , were estimated in the absence of any information from 
the companies concerned . 
TABLE I - 3 : RESPONSE TO THE SURVEY , BY EMPLOYMENT IN 1962(a) 
Si ze of Participating companies Non- participating companies Total 
companies by 
employment Number Employment Number Employment Companies Employment 
1 - 25 9 152 12 173 21 325 
26 - 50 11 396 16 638 27 1 , 034 
51 - 75 7 422 11 720 18 1 , 142 
76 - 100 8 728 9 778 17 1 , 506 
101 - 150 14 1 , 687 13 1 ,844 27 3 , 531 
151 - 200 7 1 , 227 19 3 , 321 26 4, 548 
201 - 300 8 2, 017 15 3 , 538 23 5 , 555 
301 - 400 5 1 , 633 2 785 7 2, 418 
401 - 500 3 1 , 404 3 1 , 426 6 2 ,830 
501 - 750 6 3,810 4 2 , 480 10 6 , 290 
751 - 1000 8 7 , 066 1 965 9 8 , 031 
1001 - 1500 5 6 , 312 5 6 , 312 
1501 - 2000 1 1 , 627 2 3 , 297 3 4, 924 
Over 2000 8 44 , 766 1 3 , 281 9 48 , 047 
(a ) For explanatory comments on employment figures , s ee Notes (b) and ( c) to Table I - 2 . 



















Tabl I-2 shows the response to the survey by industry . 
In total, slightly less than half the eligible companies 
actually participated, with particularly disappointing re -
sponse rates in th agricultural equipment, gramophone re -
cord, sausage casing, inks and polishes, cosmetics, paper, 
and rubb r industries . The motor vehicle, motor accessories, 
industr·al chemicals, and electrical apparatus industries , 
how v r, were mark d by very satisfying response rates . 
In t rms of employm nt, the response rate was appreciably 
better : of th total employment, almost 76 per cent was in 
p articipating companies . Though the excellent cooperation 
of th motor v hicles industry was partly responsible for 
this v ry satisfactory result , the response rate of all 
compani s except those in the motor vehicles industry was 
still 62 . 5 p r cent in terms of employment . 
From Table I - J it may be seen that the participating 
. ·d f . 41 Th h h companles cover a Wl e range 0 company Slze . oug t e 
number of medium- size companies participating in the survey 
is disappointing - only 15 of a total of 49 companies with 
employment in the l5l- J OO range took part - in most other 
siz classifications the response was satisfactory . 42 
This is particularly true of the largest companies: of the 
J6 with employment in exc ss of 500, no less than 28 took 
part in th survey . 
Both tables clearly show the importance of American-
affiliated ompani s in terms of employment . 
they employ d almost 100 ,000 people in 1962 . 
In total, 
It is not 
possible to compar this figure directly with those pub-
lish d by th commonw alth Bureau of Census and Statistics 
for fa tory mployment, sinc it includes employees engaged 
in acti it· s not class d as manufacturing by the Bureau. 
As a v ry appro imate guide, however, total factory employ-
m nt in Australia in 1961/62 was a little over 1 . 1 million . 43 
41 . D tails of th r sponse rate by age of company and by 
own rship patt rn ar given in Chapters II a n d I V respective ly . 
42 . Th auses of this r latively low r esp onse rate in the 
m d·um siz rang ar not clear . It may be that part of 
th xplanat·on can b found in theories of busin ss psych-
ology but ·t is also possibl that other factors ( s u ch as 
·ndustry, 1 ngth of p rienc in Australia , etc . ) played 
a part . Th hara t r of th bias thus introduced into 
h figur s ·s n t ob ious and is probably in any cas of 
1 ss ·mport nc th n th bias i n trodu d by differ n tial 
indu stry r spons rat s . 
4J . Th stimat d total Australian work force i n 1962 was 
4 .3 m·llion . S also App ndi A . 
TABLE 1- 4: SIZE OF AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES MANUFACTURING IN AUSTRALIA IN 1962 , BY 
EMPLOYMENT AND INDUSTRY 
Industry Size of companies by employment (a ) -
501- 1000 1001- 2000 Over 2000 1- 50 51- 100 101- 200 201- 500 




Mot or accessories 
Metal manufactures, n . e . i . 
Electrical equipment , 
instruments , etc . 
Gramophone r ecords 
Food and drink 
Sausage casings 
Industria l chemica ls and 
plastics 
Inks , polishes , adhesives, 
etc . 
Pharmaceutical and toilet 
preparations 
Cosmetics 
Oils , mineral 
Paper products 
Rubber products 
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TABLE 1-5: SALES AND FIXED ASSETS OF PARTICIPATING COMPANIES IN 1961/62 , 
BY INDUSTRY 
£A (thousand) 
Industry Sales (a) Fixed assets 
Plant , equipment , machinery 
Motor vehicles 
Motor accessories 
Metal manufactures , n~e . i . 
Electrical equipment , instruments, 
etc . 
Food and drink 
Industrial chemicals and plastics 
Pharmaceutical and toilet prepara-
tions 
Oils , mineral 
Clothing and fabrics 
Other industries 
Total (c) 
33 , 001 
262 , 491 
5 , 598 
35 , 975 
38 , 506 
31,811 
26 , 723 
28,092 
42 , 535 
3, 696 
26 , 707 
535 ,134 
9 , 692 
85 , 370 
3 , 179 
43 , 617 
15 , 703 
8 , 316 
34 , 598 
7,963 
38,828 
1 , 221 
16 , 313 
264,800 
(b) 
(a) Companies were asked to show their total sales for either the 
year ended 30 June 1962 or their own 1961/62 company year . Many 
companies gave figures for the year ended 30 June but many others 
used an alt ernative period ending in 1962 . The figures shown thus 
present a somewhat composite picture . No correction was made to 
the figures of companies which operated for a part only of 1961/62 : 
this results in an understatement of the importance of the 'Industrial 
chemicals and plastics ' industry in particular , because of the 
establishment of a large number of American- affiliat ed companies in 
that industry during the year . 
As with employment figures , a few companies gave sales figures 
inclusive of sales of manufacturing branches located outside Australia 
but these are insignificant in the total . 
In the case of the three ' non- manufacturing companies' participat-
ing in the survey (see Not e (b) to Table 1- 2) , only 'manufacturing 
output' (as given to the Bur eau of Census and Statistics) has been 
included in the sales figures . Total sales of the three companies 
in 1962 were £97 . 1 million but only £46 . 5 million of this has been 
included in the above figures . In all other cases the total sales 
of the companies concerned have been shown . For r easons parallel 
to those indicated in Table 1- 2 , Note (b) , sales data are not 
directly comparable with factory statistics published by the 
Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics . 
(b) Fixed asset figures, net of depreciation, have been taken from 
the 1961/62 balance sheets of the participating companies . This 
implies that assets employed by companies but not owned by them are 
not included in the above figures . See Not e (a) above for parallel 
comments on the period to which data refer , the occasional inclusion 
of figures for operations outside Australia , and the non- comparability 
of these figures with those published by the Commonwea lth Bureau 
of Census and Statistics . Figures for the three 'non- manufacturing 
companies', however , are based on those provided to the Commonwealth 
Statistician as assets employed in manufacturing . Total fixed assets 
of the three companies at the end of their 1962 financial year were 
£82 . 2 million, but only £35 . 5 million of this ha s been included in 
the above figures . 
(c) Detail may not add to totals because of r ounding . 
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Th ital s igniri anc of th motor hicles industry 
in th to al pictu e is brought out in Tables 1-2 and 1 - 4. 
o 1 ss than 36 per cent of the total employm nt of the 
compani s approached was in that single industry. Th 
imp r ssion is on~irm d in Table 1-5, which shows the 
sal sand n t fi ed assets of particip ating companies only . 
Th mot r v hicles industry made ~p almost half the total 
sal s of all participating companies, and its assets made 
u p almost one - third thos of the same group of companies . 
o accurate estimat can be made of the total sales and 
fix d assets in 1962 of all fue companies approached, non-
participating as w 11 as participating , but it seems 
certain that the total sales o~ the group amounted to 
b tw en £680 million and £720 million , and the total book 
valu o~ fixed assets to between £341 million and £349 million . 44 
The motor v hicles industry still remains the heaviest weight 
in the total. 
The c ncentration of American investment in a few 
larg companies is striking . The largest company , in the 
motor hicles indus~ry, employed more than 22 per cent of 
the total mployed by all the companies approached and 
almost 30 p r cent of the total employed by the participat -
ing comp anies. Whil the nine companies with employment of 
44 . In addition to th participating companies, 37 firms pro -
vided sales figures, while the sales of three others could be 
estimated with reasonable accuracy. These 40 companies, with 
total employm nt of 7 , 193, had sal s in 1961/62 of £35 . 4 million. 
Sal s for the remaining 6 compani s, with employment of 16, 053, 
wer estimated, industry by industry, using as a basis the sa l e s 
p r mploye figur s both of the participating companies and 
the 40 non-participating compani s for which sales figures we r e 
availabl . In almost eery industry where sales figures for 
b o th participating and non-participating companies w r a ai l -
abl , th al s per mployee figur as higher ( and sometimes 
substantially - 0) for participating compani s taken together 
than for n n-partic ' pating . This elem nt of unc rtainty ex-
p lains th cons id rable range of the stimates made for the 
sal s o~ the r maining 6 ompanies. The U. S. D partment of 
Comm r h s p ublish d a figure of £583 million as th sales of 
t h Aust alian m nufacturing affiliates of U. S . concerns in 1962 . 
(Austr lian Financial R iew, 30 Obtob r 1964, p . 6. ) If to 
t h is figur is add d n llowance for the ' manufactu ring outpu t ' 
of omp ni s which th U.S. D partm nt of Commerce would class -
' fy und r -'ndus ' s oth r than m nuf cturing, estimat d to be 
b tw n 6 m'l and 92 million, th total of £669 million t o 
~675 mill ' n is signifi antly dift r nt from the estimate i n 
th t t . 
S i t -s n omp i ~ oth r than participatin g omp ani 
mploym nt or 7 , 292, pro id d inf,orma tion on th book 
s, wLth 
a l u o f 
Th th ir r' d s n 1 2 ( a total 0 64. 7 million). 
ass ts ~ th in'ng 41, with mployment of 5 , 95 4, w re 
st'm t d n similar to hat us d for sal s . 
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mor than 2,000 employed 49 . 8 per cent of the total employ-
m nt of all compani s approached, 136 companoes had 
employm nt of 200 or less and the median employm nt for the 
whol group was only 146 . 5. The five largest participating 
companies mployed mor than 51 per cent of the total 
employment of the 100 participating companies. This comes 
as som thing of a surpris. It also makes the task of 
reporting on a study of th companies more difficult since 
to say that '20 companies' agreed with a c rtain proposition 
means little in the absence of some estimate of th ir total 
size. 
Most of the following chapters are concerned with the 
presentation of data gathered during the course of the 
surv y outlin d above . Chapters II and III briefly outline 
th history of American investment in Australian manufact-
uring, discuss the present industrial scope of this invest-
ment, and examine in som detail the reasons for the 
capital inflow. Chapter IV looks at the ownership patterns 
of thes 'American-owned' companies and tries to asse~the 
importance they attach to the Australian capital market as 
a source of funds. Chapters V, VI, and VII form a group: 
they att mpt to gauge th extent of American control over 
th decision-making of th local firms, the access which 
Am rOcan-affiliat d compani s enjoy to the technical e 
peri nc of th ir parent companies, and the effect of 
thes two factors on their growth and productivity. The 
impact of thes companies on domestic Australian incomes 
can only b s en in its entirety in a g neral theoretical 
fram work, but to the e t nt that it is susceptibl to 
fairly simpl empirocal observation, this is discussed in 
Chapter VIII . Logically, American control over the sales 
and pur hasing polici s of local affiliates and the profit -
abilOty of th s compani s should be discuss d in Chapters 
V, VI, and VII , but b cause export franchise restrictions 
and th profitability of American companies are matters 
of partO ular public int r st, a discussion of the 
ports and °mports of participating companies is def rred 
to Chapt r X, and of th or profitability to Chapter 
Th fOn I chapt r att mpts a theor tical summing-up and 
sugg sts polOcy It rn to so 
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Chapter I 
THE PAST GROWTH AND PRESENT SCOPE OF AMERICAN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT IN AUSTRALIAN MANUFACTURING 
I 
American direct investment in Australian industry is 
by no means a new phenomenon . Records are inadequate to 
determine when the flow first began but it was certainly 
before the turn of this century . Cleona Lewis, in her 
classic work on America ' s international investments; noted 
that ' at least one American company had established a 
manu facturing branch in Australia before 1897 - the only 
on e no t in Canada or Europe concerning which we have 
information. , l Unfortunately, she did not name the 
comp any in question though it is possiblefuat she was in 
fact referring to the National Ammonia Company of A~stralia, 
which was established at Clyde in ew South Wales in 1896 . 2 
There may have been other isolated cases of this kind which 
have escaped the notice of historians. 
Like American direct investment as a whole, however, 
that in Australia is predominantly of twentieth century 
origin . This is brought out clearly in Table II_l . 3 
The figures in that table require cautious interpretation : 
they represent book values of investment only and in no 
sense reflect the ' market value' of the companies concerned . 
1 . Cleona Lewis, assisted by Karl T . Schlotterbeck, 
America's Stake in International Investments (Washington : 
The Brookings Institution, 1938j;-P:-600 . 
2 . Alex Hunter and L.R . Webb, ' The Chemical Industry', 
in The Economics of Australian Industry, ed . Alex Hunter 
(Melbourne : Melbourne University P ress, 1963), p . 291 . 
The U. S . Department of Commerce has reporte~ the establish-
ment of an Am rican factory in Australia as early a s 1892 , 
but this may be an error since n o other company was reported 
as being established before 1902 . (Paul D. Dickens , 
American Direct Investments in Foreign Countries ( Washington: 
Bureau of For ign and Domestic Commerce, U. S . Department of 
Comm rc , Trad Information Bulletin No . 731, 1930), p . 45 . ) 
3 . As alr ady noted, Australian official statistics per-
mit no accurat stimat of total American investment in 
Australia . Th figur s in Tabl II-l are therefore 
entir ly from Am rican sourc s . 
28 
The substantial ris in prices which has occurred over the 
p eriod 
. 4 
co red by th table introduc s a furth r complica-
tlon . But whil ' t is not possible to be pr cise about 
the incr as 'n tb r al valu 01 American direct inv stment 
i n Australia, it s c rta ' nly easy to se that the increase 
has be n dramat' Of th total, investm nt in manufactur-
ing h a s not always b n th largest part. Though it grew 
rap i d ly from small b ginnings - the only setback to its 
growth apparently being during the d pre ss ion of the 
thi r ties - it was not until n ar the end Ol the int r-war 
period that American capital in that sector overtook the 
American investment in petroleum (at that time almost 
entirely investm nt in marke ting and distribution facilities) . 
After the Second World Wa r , the value of American in estment 
in th manufacturing sector soared, quickly becoming by far 
the largest singl categ ory of investment. This would be 
even more evident if to t he figur s shown for inv stment 
in manufacturing wer added the in estment in oil refining 
and metal sm lting, both acti ities which are taken here to 
be ss ntially 'manufac t uring ' but which are included in 
Table II-l und roth r clas s ifications. 
With the expansion in the value of American investment 
has gone a smaller expansion in th number of American 
dir ct investments in Australia. There is less published 
information available on this subject but it is reported 
that in 1936 the number of American-affiliated companies 
op rating in this country was 94, 01 which 58 were engaged 
4. H .P . Brown has link d arious official retail price 
ind x s to giv ninde which runs from 1901 to 1963/ 64 . 
Based on 1952/ 53=1000, the ind for 1901 is 241; for 1911 , 
27 4; 1920/21, 515; 1930 / 31 , 414; 1940/ 41, 443; 1950/ 51, 
7 46 ; and for 1960/ 61 , 123 0 Much of the price ris be -
tw n 1950/ 51 and 1960 / 61 occurr d b " t we n 1950/ 51 and 
1952/53, wh n hind jumped from 7 46 to 1000, primarily 
as a r sult of th r w mat rial boom caused by the Korean 
War . ( H .P . 'Thr Asp cts of th Australian Retail 
P ric Ind Record , XL (1964) p . 576 .) 
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(a) Except f or 1929, 1936 , 1951- 56 , and 1960- 62 , most of t he invest-
ment i n t his category was in dis t r ibution , though after 1943 small 
amount s of i nves tment i n public utilities , f i nance , and agriculture 
are included . See als o Notes (c) , (d) , and (e) . 
(b) Figures i n these years include inves tment i n New Zealand . 
( c) Included in ' Ot her' American i~vestment in ' Petroleum' in 1936 
had f allen below $ 40 milli on , i nves tment in both the Australian and 
New Zea l and pet roleum industr ies t ogether being only $ 43 million. 
(d ) Figur es include i nv estment in ' Mining and smelting ' and/or 
' Petroleum' • 
( e) Figur es f or ' Petroleum' are not separately published for these 
years but s ince the f i gures f or all other i naustries except ' Public 
utilities' are published I or three of the I Our year s thus marked, and 
the Iigur e I or ' Public utilities ' is given a s $1 mil lion i n the 
f ourth year, the Iigures shown are very close es t imates . 
SOURCES : 1897- 1924, from Cleona LewiS, op . cit ., pp . 578- 606 . 1929, f rom American Direct Inves t ments in Foreign Countries 
(Washi ngton : Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Cormnerce , 
U, S. Department of Cormnerce , Trade Information Bulletin 
No. 731, 1930) , p ~ 26 . 
1936 , from Amer ican Direct Investments in Foreign Countries 
. ~l"936 (Washington : Bureau of Forei gn and Domestic Commerce , 
. ~S . Department of ormnerce , 1938) , p~ 16. 
1943, from Census of Am .ric~Owned Ass ets i n Forei 
Countries Washingt on : Office of the Secretary , U. S. 
Treasury Department , 1947) , p. 71 . 
1950- 1959, partly f r om U. S. Bus iness Investments in Foreign 
Countries (Washington : OIfice of Business Economics, 
U •• Depart)llent of Commerce , 1960) , pp.89- 91 ; and partly 
Irom Balance OI Pa ents Stat istical Supplement , Revised 
Edition Washingt n : OfIice of Business Economics, U. S. 
Depart ment OI Cormner ce , 1963) , pp . 210- 215. 
1960- 62, I rom inIo~mation supplied directly by Dr . Samuel 
Pi zer of the OIIi ce of Business EconomiCs of the U. S. 
Department of 8 ormnerce . 
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in manufacture and 20 in distribution other than petroleum 
marketing . 5 By 1957 the number had risen almost threefold 
to 271 , though the numb r of those in manufacturing was 
6 
not r ported. 
Table II - 2 shows the pe iod during which 204 of the 
208 companies approa hed during the cours of the present 
surv y comm nc d manufactur in Au s tralia . 7 P erhaps the 
most striking f atur revealed is the v e ry larg number 
of compani s which began operations in the period after 
1955 · Of the companies operating in 1962, the number 
established in the period 1955-59 was more than double 
that stablished in any previous fiv -year period while 
the number whi h commenced operations in the thirty-
month period from th beginning of 1960 was higher than 
that in any ten-y ar period except the fifties . It is 
tru , of course, that Table II-2 shows the dates at 
which manufacture began only for those companies still in 
operation at th middle of 1962. There were many companies 
set up in earlier years which had been liquidated or sold 
to other interests before 1962, and the figures shown can 
not be used ther fore to get an exact picture of the 
total number of companies in operation at any point except 
1962. Th same omission may lead to an exaggerat d im-
pression of th rate of growth of the number of individual 
direct in stments . o comprehensi e s arch was made 
for such 'd ceased' American compani s but in the course 
01 r s arch for the survey a total of 26 were found . Of 
th se, the dates at which 24 commenced manufacture are 
known: on th ational Ammonia Company of Australia, 
ref rr d to abov , b gan op rations before 1900; one began 
5 . P ul D. Di k ns, Am rican Dir ct Investments in Foreign 
~ __ ...:;;...::;;..,::...::.-_-_.;;;1:..::9;...3~6 (, ashington: Bur au of Foreign and Domestic 
Comm r U . S . D P rtm nt 01 Comm rc , 1938 ) , p . 16 . The 
accura y of this figur i not absolutely certain . An 
arli r r port of the D partm nt noted the establishment 
of 32 Am rican- aff"liat d Ifactori s ' in Australia to 1929 : 
' Th numb r of f tori s start d in Australia by Americans , 
by y a s, w r s follows: 1892, 1; 1902, 2 ; 1903 , 1 ; 1907, 
1 ; 190 , 3; 1911, 1; 1914, 1; 1915, 3 ; 1917 and 1919 to 
192 , 1 a h yar; 1926, 3; 1927 , 2; 192 , 4 ; and 1929 , 2 . ' 
(Am ri n Dir t In stm nts in For ign Countries, p . 45 . ) 
Tabl I-2 lon not s h stablishm nt of 33 companies 
by 1929, how r , nd that tabl tak s no account of com-
pan S £0 m d in that p riod but no long r in istenc . 
6 . 
In 
p · 99 . 
D" 
m ti nal 





in th p rOod 1910-19; two in the p riod 1920-29 ; seven 
in 1930-J9; four in 1940-49; one in 1950-54; and eight in 
1955-59. Both companies for which no date is known began 
op rations b for 1950. The inclusion of these companies 
and oth rs like them mod"fies th picture somewhat but 
it do ssm clear that there has been a remarkable in-
crease n the numb r of American direct investments 
establish d in the manufacturing sector. 
Another point of particular interest shown in Table 11 - 2 
is that, of th total 1962 mployment of the 204 companies 
whos commencement dates are known (95,5JJ in all), no 
fewer than 65,255 w re employed by companies which began 
manufacturing before World \{ar II ~ Of the 57 companies 
listed as being establish d before 19J9, one in three had 
mployment of more than 750 in 1962, while of the 147 
list d as being establish d after that date only seven (of 
which fiv had b en manufacturing prior to the acquisition 
of the Am rican equity) e ceeded 750 employees in size . 
(Th 1962 size distribution of companies by the date at 
which they began manufacture in Australia is shown in 
Tabl II-J .) 
As far as is known, no reliable estimates have been 
publish d on th employment of American-affiliated companies 
in Australian manufacturing, though from figures published 
by th .S . 
arriv at a 
Department of Commerce it is possible to 
figure of approximately 60,000 for 1957, ex-
" 8 
cluding thos employ d in oil refining and metal smeltlng . 
( 6 ) s tor in the period S ptember 1945 to July 195J . This 
figur almost ertainl overstates the number of American 
dir ct-inve tment nt rpris s stablished in this period 
not onl be aus it is knownfuat in some ca es the American 
int r st in companies "nclud d in Hocking's list fell short 
of 25 per nt but also b cause, as Hocking himself fully 
reali of th ntries in th Division ' s files were 
bas d nnoun m nt of int ntion rath r than on 
ifi d stablishm nts. (D . Mo Hocking, 'The 
Con ribution of 0 rs ~Compani s to Australia ' s P ost-
War Industr"al D 10pm nt', a paper pr s nted t o Section G, 
Austr li nand w Z aland Association for th Ad ancemerit 





y ar in wh"ch manufacture b gan is taken to be 
Ln whi h n Am i an quity of at lea t 25 per 
fi st a quir d "n th as of compani s manufact -
iousl a Au s ralian-own d ntur s . 
8. . S. Busin ign Countries, pp.122- J • 
TABLE II- 2: MANUFACTURING COMMENCEMENT DATES OF AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES OPERATING IN MID- +962 , BY INDUSTRY (a ) 
Industry 
Plant, equipment, ma chineYj 
Agricultural equipment 
Mot or vehicles 
Motor accessories 
Metal manufactures , n . eo. L 
Electrical equipment, instruments, etc . 
Gramophone records 
Food and drink 
Sausage casings 
Industrial chemicals and plast ics 
Inks, polishes , adhesives , etc . 
Pharmaceutical and toilet preparations 
Cosmetics 
Oils , mineral 
Paper products 
Rubber products 
Plastic product s 
Abrasives 





Total 1962 employment 















4 , 597 































































8 , 241 


















































7 ,155 960 
(a) The year i n which manuf acture began is taken to be the year i~ which an American equity of at l east 25 per cent was first 
acquired in the case of companies manufacturing previously as Australian- owned ventures . 
(b) This figur e includes the establishment of o~e company which has been counted a s 'two' because it l ater 'divided' and had 
become two s eparat e and distinct companies before 1962 . 
NOlE : (1) All companies have been classified a ccording to what appears to have been their main activity in 1962 . 
(2) In a small minority of cases , the meaning atta ched to the word 'manufacturing ' varied somewhat from that generally 




From "nformation d riv d from the present surv y it appears 
that th tota mployment 01 Ameri can- affiliated manufact -
uring ompanie s in Australia almost exactly doubled b 
twe n 1950 and 1962 . Thi s compar s with a growth of 
littl mor than 22 p r cent for Australian manufact-
uring employm nt as a whol in the same period . 
9 In part 
this was due to th fact that American-affiliated companies 
in op ration in both 1950 and 1962 expanded th ir mploy-
m nt mor quickly than the a erage for the whole economy; 
in part it was du to the cr ation of new companies 
which together more than offset the ' loss ' caused by the 
liquidat ion or sale 01 a number of American-affiliat e d 
compani s operating in 1950 . 
Table II-4 shows the total employment of 81 companies 
which w , r both manufacturing and classifiable as 
American direct investment in 1950 and 1962. This number 
appears to include all the companies which satisfy those 
two crit ria with the possible ception of three firms 
(with total 1962 employment of about 800) which did not 
provide "nformation on the date at which they began 
manufacture and which may have begun operations before 
1950 . The total employmen of the group climbed from 
4) ,222 to 71 ,82) between the two dates . The average in-
cr as i ~ thus se n to ha b en more than 66 per cent, 
though the increas s registered by individual industries 
( and ven mor those registered by individual companies, 
as s hown in Table II-5) di fer ubstantially from this 
a erag • 
Thirt e n companie which had once been affiliated 
with an m rican compan but which had terminated that 
ass ciat"on b 1962 ar known to ha eben manufacturing 
"n 1950 . Their total mploym nt in 1950 was approximat ly 
4,200. This , with th 4) ,222 ref rred to abo e and 
som allowan for th thr e compani which may have 
comm n d manufa tur befor 1950 , mak s a total employ-
m nt b Am ic n dir ct-in e tment ent r prises in 
Austr li n manut~ cturing n 19""0 of about 4 , 000 . 
9. igur 
wa s 
is no r a 
ni w r 
th EConom . 
with 19 49/50, h ow r in-
r h manuf turing s ct r as a 
n h "gh r ( ~ nd 27 p r c nt r sp cti e l y ) . 
TABLE II- 3: MANUFACTURING COMMENCEMENT DATES OF AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES OPERATING IN MID- 1962 




ment 1900- 09 '10- 19 ' 20- 29 ' 30- 39 ' 40-49 '50-54 '55- 59 
' 60- Not classi-
mid'62 fiable 
1 - 25 1 , . 4 3 5 
8 ~ . 
26,,- 50 2 4 2 1 10 
6 2 
51 - 75 1 2 1 3 4 3 
4 
76 - 100 1 2 2 7 
5 
101 - 150 3 3 1 4 7 
9 
151 - 200 1 2 2 3 3 10 4 
1 
201 - 300 1 <> . 3 3 1 2 10 3 
301 - 400 .. • < 1 4 
2 
401 - 500 2 1 1 2 
501 - 750 2 1 2 2 
2 1 
751 - 1000 1 1 4 1 l 1 
1001 - 1500 2 1 1 .., . 1 
1501 - 2000 1 1 '" . 1 
Over 2000 1 1 4 2 1 
Tota l 3 6 25(b) 23 22 24 57 44 4 
~a ) See Note (a ) to Table II- 2 . 




TABLE II- 4: EMPLOYMENT OF 81 AMERICAN-AFFILIATED COMPANIES MANU-
FACTURING IN BOTH 1950 AND 1962 , BY INDUSTRY 
Number of Employment in 
Industry companies 1950 1962 
cover ed 
Plant , equipment , machinery 10 2, 637 3, 097 
Motor vehicles 3 17 , 924 32 , 049 
Metal manufa ctures , n . e . i . 6 1 , 751 3, 927 
Electrical equipment , ins trument s , etc . 7 3 , 642 6 , 65 9 
Food and drink 8 4,867 6 , 260 
ausage casings 3 271 374 
Industrial chemicals and plastiCS 6 1 , 720 3, 296 
Inks , polishes, adheSives , etc . 5 254 ~79 
Pharmaceutical and t oilet preparations 10 2, 756 4, 083 
Cosmetics 5 270 636 
Paper products 6 527 1,201 
Other industries 12 6, 603 9, 762 
Total 81 43 , 222 71 ,823 
NOTE : (1) Employment figures f or 1950 wer e only estimated by many 
companies . In 14 cases , with total 1962 employment of 
5, 951 , employment for 1950 was estimated by the 
writer . 
(2) Ther e is s ome understatement of the growth of f our of 
these companies which between 1950 and 1962 es t ablished 
other affilia tes in Australia which have been treated 
as separate units and ther efore not included in the 
employment of the 81 companies in 1962 . 
TABLE 11- 5: GROWTH IN EMPLOYMENT BETWEEN ,1950 and 1962 OF 67 
AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES 
Change in employ- Employment in -
ment between 1950 1950 1962 
and 1962 
(i) Decr ease 
(ii) Increase 
(per cent) 
o - 24 
25 - 49 
50 - 74 
75 - 99 
100 - 199 
200 and over 
Total 
1 ,867 




11 , 746 
1 , 424 
39 , 285 
1 , 342 
6 , 603 
19 , 403 
3, 129 
4, 211 
25 , 476 
5 , 708 
65 ,872 
Average Number of 
increas e or compa nies 
decrea se covered 



















NOTE: The 67 companies included in this table are all thos e in-
cluded in Table 11- 4 exc ept the 14 f or which no company 
estimate of 1950 employment was availa ble . See a lso 
notes t o Table 11- 4. 
TABLE II - 6 : RESPONSE TO THE SURVEY , BY DATE AT WHICH MANUFACTURE 
BEGAN 
Period in which 
Austral i an Participat-
manufacture ing companies 
began (a ) 
1900- 0 9 1 
1910-19 4 
1920- 29 9 
1930- 39 10 
1940-49 9 
1950- 54 8 
1955- 59 35 








































ot s urprisingly in view of the rise in prices since 
1950, th sales of American- affiliated companies expanded 
by mor than the expansion in their employment between 
1950 and 1962. This increase in sales must be inter-
pr ted with considerable caution because of the possib-
ility of a change in the degree of vertical int egration 
of production over a period of this length . Such a change 
is especially likely to have occurred in these companies : 
many American-affiliated companies begin operations at 
a sup rficial level - assembling or packaging perhaps 
- and g radually 'deepen ' their production by buying- in 
mat erials at a progressively less developed stage of 
manufacture . For t his reason the growth in the production 
of Am rican-affiliated companies is examined in greater 
d ta·l later . Suffice it to say for the moment, there -
for, that th sales of the 81 oompanies known to have 
b n ma nufacturing in both 1950 and 1962 expanded from 
£155 -165 million in 1950 to £500- 515 million in 1962 . 10 
Th in lusion of an estimate for companies operating in 
1950 but 'd c as d ' by 1962 yields a total estimate for 
sal s i n 195 0 of £170-180 million , compared with the 
to al stimate for 1962 gi n in Chapter I of £6 0-720 million . 
10. A t ota l of 44 compani s gav precise figur s for sales 
in ompany y ars nding in 1950 and 1962 . A f u rther two 
ompan· s, both of m dium siz , gav an index of sales 
g rowth 0 r·ng th two y ars . Of thes 46 companies three 
r g·s r d n abs olute fall in sales betw en 1950 and 1962, 
four g ·n of 1 ss than 50 p r cent , four a gain of between 
50 nd 99 p r c nt, 1 8 a gain of between 100 and 299 per 
c nt, IJ a g ·n of b twe n J OO a n d 499 per cen t , a n d fou r 
a ga ·n of mor than 500 p ~ c n t . Th sa l es of the group 
a s whol ros by 212 p r c nt from £lJO million t o £ 40 5 
m·Ili n . 
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Wh n attention is turned to the xtent of American 
inv stment in Australian manufacturing in 1962 , the 
dominant °mpr ssion is on of almost infinite diversity. 
The gr at range of company size has already been illus -
trat d, but the diversity of product manufactured is , 
of anything, even greater. Unfortunately, it is not 
possibl to describ this aspect in short compass and a 
d tailed surv y of American-affiliated compa nies, based 
mainly on °nformation gleaned from the financial press 
and Tariff Board reports , is contained in Appendix B. 
H re it is only possible to discuss briefly the market 
shares enjoy d by American-affiliated companies and to 
pr sent vid nce showing the overall importance of 
American investment in the manufacturing sector. 
Th attempt to gain some idea of the market shares 
enjoy d by American-affiliated companies was among the 
less su cessful objects of the survey. All participating 
companies wer asked: 'What is your estimate of the share 
of th market for th products of your industry held 
by your Australian company in 1961/ 62?' To this question, 
65 compan oes, with total employment of 53,041, gave a 
singl -number answ r. Si teen firms (with employment of 
11,591) stimated their mark t share at less than 20 
p r cent; fourte n (with mployment of 7,799) at between 
20 and 39 per cent; fifte n (with employment of 26 , 493) 
at b tw n 40 and 59 per c nt ; twelve (with employment 
of 5,006) at betw n 60 and 79 per cent; and eight (with 
employm nt of 2,152) at betwe n 80 and 100 per cent . 
(p rhaps obviously, th total mployment of the group of 
compani s claiming to hold between 40 and 59 per cent 
of th r r sp cti mark ts is h avily inflat d by 
on ry larg company.) 
But though th impr sion is int r sting , in detail 
the fOgur ar of littl signifOcanc . Two large com-
p n g a figur vhi h , as simply the arithmetic 
a r g f mark t shar s h ld by wid ly diff rent pro -
ducts nd on a numb r of other as s compani s found 
dOffi ulty in int rpr ting th phras 'th mark t for 
th p du ts of your indu tr ' The difficulty can be 
d by th cas of a ompany which s u ppli d 
1 ctrO tim syst ms, 1 ctroni comput rs , and elect r ic 
typ wrOt s . o only was its shar of °th marl t for 
h f th s produ ts dOff r nt but also th r was a 
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consid rabl p~obl m involved in d fining each of the 
mark ts conc rn d . By common knowledge, the company 
suppli s a r lativ ly small part of the total Australian 
demand for , say, typewriters but a significant part of 
th d mand for lectric typewriters . 
Many of the large, multi - product, companies dominated 
at least on market but were insignificant in others. 
This can be se n most clearly in the chemical industry . 
Union Carbide , for example , was the sole Australian 
produc r of 57 per cent of its product range in 1962 but 
was one of at 1 ast four producers for 18 per cent of 
its range . Monsanto Chemicals was the sole producer of 
25 p r cent of its range and one of only two producers 
for a further 17 per cent, but shared the market with at 
11 least four other producers in 45 per cent of its range . 
Regrettably, U. S . Department of Commerce figures do 
not help th problem of assessing the share of particular 
Australian industries owned by American-affiliated com-
p anies . Figures showing book value of investment and 
total sales for 1957, by industry, are presented in 
Table II - 7 but in the absence of comparable data for 
Australian compani s they indicate only the relative 
importance of various Australian industries to American 
° t t 12 lnves m n • 
TABLE II - 7 : SALES OF , AND AMERICAN INVESTMENT IN , AMERICAN- AFFILIATED 




Paper and allied products 
Chemicals and allied products 
Rubber products 
Primary and fabricated metals 





























(a) As noted previously , the U. S. Department of Commerce does not 
classify the smelting activities of mining companies or the r efining 
operations of oil companies as 'manufacturing ' . 
(b) Estimates based on figure s published by the U. S. Department of 
Commerce for Oceania. 
SOURCE : U.S . Business Investments in Foreign Countries , pp . 95 , 112 . 
11. d lrom th fourth d Otion of Directory of Austra lian 
by Al Hunt rand L.R . W bb , Op e cit ., p . 311. 
. B nn tt h s compar d th sal s figur s shown in 
/ 39 
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Whil ill P ovid "ng littl h lp "n the case of 
indiv"dual indust i s, h present surv y does give some 
insight Onto th siz of American in estment relative to 
Aust al"an m nufacturing industry as a whole . All companies 
wer ask d to pr v"d som f th da a which they pro ided 
to th C mmonwealth Bu eau of Census and Statistics for 
th y ar 1961/62 . By "ts nature. a oluntary survey of 
this kind is ill- quipp d to nswer questions relating 
to 'industry shar s ' , but th extent of the response to 
it, in luding about 76 p r cent of th estimated total 
mploym nt of Am rican-affll"ated compani s in 1962 , 
mans that something of value can b said. Limitations 
of space preclude d tailed xamination of the findings 
h re and most of the information coll cted is set out 
in tabular form in App e nd" A . In summary, the partic-
ipating companies employed approximately 5 . 1 per cent of 
th total numb r mployed in Australian manufacturing 
industry in 1961/62; produc d 700 p r cent of the total 
v alu of production; owned 609 and 10.2 per cent of the 
total book value of land and buildings, and plant and 
machin r , respectively; and made 14.8 per cent of the 
additions nd eplacemen~s to land and buildings and 13 . 1 
per c nt of thos to plant and machinery . In individual 
industri s, th Am rican hare of total production was 
often substantially high r than the a rage figure of 
7 .0 p r c nt would indicate. hough the figures must 
be tr at d with caution "n four of the indu tries 
num rat d in Tabl A-7 - 'Industrial ch micals ' , 
'Pharma euticals and toil. t p e parations', 'Motor vehic l e 
construction nd as mbl, and motor bodie ~ ' , and ' Founda-
tion garm nts ' - th shar of production uppli d by 
parti ipa ing ompani ~ d d 20 per cent, and in two 
of th s indu"t i s th ir shar eded 50 per cent. 
This pro "d s som onfirmation, if any is n d d, of 
t h g 
r lat" 
onc n a on of most Am rican investment i n a 
sm 11 num er o.f "ndustr " s. 
lu of Australian 
ttern and S ig-
in Australia' , 
sis Univ rsity of 
omp rison "s not valid, 
two figu - ar coll ted on 
ain d "n d tail in App ndi A, 
In th large-scale section of Australian industry 
American ·nv stment i s particularly important, as Tables 
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A-2 and A-J show. Of the 66 plants throughout Australian 
industry which employ d more than 1,000 persons during 
1961/62, participating companies owned ten. 
Th se figures shed some light on the current contro-
v rsy on th extent of all foreign ownership of Australian 
industry. Various unofficial estimates have been made of 
this 'for ign shar ' E.L . Wheelwright, fo r xampl, 
writing in 1962, estimated it as 'about one-third', 
using statistics both of new capital expenditure and of 
company profits . 1J But at least to the extent that his 
stimate d pends on figures for new capital expenditure 
it is unr liable: the statistics he used for the period 
1945 to 195J, thos published by the former Division of 
Industrial D velopment (also u s ed by D. M. Hocking), appear 
to seriously overstate the importance of foreign capital. 14 
E . J. Thomson estimat d that almost one - third of all invest-
ment in manufacturing in the years 1956/57 to 1959/60 was 
financ d from abroad, but his method - the comparison 
of total for ign investment in the manufacturing sector 
with total 'additions and replacements ' to land, buildings, 
plant , and machinery, as shown in factory statistics - is 
quite Inadmissible. To compare total investment in 
compani s OJ which the main activIty is manufacturing 
with addItions to th book value of the land, buildings, 
plant , and machin ry actually employed in manufacturing 
b f .. .. · d . f 15 y actor1es 1S to 1nvlte a Wl e margln 0 error. 
Part of th difficulty in making an estimate of the 
'fo r ign shar ' lies in d ciding wheth r it is the foreign 
shar in profits, in production, in assets, or in mploy-
ment that ·s of primary inter st. If in employment , it 
is hard to how th foreign shar could exc ed 20 per 
c nt ~ For·f compani s participating in the present survey 
lJ. E.L. Wh 1\ right, '0 rs as In stment in Australia t , 
·n Th onomics of Australian Industry, p . 144. 
14. Th figur s publish d by the Division have been used 
as proof that, during th p riod 1945 to 195J, 45 p r cent 
of 11 in stm nt in manufa turing cam from overseas. 
But ·t pp ar that all th announced in stment pendi-
tur s of compan· s with v n a minorit of foreign equity 
wer ·n lud d in figur s for in stm nt financ d from 
abr d, wh·l th in lus·on in th statistics of only 
th major n stm nt proj ts of th p riod nsured th 
omiss·on 01 ry m ny small ill stments financ d by 
Austr l Oans. 
15. E.J. Thomson, '0 r a In tm nt - th Lengthening 
Shadow' , monograph pr s nved to th Econ mic Soci ty of 
Austr i and w Z 1 nd, w South Wal s Branch, May 1962, 
pp.J-4. 
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mad up 'ttl mo ' ttl. n '5 p . c n t~ th 0 1, it is 
lik ly ',hat all Am ' rl n-af ' Ii a~ d c ompanies in Australian 
manuf'a uring made up -,-e~5 t:han 7 pe r ent in 1961/62 - and 
of ours a numb r or b e ornpani wer jointly- owned 
and om r undoubt d ' y COl1 ro11~ d i n Australia. The 
importan o Br ' ri h 'tn' s m nt, tn largest part of the 
balan o~ reign 
than a ore 0 : the 
nt , is far rom lear. More 
id .red here as 'American-
affiliat d' ith iliation~ i h th United 
Kingdom also or are n ir ly own d by a n American-
own d compan - based in h ~ Unit ,d Kingdom, and in both 
situations h e TO e'gn inve ment in olved would appear in 
official s ati ti c s t ast in p r as 'British'. Further , 
much 0 th to 1 of B i ', i-h in el.:> t rnent n Australia is 
in th field o f banking , ins urance , real state , and stock 
and st ion ag ncie ~ . E n if B ' tish direct investments 
in manufa tu ing mp o· d hvi h number mployed by 
Am rican-a1 Ii t d Gcmp n _~ Ln 1961/ 62 - nd that would 
se m unlik ly - th 10 .L numb r 0 Australian emp loye d 
in for ign d , r ct- ' nre tm n enterpris s in he manufact -
uring ec 0 .ould r 0 . hav - gr a tly e ceded 20 per cent 
of th wo k10rc in th t "ector. 
If o pr durrlon is tak n a th rele ant 
m a uring- ~ ick , it 1 ~ P ~'_ ibl i ' d p d th t the figure of 
one-thi rd ou d b . aL in d , e ~ p c ially in iew of the 
1ik 1ihood 0 -h b ing ~om und s atement in the value 
of p od , tio n att.ribui. d t th m +. or ehi 1 s industry 
( s e App nd ' A). Bu ' t ould ill be ne essary to 
assum hat Bri . Rh man u ing in r_-tmen in Au tra1ia 
produ d tW.l .· a .:. muC'h , in y ue rm~ , as did American, 
and th s mt- dou tiu L 
A ow r 0 f:' ] (l . ign wne ship 01 





ry hi g h P C' n t g e-
'ndu i S o Th F e de a 
Works , S .nato G r n , 1 - p r , d ' -
for gn "'ha of the Aut"t lian mo ', 0 
o~ ign 1Vll r~hip 
Mini -t r for 
imaing the 
hicl indu try in 
th ,a 95 p r \~ nt , l.i' m tor p rt ~ and 
acc s ri <;. 5 p e r (' nt, of' ' e1 ,ommun icat ions at J per 
c nt , of ph ,~nd ,oilet 
nt , or s p nd rl. t p f,'pn '_ o 
um ~n n g nd di~i ~ u ~ 
16 . 
r 
n s at 97 p r 
nt, and of p tro1 -
16 
, n 0 
1965, po 6 . 
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In conclusion, it would appear that while American 
investment in Australian manufacturing has been growing 
rapidly, especially since 1945, it does not yet constitute 
a large fraction of that sector. Total foreign invest-
ment is considerably more significant but even this does 
not seem to be as important, in quantitative ferms, as 
has sometimes been imagined. The need for official 
statistics in this area, such as those now available for 
foreign investment in Canada, is obvious. 
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Chapter III 
THE MOTIVATIO OF AUSTRALIA 
MA 
I 
Essentially, th factors bearing on a decision to 
invest abroad fall into two categories : those concerning 
the general investment climate in the recipient economy, 
1 
and the immediat or proximate causes. The present 
survey asked no questions about th part tha t the 
Australian investment climate played in inducing invest -
ment her , mainly because the evidence of other surveys 
indicat s that, from the point of view of American companies, 
the Australian 'climat ' is one of the most favourable in 
the world . The country is politically stable, and for 
over a decad th party in power on the federal level has 
be n a cons rvative one with a basic economic philosphy 
1 . In r c nt y ars, a number of studies have been devoted 
exclusiv ly to an e amination of the factors which lead 
companies to engage in foreign investment . Among the best 
of these ar; E.R. Barlow and Ira To Wender, Foreign 
Investment and Taxation (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 
1955); Harry J . Robinson, Th Motivation and Flow of 
Privat Fo i n Investment (M nlo Park, Cal .: Stanford 
R search Institut , 1961; Factors Limiting U. S. Invest -
ment Abroad (Washington: Office of International Trade , 
U.S. D partment 01 Commerce, 195J). In addition, almost 
ev ry mpirical study on foreign investment written in 
th last four d cades has included one major section on 
th sam subj ct. See, for example, Irving Brecher and 
S.S. R isman, Canada-United States Economic Relations 
(Ottawa: Royal Commiss'on on Canada's Economic P rospects , 
1957 ) , pp.114-l ; Lin oln Gordon and Engelbert L . Grommers, 
United Stat s Manufacturin Investment in Brazil: The 
Impact of Brazilian Government P olicies 1946-19 0 Boston : 
Graduat School of Business Administration, Harvard Uni-
versity, 1962), pp .146-50; Cleona Lewis, assisted by 
Kar~ T. Schlotterb cl, Am rica ' s Stake in International 
Investments (Washington: Th Brookings Institution, 19J8) , 
pp.J06-l3; H b t 1arshall , Frank A. Southard, Jr . , and 
K nn th W. Taylor, Canadian-American Industr : A Stud in 
Int rnational In estm nt w Haven : Yale Uni ersity P ress, 
19J6), pp . 19 -210; J-. --.-Behrman, ' Foreign Associates and 
Th " "r F'nan ing', in U.S. P ri ate and Governm nt Invest -
m nt Abroad, d. Raymond F. Mlk 11 (Eugene, Oregon : 
rsity of Or gon Books, 1962), pp . 8 -91 ; D. M. Phelps , 
tion of Industry to South Am rica ( w York : McGraw-
Bool C . , 1936), pp .43- 9; Eug n A. Philipps , 
'Am r'can Dir ct In stm nt in W st German Manufacturing 
Industri s, 1945 to 1959', Curr nt Economic Comment, XXII 
(1960), o . 2, pp.J5--6; Frank A. Southard, J r ., American 
Industry in Europ ( Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co . , 1931 ), 
Pp . llJ-J2 . 
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closely akin to the Am rican. On the international plane, 
Australia and the United Stat s are linked in the A ZUS and 
SEATO def nc pacts . There is no discrimination of any 
kind against foreign companies, except in the ownership of 
t 1 vision stations, and th re is no limitation on the 
proportion of a company s shar capital which may be held 
abroad . Ta ation on company income is light by American 
or British standards, and since the United States-
Australia Income Tax Convention came into force in 195J, 
there has b en a limit of 15 per cent placed on the tax 
on divid nds paid by a company incorporated in Australia 
to its American shareholders. Though no guarantee has 
b en giv n on th fre dom of companies at all times to 
remit profits or r patriate capital, the Government has 
indicated that under p resent policy ' all current net income 
(after taxation) accruing to firms or individuals resident 
overs as may be remitted overseas without restriction ., 2 
Further, while ' advance commitments to allow repatriation 
are not ntered into . . . approval would be withheld only 
in cases where the circumstances were exceptional ., J 
The v ry mod sty of these claims bears witness to their 
I , b'l' 4 re la J.: lty. 
That Am rican business executives see Australia in a 
most favourable light is amply confirmed not merely by the 
rapid growth of American inv stment in Australia but also 
by rep ated stat ments to this eff ct . Only slightly more 
e tra agant than usual were he reported comments of 
Boon Gross, pr sident of the Gill tte Company of America, 
in 1961: 'Australia is the promised land , of all the 
countries I have isit d. Its stable economy, its sound 
politi al atmosph re and its people add up to an excellent 
guarant e for h futur ., 5 
But th isten 
does not in its If 
of a fa ourable 'cl imate ' in Aus tralia 
plain American investm nt here, tho u gh 
2. 0 in Australia (Canberra: Common-~~~~~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
walth 4. 
J. bid., p . 
4. For lurth r d tails on the Australian in estment 
Information for 
shington : Bur a u of Foreign 
, 1956); Francis P. 
Dono an , 'Australia ' , in L g 1 As p ts of For ign Invest -
m nt, d. Wolfgang G . Fri dmann and Richard C. Pugh 
1London : S t ns e Sons , 1959); Establishing a Business 
in Aust l 'a (S dn : Bank of w South Wal s , 1961) . 
UP-to-d t information is publish d at int r als in the 
Ov rs as Busin ss R p orts of the U. S . D partment of Comm rce. 
5. Austr lian F inancial R vi w, Jl 0 t ob r 1961 , p . J . 
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it does form all important pr -condition for such invest -
6 
m nt . Compani s in th pr sent survey were asked to 
indicat theOr American associates ' main reasons for de-
ciding to undertak manufacturing operations in Australia 
and th 100 answers r ceived to th question are presented 
in Tables III-I, III-2, and III -J. 7 Companies were re -
quest d to use a ranking proc dure to indicate the order 
of importance of each factor mentioned and while some 
companies marked more factors than others, the overwhelm-
ing significance of two or three factors is clearly brought 
out. Th possibl factors were listed on the questionnaire 
in th same order that they appear in the table . 
By far the most important singl reason given for 
the d cision to invest in Australian manufacturing facil -
ities was 'to take advantage 01 the expected growth of 
the Australian market' . 0 fewer than 54 per cent of all 
respond nts gav that as th primary motive of their 
Am rican parent in investing here, while 86 per cent 
m ntion d it among th first three reasons. One executive 
explained that 'we f el Australia is beginning a period of 
industrial expansion similar to that which occurred in the 
U. S . aft r the First World War' and the sentiment was 
common . While th small number of respondent companies 
in each industry pr vents detailed analysis of the 
importanc attach d to this factor in different industries , 
it may also be of significance that 11 of the 12 respond-
nts in the chemical industry and all of the seven re-
spond nts in the pharmaceutical and toil t preparations 
industry gav market growth as th primary reason for 
investm nt in Australia . 
It is n v rthel ss hard to see how market growth in 
itself could be the cause of Am rican inv stment in 
Australia . In the abs nce of any obstacle to trade , 
ther would be no reason why an e p anding market in 
6. Th r 
pr f r Ii 
their own 
For tr atm 








Qu stionn ir 
t her w r 100 ompan 
quit fortuitous. 
rr abo are basically 
s' to pr iously . 
r, how r, w r unable to 
som 'non-participating companies ' 
ompl t d only a small part of 
d th balan of the ans w rs . That 
s that omplet d this question is 
46 
Austra ia should not be served by xports from the United 
States 9 possibly in conjunction with a local company 
engag d in s lling and in th provision of after- sales 
servic Th r in lies the importance of the other factors 
listed in Tabl III-l, almost all of which are concerned 
in on form or another with obstacles to trade. 
Tariff barriers stand out as by far the most import -
ant of th se obstacles. One half of all respondent 
compani s mentioned the desire to bypass tariff barriers 
as a motive in th ir stablishment in Australia . 
R lativ ly few companies m ntioned tariffs as their 
primary motiv for investment so that little can be said 
about th industrial distribution of such companies from 
Table III-2 but in fact companies which mentioned tariffs 
as on of th ir reasons for investment are widely dispersed 
through industry. 
TABLE III 1 : MOTIVES OF 100 AMERICAN COMPANIES FOR INVESTING IN 
MANUFACTURING FACILITIES IN AUSTRALIA 
Number of times fact or ranked -
Motive for invest-
ment 
First Second Third As an addi- Total 
tional 
To overcome tariff 
barriers 13 
To overcome import 
restrictions 9 
To take advantage of the 
expected growth of the 
Australian market 54 
To take advantage of 
l ower Australian unit 
cost conditions 1 
To take advantage of 
consumer preference for 
' made in Australia' 
goods 2 
To gain access to Asian 
markets 
To gain access to the New 
Zealand and other Pacific 
markets 
To take advantage of 
specific encouragement 
by State or Federal 
Gov ernment 
To avoid unfavourable 
c onditions for expan-
sion in the U •• 
To avoid freight charges 
To meet a need caused by 
the break-down of a 
previous licensing 




























































An x cutive of one company producing a specialized 
typ of machinery stat d that the Australian subsidiary be -
cam th first for ign affiliate of the American company 
to produc this machinery b cause of an Australian tariff 
of 60 p r nt ad valorem on the American product . Had 
the Canadian affiliate been in production at the time, 
Australian manufacture would not hav been started because 
of th lower Australian tariff on goods of Canadian origin . 
Another company engaged only in the assembly of imported 
parts plained that though a tariff of 42~ per cent was 
paid on both parts and assembled units imported from the 
U.S., local assembly permitted the company to obtain some 
parts at lower rates of duty by importing from the Canadian 
affiliat and avoid d the payment of duty on American 
assembly costs, ov rhead, and profit. Since the tariff 
is usually levi d on th current dom stic value of the 
imported articl , th re is often a further stimulus to 
local assembly. One firm commented that while nominally 
a 45 p r c nt tariff is levied on both parts and assembled 
units, th Customs Depar ment actually levies a 73 per cent 
duty on the invoice value of the fully assembled article, 
stimating the current domestic value to be considerably 
higher than th invoice value. Since it is harder to 
estimate th current domestic alue of a component, the 
45 per cent tariff on parts is levied on invoice value only, 
and the tariff thus pro ides a significant incentive to 
import comp nents rath r than the assembled producto 
Attention may be drawn to a number of specific cases 
wh r alr ady publish d material makes it possible to 
illustrate th importanc of tariffs in causing the influx 
of for ign compani s . In the motor vehicle industry, ery 
high tariff protect d th Australian body-bunding industry 
8 from 1920 on. Soon aft r 1920, th tariff pref rence in 
favour of th unass mbl d chassis, as against the fully 
ass mbl d unit , was s d, while a parallel mo ment 
incr as d th pr f r nc in favour of British carSe 
G org Ma cy conne s his change in tariff struc ure 
clos ly with two majo Am r' an inv stm nts: 
8 . In 1935, th Ta iff Board stat d that 'th e i ting 
dut' s on s ts of mot p n ls r pr s nt ad alor m 
qu 1 nt of f om bout 200 p nt to bout 600 per 
c nt, and r, n f t, proh ' b'ti (Tariff Board ' s 
R port on Motor Body Pan 1 , 23 J nuary 1935 , p. 5. ) 
Convinced that the only way to r tain a hold on 
th Austral ian market in the long run in the 
face of high tariffs (and especially tariffs 
discriminating heavily in favour of British pro -
duc rs ) was to get behind the trade barriers, 
Ford and General Motors made the decision to 
in st substantial amounts in production and 
assembly facilities in Australia. 9 
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The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company of Ohio is another 
company which, after more than a decade of exporting tyres 
to Australia, decided to establish Australian manufactur -
ing facilities in 1926 'b cause of the Commonwealth 
Government's well-d fined tariff policy' .10 
Forst r believes that the Australian tarifl was the 
factor which more than any other compelled Julius Kayser 
£ Company and th Holeproof Hosiery Company, both of the 
U.S., to establish manufacturing ventures in Australia 
at the end of th twenties and, in view of the opposition 
of both companies to the Australian tariff on silk stock-
ings in 1925, this seems very likely.ll Even earlier 
than this, the Australian tariff had played a vital role 
in encouraging th Eastman Kodak Company to form a joint 
venture with an Aus tralian firm to manufacture photographic 
film. This case has been described in such detail by 
Thomas Bak r, first managing director of Kodak (Austral -
asia) Ltd, in evidence submitted to a tarilf enquiry in 
1914, that it merits quoting at length: 
Prior to 1908 the duty imposed upon films was 15 
per c nt, and a similar duty was then also im-
pos d upon dry plates. Upon the introduction of 
th Tariff Bill in 1907 showing the increased 
duty upon the films, I went to America for 
th purpose of consulting with the Eastman 
Kodak Company, whos ag nts we then were, who 
manufactur about 80 per cent of the photo -
graphic films used in the world, to see if any 
arrang ment could b made by which the films 
ould be manufa tur d in Australia. Th y pointed 
out to m the difficult nature of the undertaking, 
whi h I think is vid nc d by the fact that 
9 . G org Ma y, ' Th Motor Industry ', in The Economics 
of Australian Industry, d. Alex Hunt r (M lbourne: Melbourne 
Univ rsity Pr ss, 1963), p. 503 . A v ry int resting dis -
cussion of th Austral oan tariff and th growth of the car 
industry i contained in Colin Forst r , Industrial De 1 -
o m nt in Australia 1 20-19 0 (Canberra : Aus tralian ational 
Univ rsity, 1964 , pp. 34-57 . 
10 . Colon Forst r, Op e cit. , p. 55 . 
11. Ibod., p . 97 . Cl na L wis, too , stat d that 'in 
Australia on 1930 (Julous ) Kays r £ Co . anti ipated th 
imposOtion 0 a prohibiti duty on silk hosi ry by form -
ing a larg subsidiar to manula t ur in that marl t .' 
(Op . it., p. 307 .) 
throughout th world only about six factories 
ar ngaged in it , f which three a , Kodak 
factori s, viz o, one at Roch s ter , . Yo; one 
at Toronto, Canada ; and the factory of the 
Australian comp ny here. Other factories are -
on in England, one in the United States of 
America, and on in France; but, with the 
xception of the Kodak manufacture, the success 
achi v d has not been at all striking .. . Th Y 
also pointed out th larg amount of capital 
whi h would b n cessary to provide a suitable 
factory and machinery; but in the end . the 
imposition of th new duty having be e n ratified 
by Parliam nt, it was agreed that the a tt empt 
should be mad . 12 
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Even the xistence of a tariff barrier shielding a 
rapidly growing market may not be sufficient inducement 
for a for ign company to establish manufacturing facilities . 
If the market is still very small in relation to the most 
economic plant siz , there is little likelihood of dom-
estic competition for th import d product and so no need 
to inv st in the market concerned. As the market grows, 
however, the risk of competition substantially increases, 
and with it the incenti e to invest. lJ This can be well 
illustrated from Australian experience ~ Despite a J5 per 
cent British P refer ntial Tariff and a 45 per cent General 
Tariff on domestic irons in Australia throughout the 
twenties, it wa not until late in that decade, and the 
entry into th local industry of s veral other companies, 
that Australian Gen ral Electric b gan the local production 
of the Hotpoint irons it had previously imported from the 
U.S. 14 Th particularl frank statement of the general 
manag r of a recently established chemi al company pro -
vides an e n b tt r ample: 
P rsonally, I don't thiruc any U.S. chemical company 
would tablish op rations in Australia if it 
could continue to suppl the Australian market 
from th U.S. But import controls and tariffs, 
and particularl th ar that a competitor will 
est blish himself b for you in th Australian 
mark t and th n s cu heavy tariff protection, 
comp 1 U.S . compani s to inv st h re o 
This attitud was by no m an un ommon. 
Import controls w r m ntioned by r spond .nt companies 
as th s cond most import nt obst 1 to trade. Onc e 
again, th numb r of' comp nies which mentioned this factor 
12. Commission of Aust alia. Tariff Investi-
llaneous Group VI . R port , p. 66. 
lJ . For a onun nt on th 
Frank A . Southard, Jr p , 
impor 
op . it., 
14 . Colon t r, p • .LO -9. 
n of c mpetition , 
pp. 11 , 117. 
se 
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as th primary reason for investment in Australia is too 
small to p rmit m aningful omment on their number by 
industry, and no special sign.ificance appears to attach 
to the fac that five of the nine are in the electrical 
products industry. One p rticularly graphic illustration 
of th effect of import r strictions may be taken from 
that industry however, After th suspension of import 
controls on lectric shav rs in February 1960, the local 
production of shavers by two foreign companies, Ronson 
of the U.S. and Philips of Holland, ceased almost entirely. 
Ronson did not explain at the tariff enquiry of 1962 why 
it began the production of shavers in Australia but from 
its subsequent action it may be surmised that its reason 
was parall 1 to that of Philips. The latter company ad-
mitted that ' during 1959, 1960 and part of 1961, part of 
its lectric shaver requirements were made locally, mainly 
because import restrictions prevented it from obtaining 
its total needs from overs as.,15 
Other examples of the importance of import restrictions 
are not hard to find . Their importance in the decision to 
build at least two of the plants in the Altona petrochemical 
complex (and th refore probably in the decision to build 
the complex as a whole) has been noted by the Tariff Board . 16 
Two American pharmaceutical companies which began manu-
factur±ng in Australia in the late fifties expressed in 
almost identical term the vi w that 'manufacture might 
not have been started in Australia but for import licenses . 
The import licens s restricted the value of imports and 
it was cheaper to import the bulk raw materials than the 
finished pills. ' Though Maxcy believes that it was tariffs 
which caused the initial in estment in Australian assembly 
facilities by Ford and General Motors , he yet feels that 
it was th skilful us made of th dollar shortage by 
the F deral Gov rnment imm diately after World War II which 
caus d four compani s, all of them American, to embark 
on ext nsiv in stm nt programmes in olving a progressive 
incr as in th Australian nt nt of their vehicles . 17 
6 Dec mber 
on Vinyl 
p . 1 0 . 
M y, p . 
Writing of Am r i can investment in South America 'n 
the twenti sand thirti s, Pbelps observed that ' upward 
revision of tariffs has b en mor important than any 
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oth r single cause in bringing the question of migration 
[of industry] to th fore. , 18 It app ars that tariffs 
hav play d th d cisive role in Australia too , though 
sinc World War II import e strictions have also been 
important. 19 Both may pose a threat to an existing 
market 0 There app ars to be much to be said for the 
view of Barlow and W nder, reached after very extensive 
empirical investigat'ons, that, far from obj ctively 
weighing up the differential profit prosp cts in various 
countries, 'manufacturing companies invest abroad pri-
marily to maintain a mark t that has been stablished 
by xport but which is in dang er of being 10st.t 20 
ot surprisingly, of th 71 companies which provided 
information on the connection whi c h their American parent 
had had with the Australian ma rket b fore its investment 
in the manufacturing fa cilitie s of the company concerned, 
only six had par nt companies which had had no prior 
contact with Australia - and in at least four of these 
18 . DoM. Ph lps, op ci t ., p. 6J. 
19 , The tariff, of course, ha been on the Australian 
scen sinc bef r Fed~ration . Quantitative import restric -
tions w r intr du c e d on products from dollar countries 
only in 1947, and on s t rling ar a products in 1952 . Almost 
all such r stri t ions w re abolished early in 1960. For a 
brief history of th Aus t ralian tariff, s e W.M. Corden, 
' The Tariff', in The Economics of Australian Industry, pp.184-9 . 
A full r description i in A.J. Reitsma, Trade P rotection 
in Australia (L id n: H.E . Stenfert Kroese . V., 1960 ) , 
pp . 1-66 . 
20. E.R. Barlow and Ira T. W nd r, op. cit . p o 160. See 
also ibid. , pp . l72-J. V ry few companies in the pr sent 
surv y indi ated th t th ir Am rican parents had in ested 
in Australia in th e p tation of r c iving a diff rentially 
high prof't rat h r than in the U.S., though it is poss -
ibl that th of th's s ction of th questionnaire 
was partly to this . On firm mentioned that 
for ign subs'd'ari ted to show a r turn ' comm-
nsurat with th ri el d', and anoth r that , while 
a U. S. comp ' ny mi gh t r quir only 5 p r nt profit on 
turnov r in th would r e quir a profit of ' at 
least 20 p 1 ri k mark t' But both of 
thes f'rm g nd' p ct d marl t growth ' as 
the m n r a ons own n stm nt In Austr lia . 
Only on comp n y plic'tly th t ' th o big r ason a 
company d br d is b caus it b li v s 
it can g stment abroad than 
at hom th siz of differ n -
ti 1 P of it r t an Am ri an company to 
inv st stat d : 
About 25 In the . S. w might 
b h f 6 p r c nt on sales, 
/ J 
TABLE III - 2 : ANALYSIS OF MOTIVES FOR INVESTMENT RANKED AS OF FIRST IMPORTANCE , BY INDUSTRY (a) 
Number of times the following motives were ranked as of first importance -
Industry 
Plant , equipment , machinery 
Agricultural equipment 
Motor vehicles 
Motor a ccessories 
Metal manufactures , n . e . i . 
Electrical equipment , instru-
ments , etc . 
Food and drink 
Sausage casings 
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Furnishings 
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cas s tb primary initiativ for investm nt was not 
American. one of th six was a wholly- American venture 
in 1962 (though on of them had b n at th time of 
establishment here), a fact which tends to support the 
view that it was not American initiative which was 
r sponsibl for th decision to inv st in Australia . 
Thi rty-thr e par nt compani s had confined their operations 
to xporting to Australia, leaving distribution in local 
hands . A further ten had established their own sales 
subsidiaries on Aus t ralia, while as many as 1 8 had made 
arrangements 'vi th a local firm for the manufacture of at 
least some products under licence. In practice such an 
arrangement often went hand in hand with a considerable 
21 
export from the U.S . company. (Three of the four 
remaining local companies were affiliates of other 
American-own d companie s operating in Australia before 
th ir own s t ablishment, while the fourth was the newly 
establish d subsidiary of a company which, after many 
years of manufacturing experience in Australia, had been 
(20) and lJ-14 per cent on net worth. We might expect 
7-8 per cent on sales in Australia, 16-17 per cent 
on n t worth, and of course higher rates of re-
turn in less stable countries. 
But v n this company felt that an important motive in in-
ducing its own investm nt in Australia was the fear that 
an American competitor 'would get too big internationally '. 
21 . Of these 18 lic nsees, five were engaged in only a 
very small amount of manufacturing. It is interesting to 
not , in vi w of th widely held view that the sudden 
canc llation of an agreem nt of this kind by a foreign 
licensor is a frequent cause of loss to Australian 
licens e s, that only thre e of these 18 licensing agree -
ments had be n canc lIed and the link between licensor 
and lic .ns ee s ver d e At th time the sur r y was con-
ducted, it was anticipated that one more licensing agree-
m nt would not b ren wed on its e piry. Of the others, 
one lic nse w nt bankrupt (which 'vas a potent factor in 
th Am ri an company ' s decision to in est in Australia) ; 
on was acquir d by th Am ri an firm ; one sold its ass ts 
to the Am rican lic nsor a~ter declining an offer of a 
shareholdlng in th n w subsidiary; one h ld a licence 
not a~f t d by the Am rican investment; and ten r tained 
an quity inter st in th local manufacture after th 
Am ri an on estment . Of th slatter, ight still re-
tain d an quity int r st in 196J , an int r st which 
rang d from Jl to 75 p r c nt . 
In som cas s, ° n c omp ni s which hav only b en ngag d 
in th distribution f Am ri n products ar affected by 
th stabloshm nt o~ 1 1 manufacturOng facilities by 
th Am r O t Os w 11 known, for amp 1 , that 
P~iz r ' s d ision to b ndl th distribution of its own 
produ ts in Australia following its inv stm nt her had a 
consod rabl jmpa t on th local firm F . R . Faulding 8 Co . 
Ltd. Eu though th o vid n is insufficient to be dog-
mati, °t would app ar that for the most part d alers do 
llOt su.ff r gr tly a r suIt of Am rican in stment in 
manu~a tu ng. Of th °ght cas s un 0 r d by the survey 
/5 4 
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compelled to withdraw fr m this m rket for some years.) 
Turning to the oth r reasons given for the establish-
ment of manufacturing facilities in Australia, it is 
somewhat surprising to see that relatively f w companies 
rat d th avoidance of freight charges as significant in 
their decision . Twenty-two companies made some mention 
of freight charges, but none reckoned them as of primary 
, 22 lmportance . 
Only slightly mor significant was the desire to take 
advantag of consumer preference for goods made in 
Australia . Two companies mentioned this as their primary 
reason for investing in Australia and a further 22 firms 
mentioned this as a supplementary reason . But it will 
bring little cheer to those who spend considerable sums 
promoting the 'Buy Australian' concept to learn that even 
these figures exaggerate the importance of this factor, 
as usually understood . Certainly, one company explained 
that preference for Australian goods 'is quite important 
because our main customers are tradesmen subject to union 
pressure', and another company, producing household 
appliances , felt that while consumer preference for 'made 
in Aus tralia ' products was not sigrificant when manufacture 
was begun in the fifties, such preference ' is significant 
now' . But even the former of these two companies felt that 
it was the threat posed to the Australian market of the 
American company by a sudden increase in tariff pro -
tection that was the primary reason for Australian invest-
mente 
(21) in which the ' fate ' of the prev'ous dealer is known , 
four were acquired by the American firm (at least one at 
a price which later pro d to be far too high), and four 
initially held substantial shareholdings in the newly formed 
companies. Two of these local shareholdings, of 15 and 25 
per cent, still remain. A fa.miliar case, though one which 
fell outside the scope of the survey, is the cancellation 
by Cyanamid of th distribution rights of Drug Houses of 
Australia Ltd : the latter was able to acquire a 20 per 
cent interest in th n w manufacturing ompany Cyanamid -
D.H.A . Pty Ltd . In anoth r cas , when an American firm 
terminat d the distribution rights of a local firm , the 
American company bought back th local firm's existing 
stock of Am rican-m d goods at a price abov that paid 
orig'nally by the local company and agreed to pay the 
latter 5 p r c nt of total Austra.lian s~les for the first 
year aft r th t rmination of th agency, J per cent ~r 
the s cond y ar, and 1 p r cent for t~ third . 
22 . Forst r, howev r, b lie s fr ight charg s were of 
great r importance in inducing Ford and General Motors to 
invest in Australian ass mbly plants in th twenties than 
'vas th ari f. (Opo 't ., p. 45. ) 
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Only s v n of th 24 companies which mentioned con-
sumer prefer nc for Australian-made products sold a 
significant ~raction o~ t heir output directly to domestic 
consum rs . on of the eight companies which mentioned 
this factor in the lectrical products industry, and 
only two of the six in the industrial hemicals industry , 
sold any of their output to dom stic consumers. Most 
compani s were in fact not thinking of dom stic consumers 
when they mentioned this motive. Four oE t h e m were al-
most c rtainly referring to government pref r e nce that 
certain strategically important products be locally 
manufactured, whil a number of the balance had in mind 
th pr fer nc of their industrial consumers for the 
flexibility which only a local source of supply confers. 
This was probably th factor prompting two companies 
producing motor vehicle components to ment ion 'consumer' 
preference for Australian-made goods, though the ability 
of the motor vehicle company i t self to advertise a high 
Australian content may also have been relevant. Two 
companies supplying parts to firms operating in the highly 
volatil home appliance market did not have the Australian 
cont nt of the end product in mind , however . One of these 
cont nded that Australian manufacturers of household 
appliances would sooner buy an inferior Australian-made 
articl than a better American one because of the greater 
availability of local supplies in a market t)~ified by 
sharp fluctuations in demand . Indeed, an offer of a 
more or 1 ss guaranteed market by one of the Australian 
applianc manufacturers, at prices initially abo those 
of imports, was on impor t ant reason for this company ' s 
Australian investm nt . The other company stated that 
it had be n told by on of its major customers that it 
1 was worth a 122 p r c nt Au tralian price disad antage to 
hav a local sourc of supply because of the gr ater 
fl ibility of delivery and th clos .r contact made 
possibl b tw en custom rand suppli r . A company in 
the ch mi als industry, with 1962 sal s of less than £2 
million, stimat d that sa ings mad by customers because 
of local produ tion d d £100,000. This was a resul t 
of th substantial r duct·on in in entorl s mad possibl e : 
wh r as p r iously custom rs had had to allow ight we ks 
betw n h time of ord ring from th U.S . and the time 
of d li ry, now th tim had b n r duc d to t n days. 
Th r is littl in th abo to ugg st that the pre-
f r n of dom sti consum rs for Australian-made goods 
\Vas a signit'icant factor in encouraging American invest-
ment in Australia. On th contrary, pr judice against 
Australian- made produ ts \Vas ncounter d on se eral 
occasions . A complaint by Kodak (Austr lasia) in 1914 
about ' th prejudice existing against th local product , 2 3 
is p rhaps not surprising but the follo\Ving statement 
mad in 1963 by the g neral manager of a company in the 
metal-working industry is in a different category: 
obody has a pr ference for 'made in Australia' 
even today - that is certainly not one r e ason for 
manufacturing here. Thi s might be a factor in 
goods where quality isn't important but not in 
our line. We considered stamping our boxes with 
th 'made in Australia ' sign but decided against 
it. Last week we got a consignment returned 
from one of Australia 's biggest companies with a 
complaint that was so trivial that \Ve knew it 
was only an xcuse and didn't ev n bother 
arguing with them. 
A total of thirteen companies mentioned ' government 
encouragement' as a significant factor in their decision 
to inv st in Australia. Only two of these felt that it 
had been state government encouragement which had been a 
contributing factor in their decision to come to Australia, 
though th number would doubtl ss have been higher than 
this had th question s 'ought information on the reasons 
why compani s hose particular Australian 10cations. 24 
23 . Int r-State Commission of Australia . Tariff Investi-
gation: Misc llaneous Group VI. Report, p. 66. 
24 . One of the mor unfortunate aspects of the Australian 
federal syst m in its pr sen form is that · t gives rise 
to totall unplanned comp tition by state governments for 
industries of ev ry kind. A numb r o:f ompanies indicated 
that indu m nts e tend .d by state governm nts h d been an 
important considera .ion in the location o:f their Australian 
plants. An illuminating mple of this wa.s provided by 
the pr sident of th Gill tt Company in 1962 on th 
occasion of the official opening of the new plant of 
Gillett (Aust. ) Pty L d. H omm nted tho t since Gillette 
had b n trading in Aus ralia for more than 50 years and 
had its h adquar r~ in Sydney, that ity appeared the 
natural h ice for th sit of Gill tt " ne\V Aus tralian 
plant. But the 'real p rsonal interest shown in our 
probl ms ' by th ictori n go ernm nt had induc .d the 
company to in st n ar M lbourn inst ad. (Australian 
Financial R vi w, 13 D c mb r 1962, po 4.) It is 
widely known that the South Austr lian go . rnm nt has a 
highly d v lop d sys em of 'Bu South Australian' and the 
pol'cy of t nding 'nducem nts to pr s p ecti in stors 
is so ommon th r th t th polic is b coming nationally 
known s lPlayfordism', ft r form r South Australian 
Pr m' Wh n Mobjl Oil decid d to build its s ond 
Austr n oil r f'in ry, th S uth Australian go rnm nt 
ncourag d th ompan 0 bu'ld in that tat b agr ing 
to pro id not onl a S' roads and rail a. line but 
also hous'ng, wat rand tri ity . Thi w s in addition 
to an und rt 1 . ng that pr f r n s ."ould b g n 
to th produ t of h finery. (J. M B. Grant , 
/~7 
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(Ind ed , s·nce ev n these two m ntioned uch encouragement 
as the third factor n th ir decision to invest in 
Australia, it is quit possible that both were thinkin g 
more in terms of location than of whether to in est as 
such.) Another two ompani s referr d specifically to 
encou ragem nt received from the Department of Trade, one 
'stating that during a p riod of acute foreign exchange 
shortage it had be n offered an assurance of import 
licences for all components if the total cost of import-
ing th components could be r duced to 55 per cent of the 
previous cost of i~porting the fully assembled article . 
Three firms mentioned encouragement from the Department of 
Supply, one being promised duty-free admission for imported 
materials and another a premium above the price of imported 
goods. The encouragement given by the Postmaster-General I s 
Department to the two American-affiliated manufacturers of 
telecommunications equipment is well known. Even in the 
twenties , that department assisted Standard Telephones 
and Cables Pty Ltd through the payment of a 15 per cent 
price premium. 25 World War II, and the drastic reduction 
in the availability of imports which it caused , convinced 
the government of the need to fost r the local manufacture 
of this equipment and both S.T.C . and its affiliate , 
Austral Standard Cables Pty Ltd, secured major benefit as 
- f 26 
a resuJ:i: . 
Th government ' s encouragement of the motor vehicle 
industry aft r th war has been noted in Appendix B. It 
is publi kno, l dge that the government provided tariff 
conc ssions on ·mport d rna hinery, assistanc .. in the 
acquisition of government wartime rna hinery, freedom to 
import qu·pm nt without e chang r strictions , tax con-
cessions to isiting for ign 'p rts, and even, in the 
case of G.M.H. , ass · stance in the securing of a local bank 
overdraft of mor than £2 million. It may be less widely 
known that governm nt int r st in th car industry, in 
( 2 4) ' Th in Th ~~------~--~---~E~li It is ly surprising , 
perhaps , ompanJ. which mention d state go ern-
ment n ourag ment as signi1~icant in th ·r d ision to 
inv st in Australia r 10 t d in South Austr lia . ( See 
also an illuminating articl by I .D . ott in the Austral~an, 
4 March 196~ , po 9 .) 
25 . Colin Forst r, pp. l12-J. 
26 . ~~-=-=-':::::"::"=':~~-=":=":":"::7=--=";~;"':;;;;"~W , 2 0 J ul y 196 4, p. 2 ; . b i d. , 
addition to that r fl cted in tariff policy, had its 
genesis as far as Am rican companies ar concerned in 
the twenties , when representatives were sent to orth 
America in what proved to be a successful attempt to 
persu ade Ford to invest in the Australian industry.27 
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The desire to gain access to the markets of Asia on the 
one hand and ew Zealand and the Pacific on the other by 
establishing operations in Australia wa s mentioned by 22 
companies. ( Eight firms mentioned that the d es ire to serve 
both the Asian and P acific areas had been significant in 
their decision to invest . ) But none ranked this motive as of 
primary importance and only seven mentioned it as of second-
ary significance . Twelve of the 22 were in the metal-working 
industries, three produced food or drink, two industrial 
chemicals , three pharmaceuticals, one plastic products, and 
one was in the ' Miscellaneous ' classification. 
Very few compani s indeed mentioned either a desire 'to 
avoid unfavourable conditions for expansion in the U.S. ' or 
' a n ed caused by the break-down of a previous licensing 
agreement with a local manufacturer'. Both motives for in-
vestment would be meaningless without the presence also of 
some oth r factor such as freight charges, tariffs, or 
quotas . The only firm which mentioned 'the break- down of a 
licensing agr ement' as of firs t importance in its decision 
to invest in Australia was ngaged in the production of an 
item on which freight charges are prohibitively high: when 
the licens e was taken over by a major competitor, the 
American company had little choice but to invest if it 
wer to retain its mark t share. In another case, the 
Australian licensee went bankrupt and f 11 back to being an 
import ag nt for th American firm . Tariff barriers made 
this increasingly difficult and so, after encouragement 
from no less than fiv Am rican subsidiaries already in 
Australia, the d cisjon to invest was taken. 
Only 11 compan° s ga e ' lower Australian unit costs ' 
as a moti e in their d'ecision to in st in Australia and 
only on of th s f It that this had been th main motive . 
Eight of th lev n wer in one or 0 h r of the metal-
working ndustri s . Th smalln ss of the number of 
compani s which sought low r costs by manufacturing in 
Australia Os not , p rhaps, surprising: a cost study made 
by th Am rOcan ational Industrial Conf renc Board 
27 . ColOn Forst r p . J • 
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indicated th t Australian unit :osts w re low r than 
American on only four of th 19 cases available to them , 
and that he m dian Australi n ost , a 25 per cent above 
th Am rican cost, was th 
major areas xamined by th 
highest in any of he five 
8 
m. Th conclusions of the 
pr s nt surv y seem to show h t this pOcture may be 
slightly too pessimistic bu th g neral impression is 
f o d 29 con lrm • 
A sign oficant number of" companies f lt that the 
r asons off r d in th qu stionnaire were inad quate as 
an xplanation of their investment in Aust ralia . Thirty-
one mention d som reason for investment other than those 
already discuss d . Seven poke of the establishment of 
some Am rican customer in Australia , and no fewer than 
thre of th se compani s commented on the investment of 
one company, G . M.H . While for some the establishment of 
a major American customer in Australia meant the auto-
matic creation of a growth market in this country, in 
other cases the investment was undertaken at a loss in 
order to preserve the goodwill of the American parent 
company. One firm explain d that 'it'll be many years 
befor th Australian market i r ally big nough to 
support conomic production but th y re our best customer 
and w supply th m 11 ov r the world.' 
Thr companies mentioned that a major part of the 
reason for th ir in stm nt in Australia was a desire to 
sp d th sale of Am ri an-m de product s . One of these 
acquired its previous Australian d aler because of the 
inabilOty of th latt r to k e p pace with th overall 
growth patt n t by the U.S. ompan and t hen almost 
drift d into ass mbling th imported product. Another felt 
that h ablishm nt of a limited Au~tralian a s mbly 
op ratOon w uld incr as consum r acceptan e of the 




th y w r 
Many of 
co ts w 
op atO ns 
on y oor th 
to 
Lind n, Co ts and Comp eti -
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pp. 11, 1 . 
c s s ar dis us s d t great r length in 
For th mom nt it may e not d t hat of the 
i d d boo 70 comp nj s, 23 indi ated 
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~am, nd 47 th thy r high r . 
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Som companies inv sted in Australia for reasons not 
directly r lat d to Australian economic conditions . It 
is well known that Alcoa and Kaiser Aluminium invested in 
Australia at least partly in order to secure access to 
larg bauxite d p osits in a politically stable country, 
whil the investm nt of Asarco inthe Mining Trust Ltd of 
London , wh nce it acquired its holding in Mount Isa Mines, 
was scarcely related to Australian economic growth. 
Similarly , the establishment of Swift Austra lian and the 
four American comp anies producing sausage casings for the 
American market was clearly motivated by growth in American 
demand and by th size of Australia ' s farming sector . 
Reasons for American investment in Australian oil refin-
ing capacity are many : tariffs played some part, as also 
did th political security of the area and an increase 
in th number of refined products. 30 But none of these 
motives means a great deal without the overriding desire 
on the part of international oil companies to find market 
outlets for their crude oil . 
Other motives were varied . One company stated that 
on of its most important reasons for investing in 
Australia was a desire to playa part in Australia ' s 
economic development . Since this count ry is hardly one of 
the world ' s poorest, however , one may be forgiven for be -
ing a littl suspicious of the apparent altruism. One 
firm m ntioned the protection of a weak patent position 
as its p rimary reason for investment, while the share -
holding of another American comp any had been acquired as 
an income inv stm nt in support of a licensing agreement . 
Two compani s spoke of a general policy favouring the 
dec ntralization of p roduction and two more of the improve -
ment in servicing facilities made possibly by local manu -
factur . Only on firm m ntioned the r latively low 
rat s of company taxation in Australia as a reason for 
initial investm nt, and n in this case it was but a 
contr'buting factor . Surprisin gly , the personal whim of 
e cut'v splay d a p art in some investment decisions . 
Th manag'ng dir ctor of on local subsidiary stated that 
' we ar r ally in Australia because I want d to come to 
Austral'a ' and e porting from th U. S. without a local 
manufa tur ' ng op rat ' on was n ot p ossibl b cau se of the 
great i mp ortanc of aft r - sal s service . A senior ecu tiv e 
30. S J. M B . Grant, op. cit . , pp. 257 , 260. 
61 
in anoth r f'rm felt that th liking which parent company 
exe utiv s had for 'nt rnat'onal travel was a factor in 
th stablishm nt of his own firm in Australia . 
Only four firms , apart from those subject to govern-
ment ncouragem nt, sp cifically mentioned the receipt of 
an invitation from an Australian firm as a significant 
reason for in estment . This is , perhaps , not unnatural 
sinc most qu stions w r d signed to discover why 
invitations w re accepted rath r than how many were 
rec ived. Australian initiative 01 this kind has cert -
ainly b n important . Jl In the case of at least 22 
parti ipating companies , private Australian initiative 
played an important role in the decision to invest here. 
(It is int resting to note that all but four of these 
remain d joint Australian-American v ntures for at least 
a p riod a1t r the initial American investment.) In some 
cases, the Australian initiative was taken only to gain 
access to Am rican technical know-how . In some others 
the motiv was access to ch ap finance . In one case, 
for example an Australian firm issued convertible notes 
to an Am rican company at 5 p r cent - the Australian firm 
b n fit d by avoiding the necessity of paying 8 per cent 
for local funds and th American firm b nefited by being 
able to conv rt the notes into ordinary shares at sub-
stantially b low the market price . In this way, the 
Australian firm b came predominantly American-owned within 
six y ars of th initial issu • In a variation on the 
shortag -of-funds th m , an Australian company asked an 
Am rican firm to stablish a local op ration b cause the 
Brit'sh ubsidiary of th Am rican company, which had 
pr viously b n supplying the Australian firm with materials, 
r fus d to grant th Australian company JO days ' credit 
on its imports and th local company was e periencing 
diff' ulty in obtain'ng 1 tt rs of cr dit from its bank . 
ses, th Australian firm lacked both capital 
and know-h w, while one company, alr ady partly own d by 
an Am r an l'rm, su ssfully sought a doubling of the 
Am ri an n r hold'ng s an in uranc aga'nst th Am rican 
f'rms nt ring th Aus ralian mark t in amp tition with 
jl. Arthur D nning, Commission r for w South Wal s in 
North Am r' ,r p rt d in 1962 that h's w York offic 
had 200 sp 'fi inquir s from Australian firms se king 
stm n from Am r an ompani . ( Australian Financial 
6 S pt mb r 1 62, p . 12 .) 
62 
the local firm after the latter had spent considerable 
re s ources developing consumer acceptance of the American 
32 products . 
It was disturbing to find at least two Australian-
American companies felt that the ' real benefit ' of their 
American association was not access to know- how or 
capital but freedom to use ' an American name '. One of 
th se firms was using the brandname of it s American 
associate on some products not even produced b y the 
American firm . The other stated : 'We could g e t by with-
out the U. S . company, but it is very useful to have the 
U. S. name behind us . ' The executive went on to name one 
major Australian retailing firm which does no t use the 
products of this industry unless they bear an American name . 
In some cases, soliciting a take-over offer from an 
American firm is the simplest and most profitable way to 
dispose of a large personal shareholding, especially if 
this is in a proprietary company, At least two participat -
ing companies had become American in ownership after their 
founders had hawked their personal holdings in them around 
a numb r of American firms in search of the highest bidder . 
Another American firm had entered Australia by acquiring 
a local company only after a number of local firms had 
sought to be acquired by it . 
Table III - 3, which presents an analysis of primary 
investment motives by dam at which manufacture in Australia 
commenced, should be interpreted with considerable caution . 
Ther is a danger that the executives of long established 
compani s were in fact largely unaware of the motives for 
the original investment and were reading into the past 
the sentiments of the present. This may be the explana-
tion, for example, of the relatively large number of 
companies which gave 'expected market growth ' as the 
primary reason for their establishment in Australia in 
the p riod 1930-39 . On the oth r hand, th patterns of 
r asons offer d in oth r periods, with th e ception of 
the unusual grouping in the period 1950-54, correspond 
roughly with what might b pected from a general knowledge 
32 . Th· s incr as in Am rican shar holding was brought 
about by th issue of conv rtibl not s to the U. S . company 
at 2 p r c nt. The motive for th issu, howe er , was 
not a shortag of funds : th low rat of inter st on th 
not s was primarily a ta ation mano u r and the price 
at which th not s wer con rt d into ordinary shar s 
was lower d orr spondingly . 
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(a) Only motives which were listed as of f irst importance to at least one company in Table III- l appear in this table . 
(b) The year in which manufa cture began is taken to be the year in which an Ameri can equity of at least 25 per cent was 
first a cquired in the case of companies manufacturing previously as Australian- owned ventures . 
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of r c nt Australian economic history . 
Befor concluding this section of the chapter , it 
should be stressed that the whole discussion has been 
confined to the reasons given by companies for their 
initial investment in Austlalia . The contention of 
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Dr Penros - that the local subsidiaries of foreign com-
panies develop a life of their own which leads investment 
in them to continue long after a strictly objective con-
sideration of the return to be earned would justify this33 
- has been deliberately left to one side . Her thesis 
is discussed in the following chapter when the dividend 
policy of American companies in Australia is under 
examination . 
II 
It is interesting to compare the above empirical 
evidence with present theories of international capital 
movement. Wi th few e·xceptions, 
more than three decades old. 34 
such theories are li~tle 
The trade theories of the 
English Classical School depended for their validity on 
the assumption of international factor immobility and as 
late as 1929 J . H. Williams could write that 'in most 
treatments of international trade theory, capital move -
ments are discussed mainly in connection with the balanc-
ing of payments •.. and are not dis ussed as transfers 
of productive power,.35 Though some significant progress 
had been made in the development of a theory of balance 
of payments adjustment before the thirties,3 6 it was the 
publi at ion of Ohlin's Interregional and International 
Trade 37 in 1933 which may be said to have laid the founda -
tion upon whi c h modern theories of trade and factor move-
ments ar based . 
Since that date, considerable progress has been 
made on a numb r of fronts . There has been great development 
33., S Edith Tilton P enros , 'Foreign Investment and the 
Growth of th Firm ' , Economic J .ournal, LXVI (1956), espec -
ially pp . 224- 9. 
34. John Stuart Mill, however, had th beginnings of a 
theory of int rnational capital mo em n~ in his Principles 
of Pol" tical Economy, Vol . II (Boston : Charles C . Little 
e Jam s Bro\vn, 1848), esp cially pp. 285-304. He cites 
oth rs b for him, such as E,G. Wakefi Id, as holding 
similar vi ws . 
35 . John H . Williams, ' Th Theory o f International Trade 
Recons"d r d', reprinted from Economi c Journal, XXXIX (1929), 
in R adin s in the Th or of International Tra d e , American 
Econom" London : All n E Unwin , 1950), p . 255 . 
36. S , for exampl , th sur y in Jacob Viner, Studies 
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of ' mechanism of adjustment ' or transf r problem theoryo 3 8 
Th r has been considerable clarification of the restrictive 
assumptions under which international trade, by equating 
factor prices , renders international factor movements unnec-
essary . 39 The e nd o f World War II in 1945 brought much 
debate about the possibility of usin g foreign investment , 
eith r counter- cyc l ically or on a secular basis, to help 
maintain high lev els of employment in the capital- rich 
countri s, which appeared to be faced with a short - fall i n 
40 demand . But it is probably fair to say that it was 
not until the problems of economic development came to 
dominate the consciousness of economists in the fifties 
that r a1 progress was made in answering vital questions 
conc rning the motivation for international capital move -
ment and the short - and long- term effects of these flows 
on investin g and recipient countries. 
Certainly current theories are far from definitive. 
In 1953 Nurkse no ted that in the field of international 
capital movements the lag of theory behind the actual 
(36) in the Theor 
Harper Bros ., 1937 
of International Trade (New York : 
, Chapter VI . 
(37 ) Berti1 Ohlin , Interregional and International Trade 
(Cambridg , Mass .: Harvard University P ress, 1933 ; subse -
qu nt page references are to the 1957 edition). 
38: Comprehensive surveys of the deve10pmept of transfe r 
problem theory are contained in Arthur I . Bloomfield, 
Ca ita1 Im orts and the American Balance of P a ents 
1934- 39 Chicago : University of Chicago P ress, 1950 , 
Chapter IX; and Lloyd A. Metzler , 'The Theory of Inter-
national Trade ', in A Survey of Contemporary Economics, 
Vo1~ I, ed . Howard S . Ellis, published for the American 
Economic Association by Richard D. Irwin , Homewood, Ill . , 
1948. More r c nt contributions include G. M. Meier, 
' Economic Development and the Transfer Mechanism : 
Canada, 1895-1913 ' , Canadian J ournal of Economics and 
Political Sci nce , XIX ( 1953 ) , 1-19 ; and James C. Ingram , 
'Growth in Capacity and Canada ' s Ba1anc of Payments' , 
American Economic Review, XLVII ( 1957) , 93- 104 . 
39 . S e, for a mple, J . E . Made, The Th ory of Int r -
national Economic P o1ic Vol. II Trad e and Welfare 
London: 0 ford Univ rsity P r ss , 1955 , Part III ; 
Ri hard E . Ca s Trade and Economic Structure : Models 
and M thods ( Cambridg , Mass .: Harvard Uni rsity P ress , 
1960 ) , Chapt r V; Jacob Vin r, 'Re1ati Abundance o f 
th Factors and International Trade ' , Indian Economic 
Journal, IX ( 1962 ) , 274- 88 . 
40 . S ,for examp1 , Randall Hin shaw, ' For ign In st -
m nt and Am rican Emp10ym nt ', American Economic Re iew, 
Pap rs and P roce d ing s , XXXVI ( 1946 ), 661- 71 ; a nd Ev sey 
D. Domar , ' The Effect of For ign Inv estm nt on t h 
Balan of P aym nts ', American E c onomi c Rev iew , XL (1950), 
805 - 26 . 
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course of ev nts 'has been unusually gr at,41 and eight 
years lat r Cairncross could still writ 
I doubt wh ther even today we have formulated 
a th ory of [foreign] investment that does 
justic to the historical experience and 
the mass of statistical data that have become 
available . Existing theory does not even 
pos , much less answer, the questions material 
to our present problem . 42 
o attempt is made here to provide a survey of all 
existing writings in the field or to essay a more com-
prehensive theory than those already available: either 
object would be beyond the intention of the present mono -
graph . Indeed, the possibility of ever achieving a 
definitive theory of international capital movement may 
be an illusion : Kindleberg~concluded a discussion of 
the theories of foreign investment of Cairncross and 
Thomas by commenting that 'inertia, the acceleration 
principle ,- -irmovation, discovery, and migration play 
rol~s which carmot readily be fitted into any neat theory . ,4J 
But the state of current theory does permit some 
comment on matters pertinent to the Australian scene. 
The remainder of this chapter is concerned only with 
theories of why capital moves internationally, discussion 
of theories dealing with the effects of foreign investment 
being def rred to the final chapter . Throughout, concern 
is directed primarily to movement of private direct 
investment, little or no attention being paid to the 
currently less significant capital movements on portfolio 
account . 
As mentioned, detailed e amination of the causes of 
int rnational capital movement appears to have had its 
gen sis in Ohlin's famous work of the early thirties . 44 
Though Ohlin was among the first to consider the forces operat -
ing to produc international capital movements, his analysis 
is n some ways among the most general made to date . 









s p. Kindl b rg r, Th T rms of Trade: A European 
"tV York : John Wiley £ Sons, 1956 ), p . 142 . 
44. 0 ac ount is tak n h r of the essentially political 
analys·s of writ rs lik J .A. Hobson . 
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importance of the international bond market in the nine-
teenth century, he placed primary emphasis on the role 
of international interest rate differentials as giving 
rise to foreign investment . 45 Further, by adopting the 
Classical assumption that the rate of interest is a 
reflection of the supply of capital relative to other 
productive factors, he c ould believe that international 
capital movements exercise an essentially equilibrating 
function : ' Since factors move from countries where their 
prices are low to those where they are dear, their 
scarcity and reward in the former is increased, while 
their prices in the latter fall, unless there is some 
counteracting tendency. , 46 Yet, though placing primary 
emphasis on interest rate differentials, he also enum-
erated most of the other reasons for foreign investment 
on which others have since elaborated. He stated quite 
explicitly that 'foreign investments may • . . . be largely 
independent of differences in interest levels when there 
is a chance of profit', 47 and dealt also with the 
importance of tariffs, the desire to guarantee the 
supply of vital raw materials, the urge to secure market-
ing outl ts, the desire to avoid high domestic taxation, 
and the need to extend credit to promote sales of 
48 
exports . And even the equilibrating function of 
international capital movements he qualified by noting 
the case where the 'quantity of certain productive 
factors in a country may be so small that an increased 
supply of them will not reduce, but increase their prices. , 49 
It was after the publication of Ohlin's book, however, 
that what had been for him but the most important of many 
forces leading to foreign investment was developed by 
som writers into the only 'normal ' reason for inter-
na tional capital movement . -Fanno pr6vided perhaps the 
t f tl . . t f . 50 H' most complete statemen · 0 11S p01n 0 V1ew . 1S 
argum nt had essentially the same three stages as that of 
Ohlin, but it lacked the qualifications which Ohlin added 
to it . First, he retained the assumption that the rate of 
inter st in a country is an index of its supply of capital . 
45 • Op . cit . , p . J J 2 . 
46. Ibid . , p. JJ9. 
47. Ibid . , p . JJ4 . 
48. Ibid., pp . JJJ-JJ7 . 
49. Ibid . , p . J4l . 
50 . Marco Fanno, Normal and Abnormal International Cap ital 
Transfers (Minneapolis : University of Minn sota P ress , 19J9 ) . 
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Thus c pital-rich countri s would ha e a low rate of 
interest while countries with a deficient supply of 
capital in relation to oth r factors of production would 
have a high rate of interest . 51 Secondly, he argued that 
'normal capital transfers ' are those from low interest -
rate countries to those with high interest rates, all 
other capital movements being ' abnormal ' . 52 And finally, 
normal capital movements, he contended, tend to decrease 
the initial interest rate differential, 'diminish the 
initial inequality of the distribution of capital', and 
'incr ase the total volume of production in the various 
countries ' .53 He was led to the conclusion that for 
these reasons ' normal capital transfers represent an 
equilibrating, equalizing, and strengthening element in 
the international economic structure. , 54 
With the wisdom of hindsight it comes as a surprise 
to realize th great sway which this view held . Kindle -
berger, for example, accepted this neo- classical view in 
both the 1953 and 1958 editions of his textbook on inter-
national economics. 55 He appeared to see nothing in it 
which was irreconcilable with his more realistic discuss -
ion lsewhere on the various reasons why U. S. companies 
set up operations abroad, though he did note that the 
presence of British- owned companies in the U.S . testifies 
'to the fact that these direct investments can run 
'uphill" from countries with a higher to countries with a 
lower rat of interest ' . 56 Arndt has cited Ellsworth, 
Haberler, and Samuelson as taking the same vi w . 57 Even 
Marsh, whom Arndt m ntions as a ' writer who steers com-
pI tely cl ar of th r al theory of interest in his dis -
cussion of international capital movements' ,58 felt 
confidenc in th quilibrating eff cts of foreign invest -
ment and 
51 . Ibid . , 
52 . Ib'd . , 
53 . Ibid . , 
54 . Ib' d . , 
pressed th b Ii f that so long as investors 
p . 23 · 
pp . 9- 10, 29 . 
pp . 23-24. 
p. 24 . 
55 . CharI s P. Kindl b rg r, Int rnational Economic 
(Hom wood, Ill .: R' hard D. Irwin , first published 1953, 
r vis d 1958; this and ubs qu nt pag r f r nc s are to 
th 1958 dition unless oth rwise stat d), p . 366 . 
56 . Ib'd . , p . 396 . Kindl b rg r app ars to ha erred, 
how v r, n 'ting St rling Drug, Singer S wing Machine , 
and B us h 8 Lomb as ampl s of Brit'sh- own d ompanies 
op rat'ng 'n th n't d States. 
57 . H . W. Arndt ' A Sugg stion for Simpl'fying the Theory 
of In rn tional Cap'tal 1'10 m nts ' , Economia Int rnazionale , 
VII ( 1954), p . 469, footnot 3 · 
58 . Ib'd ., p . 470, footnot 1 . 
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could be encourag d to 1 nd for profit and not for political 
or other r asons th most effici nt allocation of world 
resources could b readily achiev d. 59 
One of the most r cent discussions of this subj ct 
is that by Guth . 60 Though in several places he gives an 
acc ptable analysis of the factors 1 ading to capital move -
61 
ment, the naivety of some sections of his treatment is 
striking. In a manner similar to that u s ed by Fanno, al -
most 25 y a s earlier, he adopts the ! unqualified ! 
version of Ohlin's theory that the rate of interest is 
an ind x of capital supply relative to other factors and 
that international capital movements will tend to remove 
international interest rate differentials. While he 
admits in one place that 'particularly in the case of 
direct investments, the interest rate incentive will 
usually be v ry slight since here the production costs 
62 
connected with the investment playa principal part' , 
he seems to accept the fundamental validity of the interest -
rate differential explanation of international capital 
movement and spends some pages exp laining why capital does 
not move as it ' should theoretically ' . 6J Among the reasons 
he advances for the failure of capital to move as it 
' should' ar controls 0 er capital movements ' distortion' 
of interest rates (not only because of central bank 
polici s but also becaus of the 'virtual loss of 
capital due to th rapid obsolescence of production plants 
in the face of rapid technical progr sst 64 in advanced 
countries), and differential risks. 65 Despite his con-
c ssion that ' there is no interest - induced automatism 
of long term capital movem nts from developed economies ' , 
59 . D . B. Marsh, World Trade and Investment ( ew York : 
Har ourt, Brac € Co . , 1951), p . 490 . 
60 . Wilfri d Guth, Capital E ports to Less Developed 
Countries . (Dordr cht . Holland : D. R idel Publishing Co . , 
196J dn . ). 
61. Ibid . , pp . 28-Jl, 70. 
62 . Ibid . , p . 11 . 
6J . Ibid . , p . 9 · 
64 . Ibid . , p . 10 . 
65 . Ibid . , pp . 10-11 . 
66 . bid . , p . 11. It li s n or ginal . 
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his basic acceptanc of th view that the normal flow of 
capital is from capital-rich to capital-poor countries is 
brought out strikingly in his discussion of the reasons 
for the tw ntieth century declin of private capital ex-
ports to less developed countries . One of the main 
reasons offered for this decline is the replacement of 
Great Britain by the U.S . as the world ' s dominant creditor: 
'Even today, in the USA, there are many sparsely developed 
areas which present attractive opportunities for private 
capital investm nt. , 67 The large flow of private capital 
from ew York and Michigan to Arizona and ebraska - or 
from Sydney and Melbourne to Alice Springs and Darwin -
which this view would lead one to expect is not immediately 
obvious . 
But even while the explanation of international capital 
movements in terms of interest rate differentials prevailed 
in some quarters, it was being steadily undermined in 
others . In his famous article of 194J,68 Rosenstein-
Rodan argued that if the industrialization of Eastern 
Europe w~ to be left to private investment decisions it 
would not take place because the units of private invest -
ment ar too small to take advantage of external economies . 69 
Shortly afterwards, Balogh also criticized the orthodoxy 
of the time . R ferring to 'return frommvestment' rathpr 
than ' rate of interest', an advance in itself, he stressed 
that th former ' can no longer 00 regarded as an index of 
the scarcity and productivity of capital,7 0 because of 
varying d grees of imperfect compe~tion and social con-
trol in different countries. This argument was based 
essentially on significant divergence between the social 
and privat r turn on capital investment, the result of 
which is that ' unr gulated foreign investment could not 
secur opt "mum production and maximum progress either 
in th ba kward ar as or in the lending countries ., 7 l 
In 1950, Bloomfield noted that ' many important 
categories of apital mo m nts •. • n ed not ne essarily 
t " 72 mov from low to high int res rate countrles ' and 
67 . Ibid . , p . l5. 
68 . P .. Ros nst "n-Rodan, ' Probl ms of Industrialization 
of East rn and South-East rn Europ " r pr"nt d from 
Economic Journal, LIII ( l94J ) , in Th Economi s of Und r -
developm nt, d . A . • Agarwala and S . P. S ingh ( Bombay : 
Oxford Uni rsity P r ss, 195 ) . 
69 . Ibid., p . 247 . 
70 . Tho mas Balogh, ' Som Th or tical Probl ms of P ost -
hl 
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went on to point out the importance of tariffs, transport 
costs, and ' buy at home' campaigns in inducing direct 
investment through the creation of international differences 
in rates of profit . 
Two years later, Abramovitz drew attention the the 
fact that , because of the influence of economies of 
scale 'there is no clear and definite reason to think 
that the potential productivity of capital will begin to 
drop when the ratio of capital to other r esources 
increases' and a logical conclusion of this wa s that 
'there is no convincing reason to believe, a priori, 
that capital will flow from countries with high to countries 
with low ratios of capital to other resources . ,7J 
Even more comprehensive was the assult on the 
traditional theory mounted by Nurkse in 195J . 74 He 
stressed the complementarity of investment projects 
through the market which each individual investment 
creates for other investments and thus highlighted the 
fact that private return on investment is likely to be 
higher in capital-rich countries than in capital-poor 
countries . He used the point to explain why the 
foreign capital flow to less-developed countries has had 
a strong bias in favour of production for export to the 
capital-rich areas of the world. His analysis was in-
complete in the sense that, like Rosenstein-Rodan, he 
was primarily preoccupied with the demand side of the 
incentive to invest and largely ignored the almost 
equally important supply or cost side . His dismissal 
of 'lack of public overhead capital' as hardly a valid 
reason 'for the extraordinary difference which we find 
between export industries and home market industries,75 
was scarcely adequate as a treatment of the importance of 
complementary manufacturing facilities as an influence on 
the investm nt decision, particularly in view of the 
clearly greater significance of such facilities in the 
case of most manufacturing investments than in the case of 
(70) War For ign Inv stm nt P olicy', 0 ford Economic 
Papers, VII ( 1945), p . 97 · 
(71) Ibid . p . 106. 
(72 ) Op . cit., p . -J1. 
7J . Moses Abramovitz, ' Economics of Growth ', in A Survey 
of Contemp orary Economics, Vol . II , ed . Bernard F . Haley , 
published for the Am rican Economic Association by Richard 
D. Irwin, Homewood, Ill . , 1952 , p . 155 · 
74. Op . ci t . 
75 . Ibid . , p . 85 . 
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extractiv investm nts . But his basic point r presented 
consol'dation of an important advance . 
In 1954 Arndt mad what is still perhaps the defini-
tive statement on this problem. Clearly and unambiguously, 
he made two ass rtions of relevance to this discussion : 
first, in the case of direct foreign investment, it is the 
marginal efficiency of capital and not the rate of 
interest which is of concern to the potential investor ; 
and secondly, 1the marginal fficiency of capital , all ow-
ing for all risk considerations, is very rarely higher in 
capital-poor than in capital-rich countries . 176 He 
elaborated the second point with a discussion of the 
importanc e ,to the investment decision not only of the 
size of the market and its rate of expansion but also of 
the existenc of 1the specific complementary 11 factors11 
which dev lop as a by-product of economic growth and are 
prerequisites of a high marginal productivity in developed 
countries 1 . 77 In his discussion ' of external economies the 
following year he enlarged on the same point . 78 
Since th early fifties, the advances discussed above 
have been built into a general theory of international dis-
equilibrium by men such as Myrdal . 79 The latter noted 
that 
in spite of all exchange regulations , a consider-
able stream of foreign capital, even from the 
underdevelop d countries, is, as I have pointed 
out, steadily s eking harbor in America . 'I t 
is a part of our puzzle,' observes P rofessor 
John H . Williams, that 1while the role we should 
play in the world is that of a creditor country , 
the c ondi tions are often more favorable for 
investment h r , not only for Americans but for 
oth rs. , 80 
The orthodox vi w of the motivation of foreign invest -
ment assumed that th rate of interest is a reliable index 
of cap'tal supply and that capital would move internation-
ally to r du e differ nc s in the ratio of capital to 
oth r fa t or s . Th vi w d v loped by Ros enstein-Rodan, 
Nvrks , Arndt, and 0 h rs d ni d that inter st rate 
diff r n tials w r of primar r 1 vanc to private direct 
inv stors and, mor significantly, chall ng d the assump-
tion that ' th r th rat of inter t or th marginal 
ffic' n y of ap ' tal 's a r liabl 'nd of capi tal 
Or rath r, t o th xt nt that t h marginal s upply . 
ff ' n y o f a pi t 1 is a r fl ction o f capital availability 
76 . 
77 . 
Op . it . , 
Ibid., p . 




it may be expected to be high in capital-rich countries 
and low in capital-poor countries - the reverse of the 
orthodox assumption with regard to the rate of interest.
8l 
Two of the fundamental characteristics of capital 
equipment are not homogeneity and perfect divisibility, 
as traditional theory tended to assume, but heterogeneity 
(and therefore complementarity) and imperfect divisibility. 
Given labour and other non-capital factors of production, 
the indivisibility of particular types of capital equip-
ment, and the economies of scale arising therefrom , may 
often point not to decreasing marginal productivity of an 
economy ' s capital stock with an increase in that stock but 
to increasing marginal productivity of capital in all 
sectors of the economy not in close competition with the 
sector in which the additional investment occurs . A 
liberal supply of capital in all but one sector of an 
economy tends to create a high marginal efficiency of 
capital in that one sector because of the ready supply of 
cheap inputs for that sector which the capital abundance 
in other sectors makes possible . On the demand side, the 
fact that, for any given technology, the capital stock 
is characteri zed by indivisibili ties points to the import-
ance of the size of total demand for the output of the 
sector in question. An important determinant of this is 
the capital stock in other sectors of the economy . 
In a world of only two countries, A and B, with given 
technology, given trade barriers, given demand patterns, 
and given endowments of non-capital factors, it would 
appear that the incentive for a particular company in B 
to invest in A (in a sector producing for the A market) 
will vary directly with the existing capital stock in 
A in sectors other than its own and with the existing 
capital stock in its own sector in B, and inversely 
with the existing capital stock in B in 
(7 8 ) H. W. Arndt, 
Economic Record, 
201-2 . 
'E ternal Economies in Economic Growth' , 
XXXI (1955), 192-214, especially pp . 
e, for example, Gunnar Myrdal, An International 
Pros ects ( ew York: Harper 8 Bros . , 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 107-110 . 
81 . Th's is not to say , of course, that the rate of in-
ter st in the rec'pi nt economy has no rel vance to the 
dir ct 'nv stor~' A high rate of interest in the country 
in wh'ch h cont mplates investment might , by depressing 
th price of equity shares, h ave an influ -nce on whe her 
h takes over an e isting operation / 74 
74 
sectors oth r than i s own and with the xisting capital 
stock in its own sector in A . This vi w admittedly omits 
explic Ot m ntion of such d terminants of for ign invest -
ment as political stability and the skill of the work force . 
Allowance for these could doubtless be made in the 
sugg sted proportionality, though th ir omission may be 
justifi d on the not unreas onable assumption that most 
of th se oth r factors t nd to be positively correlated 
with th total capital stock . It is no t surprIsing, if 
this vi w is adopted, that the Australian economy - already 
capital - rich by any measure - has been a major recipient 
of privat e capital in recent years . 
It is evid nt, of course, that this view is still 
too facile. It is essentially static in nature . But the I 
elem nts of change which may be introduced serve merely 
to strengthen the first impression . It is clear, for 
example, that most increases in the obstacles to trade 
will increase the incentive for factor movement , as has 
82 been proved under highly restrictive conditions by Mundell . 
It is also clear that expectation of future profit, or 
growth , is at least as important as the current capital 
stock as an inc ntive for factor movement, although, like 
political stability and workforce skills, this also tends 
to be positively correlated with the current capital stock . 
To digress briefly, it is interesting to note the 
increasing att ntion which is in fact being given to 
differential national growth rates as the most important 
stimulus to int rnational capital movement . Chakravarty, 
publishing in 1961 the finding of a statistical analysis 
of international capital movements, concluded that the neo -
classical lin of r asoning associat d with Ohlin is 
' s riously qualifi d wh n on finds that the factor of 
r lativ dOff r nc s in th growth rates is the on which 
is statistOcally found to be much more significant than 
the apital scarcity fa tor ., 8J Ball plicitly intro-
du s Onto his model of for ign investm nt an equation 




stablish san w nture . Again, an established 
s ubsidiar might b rrow more from its par nt com-
n °t would oth rwis do if th local capital ~arket 
ry high rat s of inter s . 
82 . Rob rt A. Mund 11, ' Int rnational Tr d and Factor 
Mobil Oty ' , Am rican E onomic Re i w , XLVII ( 1957 ), J21- J5 . 
8J . S . Chakra arty, ' A Stru tural S tudy of Internation a l 
Capital Mo m nt ' , Economia Int rnazional , XIV ( 1961) , 
p . J9 4. It is possibl , of curs, that what Chakra arty 
was wO tn ssing was as mu h th r sult of th capital mo 
m nt as °t was th ff t. 
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making th volunle of for ign investment which a country 
rec iv s vary directly with its chang in income . He 
justifies the equation by quoting Coyne, a form r Governor 
of the Bank of Canada: 
' .•. the more action is taken •.. to encourage 
increased production and employment in Canada 
the more rather than th less eager will 
American corporations and other foreign com-
pani s be to expand their interes ts in Canada 
so that we will be faced with the prospect of 
an increase rather than a decrease in the 
inflow of capital . . ... ' The hY§~the sis is 
ov r-simpl but not implausible . 
When allowance is made for technical progress , even 
the xist nce of a substantial stock of capital in the 
sector in which investment may occur is no necessary 
deterrent to that investment. In a situation where a 
fore'gn company has lower production costs than domestic 
compani s because of its sup e rior technical or managerial 
know-how, the prior existence of a substantial capital 
stock in the sector concerned may even be a positive 
i ncentive to investment by the foreign company, to the 
extent that domestic companies have already developed 
consumer acceptance of the products concerned . 
In th third edition of his International Economics, 
Kindl b rg r cit s a thesis by Stephen Hymer on this sub-
ject . Hymer has suggested that direct investment only 
occurs when a firm has some 'major advantage over its 
c ompe titors at home and those abroad or can obtain a 
p eculiar advantage fr om the international co -ordinati on of 
economi c action. , 85 While this advantage may in some 
cas s b acc ss to capital, it may equally well be superior 
technology, command ov r patents, access to a market, con-
sum r familiarity with an internationally advertised 
produ t, tc. From Kindl b rger ' s bri f summary, this 
a ppears to be on of th most useful contributions yet 
mad to th th ory of int rnationa.l capital movement . 
It c rtainly s ms to accord clos ly with r ality . If 
for ign in stment in min ng, aluminium production , and 
oil r f'ning and mark ting b d (for these are all 
fi l d s in whi h th ad antag of th for ign ompany may 
li n ss to apital, raw mat rials, or markets) , it 
s ms rt n that th main advantag of for ign firms 
op rating in Austral' h s b n in th ir acc ss to 
s up r'or t hn ' qu s of manag ment and production. 
84. R . J . Ba 1, ' Cap' al I mports and E onomi De elopment : 
Parado y or Orthodo y? ' , Kyllo s, XV (1962 ), p. 613 . 
85 . harl s P . Ki ndl b rg r 
(Hom wood, Ill. : R' hard D . 
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Th conclusions of th present survey are these . If 
company x cutives could be quit confident that no ob-
stacl s to trad - wh th r ' n the form 01 tariffs, quotas, 
freight charg s, consum r prefer nce for local goods, or 
governm nt bias in favour of the products of local industry 
- would ev r arise to interfere with their export 
trade, it is hard to se why many manufacturing companies 
would embark on for ign investm nt . There might be a few 
which would invest abroad to take advantage of lower 
foreign costs of production, but not many of t hese would 
com to Australia . It is th fear of being cut off from 
a rapidly expanding e port market which so often raises 
the question of foreign inv stment: it is the relatively 
low marginal cost of investing in avenues already familiar 
to th par nt company, in terms of t e chnical and 
managerial know-how, which makes foreign investment appear 
attractiv . To th foreign company, the marginal cost 
of ext nding its t chniques to Australia is not only low 
absolutely, it is also substantially lower .than the 
cost which a domestic company would incur - in terms of 
research e penditure and costly exp rimentation - if it 
attempted to enter the sam industry . This gi s the 
exp ri n ed foreign company a conside rable competitive 
advantag 0 r the domestic firm, and the more advanced 
th technology of the foreign firm, th greater its com-
petitiv advantag. (This advantage i ~ still further 
enhanced by th gr at rase with which the large, inter-
nationally-known corporation can draw on local capital 
r sourc s .) It may w 11 b , therefore, that in a dynamic 
setting diff renc s in t chnology ar ,ven more important 
than diff s in capital stock in determining the 
dir ction of d'r ct in stm nt flow 
Th g n ral 1 1 of skills in a community tends to 
b y correlat d with th ommunity ' s capital stock 
but th mount of orig'nal r search and de lopment done , 
whi h m y b 
comp iti 
t d to influ nc sub tantia11y the 
ad antag njoy d by that s oci ty's companies , 
tends to d p nd also on th r fa tors. Sinc it may be 
assum d th t th of scale a ailabl to com-
pani s op rating in tb ry large n tions of rth 
Am r' a Eu op and Japan 
thos vail bl to flrms p r 
m nt d Au s t, i 
ry mu h gr a er than 
ing in th sm 11 and frag-
ms lik ly that the scop 
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for original r search in this country will be not only 
absolutely but also proportionally smaller than in 
larger " countries, unless some differentially large 
stimulus is given to res arch in this country .86 
The view has sometim s been expressed that 
Australia ' s dependence on foreign capital will fall as 
the economy matures . But if the primary pre - condition 
for international direct investment in manufacturing is 
differential rates of technical progress , there seems 
no reason why foreign ownership of capital in Australian 
indu stry should not continue to increase as long as 
foreign countries do more research in all sectors 
than this country and trade barriers prevent their enjoy-
ing th fruits of this effort through exporting . Since 
Australia is a much smaller economy than the main capital -
exporting economies, there would appear to be no way 
of halting this trend except by legislative action unless 
Australia is prepared to concentrate research effort in 
particular sectors and thus secure a technical advantage 
over foreign companies in those areas . In this way it 
is conceivable that Australia might not only pro~ect 
domestic ownership of these sectors but also secure owner-
ship of corresponding sectors abroad . 
86 . A particularly int r sting paper on this topic is that 
by W.P. Hogan ' Th I mpact of the For ign S ctor on Indus -
trial Structur " a pap r pr s nted to Sec tion G, Australian 
and N w Z aland Association for the Ad an ement of Science, 
Sydn y, 1962 . 
78 
Chapter IV 
OWNERSHIP D SOURCE OF FU DS 
I 
Th first decision an American executive has to make 
aft r d ciding to invest in Australia is whether to establish 
a totally new operation or to buy an interest in an existing 
firm. The outcome of this decision will depend on a number 
of factors, including the speed with which the foreign 
company desires to establish its local beachhead, the funds 
available to it, the amount of over-capacity in the i ndustry 
concerned, and the attitude of any previous licensee . 
Certainly, many American companies have decided in favour 
of making their initial investment in the stock of an 
Australian firm . Of the 208 companies covered in the present 
surv y, at least 48 , with 1962 employment of 20,690, began 
their American association when an American company acquired 
all the assets of, or a major share interest in, a firm 
"alr ady operating in Australia. l All but four of these 
investments have taken place since 1945, which indicates 
either that the practice has grown in popularity or that the 
executives of long established companies were unaware of 
2 the origins of their company. 
The acquisition of Australian firms by large foreign 
corporations is one of the most controversial aspe cts of 
ov rseas investment . Yet popular concern is largely un-
conn cted with dislike of acquisitions per se~ the American 
practice of vetting acquisitions and mergers to prevent undue 
restriction of competition is totally unknown in Australia . J 
1. Of th se 48 investments, 20 were in one or other of the 
m tal-working industries, six were in ' Food and drink ' , 
thre in 'Pharmaceutical and toilet preparations ', three in 
'Plastic products ' , two in ' Clothing and fabrics ' , two in 
' Industrial chemicals and plastics ' , two in ' Inks, polishes , 
adh siv s, tc .' , thr e in 'Paper products ' , one in ' Gramo -
p hon r ords ' , one in 'Oils, mineral ' , one in ' Furnishings ', 
on in 'Writing instruments ' , and three in ' Misc llaneous '. 
2 . Similarly ther may b a bias in figures gather d for 
acqu "sitions and m rg rs made betwe n the date of local 
establishment and 1962 . Eighty companies denied making any 
acquisitions since they first s t up manufacturing operations 
in Australia, wh "l 19 compani s admitt d acquiring between 
th m 20 10 al compani s in toto and at 1 ast part of the 
ass ts of SO oth rs . Two more local firms wer ' merg d '. 
All but nOn of th s 2 acquisit Oons occu rred between 1958 
and 1962 . t shou ld b not d that the 28 acquisitions re -
f rr d to in lud thos by ompanies , lil Ducon and Boral, 
in who h th Am rican shar holding was only a minority in 1962 . 
J . Fo an int resting dOscussion of Australian merg rs and 
Am ric n antitrust laws, s John A. Bushnell , 
Comp ny M r y rs 19 46 - 1959 ( Melbourn : M lbourn 
P r ss , 1961 , pp . 166- 175. 
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It is the for ign element which arouses public anger. 4 But 
it would appear that the reasons for this are largely emo-
tional. To begin with, some Australian equity frequently 
remains in the company in which the foreign corporation makes 
its investment and indeed the investment is often made at the 
invitation of a local company desirous of a partnership with 
an overseas firm . Of the 48 cases referred to above in which 
the acquisition was part of the initial investment, 26 still 
retained a substantial element of Australian equity in 1962 . 
At least another five were partly Australian- owned for a 
period of years after the initial American investment, while 
two more had been entirely British-owned before the American 
investment . In some of the cases in which an American firm 
acquired all the outstanding shares, the previous Australian 
shareholders had declined an invitation to retain a por t ion 
of their equity . The Australian executive of one large food 
company which has recently been acquired by an American firm 
expressed regret that some Australian shareholding had not 
been retained . On being asked why this had not been done in 
view of the frequency with which the American parent em-
barked on joint ventures in European countries, he r eplied 
that the original shareholders 'wanted to get rid of t he 
company and the price was right'. Similar comments were made 
by ex cutives in two other companies . When Hunter Douglas 
acquir d control over the local firm of Mello-Lite Ltd in 
1961 in a share exchange which left the original shareholders 
of Mello-Lite with a substantial minority interest in the 
nlarged company, a writer in a financial newspaper stated that 
' ther will probably be som disappointment that the deal is . 
not a dire ct takeov r, . 5 
Wheth r the acquisition is complete or not, foreign 
investment by take-over still adds to the resources available 
to th Australian economy . Indeed, it is strange that those 
who most object to foreign companies' financing their local 
growth from internally-generated funds and not ' new capital 
4. This was graphically illustrated during a prolonged take -
ov r battle between the American- owned abisco company and the 
locally-own d Australian Biscuit Company P ty Ltd for control 
of Swa low and Ari 11 Ltd in 1964 . Though the failure of 
th abisco bid meant that the privately-owned Australian 
Biscuit Company increas d its estimated share of the Australian 
biscu·t market from 70 to 80 per cent, public sentiment 
during th confli t was strongly against th American firm . 
5 . Australian Financial Re iew , 28 ov mber 1961 , p . 16 . 
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from ov rse s ' should also object to for ign inv stment by 
tak -ov r . For in many cases companies making their initial 
inv stm nt in an xisting company have to 'bring in' substan-
tially larg r dollar funds than thos ne ded by firms plan-
ning to grow from small beg'nnings. This is not invariably 
true . It is known that one American firm used local bank 
overdraft facilities to purchase a majority shareholding in 
a medium-sized Australian company and 't appears that 
occasionally American companies pay for their acquisitions 
over a period of time from the profits of the local operation 
its If . But by and large, the acquisition of a local firm 
initially requires more 'new capital' than setting up a 
small op ration from the beginning . 
There is another obvious reason why popular concern at 
foreign take-overs is misplaced : the firm in which the initial 
investm nt is made is often in economic difficulties before 
the change of ownership. Asarco's acquisition of an interest 
in Mount Isa Mines is a vivid example of this . Wi thout the 
injection of funds which Asarco provided in 1930, Blainey 
estimat s that the Mining Trust, which then owned a majority 
o f Mount Isa ' s share capital, 'would have faced liquidation , 
a thousand workmen at Mount Isa would have been suddenly 
dismissed, and millions of pounds worth of machinery would 
have lain idle and unused. , 6 The American company continued 
to pour money into Mount Isa but did not receive its first 
dividend until 1947. Borg-Warner is another firm which be -
gan life in Australia by acquiring a majority holding in a 
local firm which was on the point of collapse: Coote £ 
Jorgensen Ltd had an accumulated deficit in profit and loss 
account of £987 332 by mid-1956, shortly before the 
American 'nv stm nt. Holden's Motor Body Builders was also 
facing a difficult per'od when it was acquired by Gen ral 
Motors (Australia) in 1931, and Swallow £ Ariell L td, which 
Nabisco att mpted to acquir in 1964, had declared no 
ordinary di idend sinc 1960/61 , with losses in 1961/62 , 
1962/63 , and th first half of 1963/ 64. 
Th in'tial acquisition of an int rest in an Australian 
company's of n only th hicl for furth r investm nt of 
th ' on n ional' typ. Th pans'on of Coote £ Jorgensen 
sin th quis't'on of Borg-Warn r ' s int r st, for ample, 
has b n dr ic. Anoth r s is that of Comalco: wh n 
S 
fac d Asarco ' s 
was acqu'red . 
Sl 
it acquir d th interest 01 the Commonwealth Government in 
the alumlllium smelt r at Bell Bay in 1961, it ntered into an 
agr m nt to increas its capacity from 12,000 to 2S,000 tons 
per annum . It was originally expected that this would take 
about four y ars. 7 In the event , capacity reached 52, 000 
tons by July 1963. In the food industry also, where foreign 
take-ov rs ar most criticized , investment in several 
companies since acquisition has been c onsiderable . P arsons 
Gen ral Foods embarked on the construction of a large new 
plant at Liverpool shortly after General Foods entered 
Australia by acquiring Parsons Foods P ty Ltd in 1961, and 
Campbell ' s Soups opened a plant reported to have cost well 
in exc ss of £1 million at Shepparton in 1962 after its 
initial acquisition of the food division of Kia Ora 
Industries in 1959 . 
Some additional comments on take-overs are made in 
Chapt r XI but for the moment there appears little justifica-
tion for th frequently unquestioning condemnation of all 
foreign take-overs common in Australia today. 
If an Am rican company decides to set up a completely 
new operation in Australia - and even if it decides to 
acquir a local firm in its ntirety - it must decide 
whether to run the operation as a branch of the parent concern 
or to establish a separately incorpcrated company structure . 
The significant factors to be taken into account in making 
this d cision mainly concern company taxation . S For American 
tax authorities regard the income of foreign branches as an 
integral part of the income of their parent corporations but 
ignor the income of subsidiaries incorporated abroad (except 
those 'n tax-haven countri ) until they remit dividends to 
their parent companies . This has a number of important 
effects . First, wh re th rate of company income tax in the 
capital-importing country is below that in the U.S., as in 
Australia, th r is an incentive for American companies to 
establish unincorporated branches initially , to permit 
for ign tabl'shment loss s to be written off against the 
relat'v ly high rat s of U.S. ta ation . When the foreign 
7. Tariff Board ' s Report on Alumlllium and Aluminium Alloys, 
17 May 1962, p . 6 . 
S . Th following s tion is a n c ssarily simplified v r-
sion of 'nformation gl an d from two sourc s: a confidential 
bookl t d r'bing th ta ituation 'n 1959, 1 nt to th 
wr't r by an int rnat'onal firm of chart r d accountants ; 
and bookl t publish d by th Comm rc Clearing Hous , Inc . , 
of Ch' Illinois, R nu Act of 1962 with e planation , 
th wr't r by Hunter Douglas Ltd. 
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op rat·on b com s profitabl , however, there is, other 
qual, a strong inc ntive to incorporat things bing 
10cally . 9 An xampl 
branch mak s a pr -ta 
may illustrate this. If an Australian 
profit of £100,000, th U.S . par nt 
company s subj ct to tax on all this amount, although a 
credit is allow d to the ext nt of taxes paid in Australia 
provided this do s not exc ed the effective rat of company 
taxation in America. Assuming that Australian taxation is at 
th rat of 40 per cent, and so takes £40 , 000, and the 
effecti U . S. tax is 50 per cent, the Ameri can parent has 
to pay a furth r £10,000 in tax, irrespective of whether the 
profit r mains in Australia or is remitted to the U.S. This 
leav s a net income from Australian operations of only £50,000. 
If th Australian operation had been incorporated locally, 
howev r, and no dividend were paid, total taxation would have 
been only £40,000 to the Australian government and t otal 
after-tax income £60,000. 
The U . S . tax position with regard to dividends received 
from a foreign subsidiary has recently undergone a change . 
The situation before the American Revenue Act of 1962 was 
pass d can be illustrated by continuing the above example . 
(It is assumed for the moment that there is no Australian tax 
le i d on the dividend itself.) If, instead of reinvesting 
all its £60,000 net income, the American- owned subsidiary 
operating in Australia had declared a di idend of £JO,OOO, 
the American parent company would ha e been liable to taxa-
tion on that divid nd only and could have claimed a taxation 
cr dit of £12,000 (being the product of the rate of Australian 
taxation and th size of th di idend) . Total American tax 
payabl on Australian op rations, th r fore, would ha been 
£J,OOO (still assuming a U . S . tax rat of 50 p r cent) and 
total ·n om aft r Australian and U.S . ta s would hav been 
£57,000 . Ev n had a di idend qual to £60,000 been declared , 
total in om arter both Australian and Am rican taxes would 
hav b n £54 , 000, or £ 4 ,000 higher than th situation 
wh r th Australian op ration was uninc orporat d. The 
Rev nu A t of 1962 introdu d th principl which has com 
to b known as ' grossing- up' . This impli s that ta spaid 
in Austr li by incorporat d subsidiari s which cQuld 
pr viously b us d s both a ta d du tion and a ta credit 
- c n now b us d as ta cr dit only . This pro ision has 
no ff t on ompan s not d claring di id nds but increases 
th Am n ta tion p yablon di id nds r mitt d to th 
9 . Th·s pra t· o~ our ,b n fits total Australian ta 
rev nu . 
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U.S . Thus, in the above example, if the Australian subsidiary 
were to declare a dividend of £60 , 000, the American tax is 
applied to the dividend plus the equivalent amount of 
Australian company taxation already levied, i . e . £40,000. 
The application of the American rate of tax to the full 
£100,000 means that subsidiaries with a high rate of dividend 
remittance are in no better position as subsidiaries than 
as unincorporated branches . 
The existen ce of a withho lding tax in t he capital - import -
ing country - on dividends declared by subsidiaries but not 
on profits remitted by branches, as in Australia - further 
complicates the issue . This may , in certain circumstances, 
make it more profitable for companies with a high rate of 
profit remittance to be branches rather than subsidiaries . 
If withholding tax is only 15 per cent (which is its maximum 
at present on dividends remitted to the U. S . from Australia), 
Australian tax on a dividend of £60,000 is £9,000 for which 
a credit is available against U . S . taxation. Before the 
Revenue Act of 1962, this meant that an American company 
would receive only £51,000 of a £60,000 Australian dividend 
but, because of ,tax credits up to the maximum American tax 
liability of £30,000 (for the £9 , 000 paid in withholding tax 
could not be claimed as a tax deduction), retained the full 
£51,000 . This still left it in a marginally better po&tion 
than if the Australian operation had been unincorporated. 
Since the Revenue Act of 1962, a parent receiving a dividend 
of £60,000 , gross of withholding tax, from a subsidiary in 
Australia is liable to a 50 per cent tax on £100,000 - and 
has tax credits for only £49,000 . After payment of a 
furth r £1 ,000 American tax, the net profit is neither more 
nor less than had the Australian operation remained a branch . 
If the Australian tax on dividends had been appreciably 
high r than 15 per cent , however , as it was prior to the tax 
agr m nt between the U. S . and Australia in 1953, or if the 
Australian rate of company tax had been significantly 
high r than the 40 per cent assumed, as, it has become 
sinc 1962 , the incom eventually accr.uing to the American 
par n of an Australian subsidiary d blaring all its profits 
in div'd nds would actually have been less than if the 
Australian operation had not been incorporated . Clearly, 
what is r 1 vant is not the level o f Australian company 
ta m r ly but 'that of total Australian ta , including 
withholding tax, in relation to the Am rican rate . 
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Th re s only one other major consideration confront"ng 
a manufacturing ventur from a tax point of view . If a long 
established foreign branch is incorporated in the country of 
operation, a prohibitive U . S . tax might apply to the book-
keeping profit made by the ' sale ' of the assets of the branch 
to th newly incorporated company . 
It appears, in summary, that companies setting up an 
operation in Australia at present have a short-term advant-
age to be gained in setting up a branch structure if the 
venture is expected to be unprofitable initially. When the 
operation becomes profitable, the decision on whether or not 
to incorporate will depend largely on the policy to be 
adopted towards profit repatriation . Companies remitting all 
(or almost all) after-tax profits have, since the change in 
U . S . tax laws in 1962, no incentive to incorporate in Australia 
and, since the increase in Australian tax rates, some posi -
tive incentive to remain unincorporated . Those with lower 
rat s of profit repatriation have every incentive to incorp-
orate locally, unless they have been operating for a long 
period as a branch and now face a heavy tax penalty if they 
incorporate, or unless they see very positive advantages in 
retaining th cloak of secrecy which non- incorporation still 
provides . 
It is no accident that the 14 American companies manufac -
turing in Australia under a branch structure in 1962 fell 
for the most part into on of three categories : those established 
in Australia for a long period , those established very 
rec ntly, and those which might be expected to have a high 
rat of profit repatriation . The companies concerned were 
Parke Davis, Coca-Cola, Watkins Products, Coty, Max Factor, 
Ches brough-P ond ' s, American Flange 8 Manufacturing, Corning 
Glass Works, Smith Klin 8 French, Cummins Diesel, Pepsi-
Cola M ropolitan Bottling Company , Pfizer , Lubrizol Inter-
national, and Lily Cups . One other firm which recently 
chang d from a branch op ration to a subsidiary did so at the 
sam tim that the Australian operation changed fro~ being 
m r ly a sal s organization to being a manufacturing venture, 
and his pr sumably coincided with a hang in the company's 
profi r mittance policy . Only one of th companies inter-
vi w d m ntion d a d "sadvantag of the branch form not 
asso iat d w"th ta a t ion, namely , the vUb rability of the 
U. S. P nt to 1 gal atta k through its foreign branch . 
Ev n aft r choosing th form of corporate structur to 
be adopt d , th Am rOcan company contemplating i n vestm nt 
still h s to d cid wh th r to be the sole owner of its 
ventur or to sha own rship with others . In making this 
de ision, i must r cogniz that one of the most ·p ot nt 
caus of popul r sus p icion 01 Am e r ican investmen t i n 
Australia is the wi d s p r ad b lief t h at American comp a n ies 
almost °nvariabl y d ny Australian s a n opp ortu nity to 
p articO p ate in the own rship of their local s u bsidiaries . 
This popul ar hostility is not diminished by the belief 
that British subsidiaries in Australia more oft n tend to 
share own rship with Australians than do American subsid-
iari s.lO The Commonw alth Government has announced that 
' it is in gen ral consider d desirable that there be 
11 Australian particip ation in ownership and management' , 
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and en th senior ex cutiv s of many wholly-American 
subsidiari shave expr ssed fear that the growth and prolif-
eration of Am rican compaWffi in which Australians are denied 
a share int r st might lead to undesirable domination of the 
economy . Again and again during th present survey the view 
was pr ssed that 'w don ' t want to become like Canada' . 
10 . Th foundations lor this belief are only moderat ly 
sure. Dr P nrose s~ated in 1956 that 'on the average 
Am rican comp anies hold 5% and British companies 40% of the 
Ordinary Shares of their subsidiaries in Australia ', though 
she ga no source for her statement. ( Edith Tilton P enr ose , 
' For ign In estment and th Growth of th Firm ' , Economic 
Journal , LXVI (1956 ) , p . 227 . ) A survey of 666 companies 
condu t d in 195 b E. L . Wh lwright and B. 0 Dougherty 
indicat d tha ,hil only 46 per cent of the total value of 
p aid- up apital held by British companies in Australia was i n 
wholly-own d sub idiari s, he corr sponding Am rican figure 
was 60%. ( E .L . Wh lwright , ' Overs as In e ~ tm nt in Australia ', 
in Th E onomics 01 Autitralian Industry, ed . Alex Hunter 
(Melbourn : M lbourn Un° rsity P r s , 1963 ), p. 170 . ) On 
the oth r hand, the Australian British Trade Association f ound 
Austr lian equit particip ation in only about on - third of t h e 
222 BrOt Osh- affiliat d ompani s °t urv d in 196 4. ( Unite d 
stm nt in Australian Industr : P recis of Submis -
Committ of Economic En quiry Melbourne : 
Trad Asso iation, 196 4), p . 1. ) Furth er , 
ident of t h Ameri an Chamb r of' Commerce 
in Aus rali , cont nd d in 1963 that ' rec nt studi s by the 
Chamb al that of 215 Am rican c ompani s op rating i n 
[ 1 ] , 115 o ' 53 p r c nt ha Australian part ici -
a t, r a otal of 5 British compani s 
r onl r 44 p r nt ha Austr lian hareholde rs .' 
FOnan ial R 4 April 1963r p. 2 .) In fact , 




tOsf ctory w °ght of paid-Up 
nd n ith r th Austral oan British 
r O an Charnb r of Comm rc in 
t hn°qu tall . Th r ar 
n whi h Au stralian an bu a n 
a 
Among th 
°on, B it O 
i n whi h Brit O h 
ar su h gian a nil er , 
h P trol urn , Tho s. Borthwicks , 
/ 6 
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Wh t n fact w· s r.h actual situation with regard to the 
own rsh'p of Am r can- :f'l'ated firms manufacturing in 
Austral' n 1962? h d ta gath r d n th survey are 
pr sent d in Tabl :2 IV 1 to IV-5 , Thes show that 125 
out o.f 208 oper tion w re ither branches or wholly-owned 
subsidiari s of American compani S j fiv had b tween 75 and 
99 p r c nt of th shares held in the . s . ; 50 
b tw n 50 and 74 p r e ntj nd 28 b tw n 25 and 49 per 
cent. S'nc 22 o · th companies in the 50 to 74 per cent 
category w r only 50 p c nt American, th r w re exactly 
50 compani s, or 24 p r cent of the total, in which the 
Ameri an shar int r st .fell s hort of a majority. And this , 
of cours , with on x ption, takes into account only 
American interest s 0 at 1 ast 25 per cent . 
Tabl IV - l r ev Is that ther were significant 
diff r nc s in own rship patt rns betw n different industries . 
Almost all Ameri an-affiliated firms in ' Pharmaceutical and 
toilet pr parations ' w r ntirely American in ownership , 
and high ratios of wholl "-Am rican companies also pr vailed 
in ' Motor v hicles' , 'Food and drink', 'Oils, mineral', 
'Abrasiv s', and 'Wr'ting instrum nts ' . On the other hand , 
only on of si companies in 'Clothing and fabrics' was 
wholly Am rican , and the proportion of wholly-owned firms 
in ' Industrial chemic 1 a nd plastics' and 'Metal manufac-
tures, no . , .1. wa no high . 
Consid rabl caut ' on must be e ercised in the interpreta-
tion of Tabl IV-2 . At .first glanc it appears to indicate 
a fairly st ad hang in th ownership pr ferences of 
American firm s . All h e of the Am rican- affiliated firms 
still 'n ist n in 1 2 which b gan manufa turing in 
Australia b tw n 1900 and 1909 w r wholly Am rican in 1962 . 
·Corr sponding ratios or th uc ssiv p riod shown in 
the tabl pr s d in p ntag s , are: 1 00 , 4, 78 , J6 , 67, 
5 4, 41 . Ap rt. from th p r'od 19 40 to 19 49 , wh n the 
e ist n of alL b r G rnm nt k n to encourage 
jO ' nt ntur s was p respons ' ble for th appar n t l y 
( 10) C dbury- r -P 1, and (sinc 196J ) A.E.I . 
( 11 ) 0 rs ' n Au tralia ( Canb r a: Commonw alth 
Tr asur , 
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TABLE IV- I : AMERICAN EQUrIY IN Al"VIERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES MANUFACTUR-
ING IN MID-1962, BY INDUSTRY (a) 
Companies incorporated in 
Australia in which the 
American interest at 30 June 
1962 was -
Industry 25-~.9% 50~74% 75-99% 106%(b) Branches Total 
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(a) ' American equity ' r efers only to 'direct investment' , as earlier 
defined . It includes ownership by way of a controlled company in a 
third country. More than 20 of the above companies had some or all of 
their ' American' shares held in some country other than the U. S., 
usually the U. K. or Canada . 
(b) In a few cases, the actua l American equity in ' lOCP;b companies ' 
was less than 100 per cent because an intermediate parent company 
had some non-American shareholding . Thus , Hoover (Aust . ) Pty Ltd 
is included as a 'lOCP;b. company ' because it was wholly- owned by 
Hoover Ltd of the U.K. The lat er company , though controlled in the 
U. S., has a substantial British shareholding . For the purpose of the 
table 9 directors' qualifying shares have been ignored, as also has 
one 'genuine ' Australian shareholding of about 0 . 2 per cent . 
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TABLE IV - 2 : AMERICAN EQUITY IN AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES MANUFACT -
URING IN MID- 1962 , BY DATE AT WHICH MANUFACTURE BEGAN (a) 
Period in which Companies incorporated in Australia 
Australian in which the American interest a t 
manufacture be- 30 June 1962 was -
gan (b) Branches Tot al 
25- 4% 50- 74% 75- 9% 10o%(c) 
1900- 09 
. " 3 3 
1910- 19 5 1 6 
1920- 29 3 1 21 25 
1930- 39 5 16 2 23 
1940-49 7 6 1 6 2 22 
1950- 54 6 2 15 1 24 
1955- 59 10 15 1 28 3 57 
1960- mid ' 62 5 19 2 13 5 44 
Not classifiable 4 4 
Total 28 50 5 III 14 208 
(a) See Not e (a ) to Table IV- L 
(b) The year in which manufacture began is taken to be the year in which 
an American equity of a t least 25 per cent was first a cquired in the 
case of companies manufacturing previously as Australian- owned ventures . 
(c) See Not e (b) to Table IV- I. 
TABLE IV- 3: AMERICAN EQUITY IN AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES MANUFACT-
URING IN MID- 1962 2 BY EMPLOYMENT IN 1962~aL 
Size of Compani es incorporated in Australia 
companies by in which the American interest a t Branches Total 
employment 30 June 1962 was -
25- 4% 50- 74% 75- 9% 10o%(b) 
1- 25 4 8 7 2 21 
26- 50 4 4 2 15 2 27 
51- 75 1 8 8 1 l8 
76- 100 1 5 9 2 17 
101- 150 4 1 2 17 3 27 
151- 200 5 6 13 2 26 
201- 300 3 7 12 1 23 
301- 400 1 4 1 1 7 
401- 500 1 4 1 6 
501- 750 2 1 7 10 
751-1000 1 2 6 9 
1001- 1500 1 2 2 5 
1501- 2000 1 . . .. 2 3 
Over 2000 1 8 9 
Tot al 28 50 5 111 14 208 
Total 1962 
em,e1ol!!!ent 7 , 606 13 , 401 665 73 , 038 1 , 783 96 , 493 
~a~ See Not e 
b Se Note 
~a~ t o Table IV-I. 
b t o Table IV- I . 
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very low proportion of wholly-owned companies established, 
the figur s evinc a most pronounced tendency in favour of 
12 th jointly-owned company. There has almost certainly been 
a tend ncy of that kind operating but this conclusion can 
not b reached with certainty from a consideration of Table 
IV-2 alone. It is possible, for example, that companies 
which b gin as joint ventures become wholly- American after a 
period and Table IV-2, therefore , may merely reflect the 
different ages of the companies covered. 
The information available on changes in ownership 
patt rn is not gr at. Of 104 firms which gave the American 
interest in their company at the commencement of manufacture 
in Australia, 21 had experienced an increase in that percent-
age int rest by 1962 and eight had experienced a decrease. 
Between 1962 and the end of 1964, it is known that at least 
another five firms exp rienced an increase in American 
shareholding, while four American companies sold out their 
inter st entirely and four more allowed their holding to de-
crease. Of the 26 firms in which the American interest is 
known to have been increased, 12 previously jointly-owned 
companies have become wholly-American ventures . One of 
thes began operations in the period 1900- 09, three in 
1920-29, two in 1940-49, two in 1950-54, and four in 1955-59 . 
Their number includes such companies as Chrysler, Kraft, 
Monsanto Ch micals, P. £ H . Power Cranes £ Shovels, and 
Revlon. In another thr e cas s, the increase in the 
American int r st was from a minority position to one of 
majority sharehold r, while in two more the American interest 
moved from a minority one to a 50 p r cent holding . Of the 
tw 1 firms in which the Am rican interest is known to have 
been r duced (1 aving out of account those in which the 
American int r st has been entirely withdrawn), six were 
form d s wholly-American ntures . In four of the si , 
th Am rican inter st r mains a majority one, but in the 
two oth rs only 50 p r c nt. Four of them established manu-
facturing op rations in Austr lia in the period 1930- 39 and 
two in th p riod 1955-59 . All but one, howev r, remained 
wholly-Am r an till aft r 1955. They include such well known 
12. FOfty-on Ameri an-affiliated compani s are known to 
hav b gun manu fa turing (or to ha e mad plans to do so) 
in th 30 months from 1 July 1962 to th nd of Dec mb r 
1964. Th own rship of all of them is not known , but it 
is l<nown th t at 1 ast 26 had substantial Australian quity 
in th m. 
90 
firms as Rh m, Union Carbid , Hunter Douglas, and Kimberly-
Clark. 
When allowance is made for thes known changes, the 
ratio of wholly-own d firms established in the period 
19JO- J9 incr ases sharply whil the ratio in 1940-49 falls 
sharply , both movements which are not unexpected . The 
incomplet ness of th data still prevents dogmatism on the 
subject , but it do s appear very likely that there has 
been a marked shift in the ownership "prefere nces of American 
firms op rating in Australia in favour of sharing ownership. 
Table IV-J shows that not all wholly-American firms 
operating her are large . Forty-six such firms had employ-
ment of 100 or less in 1962 . But at the other extre.'me, 
the origins of the public belief that American firms almost 
always hold all the ordinary shares in their Australian subsid-
iari s may be seen from the fact that eight of the nine firms 
with employment of over 2 ,000 in 1962 were wholly-o\vned . 
The importance of the large wholly-owned firms in the 
total picture is brought out in another way in Table Iv-4. 
In this table, the 1962 employment of each of the 20 companies 
cov r d was used to weight the percentage of the ordinary 
shar s (or quivalent equity in an unincorporated operation) 
held by the ten types of shareholder shown . lJ Thus, if a 
company had 60 per cent of its shares held in the U . S~ and 
a 1962 employm nt of 1,000, the figure of ' 600 ' was allocated 
to the 'Am rican ownership' column in the row for companies 
having an American equity of 50-74 per cent. Similarly, '400' 
was allocated to one of th ' on-American ownership ' columns. 
When all companies in that row had been tr ated in this manner, 
th ' employment ' in ach category of ownership was calculated 
as a p rc ntage of the total employment of all the companies 
in that row . The resulting figures permit a number of 
int r sting observations . 
First, the importanc of the wholly-Am rican firms is 
clearly d monstrat d by the fact that , despite J of the 
total of 208 firms co r d bing jointly-owned ventures, 
more than 88 per c nt of th total ' w ighted a erage o\~er-
ship ' of th whol group was American in 1962 . Secondly, 
lJ . t must b adm"tt d that mploym nt is not an entir ly 
satisf tory wight . But its u was dictat d both by th 
abs n f any oth r weight which ould b us d for all the 
208 ompan s onc rn d and by its probabl sup riority 0 r 
any oth r wight in a sur y of this kind. The us of sal s 
figur s, for ampl, was impossible not only be ause aT th 
lack of dat but also b caus 0 th numb r of' companies which 
Conctuct substantial sIs op rations unconn ct d with th ir 
manuf tur"ng ac~i iti 
TABLE IV- 4: WEIGHTED AVERAGE OWNERSHIP OF AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES MANUFACTURING IN MID- 1962 , BY PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN 
OWNERSHIP 
Percent- Employ-
age of U. S. ment in 
ownership 1962 A B 
Non- American ownership at 30 June 1962 (per cent) - American 
C D E F G H I Total(c ) ownership at 30 June 
(a) 
25- 4% 7, 606 27 . 70 9 . 34 
50- 74% 13 , 401 14. 74 17. 47 1 . 97 
75-9% 665 16~54 
8 . 48 6. 75 2. 07 
2. 16 0~52 5.70 
4. 18 
1. :33 5 · 64 4. 53 
2 . 05 
65 . 84 
44 . 61 
20 . 72 
1962 (per 
cent) 
34 . 16 
55 . 39 
79 .• 28 
100% (b) 74 ,821 ., . 100. 00 













96 , 493 4,,23 3 . 28 0 . 27 1 . 00 ' 0'. 60 0 . 96 0 . 11 0 . 44 0 . 64 11.53 
Shares directly listed , and mainly held , in Australia . 
Shares held by a company liste~and mainly owned , in Australia . 
Shares held by an Australian proprietary company which , by virtue of its being a subsidiary of a listed Australian company , 
is 'indirectly listed'" More than 50 per cent of its equity is held in Australia . 
Shares held by a small number of private shareholders in Australia . 
Shares held by an Australian proprietary company unconnect ed with a list ed company. More than 50 per cent of its equity 
is held in Australia. 
Shares held by a company listed in Australia , but mainly owned abroad . 
Shares held by an Australian proprietary company in which a listed Australian company holds a share but which is mainly 
owned a broad. 
Shares held by an Australian proprietary company unconnected with a listed Australian company. Though thffiB is some 
Australian equity in the company , it is mainly owned abroad . 
Shares held directly by a foreign (usually British) company. 
See Note (a) to Table IV- 1. 
Includes branches . See also Note (b) to Table IV- l . 
Detail may not add to totals because of rounding . 
NOTE : In ea ch of the four cat egories of Ameri·can ownership shown i n the first column, the 1962 employment of the companies 
concerned was used to weight the percentage of the ordinary shares held by the t en cat egories of shareholder shown across 
tlie t able . See text . ~ 
I-' 
TABLE IV- 5: WEIGHTED AVERAGE OWNERSHIP OF AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES MANUFACTURING IN MID- 1962 , BY INJ)USTRY 
Industry Employ-
ment i n 
1962 




Mot or vehicles 
Motor a ccessories 
Meta l manuf'act-
7 , 049 
752 
34 , 705 
1 ,307 
ures , n . e . i . 6 ,805 
Electrical equip-
ment , instruments , 
etc . 10 , 128 
Gramophone r ecords 389 
Food and drink 8 , 797 
Sausage casings 448 
Industrial chemicals 
and plastics 4,315 
I nks, polishes, 
adhesives , etc . 574 




Oils , mineral 
Paper products 
Rubber products 




1 ~ 045 
2, 231 
1 , 576 
3, 671 
180 
1 , 407 
f abrics 1 , 522 
Furnishings 631 
Writing instruments 138 




28 . 38 











0 . 07 





23 . 75 




Non- American ownership at 30 June 1962 (per cent) -
C 
I> • 










0 . 96 
0 . 60 
0. 91 
10 . 29 
0 . 40 
0 . 28 
3. 00 
0 . 21 
20 . 56 
30 . 33 
E 
6. 04 
0 . 02 








0 . 73 
.. 
0 . 41 
G H 
6 • 
0 0 54 
1 .. 49 
4. 16 
.. 
(a ) Detail may not add to t ot als because of rounding . See also notes to Tabl e IV- 4. 
I 
0 . 64 
3. 08 
2. 08 
2 . 10 
.. 
10. 98 






Total (a) 30 June 1962 
(per cent) -
16 . 94 
18.42 
0 .. 17 
40 . 64 




10 . 29 
20 . 95 
23, 75 
0 . 28 
13, 52 
24 . 15 
33 ~ 28 
4., 67 
39 . 33 
6. 14 
48 . 12 
18 . 34 
0 . 00 
8 .. 18 
83 . 06 
81. 58 
99 . 83 
59 . 36 
55 .. 66 
78.88 
92 . 29 
97 . 15 
89 . 71 
79 . 05 
76 . 25 
99 . 72 
86. 48 
75 . 85 
66 . 72 
95. 33 




100 . 00 




not even all of the non-American ownership was Australian. 
Small int r sts were also held by other foreign firms , by 
Australian proprietary companies in which the majority of th 
shares wer held abroad, and by firms listed on Australian 
Stock Exchanges in which the majority of the shares were held 
abroad . Of the total Australian ownership of somewhat less 
than 10 P r cent of the total, individual Austral ians and 
Australian-owned proprietary companies unconnected with any 
list d company held a significant share but by far the largest 
part was accessible , directly or indirectly, to the ordinary 
Australian investor . 0 fewer than JJ companies were partly 
owned by listed companies which were predominantly Australian-
owned, while shares in another lJ firms - Borg-Warner, Union 
Carbide , Boral, Formfit , Jantzen , Sporting Arms , Ducon (in 
1962), Mount Isa Mines, F.M.C., Ralph McKay , Australian Con-
trols , Hunter Douglas, and Philip Morris - could be directly 
purchased on an Australian S tock Exchange. 
Table IV - 5 p resents the same information as does Table IV-4, 
except that it does so by industry instead of by the p ercentage 
of Am rican shareholding. It is self- explantory , though it 
should perhaps be noted that the most significant change which 
has occurred in the lAm rican ownership ' figures since 1962 is 
a marked increase in that relating to the cosmetics industry with 
th sale of the entire Australian shareholding in one major com-
pany and the reduction of the Australian holding in one of the 
others . 
B fore turning to a discussion of the reasons why American 
firms choose particular ownership patterns , it is interesting to 
note th som what b tter response accorded to the survey by 
jointly.-owned companies than by wholly-owned. Wh ile 60 p r cent 
of all th companies approach d were wholly-American , only 55 per 
cent of th 100 participants were so . The assessment of the 
answers to most s ur y q u stion s by the percen tage of American 
shar holding h Ips to reduce the practical impact of any result -
ing bias . 
TABLE IV - 6 : RESPONSE TO THE SURVEY , BY PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN OWNERSHIP (a) 
Response ompanies incorporated in Branches Total 
Australia in which the 
American interest at 30 June 
1962 was -
25- 49% 50- 74% 75- 99% 100%(b) 
Participating companies 16 26 3 47 8 100 
Non-participating 
2 64 6 108 companies 12 24 
~ 28 50 5 III 14 208 
ResEons e ~Eer cent) 57 52 60 42 57 48 
(a) See Note ~a~ t o Table IV- I . 
(b) ·See Note b to Table IV- I . 
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Why do most Am ri an firms prefer to retain for th m-
selves all th shar s in their Australian subsidiaries?14 
A gr at many answers to this question were offered to the 
writer during th course of the present survey. To begin with 
it was stated that ' any overseas entrepreneur that owns an 
Australian ent rprise that is realizing or holds potential 
for good earnings and substantial growth is unlikely to be 
enthusiastic about sharing good fortune with others '. This 
motive , so unambiguously expressed by the managing dir ctor 
of one wholly-American concern , undoubtedly lies behind the 
reluctanc of many such firms to sell part of their equity 
to local inv stors. Th motive may be expected to be especially 
strong if the task of br aking into th Australian market was 
particularly xpensive and fraught with above average risks : 
having borne th costs of establishment , wholly- American firms 
are not likely to be eager to share later harvests . (It is 
no doubt significant that of all the Australian- American ven-
tures studied only two are known to have resulted from the yield-
ing to local investors of an interest in a previously all-
American firm, except where this was done to acquire another 
Australian firm.15) 
S condly, many executives in wholly- American companies 
expressed the f ar hat Australian shareholders would exercise 
considerabl pressure for dividends in conflict with the fre-
quent desire of par nt companies to reinvest profits for a 
consid rable p riod . Dividend policy is discussed in some 
detail in th s cond half of this chapter but for the moment 
14 . For a particularly full discussion of the advantages and 
disad antag s of differ nt ownership patterns , see E.R. Barlow , 
Manag m nt of For ign Manufacturing Subsidiari s (Boston: 
Graduat School of Busin ss Administration, Harvard Univ rsity, 
1953), pp . 114-47 . S also Lincoln Gordon and Engelbert L . 
Gromm rs, Unit d Stat s Manufacturin Investment in Brazil: 
The Impact of Brazilian Go ernment P olicies 1946 - 1960 Boston : 
Graduat S hool of Busin ss Administration, Harvard University, 
1962), pp . 13 -44; and Wolfgang G . Friedmann and Georg 
Kalmanolf ( ds.) , Joint Int r n ation al Busin ss Ventures ( w 
York: Columb o n rsity P ress , 1961 ), especially pp . 125-54. 
15 . Four pr iously wholly-Am rican compani s ar known to 
hav issu d shar s to Australians in the process of acquiring 
or m gOng with Australoan ompani s but all other Australian-
Am ri an ornpani s pp ar to hav originated either in the 
acquOsOtOon of an quity in an isting Australian company 
(som tOm S pr °ous d al r or licens ) or in a joint ntur 
st blosh d d no 0 in partn rship with an Australian company . 
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it may be noted that wholly-American firms do often adopt 
extremely conservative divide~d policies . ot only may 
dividends be abjured for many years aft e r the initial 
investm nt , they may also be discontinued for several 
years at a later period to finance further investment . 
This is a situation which most Australian shareholders , 
whether corporate or individual , accept only with reluct -
ance . Several of the jointly- owned companies visited 
were keenly aware of the pressure for divi d ends from local 
shareholders and in the case of at l e ast two 50 / 50 joint 
ventures this pressure had been so acute as to end the 
partnership and compel the American shareholder to buy 
out the Australian . In one of these cases, no dividend 
had been remitted to the American company for over a 
decade ( though dividends had been declared and paid to 
t h Australian shareholder until the d i ssolution of the 
arrangement), while in the other the Australian share holder 
was accused of being 'after a quick pound '. 
A conservative dividend policy may be due only in part 
to a desire to build up the local investment rapidly. 
Th desire to avoid Australian tax on dividends remitted 
to the U . S, is also an important factor encouraging their 
reinvestment . And here is found a reason for preferring 
100 per cent ownership which is logically distinct from 
considerations of divid nd policy alone . For it is 
possible for wholly- American companies which ~ keen to 
r ceive som return on their Australian investment to 
secur this without incurring Australian dividend tax . 
On way of doing this involves suitable manipulation of 
the balance she t (as will be explained later) in a manner 
which is rar ly attractive if ownership is shared with 
local investors . 
Th rare oth r important ar as of possible disagree-
ment . Wh n a subsidiary is entirely owned by its parent 
company, the problem of or dering inter- company relations 
i s in fa t not a problem at all . Technical information 
and know-how of all kinds can b fr ly transmitted with-
out on rn for a strict accounting . E ports to th 
subsidiary may b invoic d at prices d t rmin d by questions 
of t at'on and conv ni nc . P rodu ction may b allo ated 
b tw n par nt and subsidiary and betw n various for ign 
subsidiar ' s withou t r gard to th profitability of any 
on op rat'on . But if th own rship of the s u bsidiary is 
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shared w'th 10 al inv stors, the probl m of parent - subsid-
iary r lations can giv ris to innum rabl onflicts . 
If dir t international inv stm nt in manufacturing 
is essent ' ally the process of applying abroad t chniques 
learnt at great cost at home , it is not surpr±sing that 
the firms conc rned ar not prepar d to hand over part of 
th fruits of this ffort to local investors at the 
marginal cost of transmitting the know-how to the foreign 
company. This points to a need for som kind of formal -
ization of r lationships, and this in turn may cause 
considerable ill feeling on the part of both American 
shar hold r and local investor. For who can place an 
objective value on th knowledge gained from 50 years of 
manufacturing exp rience? One management consultant 
comment d to the writer that G.M . H. initially invested 
not only a few million pounds in th production of the 
Holden car but also $1,000 million worth of experience in 
the production of motor vehicles. It was not to be 
exp cted that the company would hav been willing to 
grant local investors a cheap equity in this experience, 
even had local inv stors been willing to invest in the 
company when it first commenced Holden production . A 
number of wholly-Ame rican firms mentioned that difficulties 
of this kind were important in their decision not to 
invit Australian participation . Several felt that 
Australian quity participation would inhibit the free 
flow of information between parent and subsidiary. 
Oth r compani s w re worried about potential con-
flicts in the pricing of commodity transactions between 
par nt and subsidiary. One of the s veral oil companies 
intervi w d comm nted that Australian shareholders 
might bring pr ssur ' to buy crud from the cheapest 
sourc of supply , forg tting that the ch ap st source in 
the short run may not be th cheap st source over th 
long- t rm. ' For noth r f ' rm , th problem was the re -
vers though th of th ' s wholly- Am rican com-
pany was in favour of som Australian shar participation, 
he saw th t th r could b som difficulty about import 
pr cing 0 y : 
W ha a pri ing poli y which 1 av s most of 
th profit wh r w w nt to pand fa iliti s . 
Abou t thr yars go , 't was d cid d that the 
U . K . s u bs ' diary would s 11 u s compon nts at a 
pri wh'ch only 1 ft th U .K . omp ny a v r y 
s m 11 m rg'n nd t us m < a b'g profit here . 
Th's w s mainly b aus of the low ta rat s 
' n Austral'a omp r d with rat s in th U . K. 
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Obviously, such a poli y would b most unattractive if 
Austral o n shar holders owned part of th 10 al op ration . 
At 1 st wo major compani s whos parents had 
adopt d a policy of int rnational sp ialization of pro-
duction saw that this policy would lead to s rious con-
flict i~ pursu d in a sOtuation wh re Australian inv stors 
had a shar in th local firm. On stat d that , being n 
an °ndustry wh r technology chang s rapidly, 'we must 
mak fr qu nt changes in our production programme in 
assigning n w products to plants and in re-assigning old 
on s. t will oft n b th ase that a re - assignment of 
this kind r duc s the manufacturing profitability of one 
subsidiary although overall benefit accrues to the parent 
company . ' Th oth r f lt that whil it might not be to 
the Australian company's advantag to import certain com-
ponents, it might be to th whole company ' s advantage if 
the supplyOng subsidiary had considerable e c ss capacity. 
Oth r reasons for pr f rring the ' 100 p r cent pattern ' 
were not d only occasionally. Several e ecutives commented 
on th xt nt to which complete ownership simplifies the 
probl m of manag m nt at all levels - it permits complete 
control over quality (of v ry great importance in some 
products) ; i reduces th risk of dissemination of technical 
information; it p rmits compl t control of mark ting 
poli is; ° t ven simplifies th consolidation of accounts 
in th .S . While a majority holding is in theory suffic -
i o nt to p rmi t the Am rican parent to e erci absolute 
authority on manag m nt, n practic the ne d to preserve 
an atmosph re of harmony with th Australian sharehold r 
som tim s pr nts thi 
Australoan holding is 
particularly in as s where the 
tiv ly r pres nt d in managem nt . 
On firm wh o h b gan op rations in Australia during 
th thOrt O s m ntion d that the American par nt had 
adopt d 100 p r nt patt rn h r becaus at that time 
' nobody on Australi had any mon y to spare ' . 0 company 
indO t d th t ompl t own rship had b n chos n for 
f ar th t th 10 al in stor might not b abl to pro -
vid su~fo i nt fund n th nt of a la r pansion of 
fa °lOt O 




imp rt nt d 
pt to th t nt that di id nd policy 
but th Australi n sh r h ld r of a 1 a t 
w s on rn d 1 st th Am rican partn r 
1 p th 
ailabl • 
mp ny mor r pidly than h wou ld 
On ompany m ntion d that an 
t g or not ha °ng Au tralian shar h ld rs 
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was that until 1961 this permitted annual results to be 
kept s cr t , but the f'rm was presumably confusing pro-
prietary status with comp1et American ownership and, of 
cours , th two are fr quent1y not identical. 
Interesting 1Yr two factors sometimes mentioned in 
connection with a preference for 100 per cent ownership 
were not mentioned by any of the companies interviewed, 
though that is not to say they were no t operative in some 
cases . One is the fear of creating a body of dissatis-
fied potential customers and a bad public image if local 
shar holders suffer share market loss es during the period 
of establishment . It has been said, for example, that 
Phillips Oil Products Ltd regretted issuing a 50 per cent 
holding in its newly established marketing operation to 
Australian shareholders in 1961 . Certainly, late in 1963 
the company offered to buy back the publicly-held shares 
at par (which was then more than 17 per cent above 
market price) after a series of trading losses . Secondly, 
th more complete is American ownership of its Australian 
subsidiary, the less likely it is that the parent company 
will be charged with conspiracy in restraint of trade 
under American antitrust law if the freedom of that 
subsid iary to export is restricted in any way . (Indeed , 
the surest way of avoiding antitrust action in a situation 
where it is desired to restrict the export activities of 
a for ign operation appears to be to operate the foreign 
concern as a branch rather than as an incorporated entity . ) 
It is doubtful , howev r, whether particular importance 
should be attached to this factor since, as will be seen 
1at r, there app ars to be no great hesitation on the 
part of American compani s to impose export restrictions 
ff 'l' t ' A t l' 16 on th ir jointly-own d a 1 la es ln us ra lao 
That many American firms see very strong advantages 
in having complete own rship of their foreign subsidiaries 
is onfirmed not only by the predominance of wholly- owned 
American subsidiari s in Australia but also by similar 
patt rns in other ountries . Of the 3,481 manufacturing 
conc rns in which th r was a . ' direct 'American investm nt 
in 1957, 2,455, or mor than 70 p r cent , were 95 per cent 
16 . For a full discussion of American antitrust law and 
th own rship 0 for ign subsidiaries, s e Kingman 
Br wst r, Jr ., Law and Unit d Stat s Busin ss in Canada 
(Wash ' ngton : ationa1 P lanning As sociation (U. S.A.) and 
Pri t Planning Asso iation of Canada, 1960 ), specially 
Pp.7-8 . 
or mor 
17 own d in the U . S. But while some Am rican 
parent companies which own all the shares in their 
Australian subsidiar'es maintain a policy of complete 
own rship throughout the world, this is not by any means 
tru of all of them . Chrysler , for example, has joint 
ventur s in more than on country , and so also do the 
paren$ of Merck Sharp 8 Dohme, Mobil Oil, Parsons 
G n ral Foods , Ford, and Corning Glass. Dunning noted 
in his survey of American investment in Britain that 
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the British Hoover and Singer affiliates wer both Anglo -
, , 18 Amerlcan companles , and General Milk shares the owner-
ship of its subsidiary in the Philippines. 19 Sometimes 
local equity is yielded only under duress: at least four 
firms known to the writer which appear to follow a 
general practic ol r taining sole ownership have recently 
announced the establishment of joint ventures in Japan, 
presumably as a result ' of Japanese Government pressure . 
An important pharmaceutical firm, which owns all the 
shares in its foreign subsidiaries throughout the world, 
indicat d that pressure from a government department con-
trolling import licenses in ew Zealand was on the verge 
of br, aking th company ' s policy in that country . It 
17 . Samuel P izer and Frederick Cutler, U . S . Business 
Investments in Foreign Countries (Washington: Office of 
Busin ss Economics, U . S . Department of Commerce , 1960), 
p . 10 2 . It is interesting to note that, like the data 
gath red in this survey, U.S . Departm nt of Comm rce 
figur s show a declining p rcentag of ' 95 per cent or 
mor ' compani s as the date of their establishment 
approach s the census year, 1957. 
U.S. D partment of Commerce figures make possible a 
comparison of the own rship patterns of American direct 
in estm nts in arious ar as. Their interpretation , 
how ver, is not asy. F . • Bennett has noted that while 
80 p r c nt of the total alue of American direct invest -
ments established in Oc ania ( mainly Australia and ew 
Zealand) in th period 1951- 57 was in companies owned to 
th t nt of at 1 ast 95 p r cent in the U.S., the corr-
esponding figur for Europe was only 73 per cent and for 
Canada only 57 p r c nt. ( F .• B nn tt , ' The Pattern and 
Signifi anc of Unit d Stat s Direct In stments in 
Australia', unpublish d B . E • ( Hons. ) th sis lor the 
Univ rsity of Sydney, 1961, p . 9~ If th number of such 
v ntur s b tak n, how r the Australasian p rc ntage 
is 68, th Europ an 72, and th Canadian O. (U.S . 
Busin ss In stm nts in Foreign Countries, p.10~ 
18 . J.R. Dunning , 
fa turing Industry 
101 . 
Manu-
pp . 70, 
19 . Busin ss WI, 20 April 1963 , r print of 'Multi -
nation s: How U.S. bus 'n ss go s worldwide ', p . 10 . 
do s not follow, 01 cours , that pressur 1rom th 
Australian Gov rnment would automati cally e nsure that 
companies which h a d int nded to s t up wholly-owned 
subsidiaries would in fact establish joint ventures . 
Th necessity to share ownership is, as se n above, 
undoubtedly regard d as a 'con' by many companie s and 
som would c rtainly d cide not to invest in Australia 
rath r than accept local shareholders . Moreover , 
Australian shareholders would be very hard to find for 
100 
some ntur s . But it does seem likely that Australian 
pressur would have some effect in the d i rec ti on of 
increas d joint ventures, and indeed has already had 
some ff ct in this direction. 20 
A number of companies which hold most strongly to 
the principl 01 complete ownership of their subsidiaries 
have advocated that Australian investors, instead of 
pressing for the right tobuy shares in the local sub-
sidiary, should purchase the shares of the American 
parent corporation. F.G . Donner, chairman of General 
Motors Corporation, has been one or the most outspoken 
advocates of this policy . Apart from the obvious draw-
back that such purchases are not allowed under Australian 
foreign exchang regulations at present, it is doubtful 
if buying American shares would b regarded by most 
Australian investors as a genuine alternative to buying 
stock in the local subsidiary. Few Australian buyers are 
abl to follow th progress of the American firm as 
easily as they can that of the local offshoot, and the 
Am rican withholding tax on dividends is another det rrent . 
For thos who b liev an quity in th local operation 
would p rmit significant influence to b exercised over 
it, th alt rnative off red is naturally quite inadequate . 
It is probable also that most Australi n in estors ex-
p ct a som what high r di id nd yield on th ir shares than 
can b obtained from in stment in top quality American 
sto ks with long st blish d r putations and it may be 
signifi ant that the only Am rican shar list d on Australian 
Stock E chang s, ational Dairy, appears to hav b en too 
20 . Late in 1964, 
stat d that 'th r 
of th Go 
th F d ral Tr asur r, Harold Holt, 
ha aIr ady b t n s wh r the 
rnm ~ ·has be tly rt d to 
sts in 0 rs tak -over bids , 
of Australian participation . ' 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~w~ , 15 0 tob r 1964, p . 4. ) 
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highly priced for Australian investors. 21 
Obviously, not all American companies are wedded to 
the idea of complet ownership of th ir foreign affiliates. 
Many hav a policy of inviting local participation in all 
their foreign ope r ations and it has already been seen that 
American ownership is incomplete in 83 of the manufactur-
ing ventures under study in Australia. Several wholly-
American companies - notably Amoco and S.T.C. - have been 
reported as stating that some Australian p a rticipation 
would eventually be appropriate. It has also been noted 
that more than one American firm, on acquiring an Australian 
company with which to commence local operations, offered 
an equity in the now wholly-American venture to the previous 
owners in vain. The Australian executive of one wholly-
American firm indicated that, since he did not approve of 
the wholly-American pattern, his company had attempted to 
form a jointly-owned operation with one of Australia's 
largest companies - but the offer had been repulsed . In 
yet another case , the senior executive of one of the 
largest American subsidiaries in the chemical industry ex-
plained that his company began Australian operations in 
a 50/50 partnership with an Australian firm . The company 
is now wholly-American because of the failure of the 
Australian partner to take up the frequent cash issues 
made. It is common knowledge that the present American 
owners of Australian Synthetic Rubber tried hard to persuade' 
Australian tyre companies to form the company . 
Often American firms see very positive advantages in 
joint ~wn rship. In these cases , executives tend to 
deprecate the importance of conflicts of interest between 
American and Australian shareholders : as one American said, 
, obody says in General Motors in the U.S . that only one 
person must hold all the shar s in case a oonflict of 
interest develops . We hav disagreements with our partners, 
but by and large we get on very well together .' S ome 
compani s emphasiz d the importance of tapp~ng Australian 
21 . ational Dairy shar s were first issued in Australia 
in 1959 in chang for the Australian shar holding in Kra ft 
Holdings Ltd. This was p rmitted b cause the deal involved 
no cost ·to for ign chang reser es . Originally , 100, 164 
National Dairy shar s w r issu d to Australian share -
hold rs and up to 26 August 1963 , 755 more had been issued 
under stock option schem s to senior employees, and 200 had 
been transf rr d from th ew York to the Melbourne register . 
Howev r , only 47,650 shares remained on the Melbourne re -
gist r on 26 August 1963 and it is probable that the great 
bulk of th r maind r, transferre~ to th w York register , 
had b n sold to Am ricans . 
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managem nt's knowledg o:f local conditions . One explained 
in th's connection that a jointly-own d firm had been 
established because of the difficulty of managing a plant 
so far :from th U.S., it being 'too expensive to send out 
a special U. S. administration ', and another said that 
' th U .S. comp any wanted Australians to manage the company 
and feels that a 50/ 50 partnership establishes a mutual 
22 trust ' . One Am rican firm has in Australia its only 
jointly- owned foreign subsidiary becaus e of its need for 
management with knowledge of local labour a nd local con-
ditions. Other firms e stablished joint ventures to 
conserve limited funds for foreign investment and in at 
least on case the executives of a wholly-American sub-
sidiary wished they could invite American participation 
because the parent company's shortage of funds was 
hampering expansion of the local operation. In the ex-
trem case, the American parent may contribute no capital 
at all - the cash needed to start the operation can be 
supplied by a local investor and the American company be 
issued shares in exchange for technical assistance, brand-
name, and marketing rights. 
There was disagreement among the executives inter-
viewed about the value of some Australian ownership as an 
aid to sales . An executive of a wholly-American company 
in th food industry felt that Australian participation 
'would certainly make promotion easier and consumer accept -
ance greater ', and executives in sev ral other wholly-
American firms f It the same . One firm felt that there 
22 . The number of 50/ 50 ventures encountered is some-
what surprising . Some companies having such arrangements 
ar dissatisfied with them because of the uncertainty 
about who is final master, and several 51/ 49 ventures 
e pr ss d strong distast for the 50/ 50 pattern . The 
reasons for the adoption of that pattern appear to be a 
desire ' to establish the partnership principle', to 
avoid th n cessity of consolidating the venture ' s results 
with thos of ith r shareholder , and to avoid the risk 
of on shar hold r manipulating the results of the nture 
to his wn advantag. This last moti was mentioned by 
on company in parti ular whose Australian shareholder 
had had a 49 p r c nt int r st in a British subsidiary -
th Br't'sh parent of th latter had established a s par-
ate sal s ompany and, having ffecti control of the 
manufa tur'ng subsidi ry, had contri d to appropriate 
most f th profits its If . 
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might b s om aisadv n tag in b eing wbolly-American but 
for th fact that all th oth r firm s in the indu s try 
wer also entirely for ign-owned . The only joint venture 
to mention the conn ction b tween sales and Australian 
participation, however, had had a most indifferent record 
in Australia to dat and commented that 'Australian part -
icipation in the ownership and in the Board of Directors 
of this company has not been of any r ea l value . ' Another 
executive questioned on this point contrast ed the highly 
successful sales performance of the wholly-Ame rican firm 
G.M . H. with the relative failure of a predominantly 
Australian-owned company in t he same industry. And since 
even the food company quoted above dominates the market 
for most of the products i t produces, it mi ght reasonably 
be doubt d if Australian participation has any appreciably 
ben ficial influence on sales . It migh t also be doubted 
whether American firms establishing operations in 
Australia really take this factor into account at all . 23 
This is not to say that American firms in Australia 
are indifferent to their public image or to the widespread 
sentim nt in favour of some Australian shareholding in 
American subsidiaries. S e veral companie s mentioned that 
one reason for establishing a joint venture was the 
desir to avoid the odium incurred by some of the wholly-
owned companies, and more than on ref rred t o encourage -
ment from the American Chamber of Commerce in Australia 
to retain local equity. But it does appear that very few 
companies establish an Australian-American operation 'for 
fear of customer discrimination against them as wholly-
American ventures. 
It would be an e aggeration to leave the impression 
that th Am rican par nts of all the 83 operations in which 
American ownership was incomplete in 1962 consciously 
chose to invite oth rs to share th o\vnership of their 
Australian ventures . Many Am rican companies almost 
drift d into a partnership arrangemen~, while some were 
comp 11 d to se k th assistance of lo'cal shar hold rs. 
23 . It app ars that at 1 ast one British subsidiary, A . E . I . 
Ltd, issu d shar s to th Australian public primarily 
with th int ntion of 'mproving sal s . (Fri dmann and 
Kalmanoff, op . it., p . 139 . ) It may b significant , 
how v r, th taft r a r lativ ly short p riod of y ars , 
the company bought bacl th publi ly h Id shar s and now 
op rat s as a wholly-British company. 
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One of the most common w ys in which Am ric n companies 
find th ms _lves with a joint venture in Australia is 
through an approach for t chnical or marketing assistance 
from n Au tralian firm. Or an Australian distributor 
may draw th attention of the American firm to the fact 
that an import quota or an increas in tariff is making 
importing incr asingly difficult. In both these cases, 
th American firm is quite likely to invest in facilities 
in Australia, and it is more than possible, judging by 
past xp ri nce, that an Australian-American partnership 
is the r suIt . In this situation, th percentage of the 
shar s held in the Australian operation by the American 
shareholder is in part a function of the attitude of the 
Australian partner . In at least two of the joint ventures 
studied, the American company could not have ntered the 
Australian market without raw materials to which only 
Australian companies had access, and in another case 
establishm nt would have been impossible without the 
import licenc s which the Australian partner was able to 
provide. 24 Again, wh n previously wholly-American companies 
issue shar s to acquire a local company , this may have 
little to do with a desire to share ownership with 
Australians: rath r it may be made necessary by the re -
luctance of the American parent to invest ' new dollar funds ' 
in Australia. That was certainly the motive behind at 
least one uch move in recent -years . 
Is th wid spread hostility towards wholly-American 
firms justifi d? In large measure, it springs from very 
basic motions - national pride, the fear of being 'controlled ' , 
distru t of roreigners . Th s emotion~ are easily aroused 
and it is ha d to a oid the impr s ion that th y ha e been 
arou d b om for not altogether disinter sted motives . 
But it r mains true that many thoughtful Australian fe 1 
that an Au tralian shar in the ownership of American sub-
sidiari s would ha som impor tan t national advantages . 
What th advantag s ar is not alway sp cifi d v ry 
cl arly but it i~ probabl fair to say that man f el that 
a partly Australian company is more lilly to ,ct in 
24 . This p rticular .ntur pro id d an interesting illus -
tration of th kind of bargain which Australian companies 
can dri Initiall , th Aus tralian firm demanded a 45 
p er c nt quity in tb n w op ration but v ntually s ttl d 
for 25 p nt sinc this was the first foreign subsidiary 
of th c ompan in whi h it did not ha compl t 
no t a 
Au ralian p artn r pro t o'\m. 
r, by omp lling th Am ri an par nt to 
th bold'ng of th Aus r lian p artn r 
ba 1 . ng f th shar s if th entur was 
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Australi 's int r sts than is a wholly Am ri an one, and 
that, sinc some of the profits of a jointly-owned firm 
accru to Australians, such ventures pose 1 ss of a pro -
bl m for th nation's balance of payments. 
B fore att mpting to analyse th s argum nts, it 
should b r p ated that any really serious attempt by 
gov rnm nt to compel foreign investors to acc pt local 
shar participation would encount r two difficulties . 
First, som foreign firms would decid agai nst investing 
in Australia. Those who minimize th importance of this 
factor ar probably justified in doing so because of 
the admittedly strong attraction which Australia has for 
foreign capital, but that some firms would cancel invest -
ment programmes there can be no doubt. Secondly, a few 
for ign firms would find it very difficult, if not 
impossible, to attract local investors for th ir project . 
Ev n if it be granted that these objections are pro -
bably of r latively minor importance, there must remain 
serious doubt that any likely level of Australian equity 
participation, wheth r it be 25 or 49 per c nt, could 
achiev what its proponents hope of it . For to begin with, 
any minority Australian share participation would leave 
ult'mat control in the hands of the foreign majority 
shar hold r. Certainly, it does seem lik ly that 
Australian shar hold rs could ha e some influence on 
policy in som ompani s, particularly if Au tralian owner-
ship w r con ntrat d in a f w hands: th xecutive of 
on wholly-Am rican company, a man who believ d strongly 
in Austr lian participation, said that e en a minority 
shar holding would have som ffect on poli y ' because 
all omp nies ar ain to some degre . I~ an Australian 
wer bing direct d to adopt a policy at ex uti 
varian w'th the int r sts 0 Australia or the Australian 
shar hold rs, h ould always invit th U. S . executive 
out t Australia - and 1 t him fac th dissatisfied 
10 als l' On the oth r hand, the cuti of anoth r 
wholly-Am rican firm ~elt that a m'nority Australian 
holding would only 1 d to a 'meaningl Bard' . A 
s nio cut' of a larg Anglo -Australian ompany f It 
that ' Au tr l'an har hold rs hav no ontr 1 0 r the 
ompany t 11 . All th d'r or ar appoint d by th 
Brit'sh mp ny ' - and this was a f'rm in whi h th 
Austral' n int r st s substantial, If, a s ms most l'kely , 
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a minority Australian shareholding achieves relatively 
littl control over the vital aspects of company policy, 
Australian participation just becomes a means whereby the 
resources c ontrolled by the foreign firm are increased at 
a lower cost to the foreign firm itself . 
It is also probable that the Australian investor 
would gain access to a smaller share of the 'profits ' of 
the local operation than he imagined . For wholly-owned 
firms which now neglect to pay their parent s fees for 
much of the technical information received from them, 
and often interest for very considerable advances received 
from them, would naturally introduce such payments if the 
firm became jointly owned. Some parent companies would also 
increase the price of goods sold to the Australian sub-
sidiary . Both tendencies would not only reduce the 
apparent profitability of the local operation but would 
also reduce Australian taxation revenue. (To some ex-
tent this loss of tax revenue would be offset by increased 
revenue from withholding tax on dividends, a tax which 
American shareholders of jointly- owned companies find it 
more difficult to avoid than do the shareholders of some 
wholly-American subsidiaries, as explained below . ) 
Whether American parents would be more reluctant to 
pass on technical information to a jointly- owned company 
than to a wholly-owned company probably depends to a large 
extent on the siz of the Australian equity . Other things 
being equal , it would seem that there would be some de-
creas On the American company's desire to assist the 
Australian venture, but this decrease might not be sig-
nificant as long as the American holding were in the 
majority . One 60/ 40 venture indicated this ratio of 
American-Australian ownership to be 'a very desirable, 
if not the opnimum, ratio to gain maximum benefits ..•.. 
A higher Australian participation may have tended to 
weak n the Am rican interest in developing our company at 
a high rate . ' On wholly-owned company felt there would 
be no r luctance to impart technical know-how to a jointly-
own d fOrm in which th American company still h~ld a 
majorOty of th shar s, and cited as an illustration a 
jointly-owned sister subsidiary in Venezuela. Confirming 
this impr ssion is an interesting comparison 
b tw n th ssistan granted one local fOrm in which the 
Am rOc n quity was 50 p r c nt and another in the same 
industry in which th American equity was substantially 
1 ss than this . Th firm which was 50 per cent American 
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ma·ntain d v ry amicable relations with its parent, but 
the firm which wa s mai nly Australian complained bitterly 
about th lack of American assistance . 
There could be more specific disadvantages of 
Australian ownership . If it succeeded in influencing sub-
sidiary dividend policy, local ownership would probably 
have the effect of slowing down the rate of investment of 
the company concerned . This would have dampening effects 
on the growth of industry . It is also like ly that jointly-
owned firms are more often restricted in their freedom 
to export than are wholly-American firms - and indeed 
wholly-Australian firms operating under licence are pro-
bably more restricted in this regard than are firms which 
have some American equity participation . 
As for the balance of payments, Perkins has drawn 
attention to the fact that if shares in the American sub-
sidiary were obtained at a fair market price, 
. .. this would presumably reflect the accepted 
current expectation about the future earnings 
of the shares . If so, the capital outflow 
involv d in their purchase would merely be a 
reflection of the present value of the expected 
future stream of earnings, and there would there -
for in the long run be neither loss nor gain to 
th Australian balance of payments from the 
transfer of ownership . 25 
This conclusion follows, of course, only if expectations 
about the future are in fact fulfilled . It is possible 
that, if Australian investors underestimate the future 
stre am of arnings in calculating the price they are 
pr pared to pay, there could be some gain to the Australian 
balanc of payments . But because a small number of highly 
profitabl American subsidiaries have received such con-
sid rable publicity, it is at least as likely that 
Australian investors would overestimate future profits 
and in this way caus positive harm to the balance of 
paym nts . 
It app ars, ther fore, that local equity partic·pation 
would hav f w advantag s from Australia ' s point of view . 
Mor ov r, th imm diate costs of providing for such 
25. J. O . . P rkins, ' Some Fallacies About 0 erseas 
Borrow·ng ' , Australian Quart rly , XXXII (1960 ) , o . 2, 
~ . 79. 
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participation would b high . To purchase an quity in 
existing wholly-own d subsidiaries would require a very 
consid rabl div rsion of capital resources from other 
investment projects . Th cost of a 25 per cent equity in 
General Motors - Holden ' s, for example , would have been in 
the vicinity of £100 million in 1963 (and each £1 share 
26 
would have cost about £30) . A capital outflow on 
such a scale would have seriously disruptive effects on 
the Australian domestic economy . If only newly established 
companies were to be compelled to share th i r ownership 
with Australians, the provision would serve to reduce 
th total capital flow to Australia because foreign 
companies would be able to raise locally an increased 
proportion of their funds for investment. 
Even if dependence on foreign investment has disad-
vantages , and these are examined in later chapters, 
especially Chapter XI, there is no reason to suppose that 
compelling foreign investors to accept local partners is 
the most desirable way to reduce the inflow . Australian 
minority participation c ould at best secure only limited 
control over the decisionsof the joint venture : it seems 
doubtful if it could have any appreciably beneficial 
effect on the balance of payments . The cost of minority 
participation would, at the least, be an increase in the 
Australian resources under the ultimate control of the 
majority Am rican shareholder . There is ample evidence 
also that had ther been compulsion to accept local share -
holders in the years since 1945, some of the most economically 
beneficial American investments would never have been made . 
Of course, if an American company prefers to find an 
Australian partner for its venture than to provide all the 
funds itself, it should not be discouraged simply because 
it s not prepared to finance the whole venture - half a 
loaf is b tter than no bread t And from a public relations 
point of view, Am rican companies might be well advised 
to inv'te Australian share participation . But it would 
h a rdly se m desirabl that they should be encouraged to 
shar own rship . 
26. Th aft r-ta profit of G. M. H . in 1963 was £19 , 165 705 · 
If a publ'c issu had b n made at a price giving an 
arnings yi ld of 5 p r cent , a 25 per cent equity would 
hav cost almost £96 million . Had this yield been only 4 
p r nt (by no means an impossibl figur for a company 
with such a reputation for growth ) , the cost would have 
ris n to almost £120 million . For comparison , it is 
int r ting to not that total personal sa 'ngs in Australia 
in 1962/63 amounted to £481 million . 
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II 
Closely associated with popular resentment at being 
unable to buy shares in many of the local subsidiaries of 
American companies is the belief that many of these 
companies finance their operations in Australia without 
hazarding 'one dollar of American capital ' . 27 American-
owned companies, it is asserted, not only rely heavily 
on locally generated funds for their expansion but even 
draw on Australian fixed-interest funds to supplement 
th ir investment. There is some truth in this contention. 
Table IV-7 presents data taken from the 1962 balance 
sheets of 101 Ameri can-affiliated companies . At first 
sight , it appears to confirm the importance both of re-
invested profits and of locally borrowed funds . In fact 
the former are far more significant . The figures in the 
table, which show that no less than 60 per cent of the 
American equity in these companies in 1962 was in the 
form of undistributed profits, actually understate the 
importance of profit reinvestment. This is partly because 
the unremitted profits of American branches operating in 
Australia are not separately distinguished, but more 
significantly because the figures shown for both issued 
ordinary shares and profit reserves are misleading . In 
the case of most long established companies, figures for 
profit reserves understate the true 'worth' of the assets 
they represent because of the considerable conservatism of 
many American companies in their attitude towards de-
pr ciation and asset revaluation . Where assets have 
been revalued, as has frequently happened in recent 
yars, the increased valuation has usually been ' capital-
ized ' by the issue of bonus shares to the parent corpor-
ation . 28 This means that the ratio of- undistributed 
profits to total shareholders' funds is arbitrarily 
reduc d. 
Concerning the use of Australian credit 
27 . A typical comm nt on this point was made in the 
f"nancial ditorial of the Sydney Morning Herald, 19 June 
1964, p . 10, referring to General Motors-Holden's. 
28 . Th reasons for this are not hard to find : the 
Austral"an Uniform Companies Act of 1961 exposed many 
Am rican subsidiari s for the first time to the mislead-
ing Austral"an hab"t of relating after - tax profits to 
th par valu of the company ' s issued ordinary capital . 
If a bonus shar issu is made from accumulated profits, 
th issu attracts a substantial Australian tax and so 
compani s sensitive to their public image have chosen 
for th most p art to increase capital by way of asset re-
valuation . Some very substantial revaluations and bonus 
issu s h ve taken place . Goodyear and Bristol-Myers, for 
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facilities, the table appears to show that no less than 
27 p r cent of th total assets of the whole group were 
financ d by Australian creditors . More over, while the 
United States own d 83 per cent of the shareholders' 
funds of the group, it provided only 36 per cent of th 
liabilities . 29 In assessing the relative importance of 
the U.S . and Australia~ sources of funds, however, 
several points must be borne in mind. To begin with, 
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all figures shown are book values. In older firms which 
have not revalued their assets recently, thi s leads not 
only to an important understatement of the total value 
of funds employed but also to understatement of the 
ratio of sharehold rs' funds to liabilities. Secondly, 
a not inconsiderable part of the current liabilities shown 
as being ow d to Australian creditors is accounted for 
by taxation provision . Some firms had made considerable 
provision also for employee long- service leave, and 
neither provision could with justice be termed 'Australian 
borrowing '. Thirdly, it is thought that many firms did 
not include provision for unpaid dividends in 'Debt to 
U.s . parent and its affiliates ' , so that this item, too, 
often appears as a liability to Australia . In addition, 
as noted at the foot of the table, there is some double -
counting of the current liabilities owed to 'Australian' 
cr ditors because some liabilities were actually owed to 
other Ame r ican-owned companies in Australia . This factor 
is b liev d to be of particular significance in the 
chemicals industry . Of the balance of current liabilities 
owed to Australians, a further large part is ordinary 
trade credit and as such can hardly be a cause of Australian 
r s ntm nt. 
Wh n att ntion is confined to long-term Australian 
liabiliti s, it is found that little mor than 7 per cent 
of th total book value of th funds employ d in 1962 
was account d for by this item . And indeed, only 4.5 per 
cent of th book alu of the funds used by the 56 wholly-





mpl ,ha both increased issu d capital more than 
fold since 1961, whil Ford and G.M . H . hav increased 
d pital mor than si fold . Many other firms hav 
similar mov s in r c nt years . 
29 . Th . S . D partm nt of Commerce c nsus of 1957 indic-
at d hat Am ri an companies held 84 p r cent of th equity 
of th 'r dir ct in stm nts in Australia in that year, but 
prov'd d only 24 p r c nt of the liabiliti s . (U.S. Busin ss 
In stm nts in For ign Countri s, op . it . , p . 10 .) 
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term 1"abi1ities to Australia (Table IV- 9). Certainly, 
th figure of 4.5 per c nt probably underestimates the 
importanc of long-term borrowing on the Australian 
market by foreign firms. A number of for ign subsidiaries 
hav become public companies (though still entirely owned 
abroad) since the Uniform Companies Act of 1961 removed 
the advantage of secrecy from proprietary status, and 
their avowed purpose in doing so has been to increase 
access to local loan funds . Several have made substantial 
issu s of deb nture stock to the Australian public in 
r cent years, though by no means all the firms doing so 
hav been American . General Motors Acceptance Corpora-
tion , Australia, a firm specializing in the provision of ' 
hire purchase finance for the sale of General Motors -Ho1den's 
products, had borrowings of £28 million at the end of 
1960, equivalent to more than eighteen times shareho1d rs' 
funds . At that time, this was the highest ratio of 
borrowing to shareholders' funds enjoyed by any major hire 
purchase firm in Aus tra1ia . JO (Since these borrowings 
carry the unconditional guarantee of the parent corpora-
tion in ew York, it is hardly surprising that the local 
company is sometimes able to attract funds at lower rates 
of interest than Australian firms must pay.) 
But granted that the situation may now be changing, 
it n verthe1ess seems significant that only 18 of the 56 
wholly-American firms covered in the table had any 10ng-
t rm liability to Aus tralia at all in 1962 . Only 14 of 
thes exc ed d £100,000 and only five exceeded £1 million . 
In only five cases did long- term liabilities to Australia 
ceed 50 per cent of shareholders ' funds, and the weighted 
average ratio of long-term Australian liabilities to the 
shareholders ' funds of the 18 companies concerned was 
only 18 . J per cent . By contrast, 24 of the 45 joint1y-
owned enterprises reported a long- term liability to 
Australian creditors. Fifteen of these exceeded £100,000 
and s v n exc eded £1 m"llion . In ight cases, the 
10ng-t rm liabilities to Australia e ceeded 50 per cent 
JO. Australian Financial R iew , 18 January 1962, p . 12 . 
Figur s for borrowings by G. M.A . C. , Australia, ar 
publish d p riodica11y in prospectuses issu d by th 
comp ny. By th nd of 196J, borrowings had r ached 
1most J4 million . 
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TABLE IV-7 : SOURCE OF FUNDS EMPLOYED IN 1962 BY 101 AMERICAN-AFFILIATED 
COMPANIES (a) 
£A ( thousand ) 
Type of investment Uni ted States Australia Other Total (b) 
Ordinary shares issued 96,624 19,379 4,086 120 , 088 
Preference shares issued 2,668 (c) 2,865 5,534 
Profit and loss, and other 
similar reserves 163,750 24,941 1,035 189 , 725 
Home office value of branch 
assets 6,873 6 ,873 
Interest of outsid e shareholders 
on consolidation 4, 696 3,239 87 8 , 022 
Total shareholders' funds (b) 274,611 50,424 5,208 330,243 
Debt to U. S. parent and its 
affiliates 95,711 95,711 
Other l ong-term liabilities 270 43, 586 8, 034 51,890 
Other short-term liabilities 354 119,817 661 120,832 
Tota l l iabilities (b) 96,334 163,403 8,695 268,433 
Total funds emElo~ed (b ) 370 ,945 213,827 13,903 598,676 
(a) The above figures were taken from balance sheets for company years 
ending in 1962. . 
(b) Detail may not add to totals because of rounding. 
(c) Includes some participating preference shares. 
NOTE: (1) In contrast t o previous practice, the complete balance sheets 
of the three 'non-manufacturing companies' in the survey (see 
Note (b) to Table 1-2) were incorporated in the above table. 
This was done because it is ratios and percentages which are 
of primary importance here and not absolute magnitudes. 
(2) The allocation of funds employed by country presented several 
problems . The following are the main principles adopted: 
(i) All shares owned by the U.S. parent company or any of its 
controlled affiliates, whether ill the U. S . or not, were 
treated as being held in the U.S . itself. The same rule 
was applied t o all other items of ownership and liability . 
(See also notes' to Table IV -1 . ) 
(ii) All shares owned by companies incorporated in Australia 
were t reated as being wholly owned by the country having 
the majority holding in the sharehOlding company . Thus , 
50 per cent of the equity of Comalco would be indicated as 
being held in 'Othe~' countries, though a company listed on 
Australian Stock Exchanges holds this portion of Comalco's 
shares. This rule tends to understate the Australian 
shareholding in a number of companies. 
(iii) On the other hand, all the shares of listed Australian-
American companies not owned by the U.S. parent company 
were treated as being owned in Australia. This probably 
results in some overstatement of the Australian shareholding 
in such companies as Mount Isa Mines, Union Carbide Aus -
tralia, and Borg~arner (Aust . ) . 
(3) Directors ' qualifying shares have been ignored , as also ha s one 
'genuine' Australian shareholding of about 0 . 2 per cent . 
(4) It is believed that all 'double- counting' , which could arise 
because of investment by one American-owned company in another 
treated separately in this survey , has been eliminated with t he 
f ollowing exceptions : 
(i) The minority sharehol ding of one company in the electrical 
equipment industry in another in the same industry has not 
been eliminated. The total overstatement on this account 
is £1 million. 
(ii) Obviously , no consolidation has been possible to take 
account of the fact that some American-owned companies have 
trade debts to other American- owned companies . This f act or 
may be significant in ' Industrial chemicals and plastics ' 
where it is known that one company alone had a trade debt 
to another American-owned company in excess of £3 million 
in 1962 . 
TABLE IV-8: SOORCE OF FUNDS EMPLOYED IN 1962 BY 101 AMERICAN-AFFILIATED COMPANIES , BY INDUSTRY (a) 
LA ( thousand) 
Industry Australia United States and Other 
Ordinary Profit and Long-term Short-term Total, in- Ordinary Prof it and Debt to Other Total, in-
and pre- loss, and 1iabi1- 1iabil- cluding in- and pre- loss, other U. S. 1iabi1- c1uding in- Tot al (b) 
ference other simi- Hies Hies terest of ference similar parent ities terest of 
shares lar reserves outside shares reserves, and and its outside 
(c) share- home office affiliat es share-
holders on value of holders on 
conso1ida- branch assets consolida-
tion tion 
Plant, equipment, 
machinery 2,254 946 1,482 5,207 9,889 5,141 7,922 6 ,250 722 20, 034 29,923 
Motor vehicles 847 (119) 4,731 43,431 48,890 34,020 80, 560 20,367 134,948 183,838 
Motor accessories 790 357 859 2,006 2,273 578 168 14 3,033 5, 038 
Metal manufactures, 
n.e.i. 6,333 16,124 13,000 14,871 51,401 11,237 18,352 7,091 6,675 43,356 94, 757 
Electrical equip-
ment, instruments, 
etc. 1,522 818 4,186 8,967 15,493 9,924 7,790 2,996 217 21, 014 36, 508 
Food and drink 376 39 5,239 6,610 12,270 6,866 9,661 2,348 18,875 31,145 
Industrial chemicals 
and plastics 3,891 251 5,875 13,630 23,646 14,177 1,116 12,709 260 28, 261 51, 907 
Pharmaceutical and 
toilet preparations 494 4,275 4,770 3,157 11,865 771 15, 793 20 , 563 
Other industries 6,231 6,525 8,578 21,968 45,462 16 , 584 33,815 43,010 1,430 99, 535 144,997 
Total (b) 22,244 24,941 43,586 119,817 213,827 103,378 171 , 658 95,711 9,319 384,849 598 , 676 
I-' 
(a) See notes to Table IV-7. I-' \.....) 
~b) Detail may not add to totals because of rounding. 
c) Brackets denote an accumulated loss. 
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of shar holders' funds, and the weighted average figure 
for the 24 companies was 2B . 3 per cent . Because of one 
very large d bt owed by a jointly- owned company to the 
Federal Government, it is perhaps misleading to compare 
directly the average use of Australian long-term funds 
by all jointly-owned companies ( 13.6 per cent of the 
total book value of funds employed) with their use by 
wholly-American companies. It does seem, however, that 
at 1 ast in the cas of the wholly- American firms 
surveyed in 1962, long-term Australian borrowings were 
of r 1ative1y minor importance . Indeed, the very fact 
that so many foreign subsidiaries in Australia are sub-
stantially independent of the local capital market has given 
rise to the fear that foreign subsidiaries may be at an 
unfair advantage vis-~-vis local companies, particularly 
in times of monetary stringency . This would seem to be 
an unavoidable corollary of foreign investment . 31 (To 
xamin th borrowing policies of companies of different 
ownership patterns in detail, Tables IV - 9, IV-13, and 
IV-14 may be compared . ) 
Table IV-B presents an industrial classification of 
th information that appears in Table IV-7 · It is 
largely se1f-explantory . Care must be exercised in com-
paring Tab1 s IV-5 and IV-B, however . ot only do the 
two tab1 s us quite different weights, they also cover 
different numbers of companies . This should be stressed : 
Tabl IV-B covers little more than the ' participating 
compani s', though these do represent the largest part of 
Ameri an investm nt in Australian manufacturing . Two 
furth r points should be noted . First, more than half 
the long-t rm liabilities owed to Australian creditors 
in 'M tal manufactur s, n . e . i . ' was owed by one jointly-
own d firm to the Australian government . (The long-
term liabi1iti s of this company also account for more 
than half of the total long-term l iabilities of the 
compani s cov red in Table IV- 13 , and almost half the 
Australian long-t rm liabilities of the companies in that 
31 . This m y point to th need increasingly to use fis -
cal rath r than mon tary measures to control the economy's 
progr ss . 
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TABLE IV-9 : SOURCE OF FUNDS EMPLOYED IN 1962 BY 56 WHOLLY-AMERICAN 
COMPANIES (a) 
£A(thousand) 
Type of investment United States Australia Other Total (b) 
Ordinary shares issued 73,485 73,485 
Preference shares issued 1,177 1,223 2,400 
Profit and loss, and other 
similar reserves 138,452 138,452 
Home offic e value of branch 
assets 6,873 6,873 
Interest of outside shareholders 
on consolidation 4,696 53 4,749 
Total shareholders' funds (b) 224,683 1,277 225,960 
Debt to U. S. parent and its 
affiliates 83 , 988 83,988 
Other long- term liabilities 20 18 , 923 1,300 20,243 
Other short-term liabilities 10 86 ,996 100 87 , 106 
Total liabilities (b) 84,018 105 ,918 1,400 191 ,337 
Total funds emEloled (b) 308,701 107,195 1,400 417,296 
~a~ See notes to Table IV-7. 
b Detail may not add to totals because of rounding. 
TABLE IV-lO: SOURCE OF FUNDS EMPLOYED IN 1962 BY 32 WHOLLY ... AMERICAN 
COMPANIES WHICH BEGAN MANUFACTURING IN AUSTRALIA BEFORE 
1957 (a) 
£A(thousand) 
Type of investment United States Australia Other Total (b) 
Ordinary shares issued 
Preference shares issued 
Profit and loss , and other 
similar reserves 






Interest of outside shareholders 
on consolidation 4,696 
Total shareholders' funds (b) 208,948 
Debt t o U. S. parent and its 
affiliates 
Other long-term liabilities 
Other ahort-term liabilities 
Total liabilities (b) 



























(a) See notes to Table IV-7. Also note that the year in which manu-
facture began is taken t o be the year in which an American equity of 
at least 25 per cent was firs~ acquired in the case of companies 
manufacturing previously as Australian-owned ventures. 
(b) Detail may not add to totals because of rounding. 
116 
TABLE IV-II : SOURCE OF FUNDS EMPLOYED IN 1962, BY 13 WHOLLY -AMERICAN 
COMPANIES WHICH BEGAN MANUFACTURING IN AUSTRALIA BETWEEN 
1957 AND 1959 INCLUSIVE (a) 
U(thousand) 
Type of investment United States Australia Other Total (b) 
Ordinary shares issued 
Preference shares issued 
Profit and loss, and other 
similar reserves 
Home office value of 
branch assets 
Interest of outside shareholders 
on consolidation 
Total shareholders' funds (b) 
Debt to U.S. parent and its 
affiliates 
Other long-term liabilities 
Other short-term liabilities 
Total liabilities (b) 















(a) See notes to Table IV-7, and Note (a) to Table IV-IO. 














TABLE IV-12: SOURCE OF FUNDS EMPLOYED IN 1962 BY 11 WHOLLY-AMERICAN 
COMPANIES WHICH BEGAN MANUFACTURING IN AUSTRALIA IN 1960 
OR SUBSEQUENTLY ( a) 
£A ( thousand ) 
Type of investment United states Australia Other Total (b) 
Ordinary shares issued 10,003 
Preference shares issued 100 
Profit and loss, and other 
similar reserves (c) (2,855) 
Home office value of branch 
assets 2,985 
Interest of outside shareholders 
on oonsolidation .. 
Total shareholders' funds (b) 10,234 
Debt to U.S. parent and its 
affiliates 11,534 
Other long-term liabilities 89 
Other Short-term liabilities 8,115 
Total liabilities (b) 11,534 8,204 
Total funds emplo~ed (b) 21,768 8,204 
(aj See notes to Table IV-7, and Note (a) t o Table IV- IO . 
(b Detail may not add to totals because of r ounding . 














tabl . ) Secondly, by far the largest part of the 'D bt 
to .S. par nt and its affiliates ' in th industrial 
category 'Oth8r industries' was on account of one wholly-
American oil company . 
Particular interest focuses on the use of borrowed 
funds by foreign firms in first becoming established in 
Australia. The executives of several firms interviewed 
felt strongly that American compani s too often tend to 
borrow heavily in Australia to become established, 
committing the minimum necessary dollar capital . And the 
view that this is common practice with many firms in-
vesting abroad has been expressed by several writers on 
foreign "inv stment. Barlow and Wender, for example, 
not d that Am rican firms investing abroad are frequently 
'willing to pay exc dingly high rates of interest in 
foreign countries for local funds, in preference to in-
vesting dollars in the operation ., J2 
In an att mpt to shed some light on this issue in 
th Australian context, wholly- American companies were 
classified under three headings : those which began manu-
facturing h re before 1957, those which began manufact -
uring in the y ars 1957 to 1959, and those which began 
manufacturing (or b came American in ownership) in 1960 or 
subsequ ntly. Th funds employed by each group of com-
pani s \ r then analys d and are presented in Tables 
IV-lO, I -II , and IV-12 . The results of this exercise, 
though di s tort d somewhat by the very heavy establishment 
losses incurred b two wholly- American m mbers of the 
Altona petrochemical compl x p rovid littleronfirmation 
for the vi w that it is the newly established firms which 
draw hea il on Australian resources . (This conclusion is 
reinforc d b the fact that by far the largest single 
item in the ategory of short-term liabilities owed to 
Austral'an creditors in Table IV- 12 was a trad debt to 
anoth r Am rican-own d ubsidiary in Australia .) Inde d, 
insofar s it is long-t rm liabiliti s which are of 
primary interest, it app ars to b rath r th long 
stabl'sh d subsidiari s whi h borrow from Australian 
Sourc s . 
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TABLE IV-13 : SOURCE OF FUNDS EMPLOYED IN 1962 BY 28 COMPANIES IN 
WHICH THE AMERICAN SHAREHOLDING WAS BETWEEN 50 AND 
99 PER CENT (a) 
£A(thousand) 
Type of investment United States Australia Other Tota l (b) 
Ordinary shares issued 19 , 378 13 , 587 2,075 35 , 040 
Preference shares issued 1 ,081 (c) 100 1, 181 
Profit and loss, and other 
similar reserves (d) 21 , 389 17, 352 (85) 38 , 656 
Home office value of branch 
assets 
Interest of outside shareholders 
on consolidation 1,074 1 , 074 
Total shareholders' funds (b) 41,848 32,113 1 , 990 75,951 
Debt to U. S. parent and its 
af'fi1iates 10 , 306 10 , 306 
Other long-term liabilities 250 19 , 595 6, 675 26 , 520 
Other short-t erm liabilities 344 24 , 234 63 24 , 640 
Total liabilities (b) 10 , 899 43 , 828 6, 738 61 , 466 
Tota l funds emE10led (b) 52 , 748 75 , 941 8 , 728 137 , 417 
lal See notes to Table IV- 7. 
b Detail may not add to totals because of rounding . 
c Participating preference shares. 
d Brackets denote an accumulated loss. 
TABLE IV -14 : SOURCE OF FUNDS EMPLOYED IN 1962:BY 11 COMPANIES IN 
WHICH THE AMERICAN £HAREHOLDING WAS BETWEEN 25 AND 
49 PER CENT (a) 
£A ( thousand) 
Type of investment United States Australia Other Total (b) 
Ordinary shares issued 
Preference shares issued 
Profit and loss , and other 
similar reserves 
Home office value of branch 
assets 
Interest of outside shareholders 
on consolidation 
Total shareholders' funds (b) 
Debt to U.S. parent and its 
affiliates 
Other long- term liabilities 
Other short-t erm liabilities 
Total liabilities (b) 
Total funds emE10led (b) 
(a) See notes to Table IV- 1. 





1 , 411 
9, 496 
5 , 192 
1 , 542 
1, 589 
2, 112 
11 , 034 
5, 069 
8 , 588 
13 , 651 
30 , 691 
(b) D tail may not add to totals because of rounding . 
2,011 11, 563 
1 , 952 
1 , 120 12 , 611 
81 2, 199 




498 9, 086 
551 15 , 631 
3, 115 43 ,962 
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It i i n tru tiv h o w ver, to examine t h beha ' our 
of indi · dual ompani s ' n this regard . It is c rtainly 
tru ba t om Am rican- own d firms have drawn on Austra-
l ian :fund or a ubs tantial p art of the resources ne ded 
t o c omm n local op ration s . I n s om cases this has aken 
t h f o rm of th i ss u of p re :ference shares in the local 
co mpany : Goody ar a n d Jantzen, f o r examp l , both raised 
consid rabl s wns in this way in the tw nti s,JJ and 
th issue 0 pr ferenc sha res by Gen ral Mo t ors (Aust . ) 
P ty Ltd to a cquire Holden Motor Body Builders soon after 
its comm nc m n n Australia is well known . J4 In a 
n umb r o:f cas s , Am rican- af:filiated companies have made 
sub s tantial borrowing from Australian banks to help 
financ ini t ial d velopm nt . It is known that at l e ast 
two ch mic 1 compani s commencing operations in Australia 
raised loans equivalent to their issued capital , while a 
firm in ~h pharmaceuticals industry borrowed locally a 
s u m qual to more than twice its issu d capital . Ano t her 
firm in th s ame industry stated that though its parent 
had pa i d for it s initial share issue in cash, this was 
supp l m nt d b y 'a v e ry considerable bank overdraft be-
caus o:f th r e luctanc of the U. S. company to s end cash 
ov rs ea ~' . Two firms s tat d s p ecifically that p r mi s s 
had b n 1 a s d in Australia because of the determination 
of th ir Am rican pa nts to avoid sinking dollar capital 
o rs a and on 01 t h se mentioned that it was parent 
compan poli y n r to invest in a factory ov rseas un-
1 s s p rofit r mittan was imp ossible . It i likely 
tha both companie ini ially used Australian cr dit 
f cil' t i s to a ignificant d gre . Two particularly 
bla an a ~ wer unco r d in which local funds had 
b n u d to :finan h imtial in e tm nt ntir lye 
on of h ca ' s, ,h Am rican compan tabli hed 
a hold'ng ompan n Au tralia, borrowed a sum from an 
Aust n nk, and w ' th th proceeds purcha~ed a 
In 
ma j or't h d ' n g n n Au tralian ompany . For a numb r 
of y ar ~ :f ,th d ' id nds r c i d from thi 
sh r holdin g w - u~ d to P off th local 0 erdraft . In 
JJ . C 
1920-1 C 
pp . 6, 
3 4 . A tu 11 h qu 't' n w s a hi d b t h i s u 
o f 561,60 0 20 /- 6 p r n p r f r nc s h ar s a nd by 
sh p ym n 1 550 0 0 0. 
120 
th oth r case, it was stated that th Amer'can firm paid 
for th shares in its n wly established Australian opera-
tion f om th proc ds of a local overdraft, ' excep t about 
£2 which th American over here arranging the deal had in 
his pock tI e 
or is it unusual, special l y where the American firm 
does not insist on complet ownership, for the parent 
company to b issu d shares in exchange for technical 
information or market rights . One of the best known 
cases of this kind was the purchase of 51 per cent of the 
issu d shar s of Ford of Canada by the American Ford 
Company in xchange 'for all Ford rights and processes 
in perp tuity in Canada, ew Zealand, Australia, India, 
South Africa, and British Malaya ., J5 In Australia, it is 
report d that th Aluminium Company of America acquired 
almost half of its 51 per cent interest in Alcoa of 
Australia in xchange for its processes and technical 
knowl dge,J6 and on a much smaller scale Ralph McKay Ltd 
issu d shares sufficient to give Borg-W'arner a 25 per 
c nt holding in the company in exchange for technical 
information . J ? On local firm issued 20 per cent of its 
shar s in x chang for marketing rights in Australia , ew 
Z aland, Malaya and Indonesia . A number of cases of this 
kind w re uncover d , though only one involved a large 
company . 
Oft n, s hares are issued to the American parent for 
goods nt out to stablish the local operation. S ome -
times th goods invol d are ready for sale and form the 
init'al stock of the subsidiary . In other cases, the 
produc r ceiv d in Australia are raw materials: one 
comp ny comm nted hat its Am rican parent ' was very re-
lu tan to put an mon y into Australia - they only paid 
up th minimum allowabl apital and w bought furniture 
for th offi aft r the sal of our first production in 
Australi t ' In y oth r cas s, and this is on of the 
in 
Pr 
J6. w, 2 S p t mber 1961, p.l . 
J? Ibid . , 12 S pt mb r 196J , p. 2J . 
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most common pr ctOces, shares are issued in payment for 
plant and equipmen from the U.S . company. (This practice 
may b a way in which the American company can dispose of 
its obsolet machinery in a relatively profitable manner: 
both Dunning and Phelps, in their studies of American 
investm nt, found that foreign subsidiaries frequently have 
to make do with se ond-hand equipment from their parents, 
but in only a few instances was this behaviour detected 
with certainty in the present survey.J8) 
Despi t th various ways in which Ameri can par nts 
can avoid r mitting dollars to Australia, however, it 
r mains tru that a gr at number of American subsidiaries 
are stablish d her with an allowance of American cash. 
Thos is almost always tru if American companies make their 
initial Au tralian investment in the shares of an already 
existing company, but it is also true in many other cases. 
Th v ry large dollar sums initially subscribed by Asarco 
for the support of Mount Isa Mines hav already been 
m ntion d. The Aluminium Company of America subscribe d 
in cash for 6,500,000 £1 shares in Alcoa of Australia 
shortly after the local firm was formed. Two firms 
m ntion d that, in addition to funds from their parents, 
they had also us d loans from American banks during their 
stablishm n t period, both because of the greater eas of 
s curing r dit in the United States at that period and 
becau of lower American rat s of int rest. The most 
specta ular amp 1 of the use of Am rican credit facilities 
is th r nt borrowing of appro imately £50 million for 
th onst uction of an alumina r finery at Gladstone by 
Qu nsland Alumina L td , a firm in which the larg st single 
shar hold r i the Kaiser Aluminium and Chemical Corpora-
tion 0 th . S . Whil s ral of hese e amples concern 
mining as much as manufacturing, th y dramaticall illus-
trat that not 11 borrowing is in on direction. 
A th omm nc m nt of th pres nt sur y it was 
hop d that °t would b possibl to gain som quantitati 
stOma f th i mpor anc of the various alt rnati 
m h ds of rOnan ing lor ign inv stm nt at its stablish-
m n t. n 0 tunat 1 , this pro d impossibl . Partly 
thOs was b u s u s in old stabl osh d firm m d 
J . R. DunnOng, Ope it . p . 142 ; D.M. Phelps, Migration 
Am rica ( w York: M Gral-Rill B ok 
~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
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to ha no r coil tion of the method used to f ' nance th 
'nit'al inv stm nt but, more important, failure was due 
to th diEf r n interpr tations placed upon the qu stions 
ask d and, p rhapc::, failure to ask the right questions . 
Compan' s w r asked to indi cate how th ir initial 
l ' abili y ('n luding shareho lding in the case of incor-
porat d ompanie s ) to th ir American parent had been incurr-
ed fo~ th provision 'of cash, technical information, 
plant and machinery, tc. But a fundamental difficulty 
wa quiddy ncount red: it proved impossibl for many 
compani s to d id what the ' initial liability ' to their 
parent wa~ . or Am rican companies do not, for the most 
part, stablish subsidiary with a fixed issue of shar s 
and th n 1 a it to its own devices . In the cas of 
many wholly-Am rican subsidiaries , the initial share 
cap'tal is only a fraction of the Am rican company's 
' initial 'nv stment' . The typical pattern is for quit a 
small part of the American investment to be 'capi talized' 
and th r t to b in the form of a rather flexible 
inter-company loan . This patt rn may be seen clearly in 
Tabl s IV-ll and IV-12. In the latter, showing the 
funds of wholly-Arne 'can companies which b gan operations 
in Aus tral'a in 1960 or subsequently , advances from 
pa nt ornpanie and their affiliates are larger than 
th tot 1 shareholders ' funds of th companies concerned 
whi n in Tabl IV-ll such advanc s are substantially 
than th paid-up capital of the group . 
It pp ar " in fact tha~ while Am rican subsidiaries 
s tt'ng up p a . on " in Australia fr quently do us 
cred't a iliti s to upplement their own equity capital, 
th cr d' ors r mor oft n th ir par nt companies 
than Australi n • 3 Som striking ampl s of this b -
ha 'our w r , n ount r d . Firms which had int r - ompany 
d bt s h ir paid-up capital w re by no 
m ns unu ual. G od ar, for a mpl , a firm which ha 
b n n util'zing Australian funds for part of its 
w 1 ' 0 mplo ing an ad anc from its par nt 
omp n 6l , 000 two 
on 'n 1 27 . 4 On f 
39 . B' r~ w nd W nd r h 
n y n tb p t of 
al'z'ng' und o n 
h 
s aft r it comm nced op ra-
companie it d a using 
Iso obs r d a marl d t nd-
co mpan i s to a oid ' apit-
d . ( Op . it., p . 16 3 . ) 
40. Th omp 
pit.l 1 onl 
'th th ompany's pa'd-up ordinar 
,000 t that t'm . (Colin Forst r , 
p . . L., p. 56 .) 
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Australoan ov rdraf accommodation to purchase the shares 
of th Australian operation was employing an advance equal 
to n arly forty tim s its issued capital four years after 
manufa turing comm nc d . Another firm with a paid-up 
capOtal of only £2,000 operated for its first years with 
a loan from its par nt of £250,000 . The most dramatic 
ample of all was th company with a paid-up capital of 
substantially 1 ss than £1,000 and a deficit in shar -
hold rs' ~unds of mor than £100,000 - the company was 
op rating almost entirely on advances from affiliates to -
taIling £164,000. In very many cases, it is clearly in 
serious rror to speak of an American subsidiary's paid-
up capital as being the dollar funds 'initially brought 
in' . 
Th r a ons for this reluctance to 'capi talize ' the 
funds in sted ar fairly obvious . Some companies may 
f 1 that in the event of exchange difficulties there 
would b a great r chance of withdrawing loans than of 
r mitting di idends . Al so, were the Australian pound to 
b d valu d the fact that the American investment was in 
loan form would probably ensure that the exchange loss 
would b incurr d by the subsidiary rather than the 
par nt . But almost certainly the main reason for adopting 
this patt rn of financing is the desire to avoid pay-
ment of withholding tax on dividends. For in this manner, 
a larg part of the American investment can be returned 
to the Am rican company without the payment of any tax 
on di id nds. 
Thos is th patt rn of financing which makes it 
difficul to shar ownership with Australian partners. 
It is a patt rn which is mainly of use in the early years 
of a ub °diary ' s lif but is on occasions used even with 
long st blished firm . On firm, for e ample, manu-
facturOng in Australia for more than twenty y ars, oper-
ated for most of thOs tim as an unincorporated entity 
and r mOt d it ntOr nnual profit to it parent company 
ry y ar e \vh n it was incorporat d recently, its issu d 
apital w s s t at a figur qual to only about 10 p r 
nt of °ts par nt's total in estm nt in Australia . The 
e utiv w d plained that h wa puzzled that 
at th im of in orporatOon his p ar nt company had 
r qu t d no di id nd f r the n ar futur . It was only 
fur h r qu stioning hi h r eal d that th local firm was 
ins d ng g d n th r paym nt of th ry large int r-
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company loan . Ano th r f · rm which ha be n operat·ng in 
Austr l·a for an ev n longer p riod financed a major 
pans on by par nt company cr dit of more than three 
tim s ssu d cap ital . Wh n th in estm nt programme was 
compl t d, th se loans w r reduced and in fact even 
larg r r dit was e tended to anoth r affiliat of th 
p ar nt company . Th company had declared no dividends 
for 15 Y ars at th time of the survey . 
On th for ign subsidiary has be n stablish d, 
mo s t Am rican par nts ar ev n more reluctant to invest 
'dollars' in the op ration . Many American firms, in 
announc·ng overseas investm nt programmes to their share-
hold rs, stress that no dollars from the U.S . will be 
·nvolv d. H nry Ford II stated late in 1962, for example, 
that Ford plann d to spend $270 million on capital ex-
pansion abroad ·n 1963. But he emphasized that the foreign 
e p nditur s would come from foreign arnings, deprecia-
t . d bar· f'r abroad . 41 S· . 1 t lon, an rowlngs om lml ar comm n s 
could b quot d from the annual reports of almost any of 
th major Am rican for ign investors. 
It has already be n seen that some finance for the 
xpansion of American subsidiaries in Australia is 
deriv d from local borrowing . Often such borrowings 
are mad und r parent company guarantee and one e ecutive 
comm nted that in this situation local banks ' fall over 
each oth r to lend us money' . The best known example 
of an established American subsidiary drawing on 
Austral · an loan funds for pansion is that of General 
Mo tors-Hold n's. This company borrowed about £3 million 
from Australian banks - with the assistance of the 
Commonw alth Gov rnm nt and under a guarantee from 
G n ra 
proj ct 
Mo to s Corporation - at the time when the Holden 
42 
was f·rst planned at the end of World War II . 
A numb r of oth r cas s of a similar, if less spectacular, 
k · nd uld be ·t d . 
Som t·m s, th int rn tional conn ctions of th 
41 . view, 10 January 1963, p . 26 . 
42. is a major factor in popular r sentment at 
th urr n · pr f · tability . It has led to th 
ctuall Australia that f·nanced the 
Ho d n ar e But th 0 rdraft se ms 
n d d about 27 p r c nt of th book 
mploy d by th company and it app ars 
t ly r paid b for th nd of 1950 . 
r, m r ly £3 million ,hich was r quir d, 
wond rs wh no r lian-own d company acc pt d the 
G n ' s hall to build a car locally at that 
tim . 
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foreign subsidiary p rmit it to raise loan funds more 
ch aply n othe capital markets . Union Carbide Australia , 
for e ampl , a firm which also has large local borrowings , 
rais d £l million in L ondon late in 1962, and another 
major ch mical company has in p ast years done the same . 
Swift Australian announc d that the finance to acquire 
Mayfair Hams Ltd in 1963 was raised through a loan made 
by its pare nt company from a group of American lending 
institutions, 43 and at least one of the major oil companies 
has borrow d substan ial sums in European capO tal markets . 
On the oth r hand, there appears to be no policy to 
us Australian (or other non-American) funds to the ut-
most at every opportunity . While many recent increases 
01 paid-up capital have b en bonus issues made from 
asset revaluation, many companies have in past years 
made cash issues to their parents, often long before the 
Uniform Compani es Act of 1961 provided any incentive for 
this . At least two Am rican companies, moreover, have 
bought out the Australian holders of preference shares, 
thoughth moti e Tor one of these moves appear to have 
been primarily to take shelter behind the secrecy then 
availabl in proprie tary status . Two jointly- owned firms 
were encountered wh ~ the only preference shares issued 
wer h ld by the Am rican parent , while one major wholly-
American firm made an issue of l,OOO , OOO preference 
shares to its parent to finance local expansion . 
company cr dit is also used s ubstantially by long 
Inter-
established companies. Both t he major American- owned 
oil compan° s, for e amp le, have very considerable debts 
to affilOated companies and the extent to which these 
advanc s are mad may be se n in Tables IV- 7, IV- , and 
IV-9 · One Austr lOan-Am rican firm, a company in which 
th Am ric n holding was in a minority, owed it American 
affiliat an mount ry much larger than the total of 
all its Australoan lO bilities : the ex cu ti e simply 
pl n d that the Australian mark twas unabl to cater 
for hOs ompany' s n d lor capital . One wholly-A m rican 
firm v n stat d th its American parent had advanc d 
° t mon for whi h no n d was f lt , while anoth r had 
diffO ulty p rsu ding its par nt that further advanc s 
w r not n d d . 
43 . A~u::..::s::...:t~r~.:::.:::;.:::;.:.~:...=.=:::=..::...=..:=~~-=-~w , 3 l July 196 4 , p . 7 · 
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TABLE IV- 15 : ASSET STRUCTURE IN 1962 OF 101 AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COM-
PAN IE BY PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN OWNERSHIP 
£A(thousand ) 
Per centage of U. S. Cur rent 
ownership and period assets 





100% (i) Manufactur e began 
15, 500 
39, 782 
before 1957 170 , 695 
Manufacture began 
1957-1959 
(iii ) Manufact ure 
1960- 1962 





























(a ) The year in w~ich manufa cture began i s t aken t o be the year i n 
which an America n equity of a t least 25 per cent was fir s t a cquired 
in t he cas e of companies manufa cturing previou s ly as Australi an- owned 
ventures. 
(b ) Detail may not add t o totals becaus e of rounding . 
NOTE: The rather unusua l class i f i ca t ion used in thi s t able was adopted 
t o permit comparison with Tables IV- 10 t o IV- 14. 
It is b yond doubt, however, that the most important 
source s of th funds requir d for expansion are undistrib-
uted profits and depr ciation allowances . Th importance 
of u~dOstribut d p rofits has already been noted in Table 
IV-7. Th importance of depre ciation allowances is not 
cl ar from that tabl and may only be inferred from 
Table IV-15 . Their significance may perhaps be grasped 
from th fac t that the 93 firms which pro ided figures 
for depr iation r s r s had total re er e of £93 
million t th ir 1962 balance dates. Their n t fi e d 
ass ts wer alu d t £267 million . Figures published 
by th u.s . D p artm nt of Commerc giv the same impression . 
Of th fund s b s orbed b all American direct-investm nt 
nt rpri s s in Au tralia on 1957 - a total of $129 million 
aft r paym nt of di id nds and remitted branch profits 
- $ 46 mill ° on m from undi~tribut d profOts, $ 46 million 
from d pr iation allowanc s, $35 million from 'Funds 
obt in d br d' (maonl Australia), and $2 million from 
lO th r' L than $500,000 cam from th u.s . 
Unf tunat 1 ,n s parat figur s are gi en for th 
Aust li n manuf turing s ctor, but fOgur s for manu-
fa for '0 ania' as a whol . 
S in Am ri an n stm nt on Aus tralia comprised appro imately 
TABLE IV - 16: SOURCE OF FUNDS - THREE TWELVE-YEAR CASE STUDIES 
Source of funds Case A 
1951- 56 1957-62 1951- 5E 
% % % 
The D.S. (i) Net reinvested income 52 85 37 
(ii) Other equity 
(iii) Liabilities 15 (35) 27 
Australia (i) Net reinvested income 7 
(ii) Other equity 
(iii) Liabilities 14 27 20 
Depreciation, etG . 19 23 9 
Tota l 100 100 100 
Total of rainvested income and de-
preciation 71 108 53 
Total funds suEElied from the U. S. 
includi:1,q nr vE·:)'" ~ i onate deEreciation) 86 73 72 
American shareholding in 1962 l00,t; 





























86 per c nt of the total for this area in that year, 
f ' gur s for Oceania may b taken as a r asonable approx-
imation. Th s show that of the funds available - a total 
of $69 million, xcluding funds used in the petroleum 
industry - $31 million came from undistributed profits, 
$2 4 million from dep r ciation allowances, $7 million 
from the U . S., and $7 million from ' Funds obtained 
abroad' , 4 4 
Many individual companies were encountered in the 
pres nt surv y which, because of a policy of profit 
reinv stm nt, had almost no liabilities in Australia at 
all . A number had substantial bank balances, with no 
overdraft accommodation of any kind. 
Tables IV-16 and IV-17 show the source of the funds 
used by 14 differ nt companies over periods up to twelve 
y ars . 45 Though all the companies , except Cases M and 
ar in on or other of th metal - working industries, 
th div rsity of industry, size, and length of manufact -
uring e perience in Australia makes it virtually impossible 
to see any ' typical' pattern . In the case of five of 
the si wholly-American comp anies, no shares were taken 
up for cash during th periods covered, except by way of 
initial ubscription . In every case except one (and that 
one, Cas J, includes the initial American share sub-
scription) , the percentage of American ownership exceeds 
the shar of funds supp lied from the U .S. or by the 
Am rican shareholder . In most cases, credit extended by 
the American affiliate is considerably greater to wholly-
American subsidiaries than to joint ventures . The onl y 
oth r point that can be made with any confidence is that 
internally g nerated funds seem to be of greater importance 
for wholly-American companies than for joint v enture . 
4 4. ~U~.~S~.~~~~~=-~~~~~~n~t~s~i~n~~F~o~r~~i~g~n~~C~o~u~n~t~r~i~e~s, 
pp.1 40-l . 
45 . Mor 
qu st'on 
pro 'd d 
amb'gu'ty 
to gnor 
han 14 ompani s provided an wer~ to the 
n sour of funds u sed . Most of the answers 
w r unsuitabl for u se how r, becaus an 
'n th ,ord'ng of th qu stion 1 d many firms 
hang 'n liabilities to Australian creditors . 
TABLE IV - 17: SOURCE OF FUNDS - ELEVEN MORE CASE STUDIES ~ COVERING UP TO SIX YEARS (a) 
Source of funds Case D Case E Case F Case G Case H Case I Case J Case K Case L Case M Case N 
% % % % % % % % 
The U. S , (i) Net re-
invested 
income 65 5 15 3 14 45 11 5 16 6 (12) 
(ii) Other equity 46 (b) 12 9 (b) 39 (b) 7 24 108 (b) 
(iii) Liabilities 30 6 32 9 2 4 3 19 29 
Aust:ra~ (i) Net re-
invested 
income 1 5 8 21 23 17 14 
(ii) Other equity 9 4 15 21 (2) 
(iii) Liabili ties 1 30 26 48 25 16 18 26 28 11 1 
Depr ecia t ion , etc . 4 3 6 8 40 14 11 24 37 32 3 
Tot a l 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Tot al of r einvested income 
and deEreciation 69 9 26 19 75 82 39 43 53 38 (9) 
Tot a l fund s suEElied f rom 
the U.S. ~ including 
~oEortionate de-
eciat ion ) 99 60 (b) 64 23 (b) 30 56 58 (b) 21 72 91 99 (b) 
Ameri can shareholdi~~ in 
1962 (c) 100 85 75 25 40 65 40 25 100 100 100 
(a ) All but three of the eleven cases caver a six- year period. These three are not marked to avoid identification of f-' I\) 
t h e companies concerned . \{) 
~b~ InCl udes the initial American investment in the Australian company . 
c Figures for American shareholding in 1962 nave been rounded to the nearest 5 per cent to a ssist in concealing 
company identities . 
IJO 
If Cas be xcluded (and that company had been in oper-
ation less than two years in 1962), internally generated 
funds had provided more than 50 per cent of all funds 
used by four of the five wholly-American subsidiaries . 
The one exc ption has been among the least profitable 
American subsidiaries in Australia . Of the seven joint 
ventures in the tables which had been operating for more 
than two years ( and all except one had in fact been 
operating for more than six years), only three had used 
internally generated funds to the extent of more than 
50 per cent of the total. All three, far from sharing 
ownership directly with the Australian public, were 
in partnership with large Australian companies. (Two of 
them, indeed, were in partnership with the same company, 
a firm noted throughout Australia for the conservatism of 
its di idend policy. ) 
The dividend policies of most American-owned 
subsidiaries in Australia certainly tend to be conserva-
tive. Many companies were encountered which had declared 
no divid nd at all for at least the first five or six 
y ars of op ration in Australia. One company commented 
that ' th decision on how much to remit to our parent 
is tak n h re, in the light of how much we need for ex-
pansion. W have been instructed to maintain a minimum 
cash balanc of £50,000 at all times .' This attitude 
was not uncommon . Even Gen ral Motors-Holden's, a 
company olt n criti ized for the absolute size of its 
di id nd app ars to b no e c ption to this conservatism . 
Th r is no publish d information available for the 
company ' s results in 1960 and 1961 (though published fig-
ur s for shareholders' funds in 1959 and 1962 make it 
s m lik ly that divid nd r mittanc s were particularly 
high in tho y ars ) but, xcepting those two years, the 
company's annual d Ovid nd on ordinary shares fell short 
of 50 p r nt of n t p rofit ( its If conservati ely 
arriv d at ) n e ry post-war year to 1964 e cept 1956, 
1959, and 1962 . Compan° s which are compelled to 
d clar di id nds, ith r b cau se of their tatus as 
provat ompani s for ta ation purposes or because of 
pr ssur from 10 al shar holders, oft n hold in Australia 
th dO id nd o"ruOng to th u .s . s har hold r . Som times 
this s don to a oid di id nd withholding ta but in 
oth r h O s ta s P °d v n though th di idend is 
1 f on d po °t with th local s ubsidiary . 
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It a pp ars ha wholly-American companies are more 
conse a i n their dividend policies than jointly-
own d ventures . There are exceptions to this generali za-
tion: most Australian investors are familiar with the 
caution x rcised by Mount Isa Mines Borg-Warne r, and 
P hilip Morris, or example . Wiltshire File declared its 
first dividend, of 5 per cent, in 1952, twelve years 
after manufacturing began . 46 Two joint ventures told 
the writer that it had been agreed that no dividends 
would be withdrawn from the companies concerned for at 
least ten years . But for the most part the only Australian-
American ventures not declaring dividends in 1962 were 
firms in which the Australian shares were held by a 
large company, firms which had just been established, or 
firms in which the Australian shares were held by the 
manager of the v nture who was deriving an income from 
the company in his executive capacity . Even medium-
sized Australian firms do not like to receive no return on 
a portion of their inv sted capital for a lengthy period 
and two 50/50 ventures mentioned that all the pressure for 
dividends come , from the Austr~an shareholding company . 
The smaller of the e join ventures, a company with total 
1962 mployment of much less than 100, was compelled by 
the Australian hareholder to declar a dividend in 1961 
substantially greater not only than after-tax profit in 
that year but also than the total of all dividends de-
clared in th pr vious four years . The violent di agree-
ment between th shareholders on this i sue caused the 
resignation of the company's general manager . When the 
Austral'an shares are held publicly, di idend policy may 
b conser ati , but it can hardly b subjected to the 
kind of udden chang s \vhich are oft n the rule in wholl 
American entures . Goody ar, for e ample , declared a 
di id nd on i s 0 dinary shares in 1953, 1954 , 1959, 1962, 
and 1963,bu d s pit profitable opera ion throughout, 
th Am r can shar holder r ceived no di id nd at all in 
th oth r y ars of the fourt n-y ar p riod from 1950. 
Tabl V-I gi s om ini'ormation about the d'vi-
d nd pol ' i s of 66 Am rican-affiliat d compani s . The 
olumn s h wing afte - t p of't in 196 n d~ some 
pI nt ' n. In n t. mpt to gain consist nt figures from 
ping omp ni s , f'rms w r r qu st d to gi e 
46 0 ..:::T"':::::'::~:::"':::'-=:":::':::':::"':::::'-":::"-~:...Ip;:...o.::-=..r...;:;t--=o...;:;n;;......;~i.:::l~s, 2 3 0 c to b r 1953, p. 4 . 
TABLE IV-lB: AND 
Percentage of U. S. ownership Number of After-tax Total gross Average ratio Ratio of dividend to profit (per cent), by 
and period in which Australian companies profit in dividend (c) of dividend campaur -
manufacture began (b) covered 1962 (a) to profit 
£A(thDusand) £A(thousand) (per cent) (d) Nil 1-24 25-49 50-74 75-99 100 and avex 
25-49% 
(i) Manufacture began before 1957 7 1,986 1,199 60.4 1 3 3 
(ii) Manu:facture began in 1957 or 
subsequently 4 105 16 14.7 2 1 1 
50-9% 
(i) Manufacture began before 1957 11 6,114 3,836 62·1 2 6 2 1 
(li) Manufacture began in 1957 or 
subsequently 6 515 165 32.0 1 4 1 
10a}& 
(i) Manufacture began before 1957 25 29,345 15,659 53.4 9 3 5 6 2 
(ii) Manui'acture began in 1957 or 
subsequently 13 1,211 328 27.1 8 2 1 1 1 
Total (e) 66 39,277 21,202 54.0 21 5 15 17 4 4 
(a) Only companies which both operated at a profit in 1961/62 and provided to the survey what appeared to be a 'reliable' profit figure 
are included in this table. See text for further explanation. 
(b) See Note (a) to Table IV-15. 
(c) For the purpose of the table, 'dividend' includes branch profits remitted. Not all dividends, as usually understood, were 
actually remitted abroad. 
(d) Ratios were calculated on the basis of unrounded figures f or profit and dividend. 





figures for ' taxable income ( before taxation) I rather than 
aft r-tax profits . It was hoped to gain some idea of 
after-tax profits from these figures . The hope may well 
have b en vain in any case, but in fact firms often 
provid d 'pre-tax profit' figures, as they understood 
th m, rather than figures for ' taxable income' . When it 
was known, from published taxation provision, that a 
company had provided conservatively stated figures for 
pr -tax profit, th after-tax profit figure used in the 
table was 150 per cent of the taxation provi s ion . 47 
When it was known, again from published figures, that 
th figure provided was heavily influenced by recent 
establishment losses or other similar factors, the 
published afte~-tax profit figure was adopted. In all 
remaining cases, the majority of the total, the after-
ta profit figures embodied in the tabl e merely represent 
60 per cent of the ' taxable income (before taxation)' 
figures provided. It is certain that in some cases the 
figures accepted as ' taxable income' were in fact 'pre-
ta profit', and therefore the after-tax profit figures 
shown tend to understate the 'true'picture somewhat.
48 
The figures shown in the table for the average 
ratio of dividend to after-tax profit point to a some-
what mor conservative attitude to dividends on the 
part of wholly-American subsidiaries than on that of 
jointly-owned ventur s . Actually, three of the most 
crucial figur s for comparative purposes are significantly 
'distort d', and with the removal of these ' distortions ' 
the picture is mad ven cl arer . The ratio of 5J.4 per 
cent, for wholly-Am rican firms which commenced manu-
facture in Australia b fore 1957, falls to 27.0 per cent 
on th e clusion of the results of one very large 
company, one large stock dividend, and preference divi-
d nds paid to Australian shar holders by four companies 
in th group . Ratios for joint ventures manufacturing 
in Aus ralia befor 1957 also fall when th results of 
sOngl 1 rg ompani s ar left out of consid ration, 
thos for ' 50-99% comp ni s ' and '25-49% companies ' 
fa lOng from 62.7 and 60.4 to 5J.4 and 50 . 2 r specti ely . 
47. R t s of company a ation n 1962 w r , for most 
compani s On th sur y, s en shillings in th pound on 
the fO st £5,000 of ass ssabl incom, and ight shillings 
on th pound on On abo £5 , 000. 
4 . s mparison of th total figur for after-
t pr °ts n th tabl with th figu for incom accru-
ng to U .S . par nt mp nOes from th ir op rations in 
Aust aloa on 1962 publosh d by th Commonwealth Bur au of 
C nsus nd Stat Osti s 1 ads to the conclusion that Table IV-l 
/lJ 4 
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The diff r nce betwe n wholly-American fOrms and joint 
ventures appears even more striking . 
Of th 66 companies covered , wholly-Am rican firms 
mak up about 58 per cent of the total, but they comprise 
no less than 81 per cent of those not declaring dividends 
in 1962 . The figur is slightly higher still if one 
firm d claring only a preference dividend to Australian 
shar hold rs is excluded . The impres s ion is only partially 
modified if 28 mor companies - not inc l uded in the 
table ither because they were operating a t a loss in 
1962 (18 of them) or because the figures they provided 
se m d to bear no relation to published afteF-tax profit 
figures - are taken into consideration. Fourteen of them 
( nine operating at a loss) were wholly-American and four-
teen (including another nine operating at a loss) were 
joint v ntur s. one declared a dividend in 1962 . 
Concerning dividend declaration in previous years, 
43 wholly-American firms gave information on their divi-
dends since 1950 (or since they began manufacturing, 
which ever was later ). Of the 21 which had commenced 
local manufacture before 1957 , 13 had begun operations 
even befor 1950 . These had, of course, 156 years of 
manufacturing experience in Australia between them be-
tw en 1950/ 51 and 1961/ 62, but only 92 dividends (excluding 
pref rence dividends to Australian shareholders) had been 
declar d in the period . (Four companies declared divi -
dends in ea h of the twelve years but one firm de-
clar d no dividend at all in that period. ) Of the 
eight firms which began manufacturing between 1950 and 
1956, only two had declared a dividend at all by 1962, 
and the total number of dividends declared in the 69 
years of manufa turing experience which these companies 
had b tw n them was only eleven . The other 22 wholly-
American firms which provided full details of dividend 
declaratOon b gan manufacture in Australia in 1957 or 
subs qu ntly . They had 74 y ars of manufacturing exper-
i nc b tw n th m, but only 12 dividends had been 
d clar d by 1962. Fifteen of the 22 had declared no 
dOv od nd at 11 . 
Of th 36 joint ntur s which pro id d information 
on dO °d nds sin 1950, si had b gun manufacturing 
b for 1950. Th s fOrms had d clared dO idends in 64 
of th 72 y ars of th r ombined manufacturing P r -
i n b w n 1950/ 51 and 1961/62 . Th nOne which began 
rs th gr a TIt in 
Austr ,O t should 
al omp n° s op rat Ong unprofitably . 
ag °nst p rofOts in th Bur a u' s figur 
s ar 
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manufacturing betwe n 1950 and 1956 had 73 years of 
manufacturing experi nc , and had declared 48 dividends 
( though som of these had not actually been r mitted to 
th UoS. ) between th m. The 21 joint ventures which began 
op rations in 1957 or subsequently had only 53 years of 
manufacturing experience, and had declared only 17 divi -
dends . Fourteen of the 21 had declared no dividends at 
all by 1962 . 
A direct comparison between these two sets of figures 
is made difficult by the fact that the 'as sets of American-
affiliat d companies' may actually have been manufactur-
ing long b fore the venture is recorded as commencing 
manufacture. This is because in the above figures, as 
elsewhere in the present survey, an American-affiliated 
firm is considered to commence manufacture only at the 
time the American company tak s up a t least a 25 per cent 
inter st in the venture. If this investment is in the 
shar s of an xisting company, an element of bias is 
clearly introduced . But granted that exact comparison is 
impossible, the impression that remains - that wholly-
American ompanies .are considerably more cautious in 
their dividend policies than Australian-American companies 
- app ars reliabl . 
Am rican dir ct-investment enterprises in Australia 
tend to be more cons rvative in their dividend policies 
than British-owned nterprises . The relevant facts are 
pr s nted in Table IV-19 . Whereas 55 . 3 per cent of the 
total n t profits of Am rican ventur s in Australia were 
rein st d ov r th seventeen-year period, the correspond-
ing British percentage was only 41.9 p r cent. Whereas 
undistributed profits made up 41 . 0 p r cent of the total 
Am ri an dir ct in estm nt in Australia over the period, 
th Briti h proportion was only 2 . 9 per c nt . Indeed, 
if th last three y ars of th table be e cluded, the 
contrast s ven mor apparent . American enterprises 
r in st d 63. 0 p r nt of th ir total profits for the 
p riod to 1960/61, compar d with a British figure of 
39 . 5 p r nt, and whil 56.0 p r c nt of all American 
in stm nt in Australia during that period was mad up 01 
prof' r stm nt, 49 the British figure was only 
26 . 5 p r nt. 
W'th th c pti n o f 19 47/4 and 194 / 49, 
Am r n dir t-in stm nt nt rpris s in Australia 
ons'st ntly r n st d mor than 50 p r nt of their 
49. F. . B nnett has us d U.S. D P rtm nt of 
ur show that th proportion, 0.:[ undistributed 
to n dir t n stment 'n Australi n 
0 y rs 1950-5 w s n high r than th a 
u r gi n n th t t. (Op. c' to, p . 2. ) 
TABLE IV- 19: COMPARISON OF ' NORTH AMERICAN ' AND 'BRITISH' PROFIT REMITTANCE POLICIES 
Investments of the U. S. A. and Canada in Australi~~ companies Investments of t.he United Kingdom in Australian companies 
Year ended Distributed Undistributed Investment Ratio of Ratio af un- Dist ributed UndisTri buted Investment Ratio of Ratio of un-
30 June profits (a) profits other than undistributed distributed profits (a) profi"ts other than undistributed distributed undist ributed profits to profits to undistributed profits to profits to 
profits total total in- profits total total in-
profits vestment profits vestment 
U (million) £A(million) £A (million) (per cent) (per cent) £A(mil1ion) £A(million) U(million) (per cent) (per cent) 
1948 (b) 2.3 2 . 1 
1949 ~b) 2. 6 2 .0 
1950 b) 2. 4 4.2 
1951 (b) 3.1 8 . 1 
1952 ~b) 2.6 12 .1 
1953 b) 3.0 12 . 4 
1954 (b) 13 . 5 17.0 
1955 ~b~ 12.5 15.8 1956 b 11.9 20.1 
1957 12.3 20.6 
1958 17.4 20.6 
1959 16.5 31.5 
1960 17.0 34.8 
1961 19.0 30.7 
1962 29.1 8.0 
1963 31. 6 13.3 
1964 26.3 22 .8 
4.3 47.7 
2 . 1 43.5 
6 . 1 63 . 6 
12.2 72.3 
18 . 5 82.3 
- 10 . 4 80.5 
0 . 3 55.7 
23 . 7 55.8 
11.8 62 .8 
6.9 62.6 




63 . 5 21. 6 






































































(a ) Net of withholding tax on dividends. 
(b) For these years a relatively small proport ion of 'Undistributed profits' would have been classified as 'IllV~G~ 


















i!l. other than 
NOTE : The table ~overs both direct and portfolio investment , except for undistributed profits on shares held by portfolio investors. 
SOURCE : Annual Bulletin of Oversea Investment : Australia 1963- 64 . 





total afte -tax profits until 1961/62 . In that year, 
the pol "cy of profit re "nvestment seemed to come to an 
end, and r"gures for 1962/63 seemed to confirm the 
impre on. F "gures for these two years led some Austra-
lians to belie e that such a change in policy had been 
adopted by at least a number of large American subsidiar-
ies. I is c rtainly true that changes of this kind do 
appear to occur from time to time . A similar change in 
Ameri an reinvestment policy, albeit on a much smaller 
scale, w sobs rved by the writer in New Zealand about 
the m"d-fifties. 50 But on this occasion the explanation 
seems to li rather in the change in U. S. tax legisla-
tion outlined at the beginning of this chapter . Under 
the R v nu Act of 1962, American subsidiaries operating 
abroad had a ery definite tax incentive to remit sub-
stantial dividends to their parent companies before 
either 1 January 1963 or 1 January 1965, depending on 
circums tances. It s ems probable that this is the 
e planation of the sudden decrease in profit reinvest-
ment, and at the same time the increase in capital inflow 
in other forms, witnessed in 1961/62 . It is known that a 
number of the companies covered in the survey sharply 
increa d th ir dividends during that period ( though 
this do s not for the most part effect Table IV-18), 
som declaring dividends of substantially greater sums 
than th ir total aft r-tax profit in the relevant year. 
Th r s ems lit 1 doubt that , at least for the near 
future , the policy of rein estment by American-affiliated 
ent rpris s in Aus tralia will be resumed . 
Th planat "on of the policy of heavy rein estment 
its lf is not bsolut ly clear . To som e tent, the 
poli s illusor , as has been noted . It may be merely 
a mano u to a oid dividend withholding tax whil the 
par n fOrm r sits 'r ward ' by the repayment of 
outst nding ad anc s making up the greater part of the 
Am r n nv stm nt. Th re is n verth less some reality 
to th poli Th 
controll d subs"d"a 
ontrast in the b ha iour o f Am rican-
w"th that of ompanies in whi c h 
Aust li n s ha an "nflu nc on divid nd policy pro -
bably s ems n p rt from differenc s in business philosophy 
_ undoubt dl ~ s om Am ri an executives believe this to be 
th pr"n ·pal f ctor - but almost certainly more important 
50 . D.T . B h, 
(Ch · st hu ch : Uni 
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ar dOff renc 5 in th r lative importance of the Australian 
operat "on to Amerian and Australian shareholders. 5l 
In rasing att ntion is currently being devoted to 
the implications of this policy o f profit reinvestment . 
On theor, volved primarily by John Knapp, 52 argues 
that reinvested profits do n o t cons titute a genuine 
addition to the capital resources available to the capital-
import"ng country, and this view has been supported implic -
itly by E.L. Wh elwright in Australia. 53 A corollary of 
this th ory is that the net ' increase in our access to 
foreign resources' 54 can be calculated by subtracting 
remitted profits from capital inflow excluding undistrib-
uted profit s . But the theory is clearly based on a 
fallacy: the profits of foreign subsidiaries operating in 
Australia, whether remitted or not, are the property of 
for ign shareholders and if these profits are reinvested 
in Australia this constitutes a genuine addition to the 
savings available to the Australian economy . The only 
point which must be conceded to the modern statement of 
this theory is that profit reinvestment constitutes an 
addition to Australia's capital resources only to the 
extent of 85 per cent of the amount reinvested, sinc e up 
to 15 per cent of that profit would have accrued to 
Australia in dividend withholding tax in the event of a 
dividend bing declared. To compare remitted profits 
with capital inflow, whether net of undistributed profits 
or not, is to confuse in a quite unwarranted manner the 
current and capital accounts of the nation's balance of 
payments and 'conclusions ' based on such exercises, often 
quot d in the popular press, must be regarded as without 
51 . It is instructive to compare the size of American-
affiliat d companies in Australia with that of their 
Am r"can par nts. If mployment be used as a rough index 
of siz , it appears that in 1 0 5 cases ( of the 137 where 
a ailability of data makes comparison possible ) the 
Australian v nture was less than 3 per cent of the size of 
tts Am rican affiliate. In only five cases ( four of them 
joint ntur s ) did th employment of the local enter-
pris d 10 P rent of the parent company ' s employ-
m nt. Cl arly, in most cases the receipt of a di idend 
from th Australian operation can ha e littl effect on 
tb r s ult s of th par nt . (Parent company employment 
f "gur s w r obtain d for the most part from Fortune , 
July 1963. Though th s figur s usually s em to refer 
to mploym nt within th U. S . only, it should benoted that 
n som as s the mplo ment figures for th parent com-
pany r thou.~ht to in lud th employment of foreign 
subsid"ar" so ) 
That Brit"sh subsidiari s rein st a significant l y 
small proportion of th ir after- ta profit than do 
Am ri an ubsidiari s probably in part r flects the sam 
/139 
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foundation . 55 
A theory with much more plausibility is that evolved 
by Dr , P enrose . She argued in 1956 that after a foreign 
subsid'ary is established it acquires to some extent a 
life of its own and develops i n the same way as other 
firms - expanding, diversifying into the production of 
new products, and so on . In this situation, 
It seems highly probable •.• that there will be 
a strong tendency for the parent company to 
tak its 'cut' of the profits and to p e rmit 
the subsidiary to retain a part long a ft er a 
comparison of rates of return on capital 
would attract new investments in the absence 
of the existing subsidiaries . In other words, 
even if increasing investment reduces, or 
even eliminates, the original differential 
between foreign and domestic rates of return 
on capital, foreign investment will still 
increase because foreign-owned firms wi~l 56 
continue to grow through their own earnlngs . 
Dr , Penrose did not make it clear whether she expected 
foreign subsidiaries to expand into fields new even to the 
parent corporation or only into fields already well explor-
ed by the latter . If she expected expansion into fields 
new even to the parent company, the evidence of the 
present survey would seem to contradict her thesis . It 
is certain that some American subsidiaries, even wholly-
(51) forces: the results of the British-owned subsidiary 
are likely to be much more important to many British 
parent companies than are those of American subsidiaries 
to their parents. In part, it may also be the result 
of a different industry distribution of British invest-
ment in Australia, away from investment in manufacturing 
where the policy of profit reinvestment may well be 
most prevalent. If British subsidiaries share ownership 
with Australians to a greater extent than do American, 
this could also be a significant factor. 
(52) John Knapp, 'Capital Exports and Growth' 
Journal, LXVII (1957), 432-44. 
(53) E.L. Wheelwright, op. cit . , p . 145 . 
( 54) Ibid. 
Economic 
55 . Se also J.O.N. Perkins, op . cit ., pp . 83-5; D.T. 
Brash, op. cit., pp . 34-7; and R . J . Ball, 'Capital 
Imports and Economic D velopment : P aradoxy or Orthodoxy?', 
Kyklos, xv (1962), 610 -23 . 
56 . Edith Tilton Penrose, op. cit . , p . 229 . Dr . P enrose's 
th sis's not unlike the 'gambling dollars' theory of 
Barlow and W nder . (J1:.'~. Barlow and Ira T. 'Wender, op . 
c't . , sp ially pp. iv, 161- 6 .) 
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American ones , have branched out into fields unknown to 
their Am rican parent . One firm, established to produce 
asphalt roofing, has developed principally as a producer 
of adhesives for floor coverings, an industry in which 
th parent company has almost no interest . Another firm, 
jointly owned by American and Australian interests, has 
embarked on the manufacture of 'cricketing machines', a 
field quite unknown to the American parent . Other cases 
could be quoted, but it seems that, at least up to the 
present, they are exceptions rather than the ~anera~ . rule. 
Subsidiaries certainly tend to expand and diversify, 
but usually into product lines well tried by the parent 
corporation . General Motors-Holden's, cited by 
Dr Penrose as an example of a foreign subsidiary ex-
panding into ever new fields, produces no major product 
line not also produced by General Motors Corporation . 
In the absence of any information on marginal rates 
of profit in the U . S. and Australia, it is not possible 
to judge whether profits are really reinvested in 
Australia after 'the original differential between 
foreign and domestic rates of return on capital' has 
been eliminated . There are some American operations in 
Australia which contradict the Penrose thesis by re-
mitting all their after-tax profit, presumably because 
investment in other areas does prove more attractive than 
further investment in Australia . The former manager of 
one company commented that the Australian company remitted 
'every penny of after-tax profit . This remittance often 
posed a problem of liquidity " but our parent treated it 
very s riously and laxness in this regard was an important 
r e ason for the dismissal of my predecessor . ' Another 
firm stated that 'sometimes we get a reminder to remit 
th profit before w have our accounts completed -
nothing is retained here.' A third asserted that its 
par nt 'doesn ' t se m to understand that you have to 
invest in advertising to keep sales high . They want every 
last pound we earn . ,57 All three firms had been operat-
ing "n Australia for more than ten years . 
Som companies reinvest profits primarily to protect 
th profitability of existing investments. One firm was 
encount r d wh"ch had invest d in costly facilities to 
produ a p r viously "mported raw material to avoid th 
57 . It s significant that two of the three firms cited 
op rat d as branch s in Australia . 
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necessity of purchasing the commodity in question from an 
American competitor, then thought to be about to invest in 
Australia. Another firm was fearful of the consequences 
of failing to take this action. 
But there is certainly some basis for the Penrose 
view, andthe extent to which the local subsidiary does 
develop its own separate existence is well illustrated 
by a quotation from the manager of an American subsidiary 
in the Australian chemical industry. Asked whether the 
initiative for major capital expenditure came from the 
American parent or from the local firm in Australia, he 
commented that 'generally the initiative is ours - it 
has to be since there are a lot of other countries com-
peting for U.S. capital.' This attitude, combined with 
the small size of the Australian operation in relation 
to the American, is probably an important part of the 
explanation of the profit reinvestment policy of American 
firms in Australia. 
Chapter V 
THE MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN-AFFILIATED COMPANIES IN 
AUSTRALIA 
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The extent of American ownership of a direct-invest-
ment enterprise is not always a good reflection of the 
extent of American control over the behaviour of that 
enterprise. For most purposes, control of a company 
may be thought to reside with the shareholder having an 
absolute majority of the voting shares . In t he present 
survey , a broader definition has been used: an enterprise 
is considered to constitute a direct or controlled in-
vestment when a single foreign shareholder (or affiliated 
group of shareholders) holds at least 25 per cent of the 
voting shares in a locally incorporated company or an 
equivalent interest in a nonincorporated enterprise. 
But several companies were encountered, in which the 
foreign shareholding was more than 25 per cent and was 
substantially the largest single shareholding, which felt 
themselves to be completely free of American 'control', 
while almost all firms felt themselves to be independent 
in at least some areas of policy . American control of the 
management of the local affiliate may be greater than 
consideration of the American shareholding alone would 
imply if the local firm is heavily dependent on the 
American parent company for technical know-how, patents, 
trademarks ~ etc. On the other hand, American control 
may be substantially unexercised even in the case of a 
wholly-American subsidiary if the parent actively pur-
sues a policy of decentralization of decision-making, if 
it has lost interest in the local operation, or if the 
executives of the local operation are of particularly 
independent disposition . 
The present chapter discusses in general terms the 
extent of American control on the policies of affiliated 
companies in Australia and the importance of American 
influence on th management techniques of these companies 
even when their decisions ar free from control . Two 
special aspects of this subject - the freedom of American 
affiliat s to conduct research in Australia and their 
fr~edom to buy and sell in markets of their own choosing 
ar discuss d in Chapters VI and IX respectively . 
Ther app ars to be no infallible standard by 
whi h ' control ' can b 
1 
measured. Though none of the 
1 . The difficulty of summarizing adequately the extent 
of par ntal control over foreign subsidiaries has been 
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various items of evidence to be adduced constitutes a 
r liable guide in itself, taken together they do present 
an int resting impression . 
To begin with, the composition of the Boards of 97 
of the respondent companies was examined . In all, these 
companies had 590 Board members in 1962, of whom 224 were 
. 2 0 Amerlcan. nly a small proportion of this number lived 
in Australia, however, and most of them were on the 
Boards of the wholly-American firms in the group . The 
17 companies with less than 50 per cent of their 
ordinary shares held in the U . S. had 95 Board members, 
but only 16 of these were American and only three lived 
in Australia . The 29 companies in which the American 
holding was between 50 and 99 per cent had 180 Board 
members, of wh_om _ 67 were American and seven (two of 
them managing directors) lived in Australia . The 51 
wholly-American subsidiaries, on the other hand, had 
315 Board members, of whom 141 were American and 40 
(fourteen of them managing directors) lived in Australia . 
It is noteworthy that even among wholly-American companies 
Australian directors were in the majority . 
It was clear, however, that the Boards of many 
American subsidiaries are purely nominal entities , in 
existence to comply with Australian company law . Of 
gr ater interest is the nationality of the executive 
personnel of these companies . There are obvious reasons 
why an American parent may wish to employ men from its 
own operation in the top management of the foreign 
(1) noted frequently by previous writers confronted with the 
same problem . See, for example, Irving Brecher and S . S. 
Reisman, Canada-United States Economic Relations (Ot t awa : 
Royal Commission on Canada ' s Economic Prospects, 1957), pp. 
132-3; H rbert Marshall, Frank A. Southard, Jr. , and Kenneth 
W. Taylor, Canadian-American Industr : A Stud in Inter-
national Investment ew Haven : Yale University P ress, 1936), 
pp . 229-30 . One of th best commentaries on the whole subject 
of th control of foreign subsid iar:l' s is that of E . R . Barlow , 
Management of Foreign Manufacturing Subsidiaries (Boston : 
Graduate School of Busin ss Administration , Harvard University , 
1953), esp e cially pp . 4-113, 148- 91 . 
2. Th term 'Am rican ' here includes not only citizens 
of th U.S . but also in a f w cas s citizens of Canada and 
any oth r p rson who has spent a prolonged period of years 
mploy d by th Am rican parent company . ot includ d , 
how r, are two American nationals who had ne er been 
mploy d by th American parent company and who had become 
dir ctors of a local subsidiary ind p ndently of their 
nat'onality , and a f w dir ctors ( mainly British) who had 
b n asso iat d with a sister affiliat in another country . 
The latt r category of dir ctor was cluded on the grounds 
that Bri ish dir tors r sident in Australia often settle 
h r p rman fitly. 
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subsidiary . If an executive with long experience of the 
ways of the parent company is in command of the subsidiary , 
it may greatly facilitate the problem of communication 
between the two members of the corporate family . It may 
be very much quicker to dispatch an American to commence 
operations than to wait until a local has been trained 
in the ways of the parent company. In some cases, the 
reason for preferring an American in t op management stems 
from the belief that Americans have a bet ter 'attitude' 
to bu siness than locals, though this factor appears to 
operate more in dealings with under-developed countries 
than with Australia;3 
But there are in fact very few Americans employed 
by American affiliates in Australia, if the evidence of 
the present survey is typical. Table V-I shows that in 
105 companies 4 with total 1962 employment of 75,597,5 
there were in 1962 only 146 Americans associated with 
3 . The American manager of one joint venture reported, 
however, that one of the major reasons he was employed 
in the Australian subsidiary was that 'Australians don't 
always look ahead far enough - they are too interested 
in making quick returns .' He wished strongly that his 
company was wholly- American because, though :the American 
parent had nominal voting control, it did not exercise 
this authority for fear of offending the Australian 
partner . This meant that he was compelled to adopt many 
'short-term policies ' which conflicted violently with 
his own views . He complained that his company had no 
fire proteetion system in the office because the Australian 
partner ' doesn't seem to appreciate all the intangibles 
that would be lost if a fire destroyed the building. 
The same attitude prevails towards mechanization . A 
forklift truck might cost £3,600 . In the U.S . this may 
be equivalent to only one man- year in cost, whereas in 
Australia it might cost three and a half man- years . But 
an American feels its purchase is still worthwhile, not 
on grounds of direct cost but because of the intangible 
benefits . Without the forklift, men with few brains and 
little initiative must be hired to lift heavy loads, with 
high risk of injury . With the forklift, the company can 
attract skilled labour with initiative and intelligence 
which will be l oyal to the company and help build company 
morale . ' 
4 . The 1 0 5 c ompanies referred to include the 97 firms 
referre d to in the previous paragraph and eight unincor -
porated branches . 
5 . Far the sak e of consistency, employment figu res are 
quoted on the sam basis as elsewhere in the survey . Had 
the total e mployment of the three 'non- manufacturing 
companies ' , referred to in ote ( b ) to Table I-2, been 
included, however, the ' total employment ' of the group 
of 1 0 5 c ompanies would hav been 5,966 higher than shown. 
145 
the American parent company. To b e sure , that figure 
does not include any of the Ame rican dire c t ors referred 
to in the previous paragraph, though most of the 50 
living in Australia were indeed working directors. 
Moreover, personnel previously associated with other 
affiliates of the American parent are not included in 
the figure (except those from Canada and those who have 
spent many years working in the U.S. company). With the 
inclusion of the American directors, however, the 
importance of personnel from the parent company is at 
least fully stated because personnel f r om ocher affiliates 
often settle permanently in Australia (especially those 
from a sister affiliate in the Uni ted Kingdom) and 
even some Americans become 'Australianized'. The 
writer met several 'Americans' who had lived in Australia 
for more than a quarter of a century and others who, 
after living here for a very much shorter time, were 
rapidly adopting an Australian po i nt of view. The 
Australian executive of one firm described the American 
executives of another as 'more Australian than the 
Australians' • Because the performance of an American 
executive in charge of a foreign subsidiary is naturally 
judged on the growth and development of that subsidiary, 
American executives were found not infrequently who 
adopted an aggresively 'Australian' attitu~e.6 
By no means all of the 196 Americans, 50 directors 
and 146 other employees, were of executive status. Nine-
teen Americans in one company were assisting in the 
construction of an oil refinery and most of the eight-
teen in another company were helping in a technical 
capacity on a temporary basis. One firm in the motor 
vehicle industry employed nearly 50 Americans from its 
parent company in 1962, but the majority of these 
6. The writer met one American managing director who 
was not only chief executive of the Australian subsidiary 
but was also in charge of all sales of the parent com-
pany in the Asian area. He was vigorously intent on 
proving to the American company that Australia was the 
'logical ' source of supply for the Asian area and had 
prepared a quite extraordinarily detailed multi-page 
report to document his case. This included not only 
comparison of distances between all Asian capitals and 
Sydney with distances between the same capitals and the 
home city of the parent corporation, but also data on 
everything from Asian political prospects to Asian 
climatic conditions. 
TABIE V - 1 : AMERICAN EMJ?LOYEES IN 105 AMERICAN - AFFILIATED COMPANIES , BY PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN OWNERSHIP AND PERIOD IN 
WHICH MANUFACTURE BEGAN (a) 
Percentage of U. S . ownership and 
period in which Australian 
manufacture began (b) 
25- 49% 
(i) Manufacture began before 1950 
(ii) Manufacture began 1951 - 1955 
(iii) Manufacture began 1956- 1962 
50- 9% 
(i) Ma nufacture began before 1950 
(ii) Manufacture began 1951 - 1955 
(iii) Manufacture began 1956- 1962 
100% 
(i) Manufacture tegan tefore 1950 
(ii) Manufa cture began 1951 - 1955 















Number of American employees in -
1950 1955 1962 
n . a . 
n . a . n . a . 
5 2 
n . a . 
n . a . n . a . 24 
36 56 86 
n . a . 2 12 
n . a . n . a . 22 
n . a . n . a . 146 
Employment in 
1962 
2 , 912 
1,920 
1,773 
5 , 707 
949 
4 ,1 62 
50 , 454 
4,119 
3,601 
75 , 597 
(a) The term 'American employees ' includes not only citizens of the U. S., but also citizens of Canada and any other person who 
has spent a prolonged period of years employed by the U. S . parent company . To be included in the above table , however , an 
employee must have been employed at some time by the American parent or its Canadian subsidiary - Americans hired independently 
of the American parent company by the Australian subsidiary are not included . Also excluded for the purpose of this table 
are American directors living in Australia . 
(b) The year in which manufacture began is taken to be the year in which an American equity of at least 25 per cent was first 




TABLE V- 2 : THE NATIONALITY OF EXECUTIVES INTERVIEWED rn 105 AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES! BY PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN OWNERSHIP 
Companies in which U. S. Companies in which U. S. Companies in which U. S. 
Status of person equity was 25- 49% equity was 50-9% equity was 100}6 All companies t otal 
interviewed Nationality of executive Nationality of executive Nationality of executive Nationality of executive 
interviewed - interviewed - interviewed - interviewed -
American Australian Other American Australian Other American Australian Other American Ausn-a.1ian ~ 
Managing director 3 1 3 3 10 1 4 16 1 
Assist ant managing 
director 1 1 2 
Secret ary and 
C ont ro11er-
secr etary 10 1 9 25 1 44 
~9sistant secret ary 1 3 4 
Secretary-treasurer 
and Treasurer 2 1 2 1 4 
Controller 2 2 2 2 4 
General manager 2 1 2 5 1 7 5 3 14 6 
Finance manager and 
Finance director 2 2 5 2 7 
Other exe cut i ves 4 4 1 20 1 1 28 1 




were technicians in Australia for the launching of a 
new vehicle rather than managers. Unfortunately , the 
precise proportion of the total who were in executive 
positions is not known, though if ou tside directors are 
also excluded it was certainly somewhat less than half the 
total of 196 . The relatively small number of American 
executives in American affiliates in Australia is brought 
out by a consideration of the nationality of the 
executives interviewed during the cours e of the present 
s u rvey . 7 This information, presented in Table V-2, 
shows that, even in the case of wholly-American companies, 
most of the senior executives interviewed were Australian. 
American employees were well spread through the 
industries in which American capital is represented, as 
shown in Table V-3 . Nevertheless, the impression conveyed 
by this table is somewhat deceptive because in some 
industries almost all of the Americans in that industry 
were in one company. Indeed, the concentration of the 
196 Americans in a small number of companies is striking. 
Sixty- three companies, or 60 per cent of the present 
sample, employed no Americans at all and had no American 
d irectors living in Australia. Though only one of these 
companies had total employment in 1962 of over 2,000 , 
the group included some very substantial firms . Seven-
teen firms either employed only one American or had 
only one American director living in Australia. Seven 
companies shared between them no less than 124 Americans . 
Most commonly, American managers and technicians 
are employed in the early months of a subsidiary's life 
in Australia but are 'repatriated ' as the local operation 
becomes established . Again and again this policy was 
encountered and its results are clearly discernible in 
Table V-l, though this table does not include American 
working directors . While it is true that the number 
of American employees in all companies which began 
manufacture before 1950 appears to have grown more 
quickly than their total employment (total employment 
of the group of 35 companies grew from 35,316 to 59, 073 
between 1950 and 1962, while American employment of the 
7 . Interv.iews totalling more than 220 hours we r e c on -
ducted with 10 5 American-affiliated companies manufact -
uring in Australia at 30 June 1962 . 
TABIE V- 3 : AMERICANS IN 105 AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES IN 1962, BY INDUSTRY (a) 
Industry 
Plant , equipment, machinery 
Motor vehicles 
Mot or a ccessories 
Metal manufactures , n . e . i . 
Electrical equipment , 
instruments , etc . 
Food and drink 
Industria l chemicals and plastics 
Pharmaceutical and toilet 
preparations 
Clothing and f a brics 
Other industries 
Total 















34 , 609 
1 , 184 
5,374 




1 , 067 
6,425 
75 , 597 
American managing 





































same companies grew from 41 to 88), this result is heavily 
influenced by two large firms which together had only 
one American employee ( excluding a small number of work-
ing directors) in 1950 but employed 63 on a short-
term basis in 1962 . 
The reasons for this frequent 'repatriation' 
require little explanation . Many companies stressed the 
importance their American parents attached to having 
subsidiaries staffed by local personnel 'on principle'. 
The 'principle'involved is probably a mixture of a 
desire to achieve better public relations by manning 
subsidiaries with nationals and a recognition that 
nationals often have a more detailed comprehension of 
the local business situation than is possible for 
expatriate Americans. Certainly not all American exec-
utives in Australia have been resoundingly successful 
in their achievements . Some are geared in their thinking 
to a market very much larger than the Australian, and 
several companies complained that their initially poor 
performance in Australia was the result of a grossly 
over-optimistic market assessment by an American executive . 
Other Americans, with experience of being a specialist 
in a whole company of specialists, find it difficult to 
adjust to a situation where initiative in broad areas of 
policy is required. One company secretary asserted that 
his company would never again request assistance to 
install equipment from an American because 'they're 
too narrow in their experience'. The same man resented 
the fact that he had to write reports for his American 
managing director 'in words of one syllable' because 
the man had never been beyond the confines of one 
specialized department in the U.S. company. 
There is also a cost element involved . Several 
companies noted this aspect of the policy of repatriation 
as a reason why Americans were not employed in Australia. 
Others which did mploy Americans were, in some cases, 
resentful of their cost . The Australian secretary of 
one company was very bitter that Americans sent out to 
advise for periods of six to twelve mon ths not only had 
to be paid salaries equal to more than twice those 
earned by the Australian general manager, but also ex-
pect d the Australian company to meet all their living 
expens s in the most e pens i ve motels. The comment of 
another Australian secretary illustrates the point so 
clearly that it is worth quoting at length : 
Americans are employed out here with a cavalier 
d isregard for cost - which is all charged to the 
loc al company . The average cost of each American 
to our company ( and we employ a significant number) 
is about £10,000 per annum . Americans seem to 
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r gard living in a foreign country as a kind of 
punishment , so in addition t o their basic American 
salary they receive a special s alary for living 
overseas, plus a s ubstantial allowance based on the 
alleged e tra cost of living in Aus tralia. We pay 
the school fees of any children they may have , and 
cover a number of other costs as well , Furthermore , 
at p e riod ic intervals the company pays the first 
class air fares of the American and his whole 
family back to the States, whereas other company 
executives on business trips travel second class . 
All in all , American executives out here do very 
well : they are much better off than Australian 
executives and from the financial point of view 
are considerably better off than executives of 
similar rank in the U . S. company " 
The very high cost of employing Americans to some extent 
reflec ts the fact that many Americans do r e gard being 
sent to a foreign subsidiary as a s er i ous thr e at to their 
chances of promotion within the American company and 
substantial ' f ring e benefits' must be paid as an induce-
8 
ment to the reluctant 
Undoubtedly, there are a few American companies in 
Australia which persi t in employing American executives 
in mo st of th ir top management positions despite the 
co st . The Australian executive interviewed in one firm 
commen t ed that his company had several Americans in 
senior posts, and there was no policy to replace thes e 
by A u s trali ans • He felt that thi was not because 
Am rican ex cuti es were b tter than Australian but just 
b c a u s e :we hav a dopted a policy of not seeking high-
8. Because foreign posting may interfere with an 
American e ecutiv Y prospects in the American company . 
it has been obser ed by s ome that only when the local 
s ubsidi ary b com s large enough for the parent company 
to notice an e cuti ers performance in it does -t 
attrac th mo st compe t ent Ameri an e ecu i e s . There is 
some truth in his obs ration , though there are cer t -
ainly e ceptions to it , and it probably e plains why~ 
a s on ma nag ement cons ul tant e plained to the writer1 
Ameri an cut - in Australia t end t o be ei ther ery 
good 0 ry poor . See I s o J .. B hrman_ ' F oreign In-
v stment and the Transfer of Knowledge and Skills' s in 
U 5 S 0 Pri at and Go rnment In e stment Abroad > ed Raymond 
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gr~de Australians. We t nd to take young, inexperienced 
people and when they fail to measure up to the standard 
of a senior executive, the Americans assume that this is 
j ust because they're Australian .' By and large, however, 
the number of Americans employed in direct-investment 
enterprises in Australia is extremely small, and there 
is even an increasing tendency to use Australians in the 
higher echelons of the American company itself. 9 
It is beyond question that in many compani'es Ame.:c:n.can 
control is tightly exercised even when all local management 
is Australian . In an attempt to shed further light on 
the question of control, companies were asked to indicate 
t o what authority in the American company they were 
finally responsible. In none of the 10 4 companies 
examined did there exist a separate department of the 
American company responsible solely for Australian opera-
tions. Forty- six companies indicated that they were 
responsible to a division of the parent company dealing 
with all overseas operations of the company, and eleven 
said they were responsible to a division dealing with 
overseas investmen~ alone . Thirty- four firms were re -
s p onsible to one of the directors of their American 
p arent, and t .en of these were directly responsible to the 
chairman of directors himself . Of the other thirteen 
companies, about half were jointly-owned ventures who 
c ontended that all authority was vested in the local 
Bo ard and most of the rest were responsible to various 
regional controllers in the U. S. The classification is 
not very helpful, however, , because varying degrees of 
control were found in each category. The only exception 
to this is that most of the firms responsible only to 
the chairman of directors of the U.S. company appeared 
to be little subject to direct American interference in 
management . 
Differences in the amount of information sent by 
American affiliates to their parent companies are 
( 8) F. Mik sell (Eug n , Oregon: University of Oregon 
Books, 1962), pp. 115 11. 
9. Th pr sid nt of at 1 ast on American company is 
n Australian who worl d up through th ranks of the 
Austr l Oan subsidoar and th int rnat Oonal division of 
the Am rican firm . S ral Australians ar known to be 
in senior positi ns on th international division of 
Am rican par nt ompani s. 
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striking . At one end of the s p ectrum was the branch 
en terprise which sent its parent six copies of every 
invoice and every letter handled by the local operation . 1 0 
Another firm was encountered which forwarded two copies 
of every invoice, while in a third case a duplicate of 
every letter written by the manager of the subsidiary 
was dispatched to the parent . It is interesting that no 
American was employed by any of these three companies 
i n Australia . At the other extreme was the Australian-
American venture ( in which the American shareholding was 
only a minority) which commented that 'we don't do any 
reporting - except annually when we tell them what divi -
d end we're goin g to declare.' Another firm in which 
the American shareholding was a minority one said that 
qu arterly sales reports are 'normally sent but we 
haven ' t wor~d about this lately' . Even a wholly-
American firm, which now sends very brief monfrUy reports 
( of about six figures, covering such main aggregates 
as total sales, total profits, etc . ), 'didn't even send 
annual accounts sometimes ' at one stage of its history 
in Australia . 
Between these extremes lie the great majority of 
the American direct - investment enterprises in Australia . 
An attempt has been made to classify companies by the 
frequency and detail of their reporting and it has been 
found that of the 94 companies which provided sufficient 
information to make classification possible, 43 reported 
frequently and in considerable detail , 28 reported 
fairly often but in less detail, and 23 reported only 
infrequ ntly or in v ry brief terms. It is significant 
that while 33 of the 43 reporting frequently and in 
great detail w r wholly-American, only three of the 23 
r porting infrequ ntly or in very brief terms were 
wholly-Am ri an. The classilication is necessarily 
subj ct to a wid m rgin of error but som illustrative 
comm nts received in answer to the qu stion seeking 
information on the m thods used to ke p in contact 
with th par nt company may b h lpful . One rath r 
small fOrm which k pt particularly clos contact with its 
p r nt stat d: 
10. This ompany s nt th surv y qu stionnaires to its 
p ar nt company , not to s k p rmission to answer th m, 
bu t to ha th m actually asnw r d compl t ly . 
We send one page sales reports to the U. S . 
fortnightly and very detailed reports on all 
financial and productiorr ma~ers mont~~ ~±most 
every single item of expenditure, sales, etc . 
is documented each month in these reports, 
which are about 50 to 60 pages long . And 
they must reach the U.S. by the fourteenth 
day of the following month . 
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Another company of medium size reports in similar 
de tail . Within five days of the end of each month; a 
preliminary statement of the month's results is forwarded 
t o the U . S . parent . Within ten days of the end of the 
month, a summary report of final results for the month is 
cabled and at the same time a very detailed financial 
r ep ort is dispatched by air mail . This latter is a 
multi - page document and includes statements on total 
sales, sales by product source, sales by product type, 
orders (in similar detail), profits, commisions from 
the sale of American products, etc . - each compared with 
figures for the previous month and the same two months 
arthe previous year . Finally, by mid-month a general 
statement of about fifteen pages is posted covering 
such topics as labour relations, state of the Australian 
economy, and litigat i on . Annual statements are sent in 
even greater detail and an audited financial statement 
must be in the U.S . three weeks after the end of the 
financial year . 
Not all the 43 firms classified as being in very 
close contact with their parent company report as fully 
as these two examples, but many of them certainly do . 
The Australian secretary of one food company which had 
recently been acquired by an American firm believed 
that his company 'generated more figures' in its 
first twelve months under American control than in all 
the several decades of previous Australian ownership . 
It was not uncommon for e ecutives to preface their 
answers to this question with comments such as ' we 
send them information three times daily after meals ', 
or ' our monthly reports include everything but the 
colour of our cuti s ' hair '. 
Typical of compani s in the group of firms re -
porting in 1 ss d ta'l was the firm which, though it 
sent a monthly r port on a standardized form , con-
fined its reporting to this one page document and a 
stat m nt of sal s in 28 product categories . The 
r ports sent by compani s inthis group are often 
copies of those prepared for us by the Board or Man-
agement Committee of the local firm, and sometimes the 
forms used for forwarding information are not the 
' standardized' r porting forms almost invariably used 
by firms in very close contact with their parent. 
Almost all firms in the group having only infre-
quent contact with their parent were either very small 
or principally Australian in ownership. Only one of 
the 2J firms in this group was a large wholly-American 
firm, andin only three other cases was the American 
shareholding in a majority. In some cases in this 
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group, the American parent only secures copies of 
monthly reports through its representative on the local 
Board, while in other cases the Australian firm itself 
does not prepare monthly statements. One executive 
of a firm in W1ch the American shareholding was in a 
minority stated that he had been asked to complete 
standardized reporting forms monthly for consolidation 
with parent company figures, but he had resisted this 
pressure. Though this company currently prepares 
production figures daily, sales and production figures 
are only sent to the U.S . firm 'occasionally' . 
The preceding discussion sheds some light on the 
question of control. Clearly, it is not possible for a 
parent company to exercise detailed management control 
on a subsidiary which transmits very little information 
on its activities . On the other hand, it does not 
follow that all companies which send very detailed re-
ports on their operations are strictly controlled in 
all aspects of their life. Several companies indicated 
that their parent company never queried the information 
forwarded. Others added that no American executive had 
visited the Australian operation for a number of 
years, which obviously made a full understanding of 
the local situation difficult even in cases where 
11 large amounts of information were sent monthly . 
Perhaps the most satisfactory way to assess the 
actual extent of American parental control on the 
activities of Australian affiliates is to examine 
11. By contrast, some subsidiaries regularly receive 
visits from parent company personnel several times 
annually and if any major decision is c ontemplated 
visits may be very frequent . 
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the importance of American control over particular areas 
of management policy. Certainly some firms are controlled 
in all major areas: one firm indicated that , though ini-
tiative is often taken in Australia, all decisions of any 
importance in whatever field must be reviewed by the 
American company. Ano ther stated that since its biggest 
asset was its world-wide reputation for quality, Australian 
management must be 'directly derivative ' . The managing 
director of one large firm was so strictly controlled that 
he was unable even to decide whether to submit sales 
figures to an independent firm of accounts for the sake 
of obtaining useful data on industry sales. Other firms, 
while carefully controlled in certain crucual decisions, 
are allowed considerable independence in many other areas. 
E.R . Barlow has noted that General Motors pursues a policy 
of requiring considerable information from its foreign 
subsidiaries while allowing much discretion to the local 
12 
management. The evidence of L.J . Hartnett, a former 
managing director of General Motors-Holden's P ty Ltd in 
Australia, substantially bears this out. 13 Still others, 
even some which report to their parent company in great 
detail, seem to be allowed almost complete freedom. 
Typical of this group was the small company, in which 
the American interest was only 50 per cent, which contended 
that 'even when building a new factory, it is not 
necessary to seek permission from the U.S . company un-
less they actually have to put up some additional capital ... 
The vice-president in charge of international operations, 
when asked his opinion on a decision being made, gives 
advice but always adds that he can't make the decision 
12,000 miles away.' Ano ther company, this time of con-
siderable size and with a majority American shareholding, 
contended that on principle its parent company 'only gives 
suggestions '. Even some wholly-American companies are 
in this group: an executive of one such company stated 
that 'if we are planning a very major expansion here, 
we send a very full report of the planned expansion and 
12 . E.R. Barlow, op. cit., pp . 91-7. 
13 . L.J. Hartnett, Big Wheels and Little Wheels (Melbourne: 
Lan.sdowne Press, 1964), for example, pp . 69, 77. 
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its justification. But it is mor to keep them in the 
picture and to get th ir advice than to get their 
approval.' 
Capital expenditure is substantially the most care-
fully controlled aspect of the operation of Australian 
affiliates of American firms, as Table v-4 illustrates . 14 
Of the 95 firms which answered the s ection of Question-
naire II dealing with this subject, 75 s tated that U.S. 
ap~roval had to be obtained before embarking on any 
major capital expenditure (though in some cases it was 
clear that seeking parental approval was almost as 
much a matter of courtesy as a matter of necessity). At 
least three of those which felt themselves to be free 
of American control, moreover, qualified this either by 
saying that this was subject to the internal generation 
of funds for the purpose or by admitting that beyond a 
certain high figure, permission would be required. There 
were wide differences in the freedom of differen t 
companies to spend money on capital expansion, even 
among those which felt themselves controlled. One fairly 
small firm said that 'all capital projects, even expend-
iture of £10 on a permanent article, must be approved in 
the U.S.' Ano ther firm of comparable size indicated a 
maximum discretionary limit of $500, except for annual 
auth0rizations which the U.S . company approved in general 
terms in advance, and the same firm stressed that this 
limit applied whether the funds involved reinvested pro-
fits or 'new capital' from the parent company. But 
these two firms were the most strictly controlled in this 
regard of any encountered. Of the 20 firms which 
specified a limit above which capital expenditure must 
be approved by the U.S. parent, three mentioned a figure 
of £1,000 or less, ten mentioned a figure above £1,000 
but not more than £5,000, four mentioned a figure of 
above £5,000 but not more than £20,000, one firm mentioned 
£25,000, one £50,000, and one £150,000. Ano ther firm 
indicated that it can spend without restriction on plant 
and machinery, provided more cash is not required from 
the U.S., but has to seek U. S. approval for the purchase 
14. OJntrol over the sale of exports, however , is also 
controlled in some detail in many cases. Discussion of 
this aspect is deferred till Chapter IX. 
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of any n w land or the construction of any new buildings . 
Of course, a limit which may be very restrictive for a 
large company may be very liberal for a small one, and 
the figures quoted above do in fact cover a wide range 
of company sizes . To illustrate the point , the five 
companies which mentioned a discretionary limit of 
$5, 000 had employment in 1962 of 1 0 6, 116, 146 , 314, and 
more than 2,000 respectively . 
o f strict control . 
The impression is one 
TABLE V- 4 : PARENT COMPANY CONTROL OVER FOUR ASPECTS OF THE MANAGEMENT 
OF 95 AMERICAN - AFFILIATED COMPANIES , BY PERCENTAGE OF 
AMERICAN OWNERSHIP 
Policy decision Companies which had an American equity of -
25-4% 50- 9% 100% 
Major caj2ital 
eXEenditure 
(i) Companies which 
must seek U. S . 
approval 3 19 53 
(ii) Companies which 
may act in-
dependently 11 8 1 
Product innovation 
a nd develoj2ment 
(i) Companies which 
must seek U. S . 
approval 2 11 45 
(ii) Companies which 
may act in-
dependently 12 16 9 
Production j21anni~ 
(i) Companies which 
must seek ,U . S . ,) 
approval 1 9 
(ii ) Companies which 
may act in-
dependently 14 26 45 
WaB.,es Eolic;y and l a bour 
relanons 
(i ) Companies which 
must se ek U. S . 
approval 5 
(ii) Companies which 
may a ct in-











In other areas of policy, U.S. control is not so 
close. Most wholly-American companies must seek parental 
approval before embarking on the production of a new pro-
duct or substantially altering an old one : though at 
least one firm mentioned that this control applied only 
to products initially designed by the U. S. company. 
The great majority of firms are independent of American 
control in planning production, and very few indeed 
must seek parental approval of decisions in the field 
of wages and labour relations. 
While the areas of management decision-making 
surveyed are too few to permit of dogmatic conclusions, 
the impression is one of strict control in particular 
areas of policy, combined with considerable freedom in 
others . 15 Clearly, there are some American affiliates 
which are free from American control in all areas of 
policy. These are mainly firms in which the American 
shareholding is less than 50 per cent, some of which 
made it very plain that their U.S . affiliate is quite 
unable to block any move which the Australian manage -
ment wish to take . Of the eight firms in the '50- 99%' 
category which indicated that they could take decisions 
with regard to capital expenditure without recourse to 
their American affiliate, six firms were only 50 per 
cent American, and the other two were very small . The 
wholly-American firm which felt itself able to embark 
on capital expenditure without parental approval 
appeared to be granted a very substantial measure of 
freedom in all respects . 
In the great majority of companies examined, the 
initiative for a major capital outlay, or major manage -
ment decision of any kind, comes from the local management , 
wherever the locus of final authority. Of 74 firms 
which commented on the source of initiative for a major 
decision, 68 felt that initiative almost invariably 
stems from local management in Australia, five felt 
that management in both Australia and the U.S . take 
15. Information was sought on the freedom of local 
management in some areas of policy other than those men-
tioned in the text but because of ambiguities and mis -
understandings, the answers received were unsuitable for 
tabulation . Very few companies made specific mention of 
parent company control over the pricing of final produ cts . 
Of thr e which did, one mentioned that all pricing 
decisioils involving materials imported from the U.S. 
company ar ery strictly controll d in the U.S . j another 
mentioned an international pricing agreement on the sale 
of its output; and the third stated that while at one 
tim th U. S. company had urged all foreign subsidiaries 
/160 
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initiative about equally, and one felt that almost all 
initiative comes from the U.S . company . 
J . H. Dunning observed in Britain that American-
affiliated companies tend to become more loosely con-
16 trolled as the years go by. Such a tendency was not 
apparent among the companies examined in the present 
survey . When the companies included in Table v- 4 were 
classified by ownership and date at which manufacture 
began , the proportion of ' controlled' companies was 
almost identical among companies which began manufacture 
before 1957 as among companies which began manufacture 
in 1957 or subsequently, within each ownership category . 
This conclusion was reached in all four areas of 
management decision- making . The problem was approached 
in a different way by asking companies directly how they 
felt the control exercised over them now compares with 
that exercised immediately after manufacturing was be -
gun in Australia . The answers to this question, from 52 
firms which began manufacturing in Australia before 1957, 
produce a result which may be more meaningful than that 
achieved by comparing control in particular areas of 
p olicy by date at which manufacture began . Seventeen 
of the 52 firms felt the control now exercised over 
them to be stronger than that exercised in the years 
immediately after manufacture began here, 17 felt the 
control to be about the same , and 18 felt it to be 
weaker . But there is an interesting variation in the 
pattern of responses which is concealed by these aggregate 
figures . Among the 21 firms in which American equity 
in 1962 was less than 10 0 per cent only three indicated 
that control in 1962 was stronger than in earlier years 
( and in the case of all three firms the U.S . shareholding 
e ceeded 70 per cent), eight indicated control to be 
about the same, and ten indicated that control had be -
come weake . Among the 31 wholly-American firms , on the 
other hand, the pattern was reversed : only eight firms 
felt that control is nawweaker than in the establishment 
period, nine felt it to be about the same, and 14 felt 
( 15) to price th "r products to yi Id an operating income 
of 20 p r cent on sal s, this policy had be n dropped 
b us of pressur from th Australian subsidiary for a 
low r pr "c . 
16 . 
fa 
J.H . Dunning, 
Industry 
Investment in British Manu-
Allen e Unwin , 195 ), p. 112 . 
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that control had become stronger. 
Various reasons were suggested to explain the 
incr ase in parental control experienced by such a 
significant fraction of wholly-American subsidiaries . 
Some executives felt it was the effect of developments 
in air transport and the growth of relatively cheap 
long-distance telecommunications. Others felt that 
growth in scientific management in the U. S. had been an 
important factor . Undoubtedly important als o is the 
fact that as foreign operations gene~ally become a more 
significant part of the total activity of more and more 
American corporations an increaSing number of firms 
establish international divisions within their corporate 
structure to permit a closer watch to be kept on 
foreign subsidiaries . A further increase in control in 
the case of some companies may therefore be the prospect 
for the future . 
Some of the independence enjoyed by so many American 
affiliates in Australia is certainly a result of their 
satisfactory performance. One company controller stated 
that the executives of his company 'have bags of inde -
pendence - till something goes wrong. Then the boot 
really goes in!' Several others expressed a similar 
sentiment. The writer visited one long established 
company which was actually in the process of being 'reno-
vated' by a number of Americans sent out t o discover 
why it had begun to operate unprofitably . The company 
had experienced a sharp fall in sales and the problem 
was to reduce overhead costs commensurately. The 
four Americans de taile d to solve the problem - one budget-
ing and costing e pert, one administrative and sales 
expert, and two producti on experts - helped in the in-
stallation of a new electronic computer, advised on 
da ta processing systems, amalgamated five previously 
almos t independent divisions into one , and secured the 
dismissal of more than 200 employees. To keep things 
running smoothly , an American was appointed assistant to 
the Aus tralian managing director for two years . 
When attention is turned from the questi on of 
American control to that of American influence over the 
technique s u.sed by the managemen of Aus tralian affiliates, 
the problem of assessing the true situation is equally 
as d ifficult as before. Beoause of the wide dissemination 
of advanced management technique throughou t the 
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industrialized world, many of th m having their origin 
in th United States, th xecutives of progressive 
compani s in Australia as elsewhere would in many cases 
be using 'American techniques ' whether or not their 
companies were Amer ican in ownership . 
To gain a general impression, companies were asked 
whether the management techniques employed by them had, 
as a whole, benefited strongly , moderatcly, or negligibly 
from their association with an American company . The 
answers given to this question by 98 companies are 
tabulated in Table V-5 . Thirty- eight firms felt they had 
benefited strongly, 38 moderately, and 22 negligibly . 
There are significant differences in the answers received 
by companies of different ownership pattern . one of the 
firms in which the Amer ican equity was in a minority felt 
that it had benefited strongly from the management 
techniques of its American affiliate, and only six of 
fourteen felt that the benefit had been moderate . 
Wholly-American firms, on the other hand, believed they 
had received much greater benefit in the field of 
management, 28 of 57 feeling the benefit to be strong 
and another 22 feeling it to be moderate . Firms in 
which the American equity was between 50 and 99 per 
cent occupied an intermediate posi tion . 
It is possible that these answers exaggerate the 
importan~e of American management techniques to the 
companies studied. Companies were also asked to indicate 
to what extent specific areas of management were in-
flu nced by the techniques and attitudes of their 
Am rican parent . The answers to this question provided 
by 95 companies are shown in Table v-6, which shows the 
importance of American influence in each of seven separate 
fields. The seven fields are not, rather obviously, 
mutually exclusi e . Moreover, the category designated 
'plant supervision and manufacturing methods' was 
interpreted by some compani s to mean the techniques of 
produ tion rath r than the organization of production, 
as "nt nd d, a misinterpretation whi h leads to some 
ov rstatem nt of th importanc of Am rican influence in 
th t fi ld . But n w"th th s qualifications the im-
pr ss n is int r sting . As befor , firms in which th 
Am r an shar hold "ng wa in th m"nority appear to have 
b n "nflu nc d to only a slight d gr by Am rican 
t hn "qu s of m n g m nt . Ev n in th case of wholly-
TABLE V- 5 : BENEFIT DERIVED FROM PAREl:ifT COMPANY TECHNIQUES OF MANAGEMENT 
BY 98 AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES , BY PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN 
OWNERSHIP AND PERIOD IN WHICH MANUFACTURE BEGAN 
Per centage of U, S . owner- Companies which fe lt their overall management 
ship and period in which 
Australian manufacture 
techniques had benefited -
began (a) Strongly Moderately Negligibly Total 
25- 49% 
(i) Manufacture began 
before 1957 2 5 7 
(ii) Ma nufa ctur e began in 
1957 or subsequently 4 3 7 
50- 99% 
(i) Ma nufa cture began 
before 1957 5 3 4 12 
(ii) Manufa cture began in 
1957 or subsequently 5 7 3 15 
100% 
(i) Manufa cture began 
before 1957 16 12 4 32 
(ii) Manufa cture began in 
1957 or subsequently 12 10 3 25 
Tot a l 38 38 22 98 
(a ) See Not e (b) t o Ta ble V-l. 
American f i rms, how v r, the proporti on of companies whi ch felt 
that Am rican t chniques of management had influ enced them strong-
ly was n no area h igher than 2J ou t of 54 firms, in the f ie ld 
of budg tary planning and costing . In most other fields, the 
numb r which f lt themsel s strong ly influenced by American 
manag m n t t hni qu s wa s s ubstantially l ess than this. While 
compani s which ar strongly influenced by American techniques 
mayor may not f 1 ben fit from them, it is c rtainly not 
poss · bl for compan·es which ar n g l igibly affected by American 
t chniqu s to r c ben fit ro m th m, and a surprising number 
of th omp ni s 0 r d in th table did not feel themselves 
i nflu n d by Ameri n 
f w ar s . 
Al mpan s w 
u . S . ompan for train 
for tr n n g n manag m 
firm's wo k. As T bl 
to th O s qu st· on s nd 
hn·qu es of manag m nt in more than a 
as l d wh ther Australians are sent to the 
ng nd, ·f so, wh th r this is primarily 
nt t hn·qu s or t chnical aspects of the 
- 7 s hows, only si of th 110 respond nts 
mploy s to th U . S. p rimarily for training i n 
16 4 
TABLE V - 6: PARENT COMPANY INFWENCE ON MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES AND METHODS 
IN 95 AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES , BY PERCENTAGE OF 
AMERICAN OWNERSHIP 
Field of management Companies which had an American equity of _ 
Production planning 
Techniques influenced 











Plant supervision and 
manufacturing methods 
Techniques influenced 
by the U. S. company -
(i) Strongly 
(ii) Mod erately 
(iii) 'Negligibly 
Sales and distribution 
Techniques influenced 












Influenced by the 






Influenced by the 
U.S . company -
(ij Strongly (ii Moderately 
(iii Negligibly 













































































managem nt t chnique s , though a furth r J2 firms felt unable 
to distinguish what th 'primary ' purpose of their training 
v'sits is . It is probable, of course, that many of the firms 
which s nd mployees primarily for training in technical s u bjects 
also send m n for training in management techniques . On the 
other hand, the interpr tation placed on the phrase ' period of 
trainin g ' by some comp ani s tended to be l iberal a n d i n cluded 
in a few cases brief visit s by company executives once in two 
or three years . It would appear beyond doubt that training in 
American techniques of management plays a smaller part than 
training in technical aspects of the programme of most American 
affiliates in Australia. (It is interest i ng that five of the 
six firms which send employees to the U .S . for training primarily 
in man ag ment techniques were wholly-American in ownership, as 
also were 26 of the J2 firms which send employees for training 
equally in both management techniques and technical areas .) 
TABLE V- 7 : TRAINING OF AUSTRALIAN PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED STATES BY 110 
AMERICAN-AFFILIATED COMPANIES , BY PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN OWNER-
SHIP AND PERIOD IN WHICH MANUFACTURE BEGAN 
Percentage of U. S . 
ownership and period 
in which Australian 
manufa cture began (a) 
25- 49% 
(i) Manufacture began 
before 1957 
(ii) Manufacture began 
in 1957 or sub-
sequently 
50- 991& 
(i) Manufacture began 
before 1957 
Companies which 
do not send 
personnel to 









(i) Manufacture began 
before 1957 8 




(a) ee Note (b) to Table V-I. 
Companies which send personnel to 
the U. S . for training -
Primarily in Primarily in Equa lly in 
management scientific both manage-





nical fields niques and 
scientific 









Many American-affiliated firms have not been 
influ nced at all by Am rican management techniques . 
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In some cases this is because the t chniques evolved in 
the American affiliate for control of a vast corporate 
structure are quite unsuited to the management of a 
relatively tiny operation in Australia. In a number 
of cases, the contact between parent and affiliate 
is too slight to permit the Australian operation to 
derive any real benefit on the management level. One 
quite substantial wholly-American firm which indicated 
on the survey questionnaire that American techniques 
have benefited it 'moderately' confessed that the only 
real benefit it derived from the U.S. company in the 
field of 'management' is cheap access to American advert -
ising material and radio and television programmes! 
In 15 years only six Americans had visited the company, 
and the only movement in the opposite direction was a 
visit every two or three years by the Australian 
managing director. One small wholly-American firm stated 
that in more than thirty years of production in Australia 
only two Americans from the parent company had visited 
the subsidiary, and in the last fifteen years only two 
Australians had visited the parent company. This firm, 
however, frankly admitted that the benefit derived 
from its parent company in the field of management tech-
niques was negligible. 
Thereware other reasons why some firms felt they were 
little influenced by American management techniques . 
Several c:ompanies (in none of which the American equi ty 
exceeded 50 per cent) stated that though they did produce 
monthly reports in considerable detail this was quite 
unrelated to their association with an American company . 
In most of these cases, the Australian shareholder was a 
large company accustomed to producing such reports for 
its own operations. No fewer than eight more firms, four 
of them wholly-American, felt that their American 
affiliates had nothing to teach them in the field of 
management. One of these stated that its parent company 
was making a profit of $50 million only because it is 
too inefficient to mak a profit of $100 million . An 
cuti e On another firm complained that it took the 
par nt company thr weeks to dispat h an order to the 
AustralOan subsidi ry, whil in yet another subsidiary 
th ompany s r tary r sented th fact that the parent 
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company preferred to do all its 'correspondence' on re -
cording tapes, which permitted parent company executives 
to b very verbose. 
In the case of some jointly-owned firms, American 
techniques of management are not introduced because of a 
desire on the part of the American shareholder to pre -
serve the cooperation of the Australian management . 
This is particularly so when the American company has 
acquired an interest in an already-existing firm . 
Among the firms visited, moreover, were some which 
( despite the contention of at least one of them that 
American techniques of management had benefited it 
'moderately') gave the impression of such inefficiency 
that it was difficult to believe that 'American techniques' 
as usually understood had had any impact on them at all . 
In many companies, American techniques are adopted 
in a few selected areas but are ignoredin others . Thus, 
the American manager of one joint venture was able to 
convince other executives of the desirability of 
'technical services selling' as a sales technique but was 
quite unable to change their attitudes in most other 
areas . The managing director of another firm who felt 
that U.S . marketing expertise had been perhaps the most 
important single factor in the growth of his company in 
Australia also felt that 'the aura of American compet -
ency [in management] is often in the imagination -
many suggestions on improving managerial efficiency 
have gone from this company to the U.S. ' Several firms 
mentioned in particular the American approach to 
quality control: one previously wholly-Australian firm 
commented that ' by Australian standards the U . S . company 
goes to quite extreme lengths. We first discovered 
this when we exported some of our products to them and 
had them rejected all the time. As a result we had 
to install procedures which in fact have improved all 
our production . Ten years ago we would have regarded 
th ir approach as in olving intolerable paper work .' 
Th manag r of a n wly established branch concern was 
told, on requesting from the par nt company a procedural 
manual for his guid nc , to sort out his own methods: 
only t hniqu s ,of quality c ontrol and of production 
w sp °fi d . In anoth r fi ld of managem nt, a 
jo Ontly-own d firm whos m thods ar mainly thos of 
th non-Am rican shar hold r has adopt d th practice 
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evolved by the American shareholder of sending blank 
cheques with small orders as a means of reducing paper 
work and securing maximum discounts for cash payment . 
On the other hand, a large wholly- American firm which 
is substantially influenced in its techniques by 
those of its parent yet turned to an independent firm 
of management consultants when it was desired to reduce 
its transportation costs. 
One Australian-American firm which felt that the 
American shareholder had not been of great use in 
moderniz ing its accounting methods nevertheless felt 
that it was because of an impending issue of shares to 
an American firm that the previously wholly- Australian 
firm had been forced to reorganize its methods . 
Despite some evidence to the contrary, it is never-
theless beyond doubt that very many of the large ,wholly-
American subsidiaries operating in Australia have been 
substantially influenced by American management techniques. 
In a limited number of cases, executives of these firms 
regard the American influence as one designed primarily 
to stand~~ the procedures used by affiliates through-
out the world, and not of great benefit in itself . A 
few companies even resent the amount of detail which 
American techniques compel them to evaluate . But for the 
most part the benefit is both real and appreciated. A 
number of companies said that it was the necessity to 
meet reporting deadlines imposed in the U.S. which had 
forced them to improve efficiency . A comment from the 
company secretary of quite a small firm was typical : 
The U.S . company sent us a very detailed operating 
manual on the financial side . It caused a lot 
of heart-burning to begin with but we are now 
reaping the benefit . We now compile complete 
and final monthly accounts (even dOl~ to the 
calculation of depreciation) , and we are 
aiming to get these to the U. S . by the seventh 
working day of the following month. This gets 
progressively easier and enables much better 
production planning and financial forecasting . 
The chief accountant of another firm felt that the U. S . 
company had not directly helped to improve efficiency in 
th Australian subsidiary, though the local firm had 
th us of two very large procedural manuals covering 
v ry asp ct of a counting, but the v ry detailed 
budg tary planning which th local firm was compelled to 
do had mad it consc'ous of cost and efficiency in a 
n w way . 
A senior Australian executive of on major company 
felt that, though he had spent a period training in the 
American company some years ago, it was the 'atmosphere ' 
of th company rather than any par ticular techniques 
which were of major benefit. He had recently conducted 
an inventory study, using advanced exponential functions, 
and had discovered that whereas stocks equal to nine 
months' sales were then being kept to give a 'probability 
coverage' of 82 per cent, by readjusting the composition 
of the stocks somewhat a coverage of 93 per cent could 
be obtained with stock equivalent to less than three 
months' sales. He commented that 'in total management 
technology, we're so far ahead of Aus tralian companies 
that it worries me. In the techniques of management 
control, the average Austral ian company is twenty years 
behind - they know nothing about it.' 
The benefit received by another Australian subsid-
iary from management techniques developed by its parent 
company was outlined in the following terms : 
Management procedures for control of all aspects 
of our business are constantly being strengthened 
and improved by our International Accounting 
Systems Department in the United States. The 
benefit of studies and experience in mechanization 
and automation of manual and clerical procedures 
is constantly being passed on to us, avoiding the 
necessity for us to adopt the even more costly 
'trial and error ' method. Company consulting 
teams visit all subsidiaries , reviewing systems 
and procedures, enabling us to reduce costs and 
improve control procedures . 
Latest cash-flow analysis techniques are developed 
and used by the Australian subsidiary to evaluate 
the economics of capital investment proposals, 
enabling us to continually up-grade production 
processes and lower produc tion costs . 
How much more efficient than their Australian competi -
tors this assistance makes some American firms was noted 
in another cas by the Tariff Board. Evaluating the 
need of local tractor manufacturers for assistance in 
1955, the Board r ommend d in fa our of some assistance 
for the main locally-own d firm in the industry, even 
though it was palpably not a effic'ent as the main foreign 
manufa tur r, Int rnationa1 Har est r Co. of Australia 
P ty Ltd. Th Board mad the comm nt that it 
do s not 'nt rpr t 
n h s ns that 
t tion should ha 
Int 'rnat'onal H r 
P ty. L td. Th r r 
h t would qu 1ify 
ts r quir m nt of effici ncy 
ry indus ry s eking pro-
th high standard s t by 
st r Compan of Au tralia 
f w indu tr' s in Australia 
for prot tion or assistance 
und r such an interpretation. And while it is 
comforting to know that there is in Australia 
an ngineering industry capable of producing 
an intricate piece of machinery without pro-
tection or assistance - an industry setting a 
standard for other industries - the Board takes 
the sensible view that an industry or a unit 
of an industry is not necessarily inefficient 
because it fails to reach that high standard . 17 
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Though it does appear that the larger the Australian 
subsidiary and the higher the proportion of American 
equity in it the more important is American influence on 
local management techniques likely to be, there are 
numerous exceptions to this generalization . One very 
small firm was encountered which, though too small to 
make use of American purchasing techniques (which pre -
supposed a large purchasing department), made use of 
American techniques in most other fields. The general 
manager had two volumes of instructions, each four inches 
thick, about all aspects of management . These covered 
such matters as the correct method of filing letters 
and orders, when quality inspections should be conducted 
in the manufacturing process and when 'batch cards' 
should be initialled, the best way of running an employee 
suggestions scheme, and the way to establish a purchas -
ing department . Though having employment in 1962 of less 
than 40, the company took very seriously its responsibility 
to educate customers in the various uses of its products . 
On another occasion, a small jointly- owned firm was en-
countered, in which the American equity was in a minority 
moreover, which had adopted the accounting procedures 
of its American affiliate in their entirety . Indeed, 
such adoption had been a condition imposed by the American 
firm for the establishment of the joint venture . 
The effect of American ownership on management 
techniques is perhaps most graphically seen where a 
previously Australian company is acquired by an American 
firm . One firm which now prepares detailed sales and 
financial reports monthly for comparison with predeter-
min d targets never produced a sales budget before it 
was acquired by an American company, and only produced 
a very small manufacturing budget. Ano ther firm of 
mod rate siz , in th food industry, used to budget on 
17 . Taro ff Board's R port on Tractors, 14 Oc tober 1955, 
p. 10 . 
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an annual basis before acquisiti on by an American company , 
but now budgets twice yearly - and revises the budg t 
quarterly . Mor over, every quarter a cash forecast cover-
ing a period of two years is prepared . , In the field of 
sales, the company has dropped a number of lines on 
which p rofit margin was very low in order to concentrate 
on a smaller number of more profitable items . 
The impression which emerges from this varied 
evidence seems to be that something like half the 
American-affiliated subsidiaries manufacturing in Austra l ia 
have derived very SUbstantial benefit from the adoption 
of techniques of management evolved by their American 
parents . Most, though by no means all, of this fraction 
are wholly- American firms, and many of them are very 
large . For the other firms, American management tech-
niques are either not important at all or are important 
1 'th' I' , 18 on y W1 1n a very 1m1ted area. 
As an addendum to this chapter on management, it is 
interesting to examine the attitude of American-affiliated 
firms in Australia to the payment of wages and salaries . 
It is imp ortant to recognize that most companies in the 
survey felt that U . S . influence is weaker in this area 
than in almost any other (as can be seen in Table v - 6), 
so that evidence produced here must not be regarded as 
18 . In Chapter I, it was mentioned that wherever possible 
attention would be drawn to ways in which American affil -
iates differ significantly from other foreign subsidiaries . 
On the evidence available it would be presumptuous for the 
writer to make any definite judgment on the relative 
contributions of American and other foreign subsidiaries 
in the field of manag ment techniques. It should per-
haps be noted, however, that a significant number of 
executives spontaneously voiced dissatisfaction with 
the management of United Kingdom companies (even British-
managed subsidiaries of American companies) with which 
they had dealings - complaining in particular about 
unreliability of deliv ries . Australian executives in , 
several firms indicated that they prefer to pay a 
higher price for an American product than depend on the 
punctual delivery of a British- made product . One man 
who had previously been employed by a British subsidiary 
in Australia and is now a senior e ecutive with an 
Ameri an subsidiary felt that Australia is learningfar 
more about the techniques of mass production from 
Amer'can firms here than from British. A management 
consultant quot d earli r as believing that American 
e utiv s employed in Australia tend to be either very 
good or very p oor indicated that ven if they are poo r 
th y ar more comp t nt than British e ecutives in 
Australia. One Am rican manager m t by the writer was 
p articularly riti a of th m thods of British manage -
m nt, n including 'n h 's criticism the British 
ut'v s of som Am rican-own d companies in Australia . 
In fa'rn ss it should b added that during the course of 
th sur ey th writ r also met s ral British man agers 
wh o w r obviously fficient . 
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typical of American influence in other areas of manage-
m nt. On the oth r hand, a number of writers have 
presented very definit views on this subject and it is 
important to portray the situation as it was found 
her. Mo st writers have contended that American direct-
inv stment enterprises tend to pay a higher total remunera-
tion per employee than do locally-owned companies, and 
som hav even contended that the wage rates paid by 
American enterprises are higher than tho s e paid by 
local firms.19 F .. Bennett, however, has argued that 
the higher than average income which employees in 
American direct-investment enterprises in Australia 
receive, according to U.S. Department of Commerce figures, 
is a result of the concentration of American-owned firms 
in industries wher the average income received by 
employees in all companies is higher than the national 
20 
average. 
Relevant evidence derived from the present survey is 
presented for the most part in Table V-So This shows 
that the average income received by an employee in the 
factory of one of the 99 American-affiliated companies 
covered was almost 16 per cent higher in 1961/62 than the 
average income received by employees in all Australian 
manufacturing industry. An important part of the explana-
tion of this figure is the greater than average 'maleness' 
of the employment of American-affiliated companies, but 
even in the individual categories of the table , employe es 
in th American-affiliated firms received a significant ly 
higher total income than did those in Australian industry 
as a whole. 
19. Among those that have noted that U. S. direct-
investment enterprises reward their employees more 
h ighly than do local firms are J.N. Behrman, 'Economic 
Effects of P rivate Direct Investment', in U. S. Pri a t e and 
Government Investment Abroad, p.147i D. M. Phelps, 
Mi ration of Industr to South America (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 193 ,pp. 273- i C.D . Blyth and 
E.B. Carty, on-Resident Ownership of Canadian Industry ' , 
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXII 
( 1956), p. 452; J.H. Dunning, op. cit., p . 25 4. They are 
supported by e idence published in U.S . Business Invest -
ments in Foreign Countries, by Samuel P izer and Frederick 
Cutler (Washington: Office of Bus iness Economics, U.S . 
D par tment of Commerce, 1960), p. 45. 
20 . F . . Bennett, 'The Pattern and Significance of 
United Stat s Direc Investments in Australia ', unpub-
lished B.Ec. (Hons . ) th sis for the University of 
Sydney, 1961, pp. 15-16. 
TABLE V~: WAGE AND SALARY PAYMENTS PER EMPLOYEE IN AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN-AFFILIATED FACTORIES IN 1961/62, BY INDUSTRY, 
CATEGORY OF EMPIDYEE , AND SEX (a) 
Industry 
Industrial chemicals 
Pharmaceuticals and toilet 
preparations 
Plant, equipment , and machinery 
Electrical machinery, cables, 
and apparatus 
Motor vehicle construction and 
assembly, and motor bodies 
Motor accessories 
Other metal products 
Foundation garments 
Food, drink, tobacco 





Male Female Total 
Managerial and clerical Wages staff Total Managerial and clerical Wages staff Total 
staff, chemists, staff, chemists, 
draftsmen, etc. draftsmen, etc . 
1,968 
(1,773) 
1 , 766 
(2,089) 
















































































































(712) (1 ,314) 
734 1,049 












(598) (675 ) 
630 1,008 





(671) (1 , 054) 
ta) Unbracketed figures refer to wage and salary payments per employee in the factories of 99 American-affiliated companies. 
Bracketed figures relate t o payments f or the whole of the Australian industry concerned , including the American-affiliated 





Th i~dustrial classification of the table shows 
that B nnett was corre ct in his belief that American-
affiliated firms tend to cluster in those industries 
where the average wage for the whole industry is higher 
than that for manufacturing as a whole, though of 
cours in some cases the presence of American companies 
may itself playa part in raising the industry average . 
But it also appears beyond doubt that even within each 
industry American-affiliated firms on average pay 
higher total incomes to their employees t han do firms 
without American connections. In all the main industries 
except 'Food, drink, tobacco' is this the case. More-
over, because the figures for each industry include 
those for American-affiliated firms, the difference 
between the latter and Australian or other non-American 
firms is even greater than is shown. This error is only 
significant in industries where American capital is 
particularly important, and the greatest error is in the 
industry designated 'Motor vehicle construction and 
assembly, and motor bodies'. Here the exclusion of the 
American firms from the total reduces the average pay-
ment for 1961/62 from £1,191 to £1,070, compared with 
an average payment by American firms of £1,291. 
A number of factors could explain this phenomenon . 
Being larger than Australian firms on average, American 
firms might employ more specialized - and so more highly 
paid - labour than Australian-owned firms. This appears 
a very plausible possibility, but unfortunately the 
evidence to prove it is lacking. It may be that within 
each of the industries covered in Table v-B there are 
sub-industries in which the American firms operate, and 
in which the total wage payments of American firms are 
only typical of the non-American firms. But this does 
not seem likely. 
In an attempt to shed more light on the wage 
policies of American-affiliated firms, most companies 
were questioned on the subject. Only three companies 
felt that, because of American influence, they paid 
substantially more to wages staff than other companies 
in their industry. One of these companies, the Lincoln 
Electric Co . (Aust.) Pty Ltd, has become known throughout 
business circles in Australia for its revolutiona ry 
approach to wages. The company, which is by no means 
among the giants of Australian industry, operates a 
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system of job evaluation and merit rating which, it 
claims, makes its workers the highest paid in its 
industry in Aus tralia . In its first 24 years of opera-
tion in Australia ( to 1964), the company distributed 
more than £900,000 in annual bonuses based on profit 
sharing (in addition to substantial fortnightly pro-
duction bonuses) and in 1963 the lowest annual bonus 
paid is reported to have been £125. 21 Two other firms 
provided somewhat similar, if rather less spectacular, 
examples. The manager of another company contended 
that 'we pay our workers more than any other shop in 
town', though this was because of the manager's personal 
dislike of trade unions not because of American influence . 
There are in fact quite a number of American-
affiliated f~rms which, though not paying substantially 
above average wages, do try to keep their wages a little 
above the average in their industry . One large firm said 
that parent company policy throughout the world is to 
pay wages 'at least equal to the going rate in the local 
community - we don ' t have to be the leader, but we would 
certainly never lag behind .' Several firms made comments 
of a similar kind. One executive described his company's 
wage policy as 'probably a little more liberal than the 
wage policies of most Australian companies. All wages 
and salaries are reviewed twice yearly and if everybody's 
doing well there is a 5 per cent annual increase across 
the board.' 
Probably more common than companies which consciously 
pay their workers above average wages are companies which 
maintain better than average 'fringe benefit' schemes 
or, in a few cases, profit sharing schemes . One firm 
which indicated that 'our approach [ to wages ] is strongly 
influenced by Australian conditions' also said that it 
had operated an ' employee superannuation scheme long 
before they became general in Australia ', while another 
which made a similar comment on its wages had a very 
generous system of Christmas bonuses. In one newly 
established company, the secretary said that the American 
company ' has a very parental attitude to its employees 
and the same attitude is being introduced here . At the 
21 . Australian Financial Review, 21 October 1964, p . 52 . 
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moment we haven't got any more social amenities for 
employees than the typical Australian company but we're 
working to change that in line with our world wide 
policy . ' One large company has a scheme whereby 
employees may purchase parent company shares at 85 
per cent of market value with up to 10 per cent of 
their annual salary, and another operates a bonus 
system which results in the annual distribution of a 
fixed percentage ( currently l~ per cent) of each 
employee ' s total five-yearly income. 
The majority of American-affiliated firms contacted, 
however, felt that wage payments are entirely governed 
by Australian factors. One American executive commented 
that ' flat award rates are paid' and went on to add that 
only trade unions advocate bonus or incentive schemes . 
Another wholly-American company, defending its efficiency 
before the Tariff Board, explained that 'it had become 
necessary to pay above award rates to skilled employees 
such as fitters, carpenters and electricians, in order 
to obtain their services in competition with other 
industries in the area . It did not consider that these 
payments were greater than those made by other industries 
in the locality . ,22 An executive in one large branch 
operation queried the meaning of the question on wages 
policy since 'that is all covered by awards' . When 
asked whether the singularly good employee amenity block 
- a building so impressive that the writer can not have 
been the first to mistake it for the main administrative 
offices - was built as a result of American influence , 
the Australian executive quite frankly admitted it 
had been built during the early fities to attract 
labour at a time of acute labour shortage. A surprising 
number of companies (at least eight) mentioned that 
though wages staff are paid at the general level pre -
vailing in the industry, executive staff are paid 
according to ' American principles '. In some cases, 
this merely means the use of some management incentive 
or bonus scheme but in at least one case Australian 
executives are paid the Australian currency equi alent of 
the salari s recei ed by e ecutives of similar status 
in the U.S . company, plus th bonuses to which American 
22. Tariff Board's Report on Citric A id, Tartaric Acid 
and Cr am of Tartar, 19 Apr"l 1962, p. 8. 
executives are entitled . (Interestingly , this is 
despite the fact that t here are no Americans in the 
Australian subsidiary to generate tension on relative 
salary levels.) 
In only one case was an American-owned firm en-
countered which openly admitted that until recently 
its wages staff had been paid less than employees in 
other parts of the industry. The executive explained 
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that some American executives had built an argument for 
fixing wages on the most poorly paid firms they could 
find and that it was only when the company began to lose 
too many of its employees that the situation was remedied. 
The same company still retains a salary structure for its 
Australian executives which compares most unfavourably 
at every level with the salary of comparable executives 
in Australian-owned companies. The executive inter-
viewed, a man who gave an impression of competency 
surpassed by none and equalled by few of all the executives 
interviewed, had been told by a firm of chartered account-
ants that in any large Australian company he could be 
expected to receive an annual salary of from £4,750 to 
£5,250. 'Allowing for some exaggeration on their part, 
you could say that £4,500 is a reasonable figure . Till 
a few months ago, I was on £3,200' and at the time of 
the survey he was still receiving a salary of less than 
£4,000. 
How common it is for American-affiliated firms to 
pay their employees less than the 'going rate' is not 
known. It would appear that the firm quoted above is 
not an isolated e ample, though its experience does not 
seem to have been common. One long established eng in-
eering firm, in which the American shareholding was 75 
per cent in 1962, has been accused by a trade union 
organizer of being 'the lawest-paid shop in the area' ,23 
and the writer was told that in at least one of the very 
large wholly-American firms executives are paid salaries 
below those typical in Australian-owned firms of com-
parable size and status. Indeed, one Australian exec -
utiv ontended that he had been told by a firm of 
chart red ac ountan s hat , with a f w notable e ceptions, 
Am rican subsidiarie in Aus ralia tend in general to 
pay their top Australian e ecutives rather poorly . But 
23 . Sydn y Morning Herald, 7 March 1964, p. 4 . 
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th admittedly limited evidence of this survey does not 
seem to support this conclusion, and for every executive 
who felt that s alaries paid by American firms are generally 
low there was another who felt that they are generally 
rather high. 
The remaining data gathered on the subject of wages 
and salaries is also inconclusive. Because a number 
of companies seemed to pay their salaried staff 'above 
average' incomes but their wages staff only 'the going 
Fate', an examination was made of the relative incomes 
received by 'Managerial and clerical staff, chemists, 
draftsmen, etc .' and by 'Wages staff'. If attention be 
confined to male employees, it appears that salaried 
staff in American-affiliated factories were paid un 
average 10.8 per cent more than salaried staff in 
Australian industry as a whole in 1961/ 62. In the same 
year, wages staff in American-affiliated factories re-
ceived 9 .4 per cent more than average . When the figures 
for individual fac t ories are examined, the picture is 
the same. Of the 152 comparisons possible,24 90 paid 
salaried staff more highly than average for their industry 
and 62 paid them more poorly. On the other hand, 86 
paid wages staff more highly than average for their 
industry and 66 paid them more poorly . Clearly, the 
difference in the approach to the payment of salaried 
and wages staff in American-affiliated firms is negligible . 
If there is any 'American influence', it either applies 
to both groups equally or to only a very small number of 
executive personnel. 
Though the wages and salaries paid by American-
affiliated firms in Australia are higher than those 
ruling in Australian industry as a whole , the rate of 
growth of wage and salary payments per employee in 
Amer ican-affiliated firms has been almost identical to 
that in Australian industry. Twenty-one companies, 
with total employment in 1962 of 47,864, provided 
information on total manufacturing employment and total 
wage and salary payments for each year from 1952/53 to 
1961/62. The average payment ·to employees in this 
2 4 . In some cases companies gave consolidated data 
for all their factories . Here the comparisons are taken 
on a company basis . In other cases, there were no 
salaried males mploy d in the factory, and in these 
cas s no comparison ·s possible. 
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group rose from £8Jl .J in 1952/5J to £1,25J .4 in 1961/62, 
a growth of 50. 8 per cent. At the same time, the 
average payment for all Australian manufacturing industry 
grew from £707 to £1,054, a growth of 49.1 per cent . 
The slightly faster rate of growth of income payments in 
American-affiliated firms is in fact entirely the 
influence of the motor vehicle factories of four large 
companies : wage and salary payments per employee in 
these factories grew by 5J . 6 per cent over the period 
and with their exclusion the rate of growth of other 
American-affiliated firms falls to only 46.2 per cent. 
Twenty-five more firms, making a total of 46 firms, 
with total 1962 employment of 59,199, provided the 
data necessary to calculate wage and salary per 
employee figures for the five years 1957/58 to 1961/62 . 
The average income paid per employee by this group 
of 46 firms rose from £1,004.1 in 1957/58 to £1,225.2 in 
1961/62, a growth of 22.0 per cent. Over the same years, 
the average payment for all Australian manufacturing 
industry grew from £898 to £1,054, a growth of only 
17 .4 per cent. But again, most of the explanation of 
the faster than average growth in payments by American-
affiliated firms is to be found in the motor vehicle 
industry, where payments per employee in American-
owned plants grew by 25.4 per cent. When this industry 
is excluded from the American figures, the rate of 
growth of their wage and salary payments fal~tolittle 
above the Australian average, at 18.8 per cent. 
Finally, it is interesting to compare the rate of 
growth of wage and salary payments per employee in wholly-
Ame rican firms with that in jointly-owned firms . If 
American firms do tend to carry abroad the high wage 
pol icies some of them adopt in the U.S. , it might be 
expected that wages and salaries per employee would 
rise more rapidly in wholly-American firms, where 
American influence would be stronger, than in jointly-
owned entures . Examination of the 21 firms which 
provided data on wages for the decade 1952/5J to 1961/62 
does seem to pro ide some support for the thesis that 
payments per employee do grow more rapidly in wholly-
American firms than in jointly-owned . Of the 14 
wholly-American firms, wages per employee grew more 
rapidly than th r 1 ant industry a erage in ten cases 
and f 11 short of th relevant industry average in 
f ur as s. By contrast, in only on of the seven 
j °ntly-own d firms did paym nts per employe rise more 
rapod y than th r 1 ant industry average. In total , 
wag s nd salaro s p r mploy ros by 52 . 2 p T cent 
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in th wholly-American firms, but only 40.1 per cent in 
the jointly-owned firms (compared with a national average 
of 49.1 per cent). Even with the exclusion of factories 
in the motor vehicle industry, wages and salaries per 
employee in the remaining plants rose by 49.7 per cent, 
substantially above the growth experienced in the jointly-
owned firms. But the evidence afforded by the 46 firms 
which provided data for the period 1957/58 to 1961/62 
( which, of course, includes the 21 which provided data 
for the full decade) is not so clear. In seventeen of 
the 29 wholly-American firms payments per employee grew 
mor rapidly than the relevant industry average, and in 
12 cases they grew more slowly. By contrast, in eight 
of the 17 jointly-owned firms payments per employee 
grew more rapidly than the industry average, and in 
nine cases they grew more slowly. In total, wages per 
employee rose by 22.4 per cent in the wholly-American 
firms, compared with a national rise of 17.4 per 
cent, but the rise in jointly-owned firms was 20.2 per 
cent, little short of the rise in wholly-American firms. 
And when plants in the motor vehicle industry are excluded 
from the wholly-American group, the average rate of 
growth of income payments in this group falls to only 
17 . 7 per cent, below the average growth in the jointly-
owned firms and only marginally above the average 
growth for all Australian manufacturing . 
Dogmatic conclusions would appear inappropriate. 
S ome American subsidiaries in Australia do make a 
policy of rewarding their employees at least marginally 
more highly than do Australian-owned firms . Among firms 
which adopt this policy are some of the largest. But 
these cases aside there is little doubt that most 
American subsidiaries, like most Australian companies, 




It has been widely recognized in Australia that the 
technical and scientific know- how transferred by foreign 
companies to their affiliates in this country is one of 
the most important benefits of foreign investment. 
Surveying Australia ' s post - war industrial development 
in 1955, D . M. Hocking contended that 'it is hardly an 
exaggeration to say that in every rapidly changing 
industry practically every major innovation was intro-
duced by a firm wholly or part owned by one or more 
overseas firms . ,l He went on to argue that, 
whatever basis of evaluation is adopted, 
overseas companies must be given the credit 
for most of Australia's technological progress 
in the post-war period .. . I have estimated 
that about one third of the American and one 
quarter of the U.K. firms which have commenced 
manufacturing in this country since the end 
of the [Second Worrd ] war have done so with 
the specific purpose of introducing a new 
product or process. 2 
The purpose of the present chapter is to assess the 
importance attached to American technical know-how by 
ex cutives in the group of companies covered in the 
survey, and to examine some of the criticisms which may 
be levelled at Australia's considerable dependence on the 
fruits of foreign scientific endeavour. 
There is no doubt that most American-affiliated 
companies operating in Australia beli ve their access 
to Am rican technology to be of vital importance to their 
continued growth, and indeed their continued existence, 
in th Australian market . Table VI-l shows that 57 of 
th 75 companies which answered the question seeking to 
larify the importanc attached to American technical 
know-how indicated that this was vital to their total 
operation, while another four firms felt that it was 
vital in one major area of production. Thirteen com-
pani s indicat d that acc ss to American technical 
know-how was of moderat benefit, and only one, a firm 
1 . D.M . Ho king, ' The Contribution of ~verseas Companies 
to Australia ' s Post-war Industrial D velopment ' , a paper 
pr s nt d to S t'on G, Australian and ew Zealand Associa-
t'on for th Ad an m nt of Science, Melbourn , 1955 , p . 8 . 
2 . Ibid . , p . 9. In a study publish d in 1958, Hocking 
bs d that Australian subsidiaries or licensees of 
f r gn ompani s, comprising just over 21 per cent of 
h's s mpl of 903 compani s operating in Australia, were 
r spons'bl for 54 p r c nt of all th innovations intro-
du d by this group of companies 0 er the perio~ 1939 to 
1953 . Of firms r sponsible for major innovations ( those 
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in which the American equity in 1962 was little more 
than 25 p er cent, regarded the benefit it derived from 
the know-how of its American affiliate as negligible . 
( It is significant that this c ompany had a technical 
kno w- h ow agr eement with a not h er Ame rican firm .) It 
a pp ears that executives of wh olly-American firms feel 
that access to American technology has been more 
important than d o executives of jointly- owned ventures, 
but the number of comp anies in the sample is insufficient 
to d raw dogmatic concl usions from this evidence . J 
Almost always the transfer of American technical 
know- how invo lves the provision of detailed designs 
and blue - prints , of f ormulae, patents, and work methods . 
Frequently , as seen in Table V- 7, personnel from the 
Australian c omp any are sent to the U.S . parent for a 
p eriod of training in American production methods . The 
most comprehensive scheme of this kind encountered is 
operated by one of the large motor vehicle manufacturers . 
This company sends about six young men each year to a 
two - year training course in engineering in the parent 
company, and in addition Australians are sent for periods 
ranging from one to six months for training in specific 
fields when the local company contemplates the intro -
duction of a new or improved product . Each department 
of th local company also sends one or two men to the 
parent company annually for a period of 'familiarization', 
and the manufacturing department may send as many as 
five for this purpose. Though a training scheme of 
such dimensions appears e ceptional, most of the 
larg firms have some procedure for training local 
p rsonnel in the U. S . company . A company in the chemical 
( 2) eading to an investment of more than £1 million) , 
8J p r cent had overseas affiliations (64 per cent by an 
qu'ty link and 19 per cent by a technical agreement) . 
(D. M. Hocking , 'R search - the E conomic I mplications ' , 
Journal of the Australian Institute of Metals , III ( 1958), 
No . 1, pp. 28 - 9 .) 
J. It does seem significant, however, that wholly-
Am ri an compani s, in contrast to jointly- owned ones, 
g n rally s m to hav ' automatic' access to the know-
how of their par nts . Fifteen companies out of 16 in 
whi h th Am rican equ'ty was complet contended that 
th r access to th t chnology of their par nt companies 
is ' automatic ' , but only fiv of ten companies in which 
th Am r ' can quity was b tw en 50 and 99 per c nt and 
only f'v of el v n ompani s in which th Am rican equity 
was 1 ss than 50 p r cent could ma ke the same contention . 
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industry, to take another example, sent eight of its 
senior production men to the u.s. for a special course 
associated with the introduction of a new product, and 
at the time of the survey had just sent two engineers 
for a period of more than two years on a study tour of 
parent company plants throughout the U.S. 
It is impossible to describe in short compass the 
technical benefit derived by the local affiliates of 
American firms, so for this reason the following quota-
tions may serve to provide a useful impression. 
Executives of all the firms quoted felt that American 
technical know-how had been 'vital' to the growth of 
their firm. By chance, none of the firms quoted was 
wholly American in ownership (though similar remarks 
could have been quoted from a number of such firms), 
and none exceeded a total employment of 200 in 1962: 
(a) The Americans are very generous people 
with technical information . We have had about 
1,000 blue-prints on the design of [ a motor 
vehicle component ] from the U.S . since we began 
its production four years ago . We write to 
th m about four times a week on technical 
problems and as far as we are aware, the U.S . 
company has never withheld technical information 
from us, and normally is very forthcoming in 
giving us information. 
(b) Technical information from the U.S. company 
is vital - we get access to all information in 
our own field automatically and usually can 
negotiate the transfer of information in other 
fields also. Technical reports are always 
going back and forth. When we started up 
initially, they sent two men out here for 
several months to help on the technical side 
and at the same time we sent two people over 
for training, one on the technical side and the 
other a salesman. Since then, one of these 
has been back to the U.S . again and another 
technical man has been over there for three 
months. Also, last year there was a world-
wid symposium of all affiliates held in Paris 
to which we sent two men. 
(c) Wh n we want to produce a new product, we 
first secure a l icence from our parent company 
and th n send from one to three people over 
th re for two or three months. There they 
have discuss ions with their U,S . dount rparts, 
going right through the methods of production, 
ironing out difficulties and learning from the 
Am rican company's e peri nc. The U . S. 
company th n supplies us with full specifications 
on materials, full tooling drawings and break-up 
d awOngs of compon nts - ev rything r quired to 
plan production in Australia. 
(d) Most of our s nior production m n have been 
on th Stat s - and if we g t into a difficulty 
TABLE VI-l : ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM PARENT COMPANIES BY 75 AMERICAN-AFFILIATED 
COMPANIES , BY PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN OWNERSHIP , AND PERIOD IN WHICH MANUFACTURE BEGAN 
Percentage of U. S. ownership and 
period in which Austra lian 
manufacture began (a) 
25- 49'fo 
(i) Manufacture began before 1957 
(ii) Manufacture began in 1957 or 
subsequently 
50- 99'fo 
(i) Manufacture began before 1957 
(ii) Manufa cture began in 1957 or 
subsequently 
10a}b 
(i) Manufacture began before 1957 
(ii) Manufacture began in 1957 or 
subsequently 
Tot a l 
Companies which assessed a ccess to parent company technology as -
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in only one major 


















(~The year in which manufacture began is taken to be the year in which an American equity of at least 25 per cent was 




we can't solve here, the best man on the pro-
blem from our parent company is rushed out here 
to help, no matter where he is . 
( e ) We sent two people - the factory manager 
and the works supervisor - to the U.S. to study 
their operating methods , which are peculiarly 
American, for a period of ten months when we 
first began here. These two now run training 
schools lasting five or six weeks for all our 
new staff •••. Also the research department of 
the U. S. company issues a monthly bulletin on 
how to improve manufacturing methods and 
materials - this is cIrculated to all affiliates 
throughout the world. 
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The implications of this kind of assistance were 
outlined in some detail by another jointly-owned firm. 
This company, with employment in 1962 of little more 
than 200, receives regular monthly bulletins giving 
information on all products produced by the parent 
company and executives of the local firm are thus able 
to select products of special interest and request 
further details. The American company provides precise 
manufacturing instructions and, wherever possible, 
blue-prints for all the machines required . If no 
prints are available, photographs of the machines in 
question are provided instead, or an engineer from the 
Australian company visits the U S. to inspect them 
personally. The managing director made the following 
comment: 
Over the last five or six years, since our 
affiliation with a U.S . firm, we have reduced 
direct labour cost from 22 per cent to about 
11 per cent of total unit cost ••. This is 
partly due to the introduction of an incentive 
scheme for labour, which has permitted a consid-
erable increase in wages at the same time . The 
incentive scheme was our own idea but for it 
to be any good, we have to employ the correct 
manufacturing methods. This is where our over-
seas connection is important •.. The flow of 
t chnical information has also been important 
in reducing the percentage of rejects at ~inal 
inspection . We used to get about 25 per cent 
of finished articles returned for further work . 
This is now almost always under 5 per c~nt, 
with an average rejection of probably 22 per 
c nt . Moreover, if 25 per cent were having to 
b r j cted at final insp ction, chances are 
that ther w r som faulty articles getting 
through. nd r onr ighteen months' guarante , 
w us d to ha an av rage r turn of about 
p r cent four y ars ago . This is now down 
to 0. 6 p r c nt, and this fall is definitely 
attributabl t th flow of t chnical information 
fr m th U.S ...• W pay a 5 per c nt royalty 
for this inform tion - but it is the cheapest 
thing w buy. 
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Not all American-affiliated firms receive technical 
benefit of this magnitude from their American associates. 
In some cases this is because the American company is 
not geared to the dissemination of information, and 
in other cases local executives are not sufficiently 
familiar with the workings of the parent company to know 
what to request and how to request it. Where an 
American shareholding has been acquired in a local 
company, or where a local firm has been completely ac-
quired by an American company, American technical know-
how may not be relevant to all fields in which the 
local firm operates. If the local company is engaged 
only in assembly or in packaging operations, again 
little of the American company's know-how will be of 
value . Indeed, even if the local firm is engaged in 
full production, it is unlikely to be concerned with 
more than a fraction of the products occupying the 
attention of the American company, and more than one 
firm indicated that only a very small proportion of its 
parent's technology was relevant to Australian operations . 
There was a small number of firms which doubted if parent 
company technology had been of any appreciable import-
ance, but without exception these companies were either 
small or substantially Australian in ownership. In 
general, American technical know-how has been of con-
siderable importance to direct-investment enterprises in 
Australia, whether wholly or only partly American in 
ownership . 
There are, of course, offsetting costs. The most 
obvious of these is the need to pay for much of this know-
how. Table VI-2 classifies 100 companies which provided 
information on this question by the main kind of 
' service fee , 4 they pay to their American parent. It 
does provide some interesting information . To begin 
with, it is perhaps surprising to see that no fewer than 
31 companies were paying no charge of any kind in 1962 . 
Ten of these, moreover, were firms in which the American 
equity fell short of 100 per cent and indeed in six 
4. Included und r the heading of ' service fee ' are pay-
m nts going by many different names, often only for taxa-
t'on reasons . Th tabl includes such charges as 
ngin ering fees, management fees, technical assistance 
f s, and contribut'ons to parent company research and 
development e penditure. 
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cases the American shareholding was not even 50 per 
cent. In eight of the Jl cases, however, six of them 
wholly-American, the company concerned anticipated the 
introduction of a charge of some kind 'when we get on 
our feet'. In one more case, a long established firm 
expected the parent company to press for the payment of 
a technical assistance fee following American government 
concern at the U.S. balance of payments position. 
Six firms paid a 'fixed fee per annum', though in 
at least two cases this fee was subject to periodic 
negotiation. In two other cases, the Australian company 
had acquired an obligation to pay a fixed sum, of sub-
stantial proportions, when the American firm first 
extended its technical assistance, and was paying this 
off over a period of ten years. At the end of the 
decade, their obligation was expected to cease. Four 
companies made their principal payment for technical 
know~huw by a contribution to parent company expenses 
based on the proportion which the sales of the Australian 
operation bear to the sales of all affiliated companies 
throughout the world. Only wholly-American companies 
appear to use this method. 
By far the most common basis for rewarding the 
parent company for its contribution to the technical know-
how of the subsidiary is by a payment which varies with 
the sales of the subsidiary. In many cases this is a 
flat percentage levy on the total sales of the Australian 
operation, but in other cases the charge may be levied on 
a part of local sales only: the charge may be only on 
goods of Australian manufacture, for example, or it may 
be only on American-designed goods. In some cases, the 
charge may vary inversely with the American content of 
the final product, reflecting the fact that the American 
company makes some profit on the sale of components or 
materials to the Australian subsidiary.5 Sometimes a 
small fixed charge is payable in addition to the fee 
based on sales. Some companies have 'multiple rate ' 
5 . A technical service fee which varies inversely 
with the American content of sales may be at its highest 
wh n the American contribution to know-how is at its 
lowest, sinc products with a high Australian content 
may b those on which most Australian design work has 
b n don. If th fe is based on the Australian con-
t nt of Am rican-d signed goods only, hower, this 
would not be th as . 
TABIE VI- 2: TYPE OF PAYMENT MADE TO PARENT COMPANIES FOR TECHNICAL AN]) MANAGERIAL ASSISTANCE BY 100 AMERICAN- AFFILIATED 
COMPANIES IN 1962 , BY PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN OWNERSHIP ANTI PERIOD IN WHICH MANUFACTURE BEGAN 
Percentage of U. S. ownership and 
period in which Australian 
manufacture began (a) No special charge 
of any kind 
25- 4% 
(i) Manufa cture began before 1957 
(ii) Manufacture began in 1957 
or subsequent ly 
50- 99% 
(i) Manufacture began before 1957 
(ii) Manufacture began in 1957 
or subsequently 
100% 
(i) Manufacture began before 1957 
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(a) See Note (a ) to Table VI- l . 
(b ) Throughout the t able , companies have been classified by the main type of payment made . Companies in this category , 
however , either did not specify the basis on which they pay their technical assistance fee or make payment in such a 





systems: one previously wholly-Australian firm, for 
1 
example, pays a royalty of 14 per cent on all sales of 
products which know-how from the American company merely 
improves, and this rate reduces to 1 p r cent after five 
years. On a completely new product, introduced with 
the help of the American company, the rate is 1 per cent 
on sales up to £900,000, but 2 per cent on sales above 
£900,000. This rate also reduces to 1 per cent after 
five years. Another company pays a royal t y of J per 
cent till the total annual royalty reaches $10,000, 2 
per cent till it reaches $20,000, and 1 per cent till 
it reaches $40,000. The maximum payable in anyone 
year, however, is $40,000. 
The seventeen firms in the 'Other' classification 
in the table either did not specify on what basis their 
contribution to the cost of parent company technology 
was made or contributed in a variety of different ways . 
Some of these companies pay only a small management fee, 
o,i?hers pay a special technical and administrative 
charge based on a formula applied to the overheads of 
their parent company and in addition pay for all engin-
eering costs incurred specifically for the Australian 
company. The variety is almost infinite. 6 
A few companies were encountered which feel they 
pay too much for access to parent company technology, 
but on the other hand there were many who felt they 
were receiving a very cheap bargain. One large jointly-
owned company indicated that its agreement with its 
parent company provided for the transfer of technical 
information at cost - 'which frequently means that 
they charge us only for the time it takes them to write 
it up'. Most companies expressed no particular opinion 
on the level of service fee paid, so it is probably 
safe to assume that most were at least content with 
their arrangement. 
Table VI-2 is not, however, very useful. Above all, 
it does not permit a comparison between payments made 
6. For comment on the great variety of royalties and 
other payments made to U.S. licensors, see Enid Baird 
Lo 11, Forei n Lic nsin A reem nts: II. Contract 
N gotiation and Administration ew York: ational 
Industrial Conf r nce Board, 1959), especially pp. 42-54 . 
S also Chapt r X low for discussion of th importance 
of all su h f s in r lat · on to profits. 
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by wholly-American and jointly-owned companies, and no 
table can adequately do this. For even if it could be 
shown that all firms pay a uniform royalty, or that all 
wholly-American companies pay a royalty above that paid 
by jointly-owned companies, no meaningful conclusions 
could be drawn . The writer has found it impossible, 
even with knowledge of the individual companies involved, 
to reach a definite impression in this area. 
Six of 17 companies in which the American share-
holding falls short of 50 per cent pay no special 
technical assistance or management fee. Those in this 
category which do make special payment frequently pay 
quite a small charge and the highest charge appears to 
be a 5 per cent charge on the sale of American-designed 
products . Royalties of 4 or 5 per cent appear somewhat 
more common among the companies in which the American 
shareholding in 1962 was between 50 and 99 per cent -
and one company pays almost 8 per cent - but again there 
are a number of companies paying charges of less than J 
per cent, and some even less than 1 per cent . Six of 
27 companies in the group make no special payment of 
any kind . Among wholly-American firms the picture is 
again one of diversity. Nineteen firms were making no 
payment in 1962 and many of those which were making a 
special payment were paying only a very small fee . One 
firm with sales of nearly £9 million, for example, paid 
a management fee in 1962 of only £50,000',. and another 
firm with sales of more than £6 million paid a manage -
ment fee of less than £24,000 in the same year . But at 
the other extreme was the highly profitable pharmaceutical firm 
paying a royalty on all sales of 5 per cent, in addition 
to a management fee equivalent to 8 per cent on all 
sales . Another firm paid a negligible engineering fee 
but a management fee of more than 9 per cent on sales , 
while a third paid a charge of 7~ per cent on the sale 
of all products of U.S. design . These payments were 
among the highest encountered, but payments of 5 per 
cent were not uncommon. 
Even if a I g neral impression l emerged, it could 
mean l'ttle . What is of relevance is not the absolute 
rat of royalty or technical assistance fee but the 
total paym nt relat d in som way to the amount of 
techni al information made available . It is simply 
not possibl to say that a company in the metal - working 
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industry is paying less for know-how because it pays a 
royalty of 2 per cent than a pharmaceutical firm which 
pays 10 per cent: the technical information made available 
to the metal-working firm may be of much smaller value 
than that made available to the pharmaceutical firm . 
Moreover, a technical assistance fee or royalty is only 
one way in which the American parent company can receive 
a reward for the technical information it supplies. In 
many cases, especially where ownership of the Australian 
affiliate is shared by others, at least a part of the 
Aus tralian shareholding has been acquired not for cash 
but in exchange for technical know-how. While it might 
be possible to make some estimate of the value of this share 
issue if the shares of the local firm were listed on a 
stock exchange, many of the compa~concerned are 
proprietary ventures and assessment of the 'disguised 
cost' of know-how is quite impossible. It may be rela-
tively simple to assess the cost of know-how in the 
case of the jointly-owned venture in which the Australian 
partner initially paid a ten shilling share pr~ on 
each twenty shilling share to 'offset' the contribution 
of the American company in terms of know-how - this was 
one of the firms in Table VI-2 which made no regular 
payment for know-how - but what of the cost involved 
when an American company takes up nearly half of its 
entitlement to shares in each new issue made by a prop-
rietary company in return for the supply of technical 
information? Ano ther complication, as noted above, is 
that American companies sometimes receive payment for 
technical information by making a profit on the sale of 
components and materials to the Australian firm, and 
payments for technical information which take this form 
are quite impossible to estimate. 
Whol ly-Ameri can companies often make no distinction 
between payments for technical information and ordinary 
profits, and when distinction is made it often appears 
arbitrary. Some companies make payment of a ' technical 
assistance fee ' only to avoid Australian taxation . One 
firm commented that 
up till the end of 1962 a technical assistance 
fee was paid, based on sales . This was not 
taxable in Australia, though since it was taxable 
at 52 per cent in the U.S. it was channelled 
to Luxembourg. Since the change in U.S. tax 
laws relating to tax-haven countries, our parent 
ompany has changed th arrangement. ow we pay 
a 2 p r c nt royalty, which is ta able at 26 per 
cent in Australia, and a J per cent engineering 
fe , which is taxable in the U.S . only, and 
both sums are sent to the U.S. 
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Other companies use technical assistance fees only as an 
insurance against times of foreign exchange shortage, 
reasoning that the more avenues available for the re-
mittance of 'profit s ' the more chance there is of 
being able to remit at least some return from the 
Australian investment. More than one company commented 
that royalty payments are 'just another way for the 
American company to get a return on its investment' . 
One reason why some wholly-American firms pay technical 
assistance fees of substantial proportions appearsto be 
a desire to improve their public image in a society 
traditionally suspicious of 'exorbitant profits'. The 
writer is aware of at least two companies which commenced 
payment of a substantial service fee in 1962 when the 
Australian Uniform Companies Ac t compelled many foreign 
companies to disclose their profits for the first time, 
and payment of large service fees is certainly one 
reason why American-owned companies can sometimes appear 
to pursue conservative dividend policies. One firm, for 
example, with an admittedly conservative dividend policy, 
1 pays ' engineering fees' equal to 72 per cent on the 
sale of all American-designed products, and these fees 
are 'annually more than five times the size of the 
biggest dividend ever remitted by us to the U.S.' 
Another firm refrained from declaring any dividend for 
more than a decade after it commenced manufacture in 
Australia but has paid a service fee, now equivalent to 
about 7 per cent of sales revenue, since establishment . 
In 1962, the American parent of this company received 
substantially more from this fee than it did from the 
dividend of the Australian firm. 
A priori, one would e pect to find jointly- owned 
enterprises making a higher 'special payment ' for 
technical assistance than do wholly-American concerns, 
and Australian-own d licens es making a higher payment 
than jointly-own d firms. Certainly, the empirical 
vid nc may show slight tendency in that direction 
and ompani s paying royalties of abo 5 per cent, 
which w r said by som to b common among Australian-
own d l' ens s, wer not typical of th companies 
co r d in th sur y . To th tent that this is the 
cas , pr ssur for Au stralian equity in American direct -
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investment enterpri s es might be expected to reduce 
Australian taxation revenue since, by a variety of 
devices, many companies contrive to avoid Australian 
taxation on their technical assistance payments. But 
regrettably the evidence, as so often in economics, does 
not lend itself to dogmatic conclusion . 7 
Though the most obvious, the direct cost of depend-
ence on foreign technology may not be the most important 
cost. For at least when a jointly-owned firm contracts 
to pay a certain level of royalty or other fee it has 
calculated that the benefit of receiving the American 
technical information exceeds the level of paymoent. 
And in the case of wholly-American companies, it is 
rarely possible for the combined total of profits earned 
and technical assistance fees paid to exceed the incre-
ment of production which takes place as a result of 
the foreign investment. S It is possible however, 
though there seems no way to test the hypothesis on the 
basis of data gathered in the present survey, that 
Australia's dependence on the technology of other 
countries results in the introduction here of producti.un 
methods unsuited to either the relative or absolute 
endowment of Australia in terms of productive factors . 
While Australia's relative endowment of capital and 
labour may not be too dissimilar from that in the United 
S tates, its absolute endowment, or total size, is 
obviously very different. If Australia is using methods 
of production unsuited to a small market ( as, perhaps, 
in parts of the chemical and petrochemical industry ) 
and if there is a genuine alternative to this in the 
de elopment of a more suitable technology, misallocation 
of resources and unnecessarily high prices are important 
costs of dependence on foreign technology . Aus tralia 
still receives full benefit from foreign produc t re-
search but may pay a considerable penalty in some 
industries in its dependence on foreign process research . 
7 . Interestingly, the writer was told by the managing 
director of on large Australian firm, holding licences 
from many foreign companies, that British companies are 
much more acting in their demands for payment for 




profitability of American compani s in Australia 
'c st' which this profitability ntaLls are 
d in Chapt rs ' X and XI. 
There may be a further cost, the possibility of 
which has worried several previous writers on foreign 
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the free access to parent company techno-
l ogy which many American-affiliated companies in 
Australia enjoy may inhibit the conduct of research 
within the Austra l ian economy . Certainly, of the 96 
participating comp anies which answered questions on 
research in the p resent survey, 55 said that they did 
n o research of any kind, other than market research, in 
1962 . S ome difficulty attaches to the interpretation 
of the word 'research'. A small number of the 55 firms 
which said they did no research in 1962 nevertheless 
did do some basic design or product d evelopment work . 
One company in the food industry, for example, runs 
x p erimental farms and nurseries in close cooperation 
with its U . S. parent and the Australian Department of 
Agriculture . Its research department works both on 
the modification of American recipes to suit the 
Australian taste and on the discovery of new recipes . 
Yet because it does no 'basic research ' , in the opinion 
of its treasurer, it is listed as one of the firms not 
conducting research . Another large firm indicated that 
' by using our brains here in Australia, we are developing 
ingeniously automatic machinery which is much cheaper 
than machinery imported from the U.S . ', but the company 
secretary considered this 'adaptive engineering ' rather 
than research . At l east six other firms, four of them 
( like the two quoted) wholly-American in ownership , 
wer doing some product development of this kind in 1962, 
though th Y d clined to call it ' res arch '. One more 
set up its own product d velopment department in 196J, 
staff d with thr e engineer and two tool makers . 
Most of th r maining firms which indicated that no 
r s arch was conduct d in 1962, howev r, did a p pear to 
be att mpting no real product dev lopment of any kind . 
Most ont nt d th mselves with modifying U .S. designs 
and formula to meet Australian saf ty r gulations, 
voltag s, tc . Som companies did not v n have 
fa ilit · s for t sting their output in Australia, and 
s ral w r ncount r d, particularly in the pharm -
a ut·cal industry, whi h sent samples of all their 
9 . S , for ampl, F . . Bennett , Pattern a nd 
S·gn·f· an e of nit d States Dir ct In stm nts in 
Aus ral·a ' , unpublish d B . Ec . ( Hons. ) th sis for the 
Un· rsity of Sydn y, 1961, pp . 16-17 ; and H rbert 
Marsh 1 , Frank A . Southard, J r . , and K nneth W. Taylor , 
Canadi n-Am . an Industry: A S tudy in Internation al 
/195 
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local production to the U.S. parent for testing. It is 
reported that some companies in the cosmetics industry 
d l 'k ' 10 h o 1 eW1se, wile a large metal-working firm whose 
immediate p arent company is British is required to send 
an article to the United Kingdom for testing by British 
engineers every three months. 
Of the 41 companies which did claim to be conduct-
ing some research in Australia in 1962, six (including 
one very large motor vehicle manufacturer which was 
undoubtedly conducting not only sUbstantial design work 
in Australia but also some fairly basic research on 
motor oil and steel) felt unable to estimate their 
research expenditure in 1962. In several cases this 
was because they felt unable to distinguish between 
exp nditure on 'design', which they felt does not con-
stitute ' research', and expenditure on 'research proper' . 
Expenditurooby the other J5 companies in 1962 are shown 
in aggregate in Table VI-J. It should be noted that some 
firms interpreted 'research' very widely, and the 
research activities of at least ten seemed to be almost 
ntirely the adaptation and modification of American 
designs and formulae. But a number of companies, some 
of them quite small, were doing some original product 
development. Two food companies, for example, which had 
recently been acquired by American firms, both maintained 
small research and development departments engaged in 
product improvement because so much of their production 
in 1962 was of commodities not produced by their parent 
con erns . Another firm in the food industry had been 
accustomed to paying £10,000 annually to the Australian 
company of which it was a subsidiary, but when the 
Am rican interest was acquired the company appointed its 
own r s arch dir ctor with the encouragement of the 
Am rican parent . One company in the earth-moving 
quipment industry boasted that it had recently developed 
a n w typ of front-end loader and that this had proved 
so succ ssful that the U.S. company was contemplating makin g it 
in th U.S. Sev ral companies had diversified away 
from th produ ts produced by their parent companies, and 
in mos cases thes firms did som ' r search' of their 
own. On small wholly-Am rican firm, for example, stated 
tha 'w hav four ch mists and spend a fair bit of 
mon y on r s ar h . This is nec ssary because in typ of 
w Hav n: Yal Uni ers'ty P ress, 19J6), 
1 0 . Australian 6 April 1961, p . lJ . 
TABLE VI- 3: RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN AUSTRALIA IN 1962 BY 90 AMERICAN-AFFILIATED COMPANIES, BY PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN 
OWNERSHIP AND PERIOD IN WHICH MANUFACTURE BEGAN 
Percentage of U.S. ownership and 
period in which Australian 
manufacture began (a) 
25-49% 
(i) Manufacture began before 
1957 
(ii) Marrufacture began in 1957 
or subsequently 
50-99% 
(i) Manufacture began before 
1957 
(ii) Manufacture began in 1957 
or subsequently 
100% 
(i) Manufacture began before 
1957 
(if) Manufacture began in 1957 
or subsequently 
~~ (c) 
Companies conducting research _ Companies not conducting 
research -
Number Total em- Employees Total sales Expenditure on Number Total e~ Total sales 
ployment engaged in in 1962 research in 1962 ployment in 1962 
research £.A ( thousand) £.A ( thousand) LA ( thousand) 
5 3,511 20 22,630 58 2 1,362 9,06 7 
1 (b) 9 (b) 34 7 1,137 7,520 
8 6,721 99 49,731 417 4 575 2,725 
1 (b) 5 (b) 10 13 1 ,260 9,030 
14 18,297 292 153,546 999 12 6,078 51,503 
6 1,420 12 8,973 31 17 1, 579 14,815 
35 30,418 437 238,457 1,549 55 11,991 94,660 
(a) See Note (a) to Table VI-I. 
(b) Not available for separate disclosure. Figures included in total. 
(c) Detail may not add to totals because of rounding. 
NOTE : The definition of 'research' adopted by some respondent companies was broad . A number of companies even included 
expendi ture on the modification and adaptation of American designs and formulae , as explained in the text . In 
all cases, the definit10n used by the respondent company has been used. Market research is excluded . Figures 





production we have grown right away from the U . S . 
company. ' The company is not included in Table VI-J, 
however, because the managing director said that he 
never calculates an exact figure for research done by 
his company in Australia because he feels the American 
company might not understand why so much is spent here. 
One company in which the American shareholding 
was in the substantial majority had developed a new 
product which it believed to be the best of its type 
in the world: indeed, the company had taken out patents 
on it in most industrialized countries. Another company, 
small by any standards, had developed a special type of 
electrical connection used in rocketry which it be-
lieved to be very much better than similar products 
produced by its parent company, while the production 
manager of the same firm had designed an unusual piece 
of machinery which, in 196J, the parent company was 
seriously thinking of adopting itself . Not many firms 
claimed to have developed better production methods 
than their parent company but one large firm did 
assert that its production line was the 'most modern 
of its type in the world' - it had been entirely de-
signed in Australia and was in 196J being copied by 
the American parent. 
The general impression is that only a very small 
amount of basic research is conducted in Australia by 
American-affiliated firms. On the other hand, effort in 
th field of product development, though small, is not 
entirely insignificant. Moreover, as Table VI-J makes 
cl ar, the longer companies are established in Australia 
th gr ater is the likelihood that they will establish 
at 1 ast a rudimentary research and development department . 
Whil only 18 per cent of companies in the table which 
b gan manufacturing in 1957 or subsequently claimed to 
11 
conduct research in Australia in 1962, 60 per cent 
of those stablished b fore 1957 felt they did some 
r s arch in 1962 . 5 v ral of the recently established 
11.As lsewh r in the survey, the e pression ' began 
manufacturing' refers to the date at which an American 
quity int rest of at least 25 per cent was acquired 
in th case of compani s which were operating previously 
as Austral"an~owned nterpris s . In fact, half of 
th s which ' b gan manufacturing in 1957 or subsequently ' 
and ar list d in Tabl VI-J as conduct"ng research in 
1962 w op rat"ng before 1957 as A.ustralian- owned 
compani s . 
TABLE VI-4: RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN AUSTRALIA IN 1962 BY 90 AMERICAN-AFFILIATED COMPANIES 2 BY SALES (a) 
Total sales in 1962 Research expenditure in 1962 -
Nil £5,000 and Over £5,000 Over £10,000 Over £25,000 Over £50,000 Over £75,000 Over £100,000 
LA under and not and not and not and not and not 
above above above above abp:ye 
£10,000 £25,000 £50,000 £75,000 £100,000 
500,000 and under 24 4 1 
Over 500,000 and not above 
1,000,000 10 1 1 1 
Over 1,000,000 and not a bove 
3,000,000 13 3 4 2 • • 
Over 3,000,000 and not above 
5,000,000 1 2 2 2 1 




Over 7,500,000 and not above 
10,000,000 2 2 2 1 
Over 10,000,000 1 .. 2 
· . 
1 2 
Total 55 8 8 4 5 2 5 3 
















firms which conducted no research in 1962 indicated 
that they expected to engage in some research activities 
as they expanded and became more highly integrated . One 
executive felt particularly strongly on this point and 
stated that ' you can be a parrot for just so long - to 
get real growth in a company you have to get people 
thinking . ' 
There is no clear indication, ei t her in Table VI - 3 
or in Table VI-5, that jointly-owned companies conduct 
any more research locally than do wholly-American firms . 
The data is subject to a wide margin of error because 
of the different interpretations placed on 'research' 
but the main determinants of whether a company was 
conducting research seem to have been the size of the 
company (as shown in Table VI-4) and the date at which it 
commenced operation in Australia, factors which, of 
course, tend to go together . Some wholly-American 
firms receive specific encouragement from their parents 
to engage in original product development . One firm 
in the chemical industry, for example, is responsible 
for conducting research for sister affiliates in Japan, 
New Zealand, and South Africa . Two companies were en-
countered, one in the pharmaceutical industry and another 
producing electrical equipment, which actually receive 
finance from the U. S. on a regular basis specifically for 
the conduct of local research. The electrical equipment 
f±rm indicated that until recently no research other 
than the adaptation of U.S . designs to local conditions 
had been done locally . Now, however, the U . S . company 
is k n for all subsidiaries to do research work if 
they can justify their project, and the Australian firm 
has b en assigned primary responsibility for research 
into three distinct fields. For these 'general develop-
ment' projects, the Australian company is entitled to 
a portion of the parent company ' s allocation for re -
s arch and development and in 1963 the Australian company 
r c v d a v ry consid rable sum from this source . 
°ncr as s of this kind in local research expenditure 
w re, incid ntally, found on several occasions : one 
whol y-Am rican firm had incr ased its Australian 
p nditur on r s arch from £12 ,000 in 1948/49 to 
£253,000 in 1961/62, whil two mor wholly-American 
Sharp 
fOrms w r constructing large development departments -
on osting £250,000 nd the oth r £500 ,000 - at the time 
TABLE VI- 5: NINETY AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES CLASSIFIED BY WHErHER RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN AUSTRALIA IN 1962, BY SALES 
AND PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN OWNERSHIP (a) 
Total sales in 1962 
LA. 
500,000 and under 
Over 500,000 and not 
above 1,000,000 
Over 1,000,000 and not 
above 3, 000 , 000 
Over 3,000,000 and not 
above 5,000,000 
Over 5, 000,000 and not 
above 7,500,000 




Companies which conducted no Companies which did conduct All companies 
research in 1962 - research in 1962 _ 
25-49% 50-99% 100% 25-49% 50-99% 100% 25-49% 50- 99.% 100% 































































the survey was conducted in 196J. Among wholly-
Ame rican subsidiaries well known in Australia for their 
conduct of design work (and even in some cases basic 
research) locally are General Motors-Holden's, Monsanto 
Chemical s , Standard Telephone € Cables, Kraft Holdings, 
Kodak, and International Harvester. 
Granted that relatively few American-affiliated 
companies do conduct research in Australia, however, 
there are two questions which must be ans wered before 
passing judgment on them . First, are American-
affiliated companies unusual in their neglect of re -
search in Aus tralia? Here, all the evidence points to 
the fact that they are not . Solomon Encel estimated 
the total expenditure on research by Australian industry 
in 1958/59 at between £J million and £5 million,12 
only about one-quarter of 1 per cent of net industrial 
output, while B.R. Williams, making an estimate in 
1962, did not put the total figure much above £9 million. 1J 
In the same year, P.H. Karmel and Maureen Brunt commented 
that ' research remains almost wholly in non-private 
hands' 14 and after an extensive survey of Australian 
industrial research in the early sixties, S.H. Bastow 
commented that the ' typical Australian director, on 
hearing the words "scientific research" will cough 
politely, take a quick look at the length of your hair, 
and change the subject' .15 Actually, it is possible 
that American-affiliated firms devote a higher percent-
age of their resources to 'research' than do other firms 
in the Australian economy, though whether this con-
clusion would hold true if the comparison were between 
firms of the same size is uncertain. Table A-5 in 
App endix A indicates that the 99 American-affiliated 
firms covered in that table employed on average more 
than twice as many chemists, draftsmen, and other 
laboratory and research staff in their factories as 
did Australian industry as a whole in 1961/ 62: whereas 
th total manufacturing employment of these factories 
2. S. Encel, 'Financing Scientific R search in 
Austral ia ', Scienc , 28 July 1961, p . 265. 
lJ . B .R. 
Growth in 
14. P.H. Karmel and Maureen Brunt, The Structure of the 
Australian Economy (Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire, 1962), p . 108 . 
15 . Australian Financial Review, 15 April 1964, p. J . 
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was only 5 . 1 per cent of the Australian total in that 
year, their employment of chemists and draftsmen amounted 
to 11 . 1 per cent of the Australian total. Care must be 
exercised in basing conclusions on these data : in part, 
they are the result of the importance of the motor 
vehicles industry in the total picture and in fact in 
only six of the ten industries where comparison is 
possible in the table did American-affiliated firms 
employ proportionally more chemists and draftsmen 
than did the Australian industry in question . 16 But 
the six industries are among the most important of 
the ten . About one-quarter of participating firms 
provided details of the income earned by their chemists 
and draftsmen in 1961/ 62, and though the figures (an 
average of £1,594 for each of J09 males and £90J for 
for each of 22 females) do not indicate the employment 
of great numbernof highly qualified scientific personnel, 
nor do they indicate that most of those involved were 
entirely unskilled. 
There is a second and perhaps more important 
question : should American-affiliated companies be 
encouraged to do more research than they do currently? 
It has been generally assumed, both .in Australia and in 
Canada (where the same situation seems to exist), th&t 
a great increase in t he research done by the local sub-
sidiaries of foreign compa~is to be desired . Often 
foreign subsidiaries incur much of the blame for the 
small amount of research done locally . The argument 
that foreign subsidiaries should do more research 
locally must rest, however, on the belief that conduct-
ing research in Australia yields significant benefits 
to Australians which the mere ~mportation of foreign 
t hnology by these companies does not . There are 
inde d some ways in which these benefits could accrue . 
If foreign subsidiaries, by conducting research locally, 
16 . Care must be e ercised for another reason . It 
app ars that most companies include all their ' research 
personnel ' on their statutory ' Factory Returns ' , from 
wh o h aggregate figures for Australian industry in 
Tabl A-5 are der.iv d. It is probable, however, that 
som companies ha ing large research and development 
d p rtm nts quit separate physically from their 
factori s do not include personnel in these departments 
on their ' Factory Returns ' . 
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were able to produce a product more suited to Australian 
need s than one developed abroad , or if they were able 
to p ro du ce an existing product more cheaply ( perhaps 
by adapting their method o f p r od u ction more appropriately 
t o the si z e o f the Australia n ma rket ), this could bene -
f i t Australian consumers , Australian shareholders ( if 
any) , and Australian tax revenue (unless of course tax 
c oncessions designed to stimulate research more than 
offset this gain ) . If foreign subsidiaries were to 
mak e discoveries suitable for use by their affiliates 
overseas, Australian tax revenue (and Australian share -
holders, if any ) would benefit if the local subsidiary 
were able to charge affiliates for the use of these 
d " "17 I lscoverles. ncreased local research would also 
increase the demand, and so the reward (in the short-
term at least), for Australian scientists. But probably 
the greatest benefit of any measures to encourage local 
r search in foreign-owned companies would accrue to the 
foreign shareholders. The situation is in no way 
parallel to the employment of Australians in the manage -
ment of foreign subsidiaries: this practice may yield 
ben fits both in the modification of policies which 
might otherwise be detrimental to Australia and in the 
training of Australians in modern management techniques, 
techniques which the men concerned take with them there -
after. In contrast, Australians employed in the research 
and development departments of foreign subsidiaries are 
rarely in a position to influence the policies of their 
employers and most of their training has been done pre -
viously at the expense of the Australian community . 
If important technical developments occurred 
randomly, therefor , there would appear to be much in 
favour of confining tax concessions designed to 
17 . Th idea of locally-based foreign subsidiaries 
charging affiliated companies for the use of information 
dis ov red in Australia was first suggested to the 
writ r by E. Barraclough, assistant managing director of 
Monsanto Chemicals (Aust.) Ltd , during an address he 
gav a symposium of th Melbourn University Chemical 
So iety in August 1963 . It seems likely, however , that 
th number of for ign subsidiaries which would be able 
to harg their affiliates for technical information 
dis ov r d in Austral "a would be ry small indeed , at 
1 ast wh re th r is an Australian shar holding in the 
subsidiary . As th managing director of one jointly-
own d ompany ( which had recently d lop d a new pro-
d u t in Austral"a ) plain d wh n question d on th 
poss"b"lity of charging affiliates for th d sign, ' there 
/ 20 4 
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stimulate research to companies of predominantly 
Australian ownership . But such developments have a 
tendency to occur in particular industries - such as the 
industrial chemicals and plastics industry - and at 
present, those industries where technical developments 
appear likely to occur most rapidly in the future are 
also those in which foreign companies occupy dominant 
positions . As long as theve is some net gain to 
Australians from research conducted by foreign 
affiliates in this country, therefore, measures to 
encourage research must be instituted on a non-dis-
criminatory basis. 
(17) are some rivers which flow in only one direction ' 
Of fourteen companies questioned on the return of 
°nformation to th ir U.S. affiliate, leven indicated 
that t chni al information of value is occasionally 
(though rarely On most cases~ returned ~o ~he U. S. ° one 
of th se eleven rec ived payment for thlS lnformatlon. 
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Chapter VII 
OF PRODUCTIVITY AND COSTS 
In view of the considerable technical benefit which 
mo st American-affiliated enterp rises in Australia undoubt -
edly derive fr om their American association, it is inter-
esting to examine the operating performance of these 
c ompanies, measured in terms of productivity and unit 
costs , compare d both t o that of their parent companies 
and to that of other firms in the Australian economy. 
The data on this subject gathered in the present survey 
are inadequate in many respects : to make them more 
adequate would have required not only a better response 
to this section of the questionnaire than was in fact 
forthcoming but also the devotion of a much greater 
section of the total survey to this aspect than was 
felt to be warranted. Some points of value never t heless 
emerge . 
If the operation of American- affiliated firms in 
Australia be compared first with that of their parent 
companies, it is evident that physical productivity, 
or physical output per man- year, is substantially lower 
in Australia than in the United States . Of 35 companies 
asked to comment on the physical productivity achieved 
in Australia, eight felt Australian productivity to 
be 'considerably lower' than American, nine felt it to 
be ' lower ' , three felt it to be 'about the same ', one 
felt it to be ' higher', one felt that it was ' consid erably 
lower ' in one major area of production but ' higher ' in 
another, and thirteen were unable to answer the question 
or felt it was meaningless because the local operation 
was so different from that in the U . S. Only five companies 
wer abl to be mor pr cise than this: three in the 
' cons'derably low r' category felt Australian production 
p r man to be less than half the American figure ( one 
company put the Australian figure as low as 39 per cent 
of th Am rican), and two in the ' lower ' category 
st'mated Australian productivity at 85 and 65 p r cent 
of th Am rican respectively . The number of respondents 
w s too small to d'sc rn any cl ar 'ndustry pattern . 
Th r was a ry gen ral consensus of opin ion on 
th reas ns for th relatively poor Australian productivity . 
All but on of th companies which felt Australian pro -
du tivity to b low in relation to that in America 
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attributed this primarily to the relatively small volume 
of production in the Australian company and the effect 
of this volume difference on the methods of production . 
The secretary of a firm in the electrical equipment 
industry, comparing the method s used in the Australian 
plant with those used by a sister affiliate in the 
United Kingdom , made a comment which was typical of 
those receive d from executives in metal-working industries: 
Where we use a two- or three-cavity die, the 
U . K . company uses a twenty-four-cavi ty die •. . 
And where we have a machine on which we do 
five different processes consecutively, 
stripping down the machine between each 
process, the U. K . company does the five pro-
cesses simultaneously on the one machine -
but their machine costs about £400,000 . 
Another firm, with a major shareholder in both the U.S . 
and the U.K., commented that 'where we use an ordinary 
turret lathe, the U.K. company uses a multi-station 
loading lathe, and the U.S. company uses a twelve spindle 
machine which performs twelve operations simultaneously' . 
A third company stated that 'where the U.S . company can 
set up a machine in eight hours to run for weeks, we 
take the same time to set i~ up but only run it for two 
hours' . On the relatively small production runs typical 
of Australian industry (and few companies have annual 
production equivalent to more than 5 per cent of that 
of their parent companies), the purchas of expensive 
~ecial-purpose machines and dies is rarely justified and 
output per man is almost inevitably lower than in the 
U . S. In the chemical industry, the methods used in both 
Australian and American plants may be similar but, as 
one ecutive commented, 'the same workforce which we 
employ could run a plant of five times our capacity' . 
Diff rences in production volume would lead to a 
smaller use of machinery relative to labour (and hence 
lower output per man) in Australia than in the U.S. 
v n if the price of labour were identical in the two 
countries . The fact that wage rates are considerably 
lower in Australia than in the U.S . tends in the 
sam dir ction . 
Th small numb r of companies which felt their 
productivity to b comparable with or above that in the 
U. S . w re all op rating in industries where economies of 
s al ar e haust d at low volum . Two of the three 
whi h f It Austral'an productivity to be ' about the same ' 
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as that in the U.S. operated in the foundation garment 
industry, where beyond a comparatively low volume exist-
ing machines are duplicated rather than replaced with 
more automatic ones . The only firm which felt that 
throughout its range its productivity exceeded that of 
its parent produced only two simple metal products for 
which it dominated the whole Australian market. The 
machinery it used was identical with that in the U .S. 
and higher physical productivity was achi eved in 
Australia, it was claimed, because of superior plant 
lay-out . 
The company which felt that in one major area 
productivity fell far short of that achieved by its 
American parent explained that in this field U .S. sales 
volume was about 25 times that of the Australian 
company. In its other major area of production, in 
which Australian productivity exceeded American, 
Aus tralian volume was almost one - third of the American . 
Moreover, while the Australian company dominated the 
local market for products in this field, and so was 
able to secure relatively large orders, the American 
company, in a much more competitive market, was compelled 
to cater for the more frequent but relatively smaller 
orders of American customers . 
Only one firm of those which could estimate 
Australian productivity in relation to American 
felt that a difference in the diligence with which labour 
works in the two countries was the primary reason for 
lower Australian productivity . The secretary of this 
firm commented that 'the vicious piece-work system used 
in th U .S. and their system of instantaneous lay- offs 
when ver demand slackens temporarily' combine to result 
in Australian productivity being only about two-thirds 
of th Amer ican, despit the use of almost identical 
qu'pment . 
There were other companies which felt that 
Aus tral'an labour do s not work as well as American, 
though not all of them were in a position to estimate 
th 0 raIl producti ity difference betwe n the two 
countries . One engin ering firm indicated that the 
hourly output of American workers in th parent company 
tends to be about 90-95 per cent of ' possible ', 
wh r as ' we in Australia ha e a hard job to get above 
70 p r cent '. Th firm f It that this was partly due to 
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severe flu ctu ations in demand, which mean a high rate 
of labour turnover ( the company was working at only 20 
per cent of capacity at one period . during the recession 
of 1961/62 , but was operating at 87 per cent late in 
1963 ), bu t also important was the different attitude 
towards produc tivity on the part of American workers . 
An Australian executive in another engineering firm 
commented : 
Australian workers are far more versatile 
than American workers . But in at titude 
Australian workers fall by the wayside . On a 
recent visit I made to the U . S. I was impressed 
with how keen the .ordinary workers on the 
floor were to explain how they had t hought up 
some scheme to save money and man-hours. Of 
the eight factories I visited, I was volunteered 
this kind of information in five of them . 
A firm in the Al tona petrochemical complex felt that the 
physical productivity of Aus t ralian construction labour 
is only about 60 per cent of construction labour on 
America's Gulf Coast. The executive admitted that this 
is partly because particular skills, unknown to 
Australians until now, are required in the building of 
petrochemical plants, but he felt that part of the 
reason is ' the very full employment in the Australian 
economy ' • 
Comments from other executives, however, differed 
from those quoted . Indeed, of 24 firms which specifically 
compared the quality of Australian labour with that of 
American, only eight (four of them wholTy-American) felt 
that Australian labour is not as productive as American . 
Five (three of them wholly-American) actually felt 
that Australian labour is better than American . One 
of these companies (one which was wholly-American in 
ownership) commented : 
You wouldn ' t get better female staff in the 
world than we ' ve got - and the two machine 
op rators who cam out from Americadn the 
early stages couldn ' t give u s the same output 
as our first Australian operator. The 
Australian tradesman has a lot more initiative 
than his American counterpart because he 
has to make do with a lot less outside help . 
Most of th oth r firms which felt Australian workers to 
b sup r Oo r to Am rican stressed the greater versatility 
of Australoans . 
While relatively few firms went so far as t o con-
t nd that Australians actually work better t h a n Amer i cans, 
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eleven out of 24 firms felt that Australians work just as 
well as Americans . The comment of one of the three wholly-
American firms which held this view is quoted in illustration : 
We have just had an industrial engineering 
team out from the U.S. and they concluded that 
there is no 'man productivity' difference 
between the two countries - the only difference 
is in the extent to which machinery is used . 
We work on the same labour times as the U .S. 
plants where equipment used is comparable . 
Decrying the quality of Australian labour in 
comparison with that in the U . S. is a popular 
drum to beat, but in my view the 'slack work ' 
of Australian workers is a result of poor 
management. 
The same executive went on to explain how he had recently 
avoided the need to employ two clerks by re-arranging an 
office to cut down walking distance. It is interesting 
to noteruso that the American firm Bechtel Pacific 
Corporation, which based its estimates for the con-
struction time of a Brisbane oil refinery on the assump-
tion that Australian workmen achieve something like two-
thirds the output of American workmen (possibly on a know-
ledge of labour performance at Al tona), found the construc-
tion of the r finery running ahead of schedule because 
'Australians are doing as much or even more than Americans 
1 
would' . 
A number of companies complained about the great 
difficulty of securing skilled labour in Aus tralia and 
some also lamented the difficulty of securing adequate 
labour for shift work. A few complained of high labour 
abs nt eism and one felt that high labour turnover was a 
factor in the low productivity of the Aus tralian operation . 
Offs tting these complaints, however, were frequent 
words of praise for Australian trade unions . There were 
som notable cep tions to this, but in general executives 
who commented on industrial r lations in Australia felt 
th yare better than in the U.S. 2 On said: 
Am ricans ar convinced that Australia is a 
hot-b d of labour troubles . They can hardly 
b li v m when I say I have never met a 
union r pr sentative in my life, e cept in 
th pub . We have far less labour trouble in 
1. Australian Financial R view, 14 Septemb r 1964, p . 
2 . Th U.S. D partm nt of Comm rce shares the view that 
labour di s put s ar 1 ss disrupti e in Australia than in 
th U.S. In arc nt publication it concluded that in 
most 'ndustri s 'tim lost through industrial disputes is 
con 'd rably 1 ss th n in the American experience ~ (Deane 
M. Black, 'Establishing a Business in Australia ', an 
Ov rs as Busin ss R port (Washington: Bureau of Inter-
nati nal Comm rc , U.S. D partment of Comm rce, 196J), p . 12 .) 
Australia than our parent does in the U.S . 
- they have a four or five week strike 
every two years when their wage settlement 
comes up for review ... We never have com -
plaints from employees about facilities 
- and of course if I did get a justifiable 
complaint I would fire the factory manager . 
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Inefficient management of the Australian subsidiary 
was a factor not mentioned by any of the executives 
interviewed as an explanation for low Australian produc-
tivity. Nor did any executive offer the view that the 
use of an outdated production method is the main reason 
for low Au stralian productivity . This is, perhaps, not 
surprising, but it does not mean that neither factor 
played a part in causing low Australian productivity. 
As mentioned in a previous chapter, the writer gained the 
impression that several of the smaller American-affiliated 
enterprises in Australia are inefficiently managed, and 
the Tariff Board observed of the two Australian producers 
of polyvinyl chloride resins (one of them affiliated with 
an American firm and the other with a British) in 196J 
that differences between the proportion of total unit 
costs attributable to overheads in the Australian industry 
and in the Japanese industry were greater than could be 
xplained by differences in labour costs, plant capacities, 
and accounting procedures. J Another American- affiliated 
company in the chemical industry was accused before the 
Tariff Board early in 1965 of employing methods of 
production which are 'as old as the hills' and of 
operating inefficient means of transportation and supply . 4 
Such cases appear to be relatively isolated examples 
however . 
It is quite possible, of course, for Australian unit 
costs to be lower than American despite relatively low 
output p r man in Australia provided wages and other 
osts ar sufficiently low to offset the effects of poor 
productivity . And Australian wages at least are very 
much low r than American . Of 25 companies which felt 
abl to stimate the level of mploye r muneration in 
J . Tariff Board's Report on Vinyl Chloride Polymers and 
Copolym rs, 24 May 196J, p. 9 · 
4. Australian, 16 F bruary 1965, p. 12 . 
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their Australian operation in comparison with that p re -
vailin g in the factories of their parent, two firms 
felt that the Australian level would be less than 40 
per cent o f the American , 18 that it would be between 
40 and 50 per cent of the American, and only five that 
it would e x cee d 50 per cent . 
S ome difficulty was encountered in the collection 
of unit cost statistics : a large number of foreign sub-
sidiaries a p pear to be genuinely ignorant of the costs 
of their parent company, and some of those who are 
better informed are not prepared to share their secret . 5 
evertheless enough information was forthcoming to per-
mit certain general principles to be discerned . 
Table VII-l shows a total of 82 unit cost comparisons 
supplied by 70 companies . In all, 2J of the comparisons 
showed Australian costs to be below American, 12 showed 
th m to be 'about the same', and 47 showed them to be 
higher . Though the number of comparisons within each 
industry is not large enough in most cases to warrant 
d tailed analysis of unit costs by industry, it does 
seem safe to conclude that a disproportionate share of 
the cases where Australian costs were lower or 'about the 
same' belonged to one or other of the metal - working 
industries, while in all the cost comparisons provided by 
companies in the industrial chemical industry Australian 
unit costs exceeded those in the u .S. 6 
Thirty- eight of the 82 comparisons, provided by J5 
comp anies, were given more exactly than is shown in the 
table . In two cases Australian unit cost actually 
fell short of 55 per cent of American cost; in one case 
Australian cost was between 56 and 75 per cent of American; 
in four cases between 76 and 95 per cent; in four cases 
5 . Pr vious writers hav ncountered the same difficulty . 
S , for e ample, Herbert Marshall, Frank A. S outhard, Jr . , 
and K nn th W. Taylor, Canadian-American Industry : A 
S tudy in International Inv stment ( ew Haven : Yale Uni -
v rsity P r ss, 19J6 ) , p . 2J7 ; and Frank A . Southard, Jr . , 
Am r' an Industry in Europ ( Boston and ew Yo rk : 
Hought n Mifflin Co . , 19J1 ) , p . 150 . 
o br ak-down of th se r sponses by ownership is 
shown b cause no patt rn appeared ob ious A By dat of 
stabl ' shm nt of manufacturing op rations, there may be 
a s'gnif ' ant patt rn : of those involving companies manu -
fa tur'ng b for 1957, 14 comparisons showed Australian 
osts to blow r than Am rican, 10 to be ' abou t the same ', 
and 21 to b h'gh r; of those involving omp anies which 
b gan manufa tur in 1957 or subsequently, nin e compari -
sons show d Australian costs to be low r than American, 
two t b ' about th sam ' , and 26 to b higher . Part of 
h planation of this pattern , howe r , is in th industry 
patt rn. 
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between 96 and 105 per cent; in ten cases between 106 
and 125 per cent; in ten cases between 126 and 150 per 
cent; and in seven cases more than 150 per cent. It is 
not possible to calculate any kind of average of these 
estimates because in several cases the figures given 
were in the form of a range rather than a single 
figure, but the tendency for Australian unit cost to be 
higher (and in many cases much higher) than American is 
clearly brought out. As noted in Chapter III, the 
same general conclusion was reached by the Ameri can 
National Industrial Conference Board in its study 
published in 1961.7 
In only one case was the cheapness of an Australian 
raw material mentioned as a major factor in relatively 
low Australian unit cost - and in this case 70 per cent 
of the cost of the product was raw steel. This was 
one of the few cases, however, in which the physical 
TABLE VII-l: UNIT COSTS OF 70 AMERICAN-AFFILIATED COMPANIES COMPARED WITH 






Cases in which Austr.alian unit cost was -
Lower than About the Higher than 
American same as American 
American 
8 3 13 
1 3 
2 2 
Metal manufactures, n.e.i. 3 1 5 
Electrical equipment, in-
struments, etc. 4 2 7 
Food and drink 2 1 2 
Industrial chemicals and 
plastics 7 
Pharmaceutical and toilet 
preparations 2 5 
Other industries 3 3 3 
Total 23 12 47 
(a) The 70 companies supplied a total of 82 cost comparisons • 
7. See Theodore R. Gates and Fabian Linden, Costs 
and Com etition: American Ex erience Abroad (New York: 
National Industrial Conference Board, 19 1 , especially 
pp. 11-19. The writers concluded that 'between Latin 
America and Australia ••• there was little to choose; 
their average total costs put them Unmistakably well 













productivity of the Australian plant was higher than the 
American, so that cheap raw material was only one of the 
factors involved in the low Australian unit cost. By 
far the most important reason for low Australian cost 
was the relative cheapness of Australian labour. This 
became a relevant factor whenever the product involved 
was one which neither the American nor the Aus tralian 
firm supplied in large volume , or whenever the volume 
supplied by the Australian firm was sufficient to 
warrant the installation of equipment similar to that 
used by the American firm . Where volume was small in 
both countries , expensive special-purpose machinery 
was not justified in the American plant and ' jobbing' 
methods had to be adopted. This gave maximum advantage 
to the Aus tralian operation with its low labour cost, 
and in one case a company was encountered producing an 
item for $Jl . 4 which cost the American firm $64 to 
produce. Where volume was considerable in both plants, 
but where Australian volume was sufficient to justify 
the sam kind of machinery as that used in the American 
plant, the same result obtained. One firm, holding 
most of the Au stralian market for a particular product, 
indicated that its production cost was 81 per cent of 
the American and would have been lower but for the need 
to pay overseas freight on a significant fraction of the 
raw materials needed . (The Australian cost compared with 
a figure of 69 per cent for the British affiliate, and 
66 per cent for the French, both countries where wage 
rates below those in Australia p revail . On the other 
hand, South African costs were 94 per cent of the 
Am rican, and Mexican 172 per cent, showing that volume 
of p roduction is also imp ortant up to a certain level.) 
In some cases, it should be stressed, Australian 
osts ar lower tban American only wh n the scope of the 
Au stralian op ration is strictly confined to a small 
part of th produ tion process . Thus se eral firms 
"nd"cat d that Australian costs ar below American 
b aus th 10 al op ration is engag d only in the 
ss mb y of "mport d parts . Becaus of th importance 
of 1 bour os s n this op rat "on, th Australian firm 
has m rk d advantag 0 r th Am r an . S ral 
omp n s also emphasiz d th ad antag which th 
Austr lOan op rat "on njoys i n having to bear almost no 
part f th r s ar h and d lopm nt costs of the par nt, 
TABLE VII- 2: AMERICAN AN]) AUSTRALIAN UNIT COSTS COMPARED - SIX CASE STUDIES 
Case A Ca se B Ca se C Case D Case E Case F 
U. S. Australia U. S . Australia U. So Australia U. S . Australia U. S. Australia U, S. Australia 
% % % % % % % % % % % 70 
Manufa cturing l abour cost (a ) 31. 5 2fL9 57 . 6 (c) 17 . 1 5 . 2 6 . 7 26 26 3 . 9 5 . 1 35 24 
Direct materials cost 19 . 4 33 . 3 20 . 1 32 . 2 67 . 0 73 . 2 44 48 S2 . 2 S1.2 50 69 
Depr eciation 4 . 6 2 . 4 2 .S 2 . 9 ( ) 6 4 1.3 1.6 (15) 2 Other overheads 44.5 35 . 4 19 . 5 47.S (27 .S 20 . 1) 24 22 12 . 6 12 . 1 ( ) 5 
Tota l unit production cost: 100. 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100. 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100. 0 
Aus t ralian unit cost a s a 
percentage of American: SO 95 100 105 112 125 
Tot a l output of product by 
Australian firm as a 
per centage of American 
output : 7 10 (b) (d) 10 5 
Average remuneration 
r eceived by Australian 
employees a s a percentage 
of that received by 
American employees: (b) 27 (b) 66 45 62 
Product involved : Metal tool Electrical Toilet article Item of apparel Toilet article Heavy engineering 






The interpretation placed on the listed cost ca tegories varied from company to company . With the exception of Case B, 
however , it is believed that the American and Australian figures are shown on a directly comparable basis in each case . 
Not known by the company concerned . 
Cost categories not compar a ble . 





and one comp any indicated that, in addition to designs, 
the American company had supplied free of charge even 
the machinery needed to manufacture one product. 
Two of the case studies shown in Table VII - 2 deal 
with p roducts which are cheaper to manufacture in the 
Australian subsidiary than in the American parent . In 
Case A , despite the comparatively small volume of pro-
duction of the Australian plant, the manufacturing 
methods used in both countries are substant ially similar . 
The only important difference is the greater use of 
mechanized methods of conveying the product from one 
stage of production to another in the American plant . 
The result of this is that the physical productivity of 
labour in the Australian plant is lower, but not greatly 
so, than in the American. The relative cheapness of 
Australian labour gives the Australian operation a 
decisive advantage in the categories 'manufacturing 
labour cost' and 'other overheads', but because of the 
high cost of raw materials to the Australian operation, 
Australian unit cost is only 20 per cent less than 
American. The same general picture emerges from an 
xamination of Case B, though with somewhat less clarity 
because cost categories adopted by the American and 
Australian plants differed . The Australian executive 
xplained that Australian unit expenditure on materials 
is higher than the American figure entirely because of 
the high r price of materials in Australia: if anything, 
th American plant buys in its materials at a more 
ad anc d stage of manufacture than th Australian because 
of the absence of satisfactory suppliers in Australia. 
Most of th companies which f It Australian unit 
cost to be about th sam as American indicat d that 
though th Ameri an company had an advantage in being 
abl to s cur ch ap r mat rials this was adequately 
omp nsat d for by low r Australian labour costs . Most 
of th s comparisons involved products for which the 
Australian mark t is suffici ntly large to permit the 
ma ·mum b n f· from conomies of scal 
ont nd d that its affiliate in 
one company 
w Zealand has 
low r costs for som products than does the Australian 
omp ny b caus both mark ts ar larg nough for ' economic 
produ tion ' and th pr·c of plasti (an important raw 
mat r·al ) is substantially ch ap r in w Z aland than in 
Austr lia. 
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The only detailed comparison available of a product 
whos cost is the same in Australia as in America appears 
as Case C in Table VII-2. From the relatively high 
share of labour in unit cost ( despite very much lower 
Australian wages and the contention of the company 
that Australian workers are just as satisfactory as 
American) and the relatively low share of depreciation 
and other overheads, it is evident that the American 
plant employs substantially more mechanized methods of 
p ro duction than the Australian . Offsetting the 
Australian net advantage on these items, however, is 
the higher cost of raw materials in Australia . Actually, 
a classification of raw material costs provided by the 
company indicated that the Australian disadvantage is 
entirely in the area of packaging materials, where 
Australian costs in 1961 were more than 50 per cent 
above those incurred by the American plant . 
Among reasons offered as explanation by the large 
number of companies which felt Australian unit costs to 
be higher than American, relatively low volume of 
production in Australia received by far the greatest 
number of mentions . Again and again companies explained 
that low volume results in under-utilization of 
machinery and high unit costs on expensive dies . One 
firm in the engineering industry indicated that at its 
operating level in 1962 manufacturing overhead in 
Australia was 622 per cent of productive labour cost, 
but that this would fall drastically with higher operat -
ing 1 vels . Several firms felt that a doubling of 
Australian volume would suffice to reduce costs to a 
par with American but one firm felt that an expansion 
of 500 p r cent would be required. Others felt that at 
no fores eable volum would the Australian company be 
abl to justify th local production of all components 
of th product conc rn d . 
Th ffects of low volume on unit costs may be 
s n most cl arly in Cases G, I, and J in Table VII - J : 
n two of th s cas s, I and J, p nditure on raw 
mat r· Is by th Australian op ration is not only 
relativ ly but also absolutely smaller per unit than is 
Am r·can 
Am ran . 
penditur , and in Case G Australian unit 
on mat rials is littl high r than the 
In all thr cases , howev r, labour and 
o rh d costs in Australia ar significantly higher than 
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those in America because of the influence of scale . 
Often, a firm's small scale of operation imposes an 
additional burden in the form of more expensive materials 
cost. Firms which are able to buy in bulk are fre-
quently able to secure significantly cheaper materials 
both because of the economies available to the supply-
ing firm and the greater bargaining power in the hands 
of the purchaser . Case H in Table VII-J offers an illus -
tration of this point. Though the relatively higher 
Australian expenditure on materials reflects in part the 
fact that the Australian firm tends to buy in more of 
its components in a finished form than does the American 
firm (itself a manifestation of the small size of the 
Australian operation), it also reflects a higher price 
which the Australian firm has to pay for Austra1ian-
made components because of the relatively small volume 
of its orders . The company felt a doubling of local 
vo1um would be required to reduce total unit cost to 
th Am rican level . Case F in Table VII-2 may offer 
another illustration of the same point, while an 
engine ring company not included in either table 
corom nt d that every steel item it purchases in 
Australia is more expensive than in America with the sole 
e ception of raw steel . 
Materials were more expensive in Australia than in 
the U.S . for other reasons than the small size of the 
supplier or the small size of the order given by the 
local subsidiary . More than one firm complained of the 
high cost of cardboard packaging materials in Australia 
whi1 others mentioned freight and, sometimes, tariff 
charges on mat rials not produced in Australia. 
Th s charg s w r m ntioned, for e ample, by the 
company conc rn d with Cas D in Table VII-2, though 
omparat"ve1y low Australian labour productivity 
Cd sP Ot the us of substantially similar equipment by 
th plants in both countri s) was an e en more important 
fa to "n this comp ny's som what high r Australian unit 
ost . (Most of th ompon nts used in th local 
ass mb1y of th it m onc rn d in Case K in Tab1 VII-J 
w r also import d, but th v ry high cost of thes 
ompon nts was prin "pa11y du not to freight or tariff 
charg s but to th fact that th y w r purchased from an 
ff"liat d ompany at pr 
comp t"tiv mark t .) 
s abov th s ruling in a 
TABLE VII-3: AMERICAN AND AUSTRALIAN UNIT coms COMPARED - FIVE MORE CASE STUDIES 
Case G Case H Case I 
U.S. Australia U. S. Australia U. S • Australia 
% % % % % % 
Manufa cturing l abour cost (a ) 19.2 19.9 17 10 4.8 11.4 
Direct materials cost 46.1 37.9 49 69 76 .9 53.3 
Depr eciation ~34. 7 ) 8 6 ~18.3 ) Other overheads 42.2) 26 15 35.3 ) 
Total unit production cost: 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 lOQ.O 100.0 
Australian unit cost as a percentage 
of American: 128 130 134 
Tot al out put o:f product by Australian 
firm as a percentage of American 
output: 8 (b) 1 
Average remuneration received by 
Australian employees as a percentage 
of that received by American employees : 40 36 (c) 
Product involved: Buildi!:lg accessory Motor Ve hicle 
(metal) 
Food product 
(al See Note (a) to Table VII-2. 
~b See Note ~d~ to Table VTI-2. 
c See Note r t o Table VII-2. 
Case J 




























Ot h er factors received only occasional mention. 
On firm complained that packaging c o sts are higher in 
Australia partly because of the strict regulations 
imposed by the Australian P ostmaster-GeneralIs Depart-
ment on the wrapping o f parcels for posting . Ano ther 
firm lamented the multi t udinous variety of municipal re -
gulations which compel it to produce not one model 
of a particular electrical appliance but as many as 
fifty if it wishes to sell throughout Australia. A 
third felt t hat local government specifications (for a 
product mainly bought by public authorities) are too 
severe, and this necessitated the empl oyment of 35 men on 
inspection duties alone, where the American firm felt 
five to be adequate . And in quite a different area of 
costs, another company commented that inventory 
charges are disproportionately great in Australia 
because of the small range of production of the local 
firm : to keep a reasonable range of the product concerned 
in stock, the Australian firm was forced in 1962 to 
maintain an inventory/ sales ratio of almost 40 per 
cent, compared with a figure of only~ per cent for t he 
British affiliate and only 3.2 per cent for the American 
par nt . 
Many of the difficulties experienced by American 
subsidiaries in Australia assume their most acute form 
in the c~emical industry . In this indus try the cost 
of constructing a plant of given size in Aus tralia may 
differ little from the cost in the U.S., the relatively 
low Australian wage level tending to offset the American 
ad antage in sp cialized process equipment . But there 
ar v ry onsiderable economies of scale in the construc-
tion of h mical plants, which m an that th large 
Am r "can plants hav a major initial ad antage over 
8 
plants d sign d for th s mall Australian market. And 
it "s not only capital osts p r unit of capacity which 
ar low r "n larg plants than in small : operating 
costs p r unit of output also are much lower in large 
pl nts . Th "s is prin ipally b aus large plants 
in 01 low r harg s for depr ciation and maintenance 
8 . At th tim that Australian Synth tic Rubb r Co. 
L t d d cid d to produ synth ti rubb r in Australia, 
it was 1 ulat d that t build a plant of 15,000 tons 
annual p ity would ha e cost £3.5 million : to con-
stru t plant of d ub l that capa "ty in olved an 
add"ti n lost of only 1.5 mill"on. (Tariff Board ' s 
R p ort on Synth Rubb r, 10 D c mb r 1962, p . 5 .) 
(b aus of the low 'nitial capital cost) and a staff 
little larger than that required by a small plant. 
When to th se difficulties are added those of fre-
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qu ntly more expensive raw materials, wid ly dispersed 
markets, and a generally unimaginative state government 
attitude towards electricity charges, it is not hard to 
see why Aus tralian unit costs in the chemical industry 
are so often above those in the U.S . 9 
o attempt was made during the present survey to 
compare unit costs in American-affiliated firms with 
those prevffiling in Australian-owned companies . ot 
only would this information have been extremely difficult 
if not impossible to obtain, in many cases there are no 
Australian-owned firms producing similar products with 
which comparison could be made. Instead, the operating 
p rformance of American-affiliated firms is compared 
with that of other firms manufacturing in Australia by 
using a broader, if less satisfactory, measure, that of 
value of production per person employed . 
Tabl VII-4 shows the value of production per 
person employed in the factories of 99 American- affiliated 
firms compared with the same measure in Aus tralian industry 
as a whole in 1961/62. In aggregate, the value of pro -
duction per person employed in the American-affiliated 
firms is seen to hav been about 36 per cent higher than 
10 that in Australian industry generally . Wha t is even 
mor interesting is that in eight of the ten individual 
industri s in which comparison is possible, the value 
productivity of the Am rican-affiliated companies was 
higher than the level prevailing within that industry . 
In other words, the higher value productivity of labour 
in American-affiliat d companies is not merely due to 
th ir on ntration in industries in which the labour 
producti ity of all companies is abov the national average . 
Admit t dly, the two industries in which Am erican- affiliated 
9. For good popular discussions of th cost disadvantages 
of th Australian ch m'cal indu stry, s Ale Hunt rand 
L.R . W bb, 'Th Ch mi al Industry ', in The Economics of 
Austra 'an Industry, d. Ale Hunt r (M lbourne: M lbourne 
Univ rs'ty Pre ss, 1963), sp cial~y pp. 323-6; and D. R. 
Z ' dl r, 'Som R s ar hand Developm nt Poss ibil't ' s ', 
'n P ro d'nrs of th Royal Australian Chemical Inst'tute, 
XXVII ( 1961, 452-67. 
10 . A r markably s'm'la differen betwe n the valu of 
p odu t'on per mploye n a group of Am rican- controlled 
n pr's s i n Can da and that in Canad'an manufacturing 
'ndustry as a whol w s noted by C.D . Blyth and E .B. Carty, 
/221 
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companies appear to fall short of the average performance 
are major ones - motor vehicles and industrial chemicals . 
The explanation of the relatively low value productivity 
of labour in the industrial chemi c als industry is not 
obvious, but there are sound reasons for believing that 
the figures shown in the table for the motor vehicles 
industry are almost meaningless beoause of the way in 
which some of the companies concerned complete their 
11 Factory Returns . If this industry be ignored, the 
value productivity of the American-affiliated firms 
exceeded the relevant industry average in eight out of 
nine industries and the average value productivity for 
the remaining American-affiliated firms in 1961/62 rises 
from £2,597 to £3,177 . 
When these figures are further dissected the 
impression is initially clouded . Somewhat less than two-
thirds of the total number of plants operated by these 
American-affiliated firms enjoyed labour productivity 
above the average for their industry and of the total 
employment of the group of 56,430, more tha~ half 
(or 30,518) were employed in plants of which the pro-
ductivity was below the industry average . Certainly, 
the great size of the motor vehicle plants exercises a 
considerable influence on this result but even if they be 
subtracted from the total the number employed in plants 
operating at above average labour productivity was 
littl more than half. In fairness it should be added, 
however, that this situation appears to be the result 
primarily of the relatively poor labour productivity 
obtaining in a small numb r of large and long established 
compani s and of the initial difficulties encountered by 
a numb r of newly stablished firms . On a company basis, 
it s ms significant that 68 out of 94 companies (leav-
ing firms mainly ngag d in the motor vehicles industry 
out of account) conduct d most of their operations in 
(10) in on-Resid nt Own rship of Canadian Industry ' , 
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Scienc , XXII 
(1956), p . 452 . 
11. Companies ngag d only in assembly work are in-
stru t d by the eommonw alth Bureau of Census and 
St t'st' s to e clud th value of components bought 
from oth r stablishments from the figures they present 
for both cost of mat rials and value of output . Th 
latt r hould includ , howev r ' the actual labour 
ost of ass mbling th parts, costs of fu 1 and power 
us d, any additional P nses of assembly , /223 
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(a) Unbracketed ~i.gures rder to the :factory operations of 99 American-a:ffiliated companies. Bracketed figures relate to the 
who1e of the Australian i.nd1t:tstry concerned, including the Ameri.ca.n-a:ffiliated companies. For further explanatory notes, 





plants operating above the industry average in terms of 
valu productivity. Moreover, the industries in which 
American-affiliated companies operate are frequently those 
in which subsidiaries of other foreign companies also 
op rate, a fact which implies that the comparisons given 
are in some cases less between American-affiliated and 
Au stralian-owned companies than between American-affiliated 
companies on the one hand and British- and European-
affiliated companies on the other. 
Value productivity figures are not easy to inter-
pret . They reflect values or prices and may not be 
closely related to physical quantities. They are influenced 
by tariff levels . But the magnitude of the difference 
between figures for Aus tralian industry and those for 
American-affiliated companies makes it seem likely that 
even in physical terms labour productivity was higher in 
American-affiliated firms in 1961/62 than in the remainder 
of Australian industry. No one explanation is adequate 
to account for this . The fact that the factories of 
American-affiliated companies are generally much larger 
than is typical in Australia, as shown in Tables A-2 and 
A-J in Appendix A, must have had an influence on productivity. 
It seems reasonable to assume that the modern techniques 
of management and 'production available to many American-
affiliated companies would result in their having a 
higher labour productivity even if their capital-labour 
ratio were the same as for Australian-owned companies. 
And Am rican-affiliated firms do appear to employ sig-
nificantly more machinery per employee than is true of 
Australian industry as a whole . Some indication of this 
is found in Table VII-4, where values of land and buildings 
on the one hand and plant and machinery on the other are 
shown on a ' per employee' basis. Though these figures 
repr s nt book values only, and so probably overstate 
th us of machinery by American-affiliated companies 
r lati e to Australian industry as a whole, figures of 
rat d horsepower of engines per wages employee, shown 
in Tabl A-9 , point in the same direction. 
(10) and profit mad on such work .' I t is believed that 
at 1 ast on (and probably more) of the large motor 
h" 1 manufactur rs does not compl te its Factory 
R turns in this way. This company shows its value of 
u tput on th basis of a fixed percentag mark-up on 
"ts osts of production (e cluding the cost of pur -
has d compon nts), and this appears to give a figure 
for lu " of output wh "ch could not possiblY -accommodate 
th ompany ' s prof "t . 
TABLE VII - 5 : GRONTH IN THE MANUFACTURING OPERATIONS OF 17 AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES BETWEEN 1952/53 ANTI 1961/62 (a) 
Wholly-American companies : 
(i) Motor vehicle industry -
Va lue of production (£A) 
Employment 
Production per employee (£A) 
(ii) Other -
Value of production (£A) 
Employment 
Production per employee (LA) 
(iii) Total -
Va lue of production (£A) 
Employment 
Production per employee (LA) 
Jointly- awned companies : 
Va lue of production (£A) 
Employment 
Production per employee (£A) 




Total, excluding motor vehicle industry -
Va lue of production (£A) 
Employment 
Production per employee (LA) 
Tot a l , including motor vehicle industry - 17 
Va lue of production (£A) 
Employment 
Production per employee (LA) 
Tot a l Australian manufacturing -
Value of production (£A) 
Employment 
Production per employee (£A) 
1952/53 
22 ,968,846 
19 , 103 
1 , 202 
7, 499 , 689 
3 , 725 
2, 013 
30 , 468 , 535 
22 ,828 
1 , 335 
1 , 334 , 179 
975 
1 , 368 
8 ,833 , 868 
4, 700 
1 ,880 
31 , 802 , 714 
23 ,803 
1 , 336 
1 , 049 ,806 , 652 
918 , 171 





19 , 695 , 609 
6 , 047 
3 , 257 
62 , 825 ,904 
29 , 918 
2 , 100 
3 , 68 9, 374 
1 , 598 
2, 309 
23 , 384 ,983 
7, 645 
3, 059 
66 , 515 , 278 
31 , 516 
2, 111 
2 , 104,305 , 328 
1 , 104,551 





50 . 3 
162 . 6 
62 . 3 
61.8 
106 . 2 
31.1 
57 . 3 
176 . 5 
63 . 9 
68 . 7 
164.7 
62 . 7 
62 . 7 
109 . 1 
32 . 4 
58 . 0 
100 . 4 
20 . 3 
66 . 7 
(a) Reasons why the data in this table must be 
further comments . 





When attention is turned to growth in the value of 
production per employee in American-affiliated firms 
the picture is more obscure. For even if the evidence 
shown in Tables VII-5 and VII-6 were superficially 
unequivocal, definite conclusions could only be reached 
on the assumption that the rate of price increase in the 
industries in which American-affiliated companies fig-
ure prominently has been the same as that for the 
average of the economy as a whole. And there are valid 
reasons for believing that in some of the major areas 
of American investment in Australia, notably motor 
vehicles, industrial chemicals, and oil products, the 
rate of price increase has been substantially less 
than any general index of consumer or wholesale prices. 
In the absence of price data of a very detailed kind, 
conclusions drawn from these tables must be tentative. 
Table VII-5 depicts in aggregate terms the 
growth of 17 companies which provided data for their 
manufacturing operations for the period from 1952/ 53 
to 1961/62:12 In total, their value productivity grew 
by 58.0 p r cent over the period, compared with an 
average growth for Australian manufacturing industry 
as a whole of 66.7 per cent. Part of the reason for 
this discrepancy is the great weight of the motor 
v hicles industry and if this be excluded, both because 
of the doubtful meaning of th figures provided and 
becaus of the very slow rate of price increase in that 
sector over the p riod, the rate of growth of productivity 
ris s to 62.7 p r cent. The danger of drawing conclusions 
from such a small number 01 compani s is highlighted, 
how r, by the obs rvation that were one additional 
company added to th figures - a company (with pro-
duct"on in its main plant in 1961/62 of slightly more 
than £3 million) cluded from Table VII-5 because it 
did not provid data for all its plants - the value 
produ ti ity of th whol group would have shown a rise 
of 59.7 p r cent and that of the group e cluding the 
mot r h"cl s industry a rise of 66 . 2 p r cent . Of 
th 17 ompanies, t n incr as d their productivity more 
12 . As pla"n d lat r, 
and VII-6 do not in all 
op ra "ons of th compan 
th figur s in Tabl s VII-5 
as s cover all the manufacturing 
s oncerned . 
rapidly than the average for their industry, while of 
th 13 companies not primarily engaged in the motor 
vehicl s industry nin surpassed the performance of 
their indu stry . 
Table VII- 6 includes not only the 17 companies 
included in Table VII-5 but also 22 firms which pro-
vided data for a shorter period . It is reasonable to 
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p ct that the incr ased number of companies makes 
conclusions drawn from this table more reliable than 
those based on the previous table but again extreme 
caution must be e ercised . The addition to the figures 
shown of three companies which provided only incomplete 
data, two of them wholly-American in ownership and 
one jointly-owned, would have raised the growth of 
productivity in th group labelled 'Wholly-American 
companies : ( ii ) Other' from 19 . 1 per cent to 28 . 7 per 
cent, and would have reduced the growth of productivity 
in'Jointly-owned companies ' from 28 . 8 to 27 . 5 per cent. 
Of the 39 companies, only 18 exceeded the productivity 
growth of their industry, though if the companies 
primarily engaged in the motor vehicles industry be 
e cluded the ratio improves somewhat to 1 8 out of 35 · 
As predicted, little can be deduced from these 
figures except the rather obvious conclusion that 
Am rican-affiliat d firms appear on average to have 
approximately maintained their superior ,position in 
t rms of value of production per person employed in 
relation to Australian manufacturing industry as a 
whol . 
B for passing to a consideration of other 
possibl m asur s of the operating performance of 
Am ri an- affiliated firms in Australia, a few comments 
should b mad on th difference, if any, in th 
p rformanc of wholly-American compani sand jointly-
own d on s . Th impr ssion is again confused. In 
19 1 /62, th plants of participating wholly-American 
ompani ~ s njoy d a alu of production p r employee 
of 2,50, ompar d w ·th a figur of £2, 64 in 
jO'ntly-own d ompani s. If motor hi le plants 
b lud d from th wholly-Am r an group, how v r , 
r g p rforman of th r maining companies in th 
th t g ry is, t £3 ,419, w 11 abo that of th 
jO'nt y-own d ompan But a f urth r q u alification is 
r qU'r d: th mu h h'gh r figur for alu producti ity 
TABIE VII- 6: GRONTH IN THE MANUFACTURING OPERATI ONS OF 39 AMERICAN-AFFILIATED COMPANIES BEl'WEEN 1957/58 AND 1961/62 (a) 
Number of companies Growth 
covered 1957/58 1961/62 (per cent) 
Wholly-American companies: 25 
( i ) Motor vehicle industry -
Value of production (LA) 38,685,667 43,130;295 11.5 
Employment 24,457 23,871 -2.4 
Production per employee (£A) 1,582 1,807 14.2 
(li) Other -
Value of production (LA) 22,595,400 32,183,454 42.4 
Employment 8,679 10,377 19.6 
Production per employee (LA) 2,603 3,101 19.1 
(iii) Total -
Val ue of production (LA) 61,281,067 75,313,749 22.9 
Employment 33,136 34,248 3.4 
Production per employee (LA) 1,849 2,199 18.9 
Jointly-owned companies: 14 
Value of production (U) 10,165,596 12,818,467 26.1 
Employment 5,620 5,500 -2. 1 
Production per employee (LA) 1,809 2,331 28.8 
Total, excluding motor vehicle industry -
Value of production (LA) 32,760,996 45,001,921 37.4 
Employment 14,299 15,877 ll.O 
Production per employee (£A) 2,291 2,834 23.7 
Total, including motor vehicle industry - 39 
Value of production (LA ) 71,446,663 88,132,216 23.4 
Employment 38,756 39,748 2.6 
Production per employee (LA) 1,843 2,217 20.3 l\J l\J 
Total Australian manufacturing - -..J 
Value of production (LA) 1,662,631,973 2,104,305,328 26.6 
Employment 1,057,191 1,104,551 4.5 
Production per employee (LA) 1,573 1,905 21.1 
(a) See Note (a) to Table VII-5. 
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in wholly-American firms ( excluding plants in the motor 
vehicles industry) is the result of the concentration of 
wholly-American firms in indu stries, such as the pharma-
ceu tical s a nd t o i l et p rep arations industry, where value of 
p r oduction p er e mployee is particularly high . When com-
p arison is made with the relevant industry p roductivity, 
it is found that , even ignoring the plants in the motor 
vehicles industry, more p ers ons were employed in wholly-
American plants o f which the productivity fell short of 
the industry average than were employed in wholly-American 
p lants which exceeded the industry figure . (The figures are 
resp ectively 9,7J2 and 8,626.) By contrast, only 5,962 
persons were employed in jointly- owned plants of which 
the produ ctivity fell short of the industry average and 
8,209 were employed in jointly- owned plants which exceeded 
th industry figure. Tables VII-5 and VII-6 indicate 
that the growth in labour value productivity in jointly-
own d plants has exceeded that in wholly-American plants, 
whether the motor vehicles industry be included or not. 
Th data contain numerous deficiencies; the industrial 
classification us d is too broad; and the number of com-
pani s participating in the survey within each industry 
is too small to permit close comparisons between companies 
of different ownership patterns - for all these reasons 
d finit judgm nt must be withheld. 
impression is int resting. 
evertheless the 
The vidence afforded by an examination of the 
growth in total production and total manufacturing employ-
ment, as shown in Tables VII - 5 and VII-6, is scarcely 
less ambiguous . Add d to th complications already 
enum rat d th r is another : in a small number of cases, 
h figur s shown do not adequat ly reflect the growth of 
whol compani s . To be included in these tables a company 
had to provide da~a for all its manufacturing op rations 
with'n th ' ndustry ( or industries ) to which it belonged 
at th b ginning of th period shown . The company ' s growth 
within that industry (or those indu tri s ) was then in-
o por d in th tabl s. If the company branched out into 
an nt'r ly d ' ff r nt industry during the period cov red 
by th tabl , as oc urr d in a small number of 
as s , th s act' iti s w r e clud d fro m th total to 
:fa ' l ' t t th ass ssm nt of th growth of th American-
d its own industr~ . It should be noted 
th for that th f'gur s shown in Tables VII - 5 and VII - 6 
som wh t u nd rstat th a t u al growth of the ompani s co ered. 
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In terms of the growth of total value of production, 
American- affiliated firms , with the exclusion of figures 
for the mo tor vehicles industry, seem to have grown 
considerably more than the average for Australian 
industry as a whole, whether the companies included in 
Table VII-S or those included in Table VII-6 be examined. 
In part this more rapid rate of growth is due to the 
operation of American- affiliated firms in industries 
which are themselves growing more rapidly t han is the 
economy as a whole, though in, some cases the very pre-
sence of the American affiliates may be presumed to 
have been one of the factors causing the rapid growth. 
Of the 17 companies covered in Table VII-S, only six 
(one of them a motor vehicle company) grew more rapidly 
than the industry in which they operated. Of the J9 
companies covered in Table VII-6, only 21 experienced 
a growth of total production above that of their 
industry . 
The factory employment of the American- affiliated 
firms in Table VII-S grew substantially more quickly 
than total employment in Australian manufacturing over 
that period, though again when the growth of employment 
in American- affiliated firms is compared with the 
growth of the industries in which they operate it is 
found that only seven of the 17 companies covered in 
the tabl experienced a growth rate above the average . 
The factory employment of the companies covered in 
Table VII - 6 grew in total somewhat less than Australian 
manufacturing employment as a whole over the period 
19S7 /S 8 to 1961/62, and only 18 of the J9 companies 
e perienced growth above that of their industry . 
It is clear from both tables, howe er, that 
factori s in the motor ehicles industry exercise a 
v ry consid rabl influence on the ov rall figures . A 
mor accurate . impr ssion may be gained from an amination 
of Tabl VII-7. Th ompani s co ered in that table 
'nclud all thos n luded in Tabl VII-S and in 
add' on four ompan s .hich w r cluded from the 
att r b caus 
da on lu 
to 961/62 . 
of th ir failure to pro ide onsistent -
of produ tion for th whol p riod 19S2/S J 
It indo arly that th mploym nt 
Am 'c n-affil' t d f'rms fell much more sharply than 
th mploym nt of Austral'an industry as a whol during 
th ssion of 1961/62, and that th principal ause 
of 11 was th sharp contra tion in th motor 
h' 1 s industry . 
TABIE VII-7: INDICES OF THE GRONTH IN MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT OF 21 AMERICAN-AFFILIATED COMPANllS OVER THE PERIOD 
1952/53 TO 1961/62, BY INDUSTRY (a) 
Pharmaceuticals and Plant, equipment, Electrical Motor vehicle Other 
toilet preparations and machinery machinery, cables, ~onstruction products 
Year and apparatus and assembly, and Total 
motor bodies 
A B A B A B A B A A 
1952/53 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1953/54 110.8 112.1 106.1 101.2 111.2 120.1 111.5 114.0 115.7 111.7 
1954/55 119.9 116.2 130.6 107.4 134.5 131.5 120.3 125.3 133.7 123.1 
1955/56 126.7 119.3 144.4 114..2 135.6 137.2 127.2 137.3 138.1 129.3 
1956/57 119.9 120.2 138.0 i15.5 132.6 139.6 123.6 132.3 151.1 127.1 
1957/58 124.7 127.4 172.3 115.6 145.6 145.2 128.0 136.8 176.1 135.0 
1958/59 126.6 130.1 166.7 117.9 158.1 156.7 126.6 139.1 188.1 136.2 
1959/60 131.7 145.3 166.7 126.5 163.5 166.2 139.4 155.1 198.1 147.3 
1960/61 145.4 145.5 187.9 129-.3 160.5 169.2 142.6 158.5 195.6 150.5 














ment in 1961162 2,481 7,910 1,147 77,464 3,891 52,918 23,871 45,746 4,645 36,035 1,104,551 
Number of com-
panies covered 5 4 3 4 6 21 (b) 
A: American-a:ff'iliated companies. 
B: The whole industry. 
(a) The figures shown do not in all cases represent the total manufacturing growth of the companies covered. See text for 
further comment. 
(b) This total does not equal the sum of' the component parts because one company owned plants in more than one of the 
industries shown. 
(c) This increase is made up of' an increase of' 25.0 per cent in the manufacturing employment of wholly-American companies in 
the motor vehicle industry, 65.9 per cent in the employment of other wholly-American companies, and 81.7 per cent in that 





It has already been noted that the figures shown 
in Table s VII-5 to VII-7 tend to unde state the growth 
of American-affiliated companies . This impression is 
confirmed by the data shown in Table VII-B, which re-
fers to the same companies as does Table II-5, but 
classifies them according to ownership. Three-quarters 
of the 67 companies in the table experienced a growth 
in total employment of more than 25 per cent between 
1950 and 1962, and substantially more than half ex-
perienced a growth of more than 50 per cent. A larger 
proportion of jointly-owned firms than of wholly-
American experienced a decline in total employment 
b tween those years but overall the growth in the 
employment of jointly-owned firms was appreciably 
great r than that o f wholly-American firms. This was 
in larg measure the result of the very considerable 
growth of three large jointly-owned companies. 
Twenty-two companies operating in both 1954/55 and 
1961/62 gave estimates of their market shares in the 
two y ars. Fifteen ( eight of them wholly-American) 
f lt their mark t share had increased between the two 
years, two (both wholly-American) that it had remained 
about the same, and only five (two of them wholly-
American) that it had declined. Again the diff rence 
b tw en wholly~American and jointly-owned compan~es is 
small. 
Growth in total size is, of course, a function of a 
numb r of factors b sides technical and managerial know-
how. Among thes factors is th ability to pursue a 
cons rvative divid nd policy. Since it has been argued 
that whOlly-American companies are more likely to re-
in st profits than ar jointly-o>med ompanies it is 
surp ising to find that th growth in total siz of 
jo Ontly-own d compani s compares not unfavourably with 
that of whOlly-American companies . But app arances 
r a little d pti Of th major jointly-own d 
ompan s n lud d in Tabl VII-B which e panded their 
to a mploym nt b tw n 1950 and 1962 , only two are 
list d on the stock hang . On of th i >'lid ly 
kn wn :for th ons r a ism of its di °d nd poli y 
and h rg st pa t of h growth in mploym nt of 
th 0 h r was a it first b cam a jointly-
own d omp ny by m g Ong with an Aus t alian-owned 
ompany . Anoth of th larg jointly-own d companies 
TABLE VII-8 : GROWTH IN EMPLOYMENT BETWEEN 1950 AND 1962 OF 67 AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMI'ANIES , BY PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN 
OWNERSHIP (a ) 
Change in employment 
between 1950 and 1962 
(i) Decrease 
(ii) Increa se (per cent) 
o - 24 
25 - 49 
50 - 74 
75 - 99 
100 - 199 
200 and over 
Tot a l 
(a ) See note to Table 11- 5. 
















1 , 922 
10 , 496 
725 
34 , 374 
132 
6 , 603 
19 , 403 
1 , 466 
3 , 637 
22 , 082 
3 , 301 
56 , 624 
Jointly- owned companies 
Number Employment in -
1950 1962 
6 1 , 655 1 , 210 
2 1 , 001 1, 663 
4 306 574 
4 1 , 250 3, 394 
5 699 2,407 





which expand d its mploym nt between 1950 and 1962 is 
pr dominantly owned by a large British company and the 
only Australian equity in a fourth is a small minority 
int rest held by one of Australia ' s largest companies. 
Similar comments apply to the figures quoted for 
changes i n market shares - one of the jointly- owned 
companies which claim d to have almost trebled its 
market share between 1954/55 and 1961/62 experienced a 
major part of this growth as a wholly-American company 
and the balance in a m rger with an Australian company. 
Th small numb r of companies make conclusive jUdgments 
impossible. 
Th figures presented for the growth in total 
employm nt between 1950 and 1962 do seem to indicate 
that the growth of American-affiliated firms has 
b n mor rapid than th growth of Australian industry 
as a whol during th post-war period, while the views 
pr ss d by companies on the change in their market 
shar point to a faster than average growth of 
Am rican-affiliated firms even within the markets for 
particular products. An American affiliation is ,not a 
guarantee of success. In Chapter X a number of cases 
will b m ntioned in which an American interest has been 
sold out or a subsidiary liquidated. It should be 
mention d here that several companies were encountered 
wh'ch f It that th re are disadvantages in their 
for ign affiliation. One firm, controlled in th first 
'nstan by a British company, felt that its competitive 
posit ' on is seriously impair d by the fact that it is 
unabl to introdu a n w model of its product until it 
has b n thoroughly t st d and marl ted by th .K. 
ompany. At th tim of th surv y, the Australian 
subs'd'ary want d to in roduce a product r cently devel-
op d 'n th .S. but was pr nt d from doing this be-
caus it was not p rmitt d to contact the ultimate 
Am i n par nt company dir ctly and th British company 
felt no n d to in rodu th product in th U.Ko 
Ano h r firm, d pend nt on its U.S. par nt for d sign 
work n on it U . K. sist r subsidiary for ompon nts, 
f that 'ts wholly-Aust alian comp titor has an 
b aus ' t do s its own d sign work and an 
buy omp n n s on th op n mark t. This gi s th 
Austra 'an ompany th gr at advantag of fl ibility 
E n n h ordering of mpon nts, th Am rican-affiliated 
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firm f It itself to be at a disadvantage - it is required 
to ord r twelve months in advance to meet the budgeting 
requirements of its associates . As a result of these 
factors , the American subsidiary had achieved a sales 
growth of only 48 per cent over a recent six-year 
p riod, which contrasted unfavourably with the growth of 
95 per cent which the Australian-owned company was be-
lieved to have achieved over the same period . The 
executive of a third company, referring to another 
American subsidiary which operates as a competitor, 
expressed confidence in the future of his own company, 
particularly stressing the disadvantage under which his 
competitor labours because of its lack of Australian 
research facilities suitable for solving the technical 
problems of customers. But on balance an American 
affiliation usually appears to confer an advantage over 
domestic competitors not enjoying such an affiliation, 
and it seems significant that the executive interviewed 
in the first of the companies quoted above described his 
company as 'the most profitable in Australia'. The 
executive who lamented the slow rate of growth of his 
company ' s sales in relation to the growth achieved by 
his Australian-owned competitor yet admitted that the 
ratio of profit to sales in his own company was signif-
icantly higher than the ratio in the Australian-owned 
company. It seems unlikely that an American affiliation 
is in many cases a net disadvantage to the company 
conc rned . 
It is a source of considerable regret to the writer 
that, despite providing a number of interesting impressions, 
this chapter does not p rmit definitive answers to be 
given to thre important questions. First, no final 
judgm nt can be made on whether the productivity of 
Am ri an direct-inv stm nt nterprises in Australia in 
terms of total inEuts is higher than that of other 
compani s operating in Australia. S condly, it is not 
possibl to decid wheth r, again in terms of total 
inputs, wholly-Am ri an compani s ar mor effici nt 
than jointly-own d f'rms. P rhaps even more disappoint -
ng, it is quit impossibl to judg whether American 
n stm nt has b en in s ctors wh re its social physical 
produ t' 'ty has b n at an optimum . E n if the pro-
ductiv'ty figur shad b n in terms of physical pro-
duct'on p r unit of labour, they would not ha e sol ed 
th probl m of allow'ng for other inputs of capital, 
raw material, and the r st. Even if the figures 
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measur d physical productivity in terms of total inputs, 
they would not have p ermitted judgment on whether 
American investment is in industries which yield maxi-
mum external economies to the Australian economy as a 
whole. The next chapter deals on an ad hoc basis with 
some of the benefit s accruing to the Aus tralian economy 
as a result of the operation of American-owned companies 
here, but it should be noted in advance that a final 
judgment on the important question of the optimum 
industry distribut ion of American investment can not 




S OME EFFECTS ON AUSTRALIANS 
It is clear that the managerial and scientific 
know-how of American- affiliated companies is of no 
advantage to Australia if it benefits only the American 
shareholders of the firms concerned. An attempt is 
made in Chapter XI to assess theoretically the net effect 
of foreign investment on the income and balance of 
payments of a recipient economy, but for the moment 
some observations may be made from the empirical 
evidence available on the effects which American invest-
ment has had on the incomes of Australians . 
The effects have been many and some can be mentioned 
only briefly . One of the most obvious is the impact 
which American investment has had on labour incomes . 
Though it has been seen in Chapter V that most American-
affiliated firms pay wages no higher than they are 
compelled to by local regulation or competitive conditions, 
the increased demand for workers to staff the new and 
expanded factories which have been the result of 
American investment must have had an important 
influence on the general wage and salary level . In 
particular cases, the advent of an American- owned 
company has created a demand for a new type of skilled 
labour and the pioneering company finds itself having 
to train Australian labour for the purpose . The fre -
quency with which American-affiliated firms send 
employees to th U.S. parent company for a period of 
training or familiarization has already been mentioned, 
but furth r illustration serves to emphasize the point . 
Wh n onstruction of the Altona petroch mical complex 
comm nc d lat in 1959 , the shortage of welders qualified 
in th particular skills needed for the project nec -
ssitat d th introduction of a special training pro -
gramme . Und r it, 1 0 2,000 man- hours were spent in 
training th men and appro imately 200 men were qualified . 
For th lat r op ration of only one of the plants in the 
1 . ndustrial Ch mi als and Synthetic Resins, Vol . II, 
publ' vidence submitted to the Tariff Board by the 
Australian Chemical Industry Council , 7 S e p tember 1964 , 
p . 75 . 
1 
2J7 
comple , that of the Altona P etrochemical Company P ty 
Ltd, 56 skilled operators were required : twenty- two of 
th s had previously be n unskilled, 28 had been semi-
skill d, and only six had been skilled . 'The weekly 
arnings of these m n as qualified shift operators 
av raged, in one period of l2 months, £27 a week com-
pared with the general average for the group of £l8 to 
£l9 a week before joining the company. This increase 
of about 50% in weekly wages represents the addition 
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of a further £25,000 a year to their purchasing power.' 
The inflow of capital from abroad has been an 
important factor in the smooth absorption of the 
large number of immigrants who have come to Australia 
from the United Kingdom and Continental Europe in the 
post-war period. Abou t 50 per cent of the workforce 
of General Motors-Holden's was made up of migrant 
labour in the early sixties J and other companies were 
probably in a similar situation, ~f on a less spectacular 
scale. 
Ano ther obvious benefit accruing to Australia from 
the operation of American-affiliated companies is the 
contribution the latter make to tax revenue. Published 
figures do not permit a precise calculation of the tax 
paid by American-affiliated firms in this country but 
it would appear that income tax of about £J5 million 
was levied on income accruing to shareholders in North 
America in 196J/64 , and this figure does not include a 
further amount of approximately £5 million which was 
paid on dividends accruing to shareholders in the U.S. 
and Canada. 4 Indirect taxes - particularly payroll 
2. Ibid., Vol. I, pp . 26-7 . 
J. Behind the Millionth (Me lbourne: General Motors-
Holden's P ty Ltd, [ 1962 J) . 
4. It is not possible to derive precise figures for 
thes amounts because of the absence of published 
Australian figures for the remittance of branch pro-
fits to orth Am rica. This lack prevents precise 
calculation of withholding ta I since none is le ied 
on the remittanc of branch profits, and this in turn 
pre ents e act estimation of after-ta profit. The 
figur of £J5 million is, however, lik ly to be a 
fairly closeestimat on the assumption of a company ta 
of 40 per c nt. If anything, it understates the ta 
pa'd by subsidiari s of orth Ame r ' can companies because 
many of th latt r in st in Australia via third 
ountri s. (F±gur s used are d~ved from Annual 
Bulletin of Overs a Investment: Australia 1963-64 (Can-
b rra: Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics).) 
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tax and custom and excise duties - amount to a further 
substant'al figure, estimated at two-thirds of direct 
taxat'on by the U.S. Department of Commerce in its 
census of 1957 . 5 In addition, many of the royalties 
and service charges accruing to American parents are 
taxable at company tax rates in Australia. Some part 
of the sales tax on products such as cosmetics, cigar-
ettes, and motor vehicles may also be borne by American-
affiliated companies, though the exact amount obviously 
depends on the elasticity of the demand and supply 
curves in each particular situation. It has already 
been observed that American-affiliated firms some-
times adopt stratagems to avoid the payment of with-
holding tax, and the extent to which Australian tax is 
avoided by the manipulation of intra-company pricing 
arrangements and the careful use of nomenclature to 
describe 'service charges' is dealt with in the next 
two chapters. But while a more rigorous policy on the 
part of the Taxation Commissioner might result in an 
increase in tax revenue, most of the revenue now 
accruing is still a net benefit to Australia. 6 
The dealers and distributors of many American-
affiliated firms have benefited greatly by the growth 
of the latter. The importance of this group is most 
obvious in the motor vehicle and agricultural equipment 
industries - General Motors-Holden 's alone estimated 
that in 1962 it had over 600 distributors and dealers, 
with employment of approximately 1 ,000 and total 
assets of close to £50 million7 - but it is very sig-
nificant in other areas also. Frequently American-
affiliated companies assume the responsibility of 
training their d alers, and while this clearly is of 
benef't to the American companies themselves, the 
5 . Samuel P izer and Fr derick Cutler, U.S. Business 
Inv in Foreign Countries (Washington: Office 
of Bus'n ss Economics, U.S. Department of Commerce, 
1960), p. 115. G n ral Motors-Holden ' s alone paid 
appro 'mately £119 million in dir ct and indirect 
ta s (o ther than sal s ta ) in its first 14 years 
of Hold n manufa tu . (The company' s 1962 Annual Report, 
p . 14. ) 
6 . Only 'most of h r v nu ' b caus of cours th 
prof'ts of Am rican-aff'liat d compani s are won to som 
t nt at th p ns or the profits of other companies. 
It should also b not d that th point made in th te t, 
and a numb r of tb oth rs mad in th's chapt r, d -
P nd on th assumpt'on that the total capital stock in 
th Australian conomy has been incr ased abo what it 
would h b n in th abs n of a apital inflow by 
/2J9 
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benefit is mutual. One firm producing soft drink con-
centrate, for example, conducts training courses in 
the U.S. for overseas personnel (mainly from locally-
owned bottling companies) twice annually, and eighteen 
Australians from companies engaged in the distribution 
of abrasives produced by another American subsidiary 
have been to the U .S . parent company over the years for 
a period of training. The writer was told by the 
managing director of a company in the food i ndustry 
fuat it had been the absolute insistence of Kraft 
Holdings Ltd on the orderly and hygienic presentation 
of its products that had first introduced modern food 
marketing techniques to much of Australia's grocery 
trade . On the other hand, some dealers handling the 
products of American-affiliated firms feel themselves 
to have been harshly treated: petrol retailers in 
particular have made bitter complaint at the unrestricted 
construction of new service stations on the part of the 
international oil companies, and it was reported in 1961 
that of 25 service stations in Sydney selected for 
investigation by the N.S .W. Prices Commissioner more 
8 than half were trading at a loss. 
The techniques of American subsidiaries tend to 
become disseminated throughout the economy in a number 
of ways. Executives with experience in American-owned 
companies often move to Australian-owned companies, 
though as so many of the larger companies in Australian 
industry are foreign-owned this effect may be of 
smaller benefit than is sometimes imagined . Nearly 
forty American-affiliated firms were members of local 
productivity groups in .1963,9 and through these contacts 
( 6) roughly the amount of the inflow itself . This may 
not be a valid assumption, but it appears to be at 
least as probable as any alternative assumption . See 
also Chapter XI . 
(7 ) Behind the Millionth . 
8 . A 'letter to the editor' in Australian Financial 
Review, 27 April 1961, p . 54 . 
9. Estimated from a list of productivity group mem-
bers published in the February 1963 issue of Group 
News, published by the Australian Joint Committee for 
Productivity Group P romotion . 
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Am rican techniqu s in at least som areas of manage-
ment are shared. (Indeed, a former managing director 
of the Ford Motor Company of Australia was chairman of 
the Australian Productivity Council for some time, in 
addition to his membership of the Australian Export 
Council and the Technical Education Advi sory Council . ) 
The writer met one highly trained company secretary 
who gives lectures on management techniques to groups 
of businessmen quite often: in addition he h ad recently 
spent considerable time trying to help the executives 
of an Australian company master 'some of the more element-
ary techniques '. (He claimed that he had had to point 
out to the managing director that by using a twelve -
month moving average smoothing technique for his sales 
data his sales information was always centred six 
months in the past.) He admitted, however, that his 
company does not encourage him to spend his time in 
this way . Several American-affiliated companies have 
organized plant tours for visitors - bo t h General 
Motors-Holden's and H.J. Heinz claim that more than 
14,000 visitors tour their plants each year - and the 
intangible effect these have, apart from their public 
relations value, must be considerable . Often the 
mere example of American-affiliated firms is sufficient 
to induce a change in the operating methods of Australian 
firms: one widely known Australian industrialist told 
the writer thatWhen he first began manufacturing opera-
tions he had observed Gene~al Motors - Holden ' s closely. 
He commented that 'if you follow General Motors' 
methods you won't go far wrong . 
The Aus tralian shareholders of jointly-owned 
companies may also be expected to gain from their 
affiliation with a large American company, though it is 
not possible to form any clear idea of the importance 
of this benefit. 
Of relatively small importance in total size but 
of considerable significance to those immediately 
affected are the scholarships awarded by some American-
affiliat d firms . By far the best known of these are 
th 25 awards made annually to Aus tralian students by 
Gen ral Mo tors-Hold n ' s to permit th m to f urther their 
studi s at a po st-graduat 1 vel. Th sam company 
annually mak s an award to ncourag Australian th atre . 
Th larg -scal financ·al aid gi en to uni er ities and 
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research institutions by companies in the U.S. is al-
most unknown in Australia, but there is no evidence 
that American subsidiaries are any more reluctant to 
contribute in this way than are Australian-owned 
companies . In certain fields, such as pharmaceutical 
research, there is evidence that some American-
affiliated firms are active in their encouragement of 
local research in universities and teaching hospitals . 
Australian companies which find themselves in 
competition with American-owned companies are among 
those most directly affected by American investment . 
In many cases, Australian companies find themselves at 
a serious competitive disadvantage: the foreign companies not 
ally have free access to the technical and managerial 
know-how of their parent companies, but are also usually 
able to draw heavily, at least initially, on the 
financial resources of their parents. Even where the 
parent company is not prepared to support the subsid-
iary financially, the reputation or guarantee of the 
former is of major benefit to the latter in raising 
finance locally. Subsidiaries may be able to purchase 
materials at lower cost than can Australian- owned 
companies, either because their parent companies buy 
in bulk from American suppliers or because their parents 
can afford to supply them at little more than marginal 
cost . Since the establishment of an Australian plant 
is a relatively minor undertaking for most American 
firms, the American subsidiary in Australia is often 
able to commence operations on a scale s u bstantially 
above that possible for an Australian- financed company, 
thus giving it a major advantage in securing economies 
of scale . The international advertising of many Ameri can 
products may also be an important factor helping the 
American-owned company . 
Certainly many Australian companies have c omplained 
at the competition they have experienced from American-
owned subsidiaries . Frequent complaints have come, 
for xample, from firms in the food and drink industry, 
wher n wly arri ed American firms have recently been 
r u nn·ng substantial losses in an effort to secure 
larger mark t shares. Typical of the comments made in 
rec nt y ars was that by the chairman of the Australian 
firm of Cott I S L d in 1964: 
Comp tition n th processed food industry 
springs, in no small measure, from companies 
of overseas origin. These companies, some 
already well established and some seeking 
to becom well established, have the use of 
considerable capital resources which their 
principals invest often without requiring an 
immediate profit return . Although, as an 
Austral ian company, we have been able to meet 
this competition it has not been without some 
reduction in profit margins . 10 
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From the other side of the competitive battle, the 
company secretary of a wholly-American firm in a related 
industry stated: 
Ours is really a very profitable business but 
we have been making losses because of heavy 
advertising expenditure. The U.S. company 
has been making loans to us on inter-
company account to cover these expenses 
and losses •... There is still a lot of 
shaking up to take place in the Australian 
industry .•. Ultimately, the firms that will 
survive will be those with overseas financial 
backing which can support an Australian com-
pany making losses over a lengthy period. 
Such behaviour appears to be in all respects tantamount 
to price discrimination between markets with the in-
tention of reducing competition in a particular market, 
and in the U.S. might fall under the purview of re-
strictive trade practices authorities . Though the 
practice has obvious benefits to Australian advertising 
agencies and shareholders in Aus tralian advertising 
media, there would seem to be much in favour of refus-
ing to accept such expenditures as deductible for 
taxation purposes in cases where an intention to 
seriously reduce competition can be established. 
Competition need not be as fierce as in the above 
example . It may be quite gradual . It~ nonetheless 
real . One American firm in the agricultural equip-
ment industry expressed the view that 'a large number 
- perhaps 250 - of the 400 firms at present operating 
in this industry in Australia will go under .' Local 
coal-mining firms have in recent years made frequent 
complaint about the unbalanced production pattern of 
in 
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some of the major oil refining companies, a pattern 
which results in the production of an 'excessive' per-
centage of fuel oil. In evidence before the Tariff 
Board in early 1965, the chairman of the Joint Coal 
Board contended that the price of furnace oil had 
declined from about £16 per ton in 1958 to little more 
than £6 per ton in 1965. From newspaper reports, he 
appears to have argued that furnace oil is offered at 
such reduced prices only when it is directly competitive 
with coal. When sold for use in ships ' bunkers, the 
price is . substantially higher at more than £10 per ton 
(in 1963/64). He is reported to have claimed further 
that the Sydney retail price (presumably net of 
excise tax ) of most premium grade motor spirit is higher 
than that in any We st European country except West 
Germany. The obvious conclusion to be drawn is that 
the oil refining companies (almost all American or 
British in ownership) indulge in a form of price dis-
crimination detrimental to the coal producers . ll 
Whether or not this is another case of 'unfair competi-
tion', it is hardly surprising that companies engaged 
in coal production dislike the pressure on them. 
The writer ' s attention was recently directed to 
the unfortunate effects of competition of another kind. 
Dr . Helen Hughes, who has been closely associated with 
the Australian television industry, pointed out in con-
versation that one American company established opera-
tio~s here with the specific intention of 'mopping up 
I 
the market and leaving before saturation set in '. By 
importing printed circuits cheaply from its American 
affiliate, this company was able to keep heavy 
pressure on the profit margins of other television 
manufacturers with the result that at least one major 
Australian-owned eompany, Amalgama te d Wireless (Australasia) 
Ltd, was forced to curtail sharply its expenditure on 
research. Dr v Hughes claimed that the American manage-
ment of the company only rented accommodation in 
Australia , itself reflecting the anticipated impermanence 
of their stay. Certainly the company operated in 
Aust ralia for only a very limited period of years, with-
drawing at the moment tel vision demand began to level 
off . 
11. view, 1 Mar h 1965, p. 4. ~~~~~~~~~~~--~ 
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The effects of the operation of American-affiliated 
companies on competitors are not always detrimental 
and often, because of the concentration of foreign own-
ership in particular industries, the greatest impact 
is felt by other foreign-owned companies . The comment 
of an executive of an Australian-owned company engaged 
in the production of household cleansers is interesting 
in this connection: 
In 1956, Ajax, produced by Colgate-Palmolive, 
hit the market. It cut our salesby 11 per 
cent and drove Old Dutch [ produced by another 
American-affiliated company ] out of business. 
But Ajax did the market a lot of good - inten-
sive advertising developed many new uses for 
our type of cleansers, and we are almost ba.ck 
to our peak sales again, though Ajax is much 
more important in the Australian market 
than we are now. 
And though the growth of General Motors-Holden's has 
undoubtedly been one of the factors impeding the 
progress of the only significant Australian-owned 
firm engaged in the assembly of motor vehicles, nobody 
would deny that the great weight of competitive pressure 
generated by that company is borne not by Australian-
owned companies but by Ford, Chrysler, British Motor 
Corporation, and Volkswagen, all of them having their 
entire ordinary capital held abroad. 
Sometimes the pressure of competition from 
American- cwned firms induces Australian-owned firms to 
modernize their methods to their own long-term benefit . 
Not infrequently this is done by establishing a licensing 
arrangement with another foreign company . An executive 
in one long established subsidiary explained that when 
his company first commenced Australian operations in 
the thirties, standard cost accounting and advanced 
techn'ques of cash forecasting were used at a time 
when they were almost unknown in Australia . 'We 
pioneered many new techniques and local competition 
was forced to follow us.' A spokesman for the oil 
industry also has contended that the significant 
increas in the fficiency of the local coal industry 
wh'ch has occurred 0 r the past decade (an increase 
which has permitt d a fall in coal prices of 17 per 
c nt b tw 
wag at 
n 1953 and 1964 at a t'm of steadily rising 
s ) has not b n unrelated to th competiti 
pr ssur of th oil r fining industry, which first 
b am stablish d as an 'mportant forc at the begin-
n'ng of th fifti s . 12 
12. Aus ralian, 19 August 196 4, p. 13 . Frank A . Southard, Jr . , 
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Moreover, what is loss to Australian-owned companies 
competing with American subsidiaries is often gain to 
Australian consumers. The establishment of a foreign 
subsidiary may be the only practical way to destroy 
a local monopoly, and there have been some spectacular 
examples of this in recent years. Probably the 
best known of these was the invasion in the mid-fifties 
of the Australian cigarette market, previously dominated 
by the Anglo-Australian firm of British Tobacco (Aus t .) 
Ltd, by Rothmans of Pall Mall (Aust.) Ltd, another 
Anglo-Australian firm,and Philip Morris (Aust.) Ltd, 
an American-Austral ian firm. From holding almost the 
entire Australian cigarette market in 1955, British 
Tobacco's share of the market is believed to have 
slipped to below 50 per cent in 1965. Another example, 
this time involving a clash between a wholly-British 
company and a wholly-American firm, has occurred in 
recent years in the soap flake and detergent market. 
For many years, Unilever Australia (Holdings) Pty Ltd 
had, through its various subsidiaries, held almost 
the entire Australian market for such products. It 
was not until Colgate-Palmolive introduced Fab that 
any serious competitor challenged the British giant on 
the local scene. As J.A. Bushnell has observed, 'the 
actual or potential entry of overseas firms into 
oligopolist Austral ian markets through locally established 
factories is an important, but seldom mentioned, 
limitation on oligopolist profits and inefficiency.,lJ 
The Australian consumer may also benefit from 
the more rapid introduction of new products than if 
the Australian market were served only by importing 
from the U.S. American direct-investment enterprises have 
manufactured many hundreds of products for the first 
time in Australia. One company indicated that it 
never introduces a new product to the Australian market 
until its stocks of the old line have been cleared and 
in this case it is possible that the American investment 
(12) in his survey of American investment in Europe, 
found several examples where American investment had 
stimulated modernization of domestic companies. (American 
Industry in Europe (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
19J1), pp. 189-90.) 
lJ. John A. Bushn 11, ~A~u~s~t~r~a~1~i~a~n~_C~0_m~~~~~~~~~_4~6~-
1222 (M lbourne: Melbourne UnivErsity p . lJJ. 
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actually delays the introduction of the new product. 
But most of the companies which commented on the time-
lag between the introduction of a new product in the U. S . 
and its introduction in Australia felt that the delay in-
volved is very short or determined by local market 
conditions . One executive commented that ' new 
products are available in Australia immediately they 
are developed in the U.S.' while another in the founda -
tion garment industry remarked that one special type 
of brassiere was introduced to the Australian market 
only six weeks after its first sale in New York . An 
executive in one pharmaceutical company even felt that 
because of new U. S. laws controlling the sale of drugs, 
there have been cases in which products have been 
manufa c tured in Australia before they have been marketed 
in the U. S . Several companies supplying industrial 
components felt that their American affiliation always 
enabled them to be prepared well in advance of any new 
demand emanating from their customers. 
The savings made by some of the customers of 
American subsidiaries through the reduction in invent -
ories that their proximity ~akes possible have already 
been noted in Chapter III. The example quoted where 
customer companies were able to save more than £100,000 
annually in inventory charges is not an isolated case. 
One firm in the chemical industry explained how it 
had won orders in New Zealand because customer companies 
could reduce stocks from a full year's supply to those 
needed for three months. Another firm felt that its 
presence in Australia made it possible for customers 
to reduce inventories from those needed for six months' 
operatiomto those needed for four weeks. 
The presence of an American manufacturing operation 
in Australia often means that the Australian customer 
is part"cularly well s rved in terms of technical 
training and after-sales attention . This appears to 
b sp cially tru in th h mical industry. Most of 
h compani s in the Altona petroch mical complex, for 
ampl , ma"ntain laboratori s for th solution of th 
t chn" al prob~ ms of ustom rs and th older firms 
app ar to off r similar servic. On ry small firm, 
with 962 mploym nt of 1 ss than 25, maintains a 
t hnica man grand two technicians who run 
d mons rations and t sts in ustom rs ' plants explaining 
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how to use their product and showing how money can be 
saved . 
Help of a different kind has been provided by 
another American-affiliated firm in the chemical 
industry, C.S.R.C.-Dow Pty Ltd. In 1963 it was re -
ported that the company 'recently sponsored representa-
tives of 10 companies in ew South Wales and Victoria 
at a course of work simplification methods ...• 
The program presented covered the improvement of 
existing methods of plant lay-out, improvement in the 
planning of work, the use of manpower, and the effect-
iveness of all employees. ,14 
' Technical services selling' appears to character-
ize the market ing of many American-affiliated firms. 
orton Australia Pty Ltd, then known as Behr-Manning 
(Aust.) Pty Ltd, indicated to the Tariff Board in 
1959 that 'since 1952, qualified products engineers 
have been used to boost sales by demonstrating to 
industry the correct use of abrasives. They also 
assist in the design of machines and techniques which 
will enable the user to reduce his grinding or finishing 
costs. Workshop clinics have been established in four 
States where user problems can be discussed. ,15 
Summing up the evidence, the Tariff Board commented 
that 
various witnesses referred to the difference 
in th selling techniques of Behr-Manning, 
3M [Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co . 
(Aust.) Pty Ltd ] and Carborundum on the one 
hand and distributors of United Kingdom fin-
ished products on the other. It appears 
that these three companies have adopted 
"American" selling techniques which provide 
considerable technical service direct to 
users. 16 
In another i~dustry, the Lincoln Electric Company 
hasfr quently advertised that 
for over a gen ration we have been helping 
manufacturers get more welding productivity. 
Som tim s th r sults ha e been spectacular 
_ cutting w ld·ng time by 90%, for e ample . 
Almost very tim a new custom r calls on 
u s , th r is som worthwhil impro ement to 
b mad, ·f only a 5% or 6% In r as in pro-
du t· ·ty. Th man from Lincoln thinks 
14 . Australian Fin Septemb r 1963, 
p . 12. 
15. T r·ff Board's R p rt on Abrasi Cloths and 
P ap rs, 5 August 1959, p. 4. 
16 . b·d . , p . 9· 
productivity •.. When he is in your shop he is 
working not for us but for you. 17 
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In a different sector of the electrical industry, I.B . M. 
has trained several hundred personnel from customer 
companies in data processing techniques, though of 
course this programme is probably not intimately de-
pendent on the company's Australian manufacturing 
activities. 
No simple answer can be given to the question of 
the effect which American investment in Australia has 
had on the prices of the products supplied by the 
American affiliates. There have certainly been some 
dramatic cases in which the prices of goods produced 
by American-affiliated firms have risen very much 
less rapidly than the price level in Australia generally. 
Probably the best known of these examples relates to 
the price of the Holden car. The list price of the 
Holden standard sedan, excluding tax, rose in a series 
of steps from £675 in November 1948 to £945 in June 
1952, a rise of 40 per cent. Over the same period, 
the rise in the Australian retail price index was in 
excess of 50 per cent. During the next few years, 
the price of this car declined until in October 1958 
it reached £885 , at which price it still remains in 
1965. At this level it is only 31 per cent above that 
of 1948, despite considerable improvements in the car 
itself and a rise in the Australian retail price index 
of 106 per cent during the same period. eedless to 
say, the competitive pressure of this company has com-
pelled other companies, including other American sub-
sidiaries, to make parallel price reductions s o that 
today cars are substantially cheaper, in relative terms, 
than they were at th beginning of the fifties. 
B cause of the considerable importance of this 
subj t, a number of other examples may be cited . In 
th trical quipm nt industry , American-affiliated 
firms ha mad som r markabl pri r ductions. In 
F bru ry 1963 Lin oln El tri illustrat d the success 
of 'ts profit sharing and job incentiv schem by the 
follow'ng stat m nt: 
Dur'ng th y ars 1939-1957 wh n the whol sal 
pr ind of goods manufactur d rose by 200 
P r c nt, th pri of on of Lin ' oln ' s main 
sal s it ms - wIding 1 ctrod - ros by only 
45 p rent . As another ample, a particular 
170 From 
..;..R~;...;;:;..~w, 26 
n ad rt's m nt in Australian Financial 
o mb r 19 4, p. 25 . 
type of farm welding machine sold in 1951 for 
£133. Today, the price of a newer type having 
65 per cent more output is only £114.18 
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Thomas Electronics of Australia Pty Ltd, a wholly-American 
subsidiary until early in 1962, was cited by the 
Australian Tariff Board in 1960 as the company which, 
while seeking high protection with other manufacturers 
in 1957, had indicated that it did not expect to need 
such protection by 1958. The Board's 1960 report on 
cathode ray tubes noted that between 1957 and 1960 
this company had reduced the selling price of one of its 
major products by about one-third. 19 In 1963 the 
Tariff Board also noted with approval that competition 
between members of the Australian portable electric 
tool industry was vigorous and that prices 'and con-
sequently profit levels' were being reduced. The 
American-owned firm of Black and Decker (Australasia) 
is one of the two largest producers in that industry.20 
The chairman of Australian Controls Ltd, a jointly-owned 
venture, announced in 1964 that 'for some years now we 
have been steadily reducing our selling prices across a 
wide range of our products. A continuation of this 
process is something which we should regard as probable 
21 
and necessary.' 
Australia~ prices of locally produced chemicals 
fell between 1953 and 1963 by 16 per cent, a fall 
greater than that in any of the major chemical manufac -
turing oountries with the exception of Japan. Both 
Monsanto Chemicals (Australia) and Union Carbide 
Australia feel that this price fall is typical of 
h ' ,22 t e1r own exper1ence . 
Similar reductions in price have occurred in the 
food industry. The H.J. Heinz Company supplied price 
da ta on four of its main product categories for the 
three years 1953, 1958, and 1963. The net-into - store 
prices of all four advanced between 1953 and 1958, but 
in thr cases this increase was less than the increase 
in th Australian whol sale pric inde. The prices 
18. Or'ginallya statement of this kind appeared in 
Busin ss R vi w, Janua y 1959. Figur s am nded to 
F bruary 1963 w r suppli d directly by th company . 
19 . Tariff Board's R po t on Cathod Ray Tubes and 
Parts Th reof, 29 Jun 960, p. 10. 
20. T riff Board's R port on Portable Electric Hand 
Tools, 24 May 1963, pp. 8-9 · 
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of all four groups declined significantly between 1958 
and 1963 so that indexes of the 1963 price of each 
product (with base 1953=100) were respectively 87, 93, 
94, and 107 . These compare with a 6 per cent increase 
in the Australian wholesale price index over the whole 
period and an increase of 58 per cent in an index of 
wages provided by the company . Since 1963, the writer 
understands there have been still further price re-
ductions, in part no dnubt because of increasing com-
petition from the entry of other foreign subsidiaries 
into the field. The imminent entry of the American-
owned firm Nabisco Pty Ltd into the Australian biscuit 
mark et also appears to be ·ha.ving a beneficial impact 
on prices. It is reported that the dominant company 
in the industry 'has now dropped its policy of price 
maintenance on ~±scuits in N.S.W.' as part of its new 
marketing drive . 23 
In the foundation garment industry, one American-
affiliated firm mentioned that the reorganization of 
production which followed the establishment of its 
American association had made .·. it possible on one 
occasion to maintain prices despite a general p rice 
rise throughout the industry of about 10 per cent . 
Another American-affiliated company in the industry 
recently introduced a brassiere which it claims to be 
of high quality at a price less than half that at 
which most brassieres are sold . 
A number of e amp1es from an earlier period may 
also be given. The Wiltshire File Company contended 
befor the Tariff Board in 1953 that between 1944 and 
1950 the 'company ' s files were purchased by merchants 
at prices equal to or less than they could have been 
land d from th United Kingdom free of duty and primage. 
For th thr years, 1946 to 1948 inclusive, the cost 
of Australian fi1 s was as much as 14 per cent less 
than the duty fr land d cost of United Kingdom fi1es ., 24 
t21) Addr ss by th hairman of Australian Controls 
Ltd to th annual g n ral meeting of th company, 8 
o tob r 1964. 
( 22) Industrial Ch mica1s and Synthetic R sins, Vol . II, 
p . 72 . 
23 . Australian Financial Revi w, 3 July 1964, p . 2 . 
24. Tar·ff Board ' s Report on Fil s, 23 Octob r 1953, 
p . 4. 
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In 1955 the Tariff Board described as 'a highly 
creditable performance' the fact that International 
Harvester had refrained from increasing the price of its 
tractors since 1951 despite increased costs for labour 
and raw materials . 25 Very much earlier, in 1914, the 
managing director of Kodak (Australasia) argued at a 
tariff hearing that the manufacture of photographic 
film by his company in Australia had reduced the price 
of such film to the world market price, which was 
apparently 'considerably lower' than the price pre-
vailing before this . 26 
It is not imagined, of course, that American-
affiliated firms reduce their selling prices simply 
out of concern for Australian consumers. Often prices 
are reduced because of competition from imports or 
otherlocal companies. In some industries prices are 
reduced in order to increase profits through the ex-
pansion in sales volume which the price reduction makes 
possible . One firm specifically stated that a price 
reduction from £125 to £99 on one of its major products 
more than doubled turnover and thus increased overall 
profitability . It is also obvious that prices in 
some industries would have fallen even without the 
influence of American investment . But it does seem 
reasonable to conclude that American investment has 
been an influence slowing the rate of price increase 
in some areas and that Australian purchasers of the 
products involved have thereby benefited . 
Unfortunately, this benefit has not been by any 
means universal . There is, for example, very substan-
tial evidence that prices charged by pharmaceutical 
companies in Australia, including many American sub-
sidiaries, are very considerably higher than necessary . 
The Federal Minister for Health, Senator Wade, gave a 
numb r of price comparisons in September 1963 which 
showed that the prices of drugs supplied to the 
ational H alth S h me by companies in Australia are 
fr qu ntly more than 100 p r cent high r than th 
pric s of id ntical drugs when supplied to the British 
Gov rnm nt ' s h alth s h m .27 Th r sult of this is 
25. Tariff Board's R port on Tractors, 14 Octob r 1955, 
p. 1 0 . 
26 . =I~n~t~=-~~~~~C~o~m~m~i~s~s~l~'~o~n~o~f~~A~u~s~t~r~a~l~l='~a~.~_T77a~r~l='=f~f~I~n~v~e~s~t~-
igat'on: VL R port, p . 66 . 
27 · i w, 19 S pt mb r 196J, p . J . ~~~====~~~~~~~~~~ 
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that th average cost of a prescription to the Australian 
health scheme was stated in 1963 to be more than double 
28 the average cost of a p rescription in England and Wales . 
In .part, of course, these high p rices may be the result 
of higher Australian unit costs . In p art also, they 
are the result o f substantially higher distribution 
margins in Australia . But these are not the only in-
fluence on p rice, as the following comment from a senior 
executive in one wholly-American company i ndicates: 
P ricing p olicy varies but the most important 
influence is what price the government can 
be prevailed upon to pay to the chemist for 
the final product under the pharmaceutical 
benefits scheme . S ome lines are in fairly 
strong competition, but in others there is 
no comp etition and in still others there is a 
gentleman ' s agreement on prices . 
In recent years the Federal Government has been exert -
ing considerable pressure on pharmaceutical companies 
to reduce their prices, pressure which has been 
accompanied by overt ministerial threats . The policy 
has met with a significant measure of success . A 
samp le list of price reductions secured by the Govern-
ment tabled in the House of Rep resentatives early in 
1 964 showed that p rice reductions in many drugs excee d ed 
25 p er cent over a two year period,29 and there is 
some evidence that because of this pre ssure there are 
now a number of cases in which Australian drug prices 
to the pharmaceutical benefits scheme are on a par 
with British p rices . As far as one can judge , however, 
government action has had little influence on the 
prices of p r oprietary lines sold directly to consumers 
and these still appear high by international standards . 
An experiment conducted by the writer, admittedly 
with a sample much too small to permit of dogmatic 
c onclusions, indicat d that the Australian prices of 
p r oprietary me d icines tend to be higher even than 
those in New Zealand - in the most e treme case , that 
of a brand of halibut li r oil capsules marketed in 
Austral'a by on of th large American branch operation s, 
( 27 ) S nator Wad's ampl s includ d th following : 
p r dnison , 30 5 mg . tabl ts, Brit'sh price 8 / 2, 
Austral' n pric 1 / 6; ortisone, 40 25 mg . tablets , 
British pr' 31 / 11, Australian p ric 50 / - ; rythromycin , 
250 mg . tabl ts, British pric 26 / 7 per 25, Australian 
p r 51 / 9 p r 16 . 
29 . Commonw alth of Australia 
Vol . H. f R. 41 ( w S r' s ) , 
of Austra l ia 
( w S ri s ), 
bates, 
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the Australian price for 100 capsules was more than 
five times the w Zealand price. 30 Despite the 
inadequacy of th sample and insufficient information 
on the tariff and marketing arrangements involved in 
each country, it is hard to avoid the feeling that 
there might be some relevance to Australia in the 
conclusion reached by the Special Committee on 
Pharmaceutical Benefits set up by the ew Zealand 
Government : 
When drugs are manufactured in New Zealand, 
even if this merely amounts to processing 
and packaging, production costs tend to be 
high, and a monopolistic situation may be 
created . Purchasing with limited competition 
in this small market tends towards high 
prices. 3l 
It is not immediately clear how many American 
direct - investment enterprises indulge in restrictive 
trade practices in Australia . Certainly there are 
many which do . It is common knowledge that the two 
American-affiliated companies in the rubber industry 
are parties to the agreement fixing prices and dis-
counts in the tyre replacement market - indeed, Forster 
has noted that one of the reasons for Goodyear's profit-
able debut in the Australian market in the late twenties 
was the issue of uniform tyre price lists by all the 
local tyre manufacturing companies in 1928. 32 A 
witness before a Tariff Board hearing on rubber con-
veyer belting in 1961 provided documentary evidence 
of price collusion by the local manufacturers of this 
item, again including Goodyear ' s Australian subsidiary . 33 
In the supply of petroleum products also, it is common 
to hear complaints from local government authorities 
of price collusion on the part of supplying companies , 
which certainly include several major American-
affiliated companies . It was reported recently that in 
the case of oral contraceptiv es ' all the manufacturers 
make their product available at the same price to the 
chemists' 34 and American subsidiaries are undoubtedly 
30 . Th content of th pills in ach country was , 
how v r, not quite id ntical . In Australia, the pills 
w r lab 11 d as containing not 1 ss than 5 , 000 I . U. of 
Vitamin A and 1,000 I.U . of Vitamin D. In ew Zealand , 
th pills conta'n d 5,000 I . U. of Vitamin A but only 
' not 1 ss t than 410 .U . of Vitamin D. To the layman 
th diff r n do s not app ar suffici nt to explain a 
fiv fold pric diff r ntial . 
i 1 Committe on Pharmaceutical 
H alth, 19 3 , p . 59 . 
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implicated in that statement . Very many pharmaceuticals 
and cosmetics are in fact covered by retail price main-
tenance agreements, and while these schemes are some-
times initiated by pharmac~ they are usually agreed 
to readily by manufacturers. J5 In both fields American 
subsidiar~es and branches are prominently represented . 
Many other examples could be adduced. Among firms 
encountered during the present survey was one which 
fixed its prices in accordance with an i nternational 
price agreement on its product, an agreement which 
appears to cover all producing countries outside the 
Soviet bloc except Japan. The chief executive of another 
company commented that when he read the proposed 
Federal legislation on restrictive trade p r actices 
'I thoug~S ir Garfield had been reading our own market -
ing arrangements - we break all the laws'. An exec-
utive in a third company admitted that a public denial 
he had made some years ago of a market sharing arrangement 
of which his company had been accused was made 'for the 
benefit of our attorneys in the U.S. who are always 
worried about antitrust laws' . Still another American-
affiliated firm complained that its Anglo-Australian 
competitor- would not come to any agreement 'to stabilise 
prices' .36 
(32) Colin Forster, Industrial Development in Australia 
1920-1930 (Canberra: Aus tralian National University, 1964), 
p. 56 . 
(33) Australian Financial Review, 25 May 1961, p. 15 . 
(34) Ibid., 15 Oc tober 1964, p. 8. 
35. The writer was fortunate in securing access to a 
copy of the retail price list issued by the Federated 
Pharmaceutical Service Guild of Australia (N.S.W. Branch) 
in 1963. This document not only specifies retail prices 
and profit margins but also indicates the 'credit rat -
ing' of each produc t . This is judged on whether the 
company concerned sells only through pharmaceutical 
chemists, whether it supports price maintenance, what 
profit margin it affords to retailers, etc. Products 
with a high rating, marked 'G' for 'gold', merit 'utmos t 
support'. Those with a low rating, marked 'R' for 'red', 
should be accorded ' no display, no support, sell only 
on demand'. It is interesting that all the products 
of several wholly-American companies, especially those 
producing mainly toilet preparations and toothpaste, 
w r gi n a low rating, indicating among other things 
th ir unwOllingn ss to participate in th price fixing 
agr m nts of th Guild . . On th oth r hand, all the 
produ ts of s v ral Am r Ocan subsidiari s whose operations 
ar mor pur ly con rn d with pharmac uticals wer 
giv n a high ra ing . 
36 . In fact th Anglo-Australian comp titor had its own 
r strO v trad pra tOc. Ha ing njoyed a monopoly 







Whatever comment one might wish to make about the 
society which tolerates such flagrant abuses of the 
competitive system, there appears little doubt that a 
significant fraction of American-affiliated firms in 
Australia do participate in restrictive trade practices. 
There are a number of products manufactured by 
American-affiliated companies which are mar keted at a 
common list price. Electrical consumer durables are 
the most popularly known, though there has been evi-
dence in recent years that competition through the 
granting of grossly unrealistic 'trade-in allowances' 
has been very vigorous. Referring to the local 
manufacturers of electric shavers in 1962, moreover, 
the Tariff Board expressed the view that 'the evidence 
indicates that there is no pricing agreement between 
them' despite the identical prices which each quotes. 37 
Similarly, though the three American subsidiaries 
producing coated abrasives in Austral ia quote 'virtually 
the same prices' (prices which, incidentally, are con-
siderably higher than those quoted by the British sub-
sidiary in the industry), the Tariff Board 'does. not 
conclude that there is collusion between the companies 
in the setting of prices but only that, as a matter of 
company policy, each would appear to follow the lead 
of the largest supplier of the three in setting its 
prices for a particular market. ,38 
Several companies were encountered which refuse 
to have anything to do with industry agreemen~ on price 
or marketing . The only one of these whose position 
with regard to price agreements is sufficiently widely 
known to permit its citation here is General Motors-
Holden's, a company which refuses to 'cooperate' with 
other manufacturers in the marketing of either motor 
vehicles or domestic appliances. But there are a number 
(36) the arrival of the American-affiliated company, it 
embarked on an aggressi e policy of price-cutting which 
compelled the new company, after a period of heavy 
losses, to sellout to the original monopolist . 
37 . Tariff Board ' s Report on Electric Shavers, 6 Decem-
be r 19.6 2, p. 7 . 
38 . Tariff Board's Report on Abrasive Cloths and Papers, 
5 August 1959, p . 9. 
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of others . These firms, with only two exceptions, all 
mentioned a fear of American antitrust legislation as 
the explanation of their behaviour . None of them 
dared 'talk price' with any other manufac t urer and 
at least one of them, in a dominant position in its 
industry, was afraid to offer discounts to Australian 
customers lest it be accused of trying to stifle 
competition. Writing of American subsidiaries in 
Canada, Kingman Brewster, Jr., noted that 'if the 
U.S. parent can be said to have dictated or even 
acquiesced in the cartel activities of its foreign 
subsidiaries, an antitrust charge may be made against 
the parent even though the subsidiary in question is 
not itself subject to the power of a U.S. court .,39 
It appears beyond doub t that, in the absence of 
effective Aus tralian legislation against restrictive 
trade practices, this country has derived some bene-
fit from the legislation of the United States. 
It is also probable that some American subsid-
iaries which now participate in industry agreements do 
so only reluctantly. In recent years the experience 
of Parsons General FoodsPty Ltd has received consider-
able publicity in this connection. When the company 
attempted to launch its Maxwell House instant coffee 
on the Aus tralian market without price maintenance, 
it is reported that Australian retailers exerted such 
pressure on the company that it was forced to follow 
the policy of other manufacturers and 'maintain price' • 
When tactics were changed and the company advertised 
one free jar of coffee for each one. JPurchased, retail-
ers again complained that their profit margins were 
40 being jeopardized. 
If a majority of American-affiliated companies do 
indulge in restrictive trade practices, and this seems 
probable, they are only following the example set by 
the great majority of Aus tralian-owned and other 
39. Kingman Brewster, Jr., Law and United States 
Business in Canada (Washington : National Planning 
Assoc iation (U. S.A.) and Private Planning Association 
of Canada, 1960), p. 10. 
40. Australian Financial Review, 3 July 1964, p. 2. 
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c ompanies in Australia. Alex Hunter concluded in 1961 
that ' h owever conservatively the position is stated, it 
is clear that Australia is well, even handsomely, en-
dowe d with trade associations and restrictive practices ., 4l 
Two years l a ter he published an estimate that between 
40 and 5 0 p er cent o f all public exp enditure on acquir -
ing s up p lies i n Australia was affected by level tender-
, 42 N ' h b 1n g . 0 eV1 d enc e as e en p roduced to suggest that 
h e e x aggera t ed t h e preval e n c e of s u ch practices . 43 
One of the most crucial questions that may be 
ask ed of American investment concerns the prices at 
which the produ cts of American affiliates are marketed 
in relation to the prices of equivalent imported pro -
ducts . Firms p articipating in the present survey were 
asked to compare the ex factory price of their main 
product line with the landed duty paid price of the 
same product if it were imported from their parent 
company . In all, 25 firms provided such data, 
t h ough the basis for comparison was not identical in 
all cases . Twenty-one companies felt the Australian 
ex factory price to be lower that the landed duty 
p aid price if the same product were imported from 
their American parent, and four felt it to be higher . 44 
Ten of the companies which felt the Australian price 
to be lower, moreover, felt it to be less than 75 per 
cent of the imported price, and of the four which 
felt Australian prices to be higher than those of im-
ported p roducts , one company was using as a basis 
for comparis on the U .S . price which an Australian 
customer could secure if he placed his whole annual 
order with the U .S. p arent at one time, something very 
unlikely to o ccur in practice . 
41. Alex Hunter, 'Restrictiv e P ractices and Mon opolies 
i n Australia ', Ec onomic Re cord , XXXVII ( 1961 ) , p . 3 2 . 
42 . Sydney Mo r n ing Herald , 18 February 1963 , p . 2 . 
43 . In a recen t s u rvey of manufactu ring industry con-
du cted in Western Australia , John Hutton discovered 
that almost two - thirds of the major firms contacted 
worked within th framework of an orderly marketing 
sch me . ( John Hutton, ' An Anatomy of Manufacturing 
Industry ' , a pap r pres nted to Section G, Australian 
and ew Z aland Assoc'ation for the Ad ancement of 
S c i ence , Canberra , 1964 .) The report of the Tasma n ian 
Royal Commission r on prices and restrictive trade 
p racti s~ r leased in 1965, found that two - thirds 
of about 70 Tasmanian rad associations were involved 
in r str' ti trad practic s . (Australian Financial 
R vi w, 5 May 1965, p . 1 .) 
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At first sight, these figures might convey the 
impression that the operation of American subsidiaries 
in Australia helps Australian consumers to purchase 
goods at prices lower than they would have to pay if 
dependent on imports. The industrial distribution 
of companies which responded to this question, though 
including few industrial chemical oompanies, was 
fairly wide, further strengthening this impression. 
But two important qualifications must be taken into 
account. First, the assumed price of the American 
impor t included an element of Australian tariff . 
While the tariff clearly influences the price at which 
Aus tralian consumers can buy, it probably has little 
influence on the price at which Australia can buy. A 
saving available to the Australian consumer by the 
purchase of a locally-produced article may be more 
than offset by a loss in taxation revenue. To shed 
further light on this matter, participating firms were 
also requested to compare their ex factory price with 
the landed price of the same product if imported from 
their parent company without customs duty . Of the 25 
firms mentioned, only 13 felt their Australian price 
to be below the American import price in such circum-
stances, two felt it to be the same, and ten felt it 
to be higher . Moreover, had a greater number of 
chemical companies been included among those which 
answered this question, the proportion of those which 
felt their Australian price to be above that of the 
imported product would certainly have been considerably 
higher. 
The second qualification which must be taken into 
account 's that n at 1 ast some cases the American 
pric s us d for th purpose of comparison w re not typical 
of those at wh'ch imports are available to Australia. 
In th as 0 some products, imports are now available 
mor ch aply from Japan or West G rmany. Moreover, the 
Amer' an pr'ces used appear in most instances to have 
be n full ost pro s, and as such are probably sig-
nif' antly h'gher than th actual prices at which 
44. It's possibl for th Australian price to be 
high r than th import pric in som cas s wh re the 
local ompany has sol Australian distribution rights 
for its affil'at s . 
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Australia can buy on th world market . The two 
companies which compared the Australian price of 
their motor vehicle with the price of a comparable 
product imported from the U.S . are both believed to 
have used the price of a fully-assembled vehicle, 
again perhaps overstating the benefit to Australia of 
local manufacture. 
To sum up the available evidence on the price of 
goods produced by American direct-investment enter-
p rises in Australia , it appears that, if it be granted 
that local manufacture of the goods concerned is desir-
able for other reasons, American investment has re-
duced the prices of many goods to Australian consumers . 
There are, however, some notable exceptions to this 
generalization . It also appears likely that many 
prices would be significantly lower than they are at 
present were it not for the participation of many 
American-affiliated companies in industry agreements 
to maintain price levels. But the most serious question 
still remains of whether or not the manufacture of 
some items now made in Australia by American affiliates 
should have been encouraged at all. Clearly there are 
some products, particularly in the metal-working 
industries and probably also in the food industry, 
whose Australian prices are lower than those in most 
overseas countries. Equally clearly, however, there 
are some products (especially, perhaps, in the field 
of industrial chemicals) which from a purely economic 
point of view it would pay Australia not to produce, 
either now or in the foreseeable future . For if the 
cost (after allowing for all external economies) of 
certain locally-manufactured goods is higher than 
that at which imports are available against an increase 
in Australian export production, not only is 
Australian real income ad ersely affected but the 
Australian balance of payments is also harmed (as will 
be explained in Chapter XI) . 45 American investment 
( or more correctly, the oligopolistic situation it may 
create) may be blamed in some cases for fragmenting an 
45 . Th r may, of course, still b grounds for local 
manufactur from a def nc point of view, though it is 
doubtful ( b caus of d p nd nc on imported raw 
mat rOals ) if such an argum nt could carry much weight 
in th as of som on stm nt in th Australian chemical 
indus y. 
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aIr ady small market and thereby mainta ' ning costs and 
pr'ces at an unnece ssarily high level,46 but, funda-
mentally, blame for the production of 'uneconomic 
products' in Australia must fallon the Tariff 
Board and the Government which lays down its terms of 
reference . 
One important influence on the incomes of 
Austral ians not thus far examined is the impact 
which American-affiliated companies have through 
their purchases of goods and services. In aggregate 
these purchases are very large. Table A-7, in 
Appendix A, shows that the expenditure of 99 
American-affiliated manufacturing companies in 1961/62 
on certain materials, fuel, power, etc. was in excess 
of £200 million. While this amount includes consider-
able expenditure on imported parts and materials, it 
almost certainly understates the total expenditure on 
Australian-made products because most finished parts 
bought by the American-owned motor vehicle manufactur-
ers are excluded from the figures. N~included at all, 
moreover, is expenditure on a multitude of services, 
perhaps the most important of which is advertising. 47 
Of the ten largest daily-press advertisers (among 
industrial companies) in 1962, four were wholly-
American subsidiaries, one was a jointly Australian-
American firm, and one was in the process of acquiring 
a large American minority interest. 48 Public author-
ities are also among the beneficiaries, to the extent 
that the price paid by American-affiliated firms for 
elect~ty, the use of roads, freight services, etc. 
exceeds the marginal cost of providing these utilities. 
In his survey of American investment in Britain, 
J.H. Dunning found that many companies supplying 
American direct-inv stment enterprises with parts and 
47. Th u.s. D partm nt of Comm rc stimat d th total 
p nd ' tur of all . S. d 'r t investm nts in Aus tralia 
on rna r 'als and sri s n 1957 (o th r than e penditure 
by t ad'ng organisat' ons) at £ 347 mill · on. (U .s . 
726i 
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materials b nefite d considerably from the operation of 
th ir Am rican-own d u stom rs . Many companies felt 
that th str'ct a dh en e to techn·ca.l tolerances de-
mand d by American s ub idiaries had compelled them to 
improve th ir manufac t ur i ng method s, and a majority of 
those h interview d f lt hat they had received some 
specific benefit in he form of materials formulae, 
manufacturing methods, or machi nery design . 49 A 
detailed survey of supplying companies was not under-
taken during the present survey but some light is shed 
on this subject by questions asked a number of the 
American subsidiaries themselves. It appears beyond 
doubt that most American subsidiaries provide their 
suppliers with detailed specifications and blue-
prints , but on the other hand it appears that very 
few give additional help. Of 22 companies asked the 
question: 
Have you found it necessary, in order to im-
prove the quality of components, to provide 
Australian producers with information on new 
techniques, materials, or formulae? 
twelve replied in the negative. Typical of the comments 
made by executives of these companies was one that ' we 
give drawings to suppliers and sub-contractors but 
nothing else. We had some difficulty with tubing for 
a time so we imported it.' Only one of these companies 
noted that, though it had not provided any technical 
information to its suppliers directly, most of them 
had in fact made contact with the American parent 
company while on overseas trip • 
Of the ten companie which answered the question 
in the affirmati e (all, incidentally, wholly-American 
in ownership), four had provided such assistance only 
on very rare occasions. One of these indicated that 
' normally we don't try to do our supplier's business 
for him ' but wen on to admit that on one occasion 
detailed information had been passed on to a local 
British subsidiary to help the latter make a particular 
( 47 ) Business Investments in Foreign Countries, p . 115 .) 
( 48 ) Aus "ralian Financial Re iew, 30 April 1963, 
p . 32 . 
49 . J . H . Dunning, Arne ican Investment in British 
Manufa turing Industry ( London: Allen e Unwin, 1958 ) , 
esp cally pp . 224-5. 
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typ of bronze. Aga·nst the American company's wishes, 
the supplier had mad use of the formulae when supply-
ing the company's competitors . The in·tial reaction 
of another firm, in the motor vehicle s industry , was 
that no help had been provided to suppliers, but as an 
afterthought it was mentioned that one supplier had 
been assisted with technical information some years 
previously. When an executive in the supplying company 
was contacted, however, he expressed the view that the 
American informat i on 'really only confirmed an opinion 
we had had before' • 
Two more companies had provided considerable in-
formation to suppliers only in t he years immediately 
after their establishment in Austral i a and felt t hat 
because of the improvement in the standards of their 
suppliers this was no longer significant . In one case, 
the technical liaison had been important: 
We laid down certain manufacturing to ler-
ances and made our suppliers live up to 
them . We had our own inspection shop and 
our rigorous standards compelled our 
suppliers to i nstall inspection shops to o. 
Right from the start, we demanded quality 
and educated our suppliers to produce it . 
But in only four cases of the 22 queried on this 
point did the writer gain the impression t hat the flow 
of technical informati on from American subsidiary to 
Aus tralian supplier is of continuing importance . One 
of these firms is in the motor vehicles industry but 
since a more detailed comment is made below on the 
relationship between Amer i can companies and their 
suppliers in this industry no further mention is made 
of this company here. The comments of the other three 
companies are worth quoting at l ength. An executive 
of a company producing electric shavers stated: 
Australian electrical steels and plastic 
components had to be made to dimensional 
tolerances which were difficult to achieve 
in the beginning, but with the provision 
of process by process details from the 
U.S., Aus tralian production of these highly 
specialized components was upgraded to meet 
the necessary standards and specifications 
on the blue-prints supplied from America ••• 
At all times there has been a free flow 
of process information from the U.S . company 
to the Australian plant and sub-contractors. 
Some of this information has been invaluable 
in the manufacture of products entirely dis-
associated with th electric shaver industry. 
In the food industry, an American subsidiary gives help 
on a similar scale: 
Contracts are issued to growe s during the 
winter, and planting out of seedlings begins 
during August. Field officers of the company 
supervise the preparation of the ground, the 
amount of fertilizer to be used, the planting 
out of seedlings, the spraying of the crop 
with pesticides and fungicides for crop pro-
tection purposes, and advise on the general 
care of the crop. 
Finally, the financial director of a company engaged 
in the production of toilet preparations commented: 
Our Australian raw material and packaging 
suppliers are not only being constantly 
alerted to new trends but are also given 
exacting quality control standards and 
advice on operations where applicable ••. 
Fairly constant pressure has to be put on 
some suppliers to make them keep up to 
standard. 
It is clear that some American subsidiaries go to 
considerable lengths to help their suppliers to meet 
required standards of quality and price, and it seems 
likely that the Australian companies involved benefit 
significantly from this. But if Dunning's impression 
of the help passed to supplying companies in Britain 
is correct, an explanation of why so few American 
subsidiaries in Australia behave in this way would 
appear to be necessary. The most important part of 
the explanation is probably to be found in the 
relatively small scale of the Australian operations of 
many American companies. A number of companies in the 
metal-working industrie s , for example, are engaged 
primarily in the assembly of imported components, and 
probably a majority of the subsidiaries in the 
Australian pharmaceutical indus try are engaged only in 
making pills or capsules from imported materials. It 
is no accident that all th four companies which were 
noted above as providing considerable information to 
supplying compani s are large and all but one of them 
have been establish d 'n Australia for more than thirty 
years. Another factor to be tak n into account is 
that suppli rs and sub-contractors in ery many 
indus r' s ar al eady in contact with an overseas 
affiliate, ithe as subsidiaries or licensees, and so 
p rhaps are not oft n ' n n d of advi e. 
Th r s Y t anoth r ason why som Australian 
suppliers do not rece've technical info mation from 
American subsidiari s: in many cases, they have al-
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ready been galvanized into efficient operation by the 
influence of the largest American subsidiary of all, 
General Motors-Holden's. The Australian managing 
director of a large domestic appliance company, answer-
ing the question on help provided to suppliers, indicated 
the complete adequacy of Australian-made parts in the 
following terms : 
I think G.M . H. did the best possible job for 
Australia: nobody in Australia knew anything 
about mass production until G.M.H. came along . 
Australian manufacturers are now served by 
efficient sub-contractors and in the early 
years this was mainly G.M.H.'s contribution. 
It was this remark, and many in a similar vein made by 
other executives, which prompted the writer to make a 
particular study of the impact of American subsidiaries 
in the motor vehicles industry on their Australian 
suppliers . 
To the outside observer, the most obvious benefit 
to the Australian manufacturers of automotive parts 
has been the very rapid growth of the motor vehicles 
industry, a phenomenon for which the American subsidiaries 
have themselves in large measure been responsible . From 
being concerned principally with the replacement market 
and the original market for only a few rather elementary 
components, the industry has graduated to the stage 
where it can now produce the full range of parts needed 
for the modern motor vehicle. In 1962, General Motors -
Holden's alone paid £ 4,172,000 to suppliers of goods 
and services, a figure which had grown from less than 
£10 million in 1948, the first year of Holden produc-
tion . In 1962, he company estimated that 31,000 people em-
ployed by its several thousand Australian supplying 
companies were dep ndent for their livelihood on the 
f 't t' ' t' 50 B th F d d G 1 success 0 1 S ac 1 1 1es. 0 or an enera 
Motors-Holden ' s boast an Australian content in their 
main passenger vehicles in e cess of 95 per cent. 
Not infrequently, th motor ehicle companies 
have paid a cons ide able premium abo e the price of 
equivalent impor s to Australian suppliers to encourage 
50. Th 
Behind th 
ompany' 1962 Annual Report, p . 14; and 
Millionth. 
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local production. This appears to be l ess important 
now than in earlier years, but is still paid in some 
cases . The policy has be en of importanc e in bui lding 
up local suppliers to the point where they can produce 
at a more economic volume. Not all the American sub-
sidiaries have adopted the policy but it appears to 
have been particularly important for General Motors-
Holden's, the company which first embarked on complete 
car manufacture in Australia . 
The benefit derived by many suppliers has been 
very great. An executive in one of the American-
affiliated companies participating in the present sur-
vey was quite neurotically fearful that the vehicle 
manufacturers would secure access to the profit figures 
of his company, while another company declined t o pro -
vide its sales figures lest 'the motor companies want 
some of the gravy'. Ano ther prosperous company, 
Australian- owned, commented that without the car 
companies 'we wouldn't be on the breadline we would be 
below it' • 
In an attempt to discover the attitude of the 
supplying companies towards the American-owned vehicle 
manufacturers, a total of seven such companies (six 
wholly-Australian in ownership and one foreign sub-
sidiary) were interviewed. The results of this short 
study may be biased, inasmuch as the seven were chosen 
from a list of major suppliers provided by one of the 
manufacturers and from press advertisements in a news-
paper supplement on the motor vehicles industry. But 
this bias does not seem t o have been unduly significant 
and all the companies interviewed are believed to supply 
part s to all the major vehicle manufacturers. 
Attention was concentrated on three main questions . 
First, do AustralIan suppliers generally have diffi-
culty meeting the technical standards demanded by the 
American-owned vehicle manufacturers? By and large, 
they do not. All seven companies felt that the most 
consistent pressure on technical standards had come 
from only one of th Am rican subsidiaries and if 
anyth'ng som of the suppli rs resent d the sudden 
fluctuations in the standards demanded by some of the 
oth r subs'diari s . Almost all had f lt at one stage 
th t th's pr ssur was unreasonable but th r was a 
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very general real ' zat ' on at the time of the survey that 
they had gained from it in the long run. 
Do Australian s uppliers have difficulty meeting 
the delivery dates and scheduling requirements of the 
American subsidiaries? Again, it appears that they do 
not. All the firms interviewed appreciated the need 
for precise delivery dates and exact ordering, and 
again the only complaint voiced was that some of the 
American subsidiaries are very inept at forecasting 
their demands and very inconsiderate to their suppliers 
when orders have to be changed at short notice. One of 
the American firms was again singled out for its 
special ability in this field and also for the thought -
ful manner in which it deals with suppliers when 
orders must be changed at short notice. 51 
But part of the explanation of the negative 
answers to the first two questions is found in the 
answers to the third question: Have Australian suppliers 
received any assistance, either in the form of technical 
information or managerial techniques, from the American 
subsidiaries? In describing the answers received to 
this question, the writer finds himself in a particularly 
embarrassing posi tion . For almost without exception,52 
all the seven companies visited contrasted the very con-
siderable help they had received from one of the 
American subsidiaries with the usually complete 
absence of such help from the other American subsidiaries 
( indeed, all the other companies) in the industry. 
While it has been deliberate policy in such situations 
51. This company was particularly considerate during 
the recession in the motor vehicles industry in 1961/62. 
A number of suppliers were aware that the company could 
have stopped all buying for several months till its 
inventories were reduced to a level commensurate with 
its sales but instead the company 'smoothed' the reduc-
tion in its order over a period. One firm indicated 
that when it reached it overdraft limit during this 
difficult period, it rang the American subsidiary and 
suocessful1y requested it to pay certain bill 
before the due date. In the mo t remarkable case, 
when one foreign subsidiary which had expanded its 
inventory at the reque t of the American subsidiary 
found itself in liquidity difficulties in 1961/62, the 
Amerioan subsidiary negotia ed a bank overdraft running 
into six figures on its behalf and agreed to increase 
the price of its purchases to co er the interest 
charges. 
52 . The one excep ion wa the foreign subsidiary 
interviewed, which felt it needed no technical advice 
because of its e isting 0 erseas connections . 
to avoid mentioning company names, to follow this 
policy here is peculiarly difficult . This is partly 
because illustrating each situation without mention-
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ing the company's name would be rather clumsy and partly 
because every Australian familiar with the motor 
vehicles industry could name the company concerned in 
any case . Some justice may be done in naming the 
company, moreover, since more than any other it has 
incurred the resentment of Aus tralians at the 
profitability of overseas investment in this country. 
Some explanation for its achievement may be found in 
the fact that it was the first company of any 
nationality to embark upon the complete manufacture 
of a motor vehicle in Australia. Its name, of course, 
is General Motors-Holden's. 
G.M . H. has taken a lively interestin the manufac-
turing methods used by its suppliers since its inception 
in Australia. Forster gives an interesting account of 
General Motors' very close technical liaison with 
Holden's Motor Body Builders Ltd in the twenties,53 
though Hartnett has argued that the company' really did 
not appreciate the problems of manufacturing in a small 
market at that stage. 54 It was after World War II when 
planning for Holden production commenced in earnest 
that the company made its biggest impact on Australian 
suppliers . While the company itself provided considerable 
information on this aspect of its activities, the im-
pression is more vivid as told by the suppliers . 
One of these, a company which sells 95 per cent of 
its output to the motor vehicles industry, has ex-
perienced a six-fold growth in total profits over the 
past decade. Its growth in export sales has been even 
more dramatic; from less than £10,000 in 1949 to over 
£1 million in 1963. A senior executive felt that both 
achievements were in important measure due to assistance 
fr om G. M • H. : 
By foroing suppliers like ourselves to meet 
their speoification requirements, they brought 
about something of a revolution in components 
53 • Op . cit ., p. 43 . 
54. L.J. Hartnett, Big Wheels and Little Wheels 
(Melbourne : Lansdowne Press, 1964), pp . 49, 62 . 
manufacture. Th Y encouraged association 
with other U. S . companies and also provided 
direct technical assistance. Because of 
this initial pressure, we have become 
better manufacturers and with competence in 
one field we have been led into other fields 
such as precision equipment. I 
This company also received benefit from G. M. H. 
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through the fact that several of its senior executives 
originally learnt that company's methods in its employ-
ment . 
Another company, engaged in die-casting, felt 
that technical information passed on from the 
American subsidiary had not been at all significant, 
but it did feel that it had learnt a great deal from 
G. M. H. in the field of management techniques . In 
particular G. M. H. had helped the company improve its 
inspection techniques by showing it all its own manuals 
on inspection . 
In the case of three of the suppliers visited, 
help of both a technical and managerial kind from 
G.M.H. had been of such considerable assistance that 
some of the comments made are reproduced in detail: 
(a) In 1954 we resented [G. M.H . IS ] pushing 
- this was when we first went into die-casting 
for the car industry . They have marvellous 
forecasting and scheduling systems and we said, 
when they wanted us to schedule our work in the 
same way, you can't schedule jobbing work. But 
they insisted - and now we schedule all our work 
up to twelve months ahead. We now set out tar-
gets and can in retrospect check our performance 
- this is a very big thing . We can talk the 
same language as G. M.H. They simply told us 
we must have strict schedule observance - they 
didn ' t tell us how to do it, but they suggested 
we could do it their way. At our request they 
showed us how to operate their time sheet system, 
how to finance our production and how to sell 
it . And they have done this for lots of companies 
Everybody in the supplying industry says G. M.H . 
demands technical standa~ which are too high 
- we say it too . But we ' re not right - it's 
only an excuse . In insisting on quality, they 
have brought the quality up to their standards . 
They have revolutionized standards in many 
industries . We have very strict quality con-
trol - but it was put in at their suggestion •... 
On many occasions we have sent people overseas 
with G. M. H. backing - I have gone myself . We 
go to Melbourne and ask for an introduction 
without that contact you wouldn ' t get beyond 
the front door in America. As it is, we go over 
th r , are m t by the head man in the plant or 
division we want to s and he gi es us a guide 
for th rest of the day We sent one senior man 
to the U. S. very year between 1954 and 1960 
General Motors are very free with informa-
tion. We are quite at liberty to take notes 
in all G.M. plants and they answer all our 
questions - on costs, rates of flow per hour -
the lot, all without charge . ... And with G.M . 
you can keep on writing back for years, getting 
further help . 
(b ) We always think G . M.H. standards are too 
high - but they always prove to be right. 
This country owes a helluva lot to G. M. In the 
early years we cursed them up hill and down 
dale : we damn nearly had to rebuild our factory 
to meet their quality demands. But they help 
us meet their standard~ - all G.M. factories 
are open to us and we visit them almost every 
year. They don't encourage us to take up 
licensing agreements with other foreign companies 
- it ' s not that they're opposed to it but just 
that in our line of business, General Motors 
owns the best factory in the world. And we have 
also had entries into many other factories 
through the good offices of G.M.H .•... And 
G.M . H. doesn't make any charge for this help: 
they even lend us their technical staff to helH 
us solve problems without any charge .... . 
G. M.H. taught me purchasing. After the war we 
didn ' t have any special purchasing department: 
purchasing was done by me, the company secretary. 
A G.M.H. man came up for three or four days, all 
without charg , and taught us how to operate a 
modern scheduling system, and we're still using 
basically the sam system. At the moment we're 
thinking of installing a teleprinter, so last 
week I went across to the G.M.H. plant at Pagewood 
to see how they use theirs. And I'm going down 
to Melbourne next year to examine their e.d.p. 
system . .. . Is there another company in the world 
which has done so much for one national economy? 
(c) Without a question of doubt, G.M.H. have con-
tributed more than any other car company to this 
country - especially with their m thods and 
quality control. Befor I m t G.M.H., I thought 
I knew all about producing the particular compo-
n nt in which we sp ialize, but I really didn't 
know the first thing about mass production 
m thods and wh n th y told m what prices they 
wer prepar d to pay I told them it couldn't be 
don. They not only showed me how I could meet 
th ir prices but also showed me how I could make 
a v ry good profit doing it. But you have to 
1 t G.M.H. boss you round, because they know 
what they'r doing. Th y put quality control 
'nto this comp ny. They help d us normously : 
th y told us th syst m th y use and th y sent 
p opl up for w ks on nd to help us with these 
syst ms, without any charg. This b n fits 
rybody, in luding G.M.H.'s ompetitors of 
ourse . I ha a gr at admiration for G.M . •. . 
G.M.H. v n sugg st what plant w should get 
som m s: just r ntly we ord r d a machine 
whi h is much mor p nsi than oth r machines 
of 'ts kind t G.M.H o 's sugg stion. But it is so 
mu h b tt r as rna h ' n that w just couldn't 
afford not to ha ito Th y put us on to all 
th n w stuff om'ng out of th Stat s in our 
fi ld. 
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G.M . R. have also given us a new attitude to many 
things we had previously taken for granted . For 
example, wh n th y gave us an order, they would 
ask us how we °ntend d to transport the products 
to Victoria. We would name the trucking company 
we planned to use and they would reply that this 
company was very frequently behind schedule in 
its deliveries. This gave us a new interest 
in transport efficiency .... 
This company was established in 1952 because of 
th expected growth of the car industry. Eleven 
years ago we employed six people - now we work 
two shifts with a total employment of over 400 . . .. 
We have just begun exporting to the U.K. and 
expect this trade to grow rapidly because of 
the relative ch apness of the Australian article 
- which in turn is due basically to our better 
manufacturing techniques and management procedures. 
The extent of th b nefit derived from G. M. R. 
by Australian manufacturers of automotive parts seems 
difficult to exaggerate. The testimonies offered by 
the suppliers interviewed are the more remarkable in 
that, human nature being what it is, one might almost 
have expected some resentment against the company so many 
of th m depend upon for their prosperity. The contribu-
tion which G.M. R. has made to the efficiency of 
Australian industry over the past twenty years must 
undoubt edly be rated among the greatest benefits 
which Australia has received from American investment . 
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Chapter IX 
IMPORTS A D EXPORTS 
One of the more controversial aspects of foreign 
investment in Australia is the alleged restriction on 
the freedom of foreign subsidiaries to buy and sell 
where they please. Australian firms sometimes feel 
that they are at an unfair competitive disadvantage 
in tendering for the supply of foreign subsidiaries 
because the latter are directed to purchas e many of 
their materials from affiliated firms, while public 
displeasure has been voiced frequently at the internation-
al market sharing arrangements which are believed to 
restrict the growth of Australia ' s exports . This 
chapter sets out the relevant data gathered during 
the present survey and attempts answers to some of the 
questions of immediate public concern . The chapter 
sp cifically does not deal with the impact of American 
investment on Australia ' s overall balance of payments 
po sition, discussion of this subject being deferred 
till Chapt r XI . 
I 
S eventy-seven companies provided information on 
th ir penditur on imports in 1961/ 62 . Though neither 
of the two very larg American-owned oil refining 
compani s is includ d in that total,l the number is 
b lie ed to r pres nt a r asonable cross-section of 
Am rican inv stment in oth r sectors of Australian 
industry . Between th m, th se companies spent in excess 
of £92 million on imports 2 in that year, and the figure 
1. On of th major Am rican oil refining compani s provided 
import figures but because of a company reorganization 
during the year th ir us proved to be impossible. 
2. A number of compani s could provide only an estimate 
of imports, so thatth accuracy of the figures shown 
both in th t xt and 'n suc eeding tables is somewhat 
s pur·ous . Most of th larg compan'es, however, pro-
v'd d figur s a urat to the nearest £1,000~ Though 
th qu stionnair fa'l d to specify th basis of valua-
tion on whi h figur s w r r quir d, it is thought that 
th f'gur s pr s nt d ppro imat a c . · .f . valuation . 
By al qu stioning, ·t is known that most ompanies 
pro id d figur s 'n th's form , though som ga f . o . b . 
figur sand oth rs add d Australian tariff to th c . i . f . 
valuati n . In a numb r of cas s, compan' s which in-
lud d Australian tar'fl w r abl to pro id an stimate 
of h's ompon nt, nd this p rm'tt d a rough stimat 
of th . i . f . f·gur. As with oth r data, many com-
pan ' s did not pro id f'gur s for th y ar nded 30 June 
1962, but inst ad us d th ir own ompany y ar ending in 
1962. 
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does not include some expenditure on capital equipment 
bought from the local agents of overseas manufacturers 
or some exporting by parent companies to non-affiliated 
companies in Australia. Most of the total import bill 
was expenditure on raw materials, components, and 
finished goods for resale without further processing, 
and together these were equivalent to nearly 19 per 
cent of the total sales of the companies concerned . 
Table I X-l shows this information by the industry 
of the importing company and by the period in which it 
began manufacturing in Australia . As might be expected, 
the direct import content of the sales of companies in 
the food and drink industry was very low, while that in 
the electrical equipment industry (where a number of 
companies were still engaged primarily in the assembly 
of imported components) was considerably higher. 
Some of the other ratios shown may be deceptive. The 
high ratio shown for companies in 'Plant, equipment, 
machinery' which began manufacture before 1957 is largely 
the result of substantial importations of finished 
goods by one company, while the ratio of 2J.9 per cent 
shown in the 'Other industries' classification for 
companies which began manufacture before 1957 is 
heavily influenced by expenditure on crude oil imports 
by on of th smaller Am rican-affiliated oil companies. 
If comparison is confined to imports of materials 
on the one hand and total sales on the other, none of 
th aggregate ratios appears high, at least if 
att ntion b restricted to companies which had been 
manufacturing her for mor than five or six years in 
1962. Admittedly, a comparison of imports of materials 
with sal s is not very satisfactory and for this reason 
an att mpt was made to compare mat rials imports with 
total cost of production as shown on th Commonwealth 
Statisticians Factory R turn. Th difficulty with this 
compar son is that th Statistician requests th exclus-
ion of th ost of ompon nts which ar m rely assembled 
by th r porting factory from th total of cost of 
produ t'on. Eu il ompan'es which ar thought to 
Iud s'gnif' ant amounts of ass mbl d compon nts in 
this w y b I ft ut of count, th r ar still 64 
compani s which an b us d for m aningful comparisons . 
o th total, th pr portion of import d mat rials 
t to I manufa turing cost .vas I ss than 20 per c nt 
TABLE IX- l : IMPORTS OF 77 AMERICAN-AFFILIATED COMPANIES IN 1961/62, BY INDUSTRY , PERIOD IN WHICH MANUFACTURE BEGAN , AND 
TYPE OF IMPORT 
Imports of - Total Total sales in Imports of Number of 
Materials imports 1962 materials and companies Finished goods Capital 
Industry U(thousand) £A ( thousa..'1d ) equipment (b) finished goods as covered 
£A(thousand) £A(thousand) £A(thousand) percentage of 
sales 
A B A B A B A B A B A B 
Plant , equipment, machinery 1,257 (a ) 1 ,483 3,848 (a) 1 , 351 7 101 8,048 14,666 13,003 34 .8 (a) 21.8 5 11 
Mot or vehicles 40,039 6,380 9 ,888 53 , 306 262 ,491( c) 17.7 4 
Electrical equipment, 
instruments , etc . 4, 579 (a) 425 3,408 (a ) 71 121 5 8 , 607 36 , 715 1 , 601 21.8 (a) 30 . 9 10 4 
Food and drink 162 49 6 1 40 150 408 23,328 3,172 0 . 7 1.6 4 2 
Industria l chemi cals and 
plastics 2,312 558 1 ,989 81 114 58 5 , 113 16 ,804 6 ,410 25 . 6 10 . 0 4 4 
Pharmaceutica l and toilet 
preparations 1,328 1,359 4 118 46 15 2 , 869 12, 121 3,142 10.5 47 . 0 3 3 
Other industries 9,297 1,188 1 , 256 574 1,177 222 13 , 714 44,108 6 , 125 23.9 28 .8 10 13 
Tot a l (b) 58 , 975 (a) 5,062 16 ,890 (a) 2,196 8,392 551 92,066 410,834(c)33,454 18.5 (a) 21. 7 40 37 
A: Companies which began marrufacture in Australia before 1957 . ~ 
B: Companies which began marrufacture in Australia in 1957 or subsequently. (The year in which manufacture began is taken to be the 
year in which an American equity of at least 25 per cent was first acquired in the case of companies manufacturing previously as 
Australian- awned ventures . ) 
(a) Four companies failed to classify part of their imports by type . In each case the unclassified portion has been allocated to 
the class which is the most nearly appropriate. This results in a small error in the figures indicated. 
(b) Detail may not add t o totals because of rounding . 
(c) To safeguard the secrecy of the sales figure of a very small participating company in the motor vehicles industry, this figure 
actually includes the sales of one company which provided no information on its imports . The overstatement is substantially 
less than £1 million however . 
NOTE : (1) Figures shown are believed to approximate a cost-insurance- freight valuation. 




in JO cases, and less than JO per cent in 41 cases . 
In only 11 cases was the ratio greater than 50 per 
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cent and several of these companies, having but recently 
begun manufacture, were accumulating stocks of im-
ported materials . Unfortunately, since information 
could not be obtained on indirect import content, no 
comparison can be made of the total import content of 
the production of American-affiliated firms on the one 
hand with the import content of Australian manufactur-
ing industry as a whole on the other . It might be 
expected, however, that since so many American ven-
tures begin life in Australia as primarily assembly 
or packaging operations, the import content of the 
production of American-affiliated firms would be 
significantly higher than for Australian industry 
generally . 
Wholly-American companies were significantly more 
dependent on imported products in 1961/62 than were 
jointly-owned firms. Table IX-2 classifies imports of 
materials and finished products by ownership of the 
importing company . Both among companies established 
in Australia before 1957 and among those which began 
manufacture more recently, the direct import content 
of sales was higher the greater the percentage of 
American equity in the importing company. The only 
exception to this is the high import ratio applying to 
co~pani s of less than 50 per cent American ownership 
which began manufacture before 1957, and closer 
examination of this figure reveals that were one 
company which imports substantial quantities of crude 
oil to be excluded it would fall from 26 per cent to 
1 ss than 10 per cent. 
Th frequency distribution of ratios of imported 
materials and finished goods to sales in Table IX-J 
pres nts the same impression . While IJ of 15 jointly-
own d firms manufacturing in Australia before 1957 
had a direct import content in their 1962 s.ales of 
less than 20 per c nt, the comparable ratio among 
wholly-Am rican firms was only . 11 out of 25 . Of those 
wh' h b gan manufa tur in 1957 or subsequently, 
almost half the jointly-own d ones had ratios of less 
than 20 p r cent but only one-third of the wholly-
Am rican on s could lay laim to a similar ratio . 
Rat'os of imported mat rials to manufacturing cost con-
firm this pictur , though with a smaller sample of 
companies . 
TABLE IX- 2 : IMPORTS OF MATERIAlS AND FINISHED GOODS BY 77 AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES IN 1961/62 , BY PERCENTAGE OF 
AMERICAN OWNERSHIP AND PERIOD IN WHIDH MANUFACTURE BEGAN 
Percentage of 
U. S. ownership 
25 - 4% 
50 - 9% 
100% 
Tota l (d ) 
Companies which began manufacture in Australia before 
1957 (a ) 
Imports of - Imports of Total sales materials and 
Materials Finished goods in 1962 finished goods 
£A ( thousand ) £A( thousand) £A(th ousand ) a s percentage 
of sales 
7 , 918 350 31 , 697 26 . 1 
1 , 411 886 22 , 073 10 . 4 
49 , 646 (b) 15 , 65 4 (b) 357 ,06 4 ( c) 18 . 3 (b) 
58 , 975 (b) 16 ,890 (b) 410 ,834 ( c) 18 . 5 (b) 
Companies which began manufacture in Australia in 1957 
or subsequently (a ) 
Imports of - Imports of 
Total sales materials and 
Materials Finished goods in 1962 finished goods 
LA ( thousand) £A(thousand) £A(thousand) as percentage 
of sa les 
611 254 8,614 10 . 0 
1 , 317 325 8,734 18 .8 
3,134 1 , 617 16 , 106 29 . 5 
5, 062 2 , 196 33,454 21. 7 
(a ) The year in which manufa cture began is taken to be the year in which an American equity of at least 25 per cent was f irst a cquir ed 




See Note (a ) t o Table IX- l . 
See Note (c) t o Ta ble IX- l . 
Detail may not add to t ot a ls because of rounding . 
NOTE : Included in the a bove t able are 43 wholly- American companies, 19 in which the American equity was between 50 and 99 per cent , 
and 15 in which the American equity was less than 50 per cent . In ea ch of the three classes , the number of those which 




TABLE IX- 3 : RATIO OF IMJ>ORTED MATERIALS AND FINISHED GOODS TO SALES IN 77 AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES IN 1961/62, BY PERCENTAGE 
OF AMERICAN OWNERSHIP AND PERIOD IN WHICH MANUFACTURE BEGAN 
Percentage of U,S, ownership and 
period in which Austra lian manu-
f a cture began (a ) 
25- 4% 
(i) Manufa cture began before 1957 
(ii) Manufacture began in 1957 or 
subsequently 
50- 9% 
(i) Manufacture began before 1957 
(ii) Manufacture began in 1957 or 
subsequently 
100% 
(i) Manufa cture began before 1957 
(ii) Manufa cture began in 1957 or 
subsequently 
Total 
(a ) See Note (a) t o Ta ble IX- 2 . 
Ratio of imported materials and finished goods t o sales (per cent) -
0-9 10- 19 20- 29 30- 39 40- 49 50 and over 
2 3 1 1 
3 1 1 2 1 
5 3 
4 1 1 2 1 2 
8 3 7 4 1 2 
2 4 6 3 3 















These figures must be interpreted with consid-
erable caution. Many jointly- owned companies were 
in fact manufacturing long before an American company 
acquired an interest in them and in this situation 
p urchasing p atterns were often laid down before the 
American investment . Of the companies shown in 
Table IX- J as being less than 50 per cent American in 
ownership and as commencing manufacture 'in 1957 or 
subsequently ' , for example, three of the four which 
had a direct import content in sales of less than 
20 per cent had been manufacturing in Australia 
long before the American interest was acquired . 
Often an Australian-American partnership begins life 
in answer to a need felt by a previously wholly-
Australian venture for technical information or 
capital . By contrast, the wholly-American firm often 
has its genesis in the desire of an American company 
to circumvent Australian trade barriers by assembling 
components imported from the U . S. Because it was so 
rarely possible to compare companies of different 
ownership pattern within the same industry, it is 
impossible to be certain from the above evidence 
that wholly-American companies import a grea~ p~ortion 
of th ir materials than do jointly-owned firms in the 
same situation. 
During early interviews conducted as part of the 
pr s nt survey, participating companies were asked a 
seri s of questions on their use of Australian-made 
materials and components. As time went on, however, 
't b came increasingly apparent that most of the 
qu stions w re inadequate to elicit much useful informa-
t'on on this topic and several of them were not asked 
in lat r intervi ws. Too often, executives stated 
that 'we buy locally wh rver possible', in deference, 
1 "J S 't is thought, to current popu ar oplnlon . orne 
J. John Lind man and Donald Armstrong found the same 
diffi ulty in th ir study of Am rican investment in 
Canada: 'Of cours all company e ecutiv s interviewed 
d a strong pr f renc for Canadian-made goods 
ic s; it would take an unusually frank man 
to pr ss any oth r vi w. Howe r, furth r investiga-
tion showed th t th r w r d gre s of pr fer nc .' 
(Pol's and P ractic s of United Stat s Subsidiari s 
in Canada (Washington: ational P lanning Association 
( U.S . A .) and Privat Planning Association of Canada, 
1960 ) , p . 5J .) 
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companies undoub ted y import a very high proportion of 
th ir raw materials - in the extreme case, a company 
in the chemical industry 'cal culated ' its imports in 
1961/62 by referring to its total expenditure on 
material s as recorded on its Factory Return. A number 
of companies in the pharmaceutical industry are in a 
similar situation. In other cases, particularly in 
th food industry, dependence on imported materials 
was found to be xtremely low or negligible. Almost 
always, companies importing materials or components 
explained that the required volume of the imported 
product was insufficient to justify local manufacture 
or that it involved a raw material not found in 
Australia at all . One of the few executives who gave 
a different reason stated that his company (predom-
inantly Australian-owned) imported steel occasionally 
b caus the local steel monopoly is so difficult to 
deal with. 
The most useful information obtained on the use 
of Australian materials emerged from an examination of 
chang s in the use of imported materials over a period. 
Companies were asked to provide data on their imports 
for 1954/55 and 1959/60, as well as for 1961/ 62, where 
r 1 vant. Twenty-three companies provided informa-
tion for all three years. Unfortunately, half of 
these firms either did not provide information on 
th ir manufacturing activities over this whole period 
or e clude all assembled components from the figure 
th y report for cost of production on their Factory 
Return. But of the eleven cases in which comparison 
between imported materials and total manufacturing 
costs is possibl ight showed an increase in 
'Australian cont nt' and only two a decrease. The 
impr ssion Os not so 1 ar if th 29 additional 
comparisons availabl for th more limit d period 
1959/60 to 1961/62 b e amin d. H r , 17 sho~ an 
in r a in 'Australian ont nt' but 11 showed a 
d cr as . Too mu h should not b read into th se 
f Ogur s on th ir own: r lating to indi idual years 
as th y do, th y ar lik ly to ha b n significantly 
aff t d by hang s in sto ks of mat rials, partic -
ularly sin b tw n 1959/ 60 and 1961/62 th r was 
not nly a chang in go rnm nt poli y on import 
ontrols but also ompl t chang in th cyclical 
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position o~ the economy. P robably of greater interest 
are the answers to a question asking companies which 
had begun manufacture in Australia before 1957 to com-
pare the Australian content of production in 1962 
with that 'five years ago '. Of the 17 companies 
which answered this question, four felt the question 
to be not very meaningful because their dependence 
on imports of materials had for long been negligible, 
six felt Australian content to be 'about the same' 
and seven felt it to be 'greater' . Fourteen com-
pani s which had begun manufacture in 1957 or sub-
sequently were asked whether Australian content had 
incr ased since manufacture began: all but three of 
th se felt that it had, and one of these had used 
xclusively Australian materials since establishment. 
Th oth r two f It Australian content had remained 
'about the same ' . All those companies which felt 
Australian content had increased expected this trend 
to continue, though one felt the growth in local 
content would be slow and another that tt would never 
go b yond a certain point. 
Table Ix-4 shows the growth of the imports of 
companies which provided data for years other than 
1961/62. In the absence of sales data for 1954/ 55 and 
1959/60, the table does not permit of definite con-
clusions except for the motor vehicle industry. The 
incr asing Australian cont nt of the production of 
Am rican-affiliated firms in that industry is clear 
both from the d cline in imports of finished goods 
and from the fact that imports of materials have 
incr as d much more slowly than the number of vehicles 
r gOster d in the names of the companies concerned 
over th sen-year p riod. The imports of th 
oth r 19 ompanies which provid d data for the three 
y ars shown ros considerably more rapidly than 
Australian imports as a whole over the same period, 
though since °t has b n obs rved that Am rican-
affilo t d compani s ha for the most part grown 
mor rapidly than th Australian conomy as a 
whol this is not surpr±sing. Imports of th 32 
mpan s whO h pro id d data for only 1959/ 60 and 
1961/62 f 11 mor s ply than did Australian imports 
g n r lly b tw n thos two yea s. 
TABLE IX- 4: GROWTH IN THE IMPCRTS OF 55 AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES 
£A(thou sand ) 
Companies which provided import da t a f or 1954/55 , 1959/60 , and 1961/62 Companies which provided import 
.. . dat a f or 1959/60 and 1961/62 Motor vehicle companles Other companles 1 ----------____________ ~ _____________________________ ~ _______________ on y 
1961/ 62 1954/55 1959/60 1961/62 "::":":';::.l1-9-59-1~6-0---1-96"'-l--'I-62 --1954/55 1959/60 
I mport s of -
Materia l s 34 , 672 52 , 428 
Finished goods 10 , 082 8 , 088 
Capita l equipment 1 , 674 2, 968 
Tot al import s (b) 46 , 428 63 , 483 
Tot a l sa les in 1962 
(a ) See Note (a ) t o Table IX- l . 
(b) Detail may not add t o t ot a ls because of rounding . 
( c) See Note (c) t o Table IX- l . 
40 , 039 
6 , 380 
6, 888 
53 , 306 
262 ,491 ( c) 
8 , 102 (a ) 12 , 904 (a ) 14 , 207 (a) 7,465 (a ) 6 , 442 (a) 
2, 475 (a ) 4 , 264 (a) 5 , 112 (a ) 9, 418 (a ) 7,009 (a ) 
148 653 1 , 337 380 149 
10 , 725 17 ,821 20 , 656 17 , 264 13 , 600 
100 , 963 54,944 
NOTE : Included in the above table are four motor vehicle companies , 19 other companies which provided information on imports for 





It wo~ld be misleading to create the impression 
that all American-affiliated companies are assiduously 
engaged in increasing the Australian content of their 
production . There have certainly been a few cases, 
particularly since the removal of import restrictions 
in 1960, in which American subsidiaries have de -
creased their Australian content in favour of a 
greater dependence on imported components bought 
from affiliates. But for the most part the trend 
seems to have been in the opposite direc t ion. Some-
times this is because of cost factors associated 
with importing . One firm in the electrical equip-
ment industry explained that when the Australian 
operation was confined to the assembly of components 
imported from the U.S . affiliate inventory costs 
were very high because the American company only~ro­
duces components for 240-volt apparatus twice yearly. 
This factor was resulting in a steady increase in 
Australian content . Another company has a deliberate 
policy of increasing local content because the pro-
ducts it supplies are subject to sharp and unpredict-
able fluctuations in demand and local suppliers are 
able to deliver components more rapidly than foreign. 
Som times, an American-affiliated firm is able to 
increase its local content because of an improvement 
in the quality of domestically-made goods: a firm in 
the garment industry, for example, indicated that 
Australian content had increased from about 40 per 
cent in 1959 to about 60 per cent in 1963 because of 
increased technical contact between local suppliers 
and 0 erseas f i rms. Probably the most important 
singl factor leading to an increase in Australian 
cont nt, however, is Australian tariff policy . Several 
fOrms indicated that they had embarked on programmes 
to incr as Australian content under agreements 
with the Customs Department to allow the importa-
tion of certain compon nts fre of duty provided 
th firm made d t rmin d fforts to increase th 
o rall Australian cont nt of its production. 
S ral oth rs indi at d that Australian content had 
b n n r as daft r sharp incr as s in tariffs on 
sp cOfic it ms. 
V ry few ompani s ould be positiv ly id ntified 
as following a poli y of paying a price pr mium for 
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Austral ian-made supplies as part of a policy to de -
v elop l o cal indu stry , though as noted in Chapter III 
it is the pra c tice of companies in some industries 
t o p a y a s omewhat higher price for local supplies 
i n order t o h a v e the flexibility associated with 
l ocal manufac t u re . It is thou ght that some c ompani e s 
in t h e mo t or vehi cle industry pay s u ch a price 
p enalty , a nd L. J . Hartnett has told how when he 
assumed c ontrol of General Mo tors - Holden's in the 
thirties he changed the policy of that company from 
one of purchasing components imported from affiliates 
unless th locally-supplied product was 10 per cent 
cheaper than the import to one of purchasing locally-
supplied products unless the import was 10 per cent 
4 
cheaper . The managing director of another wholly-
American company, in the chemic al industry, stated 
that ' in years past, we were prepared to pay a 
pr mium of up to 10 per cent for Australian supplies 
- to help boost Australian industry and so on - but 
we hav had to harden our attitude lately . We can't 
afford such a luxury since our customers buy in the 
cheap st market .' The American executive of one 
jointly- owned firm explained that he felt that 
foreign companies should behave as 'guests ' with profit 
motiv 'almost secondary ' . This implies 'we shouldn ' t 
import too much on principle' . But such an attitude 
to imports se med xtr mely rare . 
This is hardly surprising. There is little 
vidence to suggest that many Australian- owned 
companies pay a premium for Australian- made supplies, 
e c pt insofar as it is to their own immediate ad-
vantag to do so . Foreign subsidiaries have even less 
r ason to purchase supplies locally. Clearly, the 
sal of a component by an American company to its 
subsid"ary in Australia ntails a profit to the 
par nt company provid d the sale price is above its 
m rginal cost. Unl ss protected by import controls or 
substantial tariffs, local suppliers must ther fore 
comp t not with th a rage full cost price of the 
par nt ompany but with its marginal cost price, a 
pri ry lik ly to b blow n th marginal cost 
of th Australi n produc r . This is so whate er price 
th transa tion is a tually priced at in the company ' s 
books , unl ss, as is som times th case , the local 
4 . L .J . 
(M lb urn 
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affilia reta"ns th right to buy supplies wherev r 
it pI as s. 
A numb r of Am rican companies with subsidiaries 
in Australia ar wid ly known to practice a policy of 
int rnational specialization of production, and in 
this situation the Australian subsidiary is hardly 
likely to purchase a component from an Australian 
suppli r even if it is somewhat cheaper than the 
import d product . The same forces may inhibit the 
manufac uring activiti s of the American subsidiary 
itself and at least one company is known to have 
t mporarily delayed the expansion of its local 
activiti s because of the construction of new plants 
by affiliates in the U . S . and the U.K . Such use of 
import d components may cause resentment on the part 
of som domestic companies. Most Australian companies 
have no difficulty in s curing substantial tariff pro-
t ction from the Tariff Board, however, and with a few 
notabl e ceptions the imports of materials on account 
of American affiliat s in Australia genuinely seem to 
be of products not produc d in Australia or of product 
models required in quantities which would make domestic 
manufacture e tr mely un conomic . 
Most of the imports of American-owned companies 
ar purchased from affiliated firms, though in some 
cas s ' through ' affiliated firms is a more correct 
d scription than 'from'. Table IX-5 shows that of 
the imports of th 76 companies which provided 
information on th source of th ir imports in 1961/62, 
more than 91 per c nt cam from U . S . parent companies 
or th ir subsidiari s . Wholly-American firms, moreover, 
buy a gr at r proportion of their imports from 
affiliat s than do jointly-owned firms . For them, 
th p rc ntag was 94.7 p r cent , but for jointly-
own d ompani s only 74 . 4 p r cent . Inde d , the 
figur for jointly-own d compani s is artificially 
"nflat d by th rud oil imports of on jointly-own d 
omp ny and without that company the figure would have 
b n much low r . Th diff renc b tw n jointly-
own d and wholly-Am r"can ompani s is ev n more cl arly 
s n in T bl IX- wh"l only 19 of 34 jo "ntly- owned 
omp ni s p ur has d 50 p r c nt or mor of their imports 
from ffiliat d ompani s, th numb r of wholly-
Am r" n ompani s buying such a ratio from affiliat d 
TABLE IX- 5: SOURCE OF THE IMPORTS OF 76 AMERICAN-AFFILIATED COMPANIES IN 1961/62 , BY PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN OWNERSHIP 
£A(thousand) 
Percentage of U, S, Imports from U, S, parent companies and their foreign Other impor t s from - Tota l 
ownership subsidiaries - imports 




25- 49% 892 6 , 728 (d) 7 , 620 (d) 317 2, 055 9 , 992 
50- 99% 2 , 509 735 3 , 244 811 557 4, 612 
100}& 23 , 134 19 , 296 30 , 837 73 , 268 978 3, 116 77 , 362 
Total (c) 26 , 535 26 , 759 30 , 837 84 , 132 2, 106 5, 728 91 , 966 
(a ) Mostly British and Canadian . 
(b) Mostly American , British, and Canadian. 
(c) Detail may not add t o totals because of rounding . 
(d) A substa ntia l fra ction of this amount is the crude oil imports of one company. 





compani s w~s 39 out of 42. The evidence lends con-
siderabl support to the view that the import of 
dir ct investment capital has a significant influence 
on the source of a country ' s commodity imports . 5 
Because figur s in Table I X- 5 include imports 
of cap ital equipment, no direct comp arison is 
possible with figures published by the U.S. Department 
of Commerce for the exports of U . S. companies to their 
foreign manufacturing affiliates . Figures published 
by that Department show that products (o ther than 
capital equipment) bought from U.S . parent companies 
by foreign manufacturing affiliates were equal to 
about 9 per cent of total affiliate sales in 1962 . 6 
If two - thirds of the 'unclassified' imports in the 
table were purchased from U . S . parent companies (an 
arbitrary but not unreasonable assumption in view 
of the companies concerned), it seems likely that the 
ratio applicable to U . S . affiliates in Australia is 
closely similar to the average figure, even allowing 
for the possible error involved in the inclusion of 
figures for capital equipment imports . 
It is probably true that imports of capital 
quipment are more often bought on the open market 
than are imports of materials . Indeed, as noted 
earlier , many imports of capital equipment are 
thought to be excluded from the import figures pre -
sented in this chapter, since companies often purchase 
imported equip ment from local firms and so fail to 
classify such expenditure as on imports . Only nine 
participating companies are known to have purchased 
second-hand capital equipment from affiliated companies, 
and not all of th se made their purchases in 1961/62 . 
( This probably understates the true situation however . ) 
In most cases, the amount of equipment involved was 
not 1 rg , and in all cases but two executives of 
the subsidiari s concerned either did not comment 
5 . That the Australian Governm nt believes that 
ct inv stm nt can have an important effect on the 
ction of subs qu nt trade has b n report d on 
ral occasions 'n connection with recent moves 
Australian direct inv stment abroad . 
December 
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TABLE IX- 6: RATIO OF IMPORTS FROM U. S . PARENT COMPANY AND ITS FOREIGN 
SUBSIDIARIES TO TOTAL IMPORTS IN 76 AMERICAN- AFFILIATED 
COMPANIES IN 1961/62 , BY PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN OWNERSHIP 
Ra tio of imports from U. S. Percentage of U. S . ownership - Number of 
parent company and its companies 
foreign subsidiaries to 25- 49 50-99 100 covered 
tota l imports (per cent) 
o - 9 3 4 1 
10 - 19 2 1 1 
20 
- 29 1 1 1 
30 - 39 
40 - 49 1 2 
50 
- 5~ 1 1 
60 - 69 1 4 
70 - 79 2 1 
80 - 89 2 1 1 
90 
- 99 1 2 12 
100 3 6 20 
Total 15 19 42 
on its price or specifically stated that such equip -
ment had been bought at 'very reasonable' or 'give -
away' prices . 7 Both the firms which felt they had 
been overcharged for equipment were relatively small, 
jointly-owned, companies, but the comment of the 
secretary of one of t hem serve s to illustrate the 
danger som times attached to buying second-hand 
equipment in this way: 
Our first two casting machines were recon-
dition d equipment discarded by the U.S. 
company - it was certainly not of the latest 
d sign nor was it bought at a bargain price . 
ow, wh n we are spending £100,000 on a new 
machine, w hav to buy another of this older 
d sign because if we bought a new machine 
parts would not be interchangeable with our 
two existing machines . 












bought from affiliated companies has aroused considerable 
7 . In one cas, a company purchased a piece of second-
hand qU'pm nt from its parent for £45 . 'vhen a second 
machin of th same type was required, it had to be 
bought n w - and cost £1,700 . 
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attention in Australia of recent years, mainly because 
of a widespread belief that foreign subsidiari es in the 
oil industry are paying their affiliates more than the 
open market price for both crude oil and the transport 
facilities needed to bring it to Australia . Because 
of the large volume of imports purchased from 
affiliated firms (and the figures shown include al -
most none of the very considerable expenditure on 
crude oil imports by the American-affiliated oil re -
fining companies operating here in 1962), this subject 
is obviously of great importance . 
If oil companies be left aside for the moment, 
there appear to be three main factors which might 
lead American companies to overcharge their Australian 
subsidiaries, bearing in mind the compl te absence of 
restrictions on the remittance of dividends and service 
charges from Australia. The first is considerations 
of public relations. By charging a high price for 
commodities sold to the subsidiary, the profits of the 
latter may b reduced and its 'image', in a country 
highly sensitive to the profitability of foreign sub-
sidiaries, improved. It is hard to believe that 
much overcharging has taken place on this count, 
however, at least until 1962, because the profits of 
most foreign-owned companies have been secure from 
public scrutiny . This factor may be of more importance 
in the fu~ure . S condly, the American company has an 
obvious inc ntive to charge the maximum price feasible 
if th subsidiary is jointly-own d . Some tendency to 
charg jointly-own d companies more for imports than 
would b charged to wholly-owned companies probably 
8 do s op rat , but th r appears little doubt that 
most Am rican companies t mper the desir to maximize 
8 . Th only conclusive item of empirical support 
for this a prior' r asoning was found in the case of a 
company in which th Am rican quity was little more 
than 25 p r c nt . Shortly befor th surv y was con-
duct d, this company lost its right to distribute certain 
of th par nt company's products in Australia, th 
par nt company s tting up a s parat distributing com-
pany 'nst ad . Th joint v nture was not disturbed by 
th' how r, sin 't was itself to ha a 25 p r 
c nt qu'ty in th n w distributing ompany . Becaus 
th n w d's ribut'ng ompany was to buy at substantially 
low r pri s from th Am rican par nt than had th 
or'gin 1 joint v n ur , th latt r f It its profits 
would not suff r at 11. 
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their own p rofits in the short term by the desire to 
preserve harmonious relationships with local management 
and shareholders . 
The third factor, taxation, emerges as by far 
the most important to be considered . If the rate of 
Australian company tax were higher than in the country 
of residence of the affiliate exporting to the 
Australian subsidiary, or if company tax payable by 
the Australian subsidiary plus Australian withholding 
tax levied on dividends were higher than t he tax pay-
able if profits were made in the exporting country, 
there would appear to be every incentive to overcharge 
the Australian subsidiary. There is little danger of 
this happening at present, however, whether the export-
ing country is the U .S. , the U.K., or Canada . For in 
all these countries, the rate of company t ax is 
higher than the Australian. Only if the rate of 
divid nd remittance were very high would there appear 
some incentive to 'load' prices to Australian subsid-
iaries . Indeed, under most circumstances, there is a 
positiv tax incentive to reduce below the open 
market level the price of exports from affiliates in 
these countries to Australian subsidiaries . Only 
where it is possible to ' export' to Australia from a 
tax-haven country would there appear to be a strong 
incentive to overcharge the Australian subsidiary to 
avoid Australian tax liability. 
What is the situation in practice? Leaving out 
of account the wholly-American oil companies, 71 
companies were asked the following question : 
On what basis are you charged for imports 
purchased from your American associate or 
one of its affiliates? 
One company gave an answer which is believed to be 
fals and anoth r si gav answers which are impossible 
to classify. The chi f cutive of one of these 
compan s frankly admitt d that the parent company is 
ont·nually 'play·ng ' with the int r-affiliate pricing 
structur in ord r to g nerate funds where they are 
most n d d for pans ion, while the s cr tary of a 
ry larg firm among th m stat d that affiliated 
compan s 'I av 1 ss profit her than w would like' . 
But n non of th s s s was th r suffici nt vid nce 
to form alar mpr ss·on of th s·tuation. 
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In nine of the remaining 64 companies, two of 
th m jOintly-owned, there was clear evidence that 
the Australian subsidiary is charged a 'high,9 price 
for materials purchased from affiliated companies . 
One company purchasing its imports from a tax- haven 
country explained that an apparent reduction in its 
imports between 1959/60 and 1961/62 was actually the 
r suIt of a reduction in price of materials, brought 
about to maintain a roughly constant profit after 
reductions in the price of its final produ c ts. One of 
the two jointly-owned companies believed its U . S . 
parent took a profit of between 100 and 300 per cent 
on the total cost of items sold to the Australian 
company. In the case of one item which the American 
parent bought from anoth r U. S. company in bulk, it 
charged the Australian company £6 / 6 / 8 per item: the 
Australian company was eventually able to switch its 
purchases to th local subsidiary of the American 
supplying company and buy these items, including a 
40 per cent tariff, at £3 / 4/ 10. 10 ot surprisingly, 
the management of this company felt the U. S . company 
had recouped all the cash it had invested in the 
Australian company, through royalties and profits from 
the sale of components, within two years of the original 
investm nt. A company in the pharmaceutical industry 
felt that it would be meaningless to compare Australian 
and Am rican unit production cost because the great 
bulk of Australian unit cost is accounted for by pur-
chas s of materials from the international division of 
th parent company, bas d in a tax-haven country. The 
int rnational division 'makes a very handsome profit ' 
on th sal of these materials - calculated by the 
manag r of the company for one purchase at twice the 
profit made on the sal of the final product in Australia. 
9. In this conte t, 'high ' is used to include prices 
whi h ar d sign d to 1 a relatively large profits 
in the xporting company e en if, as 'n a few cases, 
th local ompany would b unable to purchase materials 
more haply els wh r b caus of patent restrictions. 
1 0 . Th ompany was inhibited from d aling ith th 
U . S. upplying ompany dire tly b ause under its 
agr m nt with th Customs D partm nt to increase 
Aus ralian ont nt, duty-free admission of imports 
appl' d only to goods bought from its own paren 
company . 
290 
In th mo st remarkable case of all, an execu tive was 
encountered who bel ieved that profit s made by the 
American parent company on sales to the wholly- owned 
Australian subsidiary were sufficient to cover the 
annual d ividend on the American company's entire 
capital . Indeed, it was contended that one unex-
pected result of the Australian Federal Treasurer's 
stringent fiscal measures in 1960 was the drastic 
reduction of the parent company's dividend when sales 
to the Austral ian operation fell off sharply l 
It should be obvious, of course, that before their 
establishment in Australian no part of the profit from 
the sale of the products of these companies incurred 
Australian taxation . As long as the Australian profits 
of the companies concerned are not artificially in-
flated by Australian tariffs, therefore (and in re-
markably few, if any, of the nine cases uncovered 
were prices dependent on Aus tralian tariffs ), there 
may still be a net gain to Australia from the taxation 
of the profits of these companies . The gain is undoubt -
edly less than it might be, however, were the Taxation 
Commissioner able to police import prices more 
closely . 11 
The motives for this 'overcharging' appeared to 
vary. Only three of the nine companies are known to 
have used a tax-haven country, and only two of the 
total were jointly-owned companies . Only one was re-
quired to publish its accounts before the Uniform 
Companies Act of 1961, and this was one of the companies 
using a tax-haven country. In one of the remaining 
cases, the motive may have been to boost parent company 
profit while being able to claim to American share -
holders that almost all foreign profi~ were being re -
invested abroad . Twice, ' overcharging ' seemed to be 
th result of a d sir on the part of a non-American 
affiliat to increas its profit, in one case because 
of natural ·nt r-affiliat rivalry and in the other 
1 . Th r may be an offs tting advantag to 
Australia op rating in som cases . Where companies 
ar f to buy 10 ally at will, and jointly-owned 
compan sand som wholly-Am rican on s ar often 
fr n this way, th y may div rt e penditure to 
loca ly produc d mater ·als. 
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becaus of che inefficiency of the exporting affiliate . 
In the latter case, an executive of the Australian 
company commented: 
We have to pay more for components than if 
we purchased them competitively. This sort 
of thing happens in a family group like 
ours, esp cially if somebody is trying to 
cover up an inefficient operation or trying 
to avoid a loss . 
In the ninth case, the policy appeared to be quite 
without rational basis and may be only a by-product 
of a policy primarily designed for countrie s which 
prevent the remittance of dividends or service 
charges . 
Such overcharging occurred in only a minority of 
th companies studied. To avoid betraying the 
classification of a few very large companies, it is 
not possible to disclose th volume of imports pur-
chased from affiliated companies by Australian firms 
in various categories of 'import price'. But it can 
be stat d that the imports bought from affiliated firms 
by subsidiaries in Australia which were bought at 'fair' 
or 'very fair ' pric s exceeded those purchased at 'high' 
prices more than three times over. 
The classification of other company responses to 
the qu stion on import pricing was inevitably arb-
itrary . As far as could be gaug d, however, 29 
compani s (of the 64 referred to above) paid 'fair' 
pric s for imports from affiliated firms, interpreting 
' fair ' as being roughly equivalent to the open market 
price. Seventeen of thes companies were jointly-
own d. This adh r nc to the open market price was 
oft n n cessary b ause jointly-owned firms retained 
the right to buy wh re they pleased, but wholly-owned 
subsidiaries of compani s which ncourage their 
affiliat s to rna imiz th ir profit almost independently 
of a h other fr qu ntly followed the sam practice . 
Th s cretary of on jointly-own d company commented 
that th merican par nt company is 'not slugging us ' . 
H stat d that his company had 'obtain d quotes from 
all ov r th world nd whil w ould g t som 
mat r'als sl'ghtly mor haply from Japan, U.S. 
d liv ry dat s ar bsolutely r liabl .' Th chi f 
plained that ut ' v of wholly-Am i an omp ny 
' w buy om uppl ' s from our par nt nd some from a 
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co mpetitor - both quote the same price' . The 
financial director of yet another wholly-American 
company stated that 'we are charged competitive 
prices - and we had a chance to check on this when 
setting up a new plant in Malaysia recently . The 
U.S . comp any might take 5 to 7 per cent, but nothing 
a p pre ciable . ' 
Another twenty companies (six jointly- owned ) 
felt the prices they pay for imports from 
affiliated companies are 'very fair ' , or slightly 
below the open market price. Often, American-
affiliated companies in Australia benefit from the 
volum discounts obtained on the bulk purchases of 
their p arent companies and this was one of the most 
common reasons for a company to contend that prices 
on imports from its American parent were somewhat less 
than thos payable if the goods were bought on the 
open market . Several wholly-American firms felt the 
prices paid were 'very competitive' or 'cost plus 
10 per cent' because 'we don't have to buy from our 
associates' One jointly-owned company purchases 
components 'at some nominal mark-up', and buys 
finished products at a 5 per cent preference over 
other manufacturers buying at comparable volumes: as 
far as was known in the local company, wholly- owned 
subsidiaries of the American company pay for imports 
on the sam basis . The secretary of another jointly-
own d company, which uses its American associate 
as a buying ag nt, stat d: 
We get a very good deal out of them really . 
They only handle the stuff for us , and 
charg us a handling charge of 5 per cent . 
For this, they do all our ordering, pay all 
our bills, and freight the stuff on a 90 -
day draft . 
in comparrliB (only one of them jointly- owned) 
ind'cat d that for imports from affiliates they pay 
consid rably below the world price for similar goods . 
In at least on of th s cases th Customs Depart -
ment r fus s to acc pt the invoic valuation as the 
tru aluation for duty purposes . A comm nt made by 
th h' f cuti of a small wholly- Am rican 
company was typ ' cal: 'W buy finish d p roducts at 
70 p r nt of th "b st " r tail pri tha"t 
bas d on th larg st volum order ] regardl ss of how 
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small our o~der is . ' Another firm indicated that all 
fully-assembled products are bought at the ' subsidiary 
discount p rice' - 40 p r cent below retail price _ 
and components are bought at the same price as that 
paid by the U .S . assembly line. Surprisingly, only 
tw o of the nine appeared to be adopting this policy 
deliberately to secure the advantage of lower Australian 
company tax rates - and one executive was sure that 
s uch a policy had never occurred to hi s parent company . 
Often, the p rices paid by the Australian s ubsidiary , 
thou gh lower than world market levels, are no different 
from those paid by subsidiaries in countries where the 
tax situation is very different . 
In summary, therefore, and still leaving oil 
companies to one side, it appears that in 1962 rela-
tively few American-affiliated companies were being 
overcharged for imports purchased from affiliated 
companies - a fact which, because of the great 
difficulty of the Taxation Commissioner ' s establish-
ing a ' fair price' for such imports, is particularly 
fortunate . If anything, local subsidiaries on balance 
secure imports at prices better than those available 
to independent companies. It is further likely that 
following the passage of the U.S . Revenue Act of 1962 
(which was intended, among other things, to prevent 
the abuse of ' tax-havens') the situation for Australia 
will improve still more . 
When attention is turned to foreign oil companies 
in Australia ( and the comments apply as much to 
British-owned companies as to American), the situation 
is quite different. Local subsidiaries buy their 
supplies of crud p troleum from affiliated companies 
in oil-producing countries, mainly the Middle East, 
Brun i, and Indon sia. At first sight, since 
Australian company ta is in most cases substantially 
low r than the combin d imposts of governm nts in the 
oil-produ ing countri s, th r would appear to be 
v ry inc nti e to mak most profits in Australia by 
charging Australian subsidiaries low prices for crude 
oil . But app s that th gov rnm nts of oil pro-
du c ng ountri s d mand a fi d P rc ntage of an 
agr d ' pos d pri , and that if th pric of oil 
falls b 10 this post d pric , th o il-produc ing 
ompani th ms 1 s b ar th full brunt of th price 
reduction . In contrast, if Australian subsidiaries 
are charged the full posted price, it is Australian 
taxation revenue which suffers part of the loss if 
oil could in fact b purchased more cheaply on the 
open market . 
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Th re is considerable evidence to suggest that 
whil in recent years independent refining companies 
have indeed been able to purchase supplies of oil at 
prices significantly below posted prices, the 
Australian subsidiaries of overseas oil companies have 
paid th full posted price. The Australian Tariff 
Board referred to this subject in its report on the 
industry in 1959, and also complained that local 
subsidiaries were being overcharged for freighting 
crude oil to Australia. 12 In its 1961 report, the 
Board was satisfied on the latter point and noted 
that local refineries were in some cases either already 
receiving or about to receive significant discounts on 
their purchases of oil. lJ But the Australian Taxation 
Commission r has clearly not yet been satisfied that 
oil companies purchase crude from the cheapest possible 
source and at th time of writing most of the foreign 
oil companies have recently announced tax provisions 
very considerably greater than consideration of their 
after-tax profit would indicate to be necessary . 
E . L . Wheelwright has suggested that the prices paid 
by local oil companies for crude oil and freight 
facilities result in an overpayment of something like 
£20 million annually (at current levels of oil 
imports - littl more than £120 million annually), 
though of course even if his estimate is correct, 
the loss to Australia in a situation where almost all 
oil r fineries are owned abroad~ not that total sum, 
14 
as he argu s, but only the ta on that sum. (This 
conclus·on d pends on th assumption, which seems 
reasonabl at 1 ast in th case of motor spirit, that 
th pric s of pet oleum end-products are stablished 
12 . Tariff Board's R port on P trol um 
Industry, 26 March 1959, p . 11. 
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in Australia independently of the price of crude .) 
Ther seems little doubt that Australian tax 
revenue has been substantially less than it might have 
been if th Taxation Commissioner had adopted a more 
rigorous policy towards foreign oil companies in 
Australia at an earlier date . There is also little 
doubt that at present the Taxation Commissioner is 
examining this situation very critically. Unfortunately, 
it is not yet clear whether he will be able to ensure 
that foreign- owned oil companies do pay no more than 
open market prices for their crude oil and its 
fr ight to Australia in the future. 
II 
Compared with th ir imports, the exports of 
American- affiliated firms in Australia in 1961/62 were 
small. 15 P robably because the Federal Government's 
tax incentives to increase exports of manufactured 
goods encourage companies to keep detailed records of 
their export activities, 98 companies were able to 
supply information on their exports for at least 1961/62 . 
Two of these companies (only one of which had significant 
exp orts ) did not supply sales data as a basis for com -
parison, one was an oil company whos most important 
single activity in the ' export field' was the supply 
of fuel for ships and aircraft calling at Australia, and 
two were engaged principally in the processing of 
Australian raw materials ( mainly copper and meat) for 
e port in an early stage of manufacture. These five 
compani shad combin d xports in 1961/62 of more than 
24 million . For the balance of th chapter, however, 
attention is concentrated on the remaining 9J companies 
in an attempt to measur th p rforman e of American-
affiliat d firms on th 'e port of manufactured goods ' 
as u s u ally u nd rstood . 
In total, th s 9J companies had exports of 
£10 . 4 million in 1961 /62 , compar d with sal s of 
15 . S nty-si compani s provided figur s for both 
imports nd ports in 1961/62 . Their total imports 
for th t Y ar w r 1.4 mOllion, compar d with e ports 
of £9 . 5 millOon . As wOth °mport figures ompanies 
ft n p rovod deport data for th or own company 
fOnan cial y a . E port figur s ha a high r d gre 
of a u ra y than import figur s, how v r , b ause most 
ompani s k p d tail d r ords of e ports for ta ation 
p urp os s . 
£456 . S million. 16 Tw nty-six companies sold no pro-
ducts outside Australia at all in 1961/62 (and only 
one of these had ever exported before) but in all of 
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the main industry groups there were some companies 
exporting and in most those exporting constituted the 
majority . It is clear from Table IX-7, however, that 
for most companies foreign sales constituted a very 
small part of total sales in 1962. Only eight companies 
sold 10 p er cent or more of their sales volume overseas 
in that year and the exports of only one of these 
exceeded 20 per cent ofrotal sales . This contrasts 
sharply with the high proportion of total sales 
exported by many American affiliates in the United 
Kingdom and Germany.17 
Wha t are the reasons for this apparently 'poor 
performance'? In particular, is the fact of American 
affil'ation itself responsible for this situat i on, as 
is often alleged? Quite obviously, there is no 
simple answer. Thefirst point which should be made is 
that Australian manufacturing industry as a whole has, 
in the past, not been noted for its 'export conscious-
ness' . Shi lded from the worst rigours of import 
comp tition and made complac nt by domestic inflation 
throughout the fifties, local manufacturers have had 
few motives to venture forth into foreign markets. 1 S 
There is no reason to suppose that Australian-owned 
manufacturing companies e ported a larger proportion of 
their output in 1961/62 than did the 93 companies under 
consideration, and it is interesting to obs rve that 
16. For a r ason which is not entir ly clear, the ratio 
of ports to sales indicat d here, 2 .3 per cent, is 
substantially lower than the figure of 5 . 3 per cent re-
eal d by th census conducted by the U.S. Department of 
Comm rc for American direct investments in Australian 
manufacturing in 1957. The e planation may lie in the 
inclus'on in th D partm nt's figures of the export 
act·v·ti s of at 1 ast on of the fiv companies r ferr d 
to 'n th te t as bing clud d from the figur s shown 
hr. (S amu 1 P iz rand Fr derick Cutl r, .S. Business 
Inv stm nts in Foreign Countries (W"ashington : Office of 
Busin ss Economics, U . S. D partment of Comm rce, 1960), 
p . 10. ) 
17 . S 
lS . Th's has b n not d by many obs rv rs. The American 
at'on 1 Industr'al Conf r n Board has quot d the 
/ 29 
TABLE IX- 7: RATIO OF EXPORTS TO SALES IN 93 AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES IN 1961/62 , BY INDUSTRY 
Industry Ratio of exports t o sales (per cent) -
Nil 0 . 01- 0 . 99 1.00- 2 . 99 3. 00- 4 . 99 5 .00- 9 . 99 10 . 00 a nd over 
Plant , equipment , machinery 9 5 3 1 1 
Mot or vehicles 1 2 1 1 
Mot or accessories 3 2 
Meta l manufa ctures , n . e . i . 1 1 3 
Electrica l equipment , 
instruments , etc . 1 6 4 2 2 
Food and drink 3 1 2 1 
Industria l chemicals and 
pla stics 2 4 1 2 2 
Pharmaceutica l and t oilet 
prepar ations 3 2 2 1 1 
Other industries 6 7 2 2 


















the xports ~f the group were a distinctly higher 
proportion of total manufactured exports in 1961/62 
(10. 2 per cent ) than was the ratio of their manufac-
turing production to total Australian manufacturing 
p roduction in the same year ( 6 . 5 per cent), though 
understatement of the value of production of 
American subsidiaries in the motor vehicle industry 
may result in some exaggeration of this difference.19 
No comparison has been made in the present survey of 
the export performance of American-affiliated firms 
with that of Australian-owned companies in the same 
industries, and indeed such a comparison would be 
impossible in many industries because of the small 
number or absence of Australian-owned companies in 
them. In a study mad by A . E. Safarian in Canada, 
howev r, th data suggested 'that any problems which 
inhibit Canadian exports are generally common to 
both [Canadian- and foreign -owned ] firms, and that in 
th typical case ownership as such is not a signif-
icant d t rrent to the exports of nonresident-
owned firms . ,20 
It is, perhaps, only to be exp cted that a number 
of American-affiliated firms would export only a small 
proportion of their total output : as seen in Chapter 
III, very many Am rican companies invest in Australia 
primarily in order to surmount trade barriers . The 
ery e istence of a tariff suggests that Australian 
operations are not competitive on the world market. 21 
Ten of the companies which were not exporting at all 
in 1962 gave as explanation for this that they did not 
consid r xporting would be p rofitable . Among companies 
( 18) e ampl of an Am rican company which would not con-
sid r licensing a company in Japan 'where there is a 
v ry strong xport driv ' but which ' felt that a 
lic nS'ng agre m nt in Australia did not expose it to 
much r'sk of lic ns comp ition 'n oth r port 
mark ts , be ause th r 's a sizable Australian domestic 
mark ailing bu in ss ethics there are such 
that Ii nse would almost c rtainly confine his 
sal s fforts to th t rritory for which h .as lic nsed.' 
(En'd Baird Lo 1, Fo i n Li ensin A r ments: I . 
Evaluation and P I nniny w York: ational Industrial 
Conf 195 p. 43.) 
19 . S Appendi A. 
20. A.E.S fa 'an, 'Th E port s of Am rican-own d 
Ent s 'n Can d' Am rican Economi P apers 




m n and A mstrong str ss this point in th ir 
on h ports 01 U. S . ub idiari 'n Canada. 
" pp. 51-2 .) 
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which were exporting, high Australian cost was the most 
frequ ntly mentioned reason for relatively small export 
volume. As an executive of a company supplying a 
sp cialized form of machinery explained, 'the U.K. 
affiliate can always under-cut our prices by about 20 
per c nt and I suspect that even then we have a 
lower mark-up than they do.' This company's only 
exports are spare part s sent to New Zealand occasionally 
for the sake of spe dy delivery . 
Related to high cost of production is the small 
size of many American-affiliated firms in Australia. 
Though a close correlation between export performance 
and company size would not be expected, not least 
because of differences in the importance of economies 
of scale in different industries, Table IX-8 does seem 
to indicate some tendency for export performance to 
improve with an increase in the size of the firm con-
c rned. All compani s with exports equal to at least 
10 per cent of total sales were quite small however . 
How important are restrictions imposed by 
American companies on the export freedom of their 
Australian affiliates?22 Companies participating in 
the present survey were asked to indicate to which of 
twelve suggested areas (broadly embracing the whole 
world) they were permitted to export by their 'expor t 
franchise' . The answers received are extremely 
difficult to summarize and almost equally difficult to 
assess. Of the 93 companies under study, the answers of 
14 could not be incorporated in Tables IX-9 and IX-lO, 
dealing with export franchise restrictions. Two of 
the 14 nad been established in Austral ia so recently 
that no d cision on e port franchise had been made 
at th time of the sur y and another company which may 
hav been in th sam positiondid not answer the 
qu stion . Two mor ompanies were engaged in the manu-
factur of produ ts the nature of which made xporting, 




of th Am rican com-
xport franchis 
11 ~ .~~ 
4·~' , ... ' ,-" .... ~.\. ' ........ . 
TABLE IX-8 : RATIO OF EXPORTS TO SALES IN 93 AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES IN 1961[62 2 BY SALES 
Tbtal sa les in 1962 Ratio of exports to sales (per cent) - Number of 
£A companies 
Nil 0 . 01- 0 . 99 1.00- 2 . 99 3. 00- 4 . 99 5 . 00- 9. 99 10 . 00 and over covereu 
500 , 000 and under 13 8 3 4 3 31 
Over 500 , 000 and not a bove 
1 , 000 , 000 6 2 1 2 2 13 
Over 1 ,000 , 000 and not above 
3,000 , 000 5 11 4 1 3 24 
Over 3, 000,000 and not above 
5 ,000 , 000 2 3 1 2 8 
Over 5, 000,000 and not above 
7 , 500 ,000 2 2 4 
Over 7, 500 , 000 and not above 
10 , 000 , 000 1 4 2 7 
Over 10 , 000 , 000 3 1 1 1 6 





cas , a p red0minantly Australian-owned company was 
excluded fr om the tables b cause of the great variety 
of the xport restrictions imposed upon it by its 
numerous overseas affiliates. Most of the balance 
w re excluded because of uncertainty concerning the 
tru nature of the restriction. Typical of this 
group was the pharmaceu tical company which indicated 
that it could exp ort to Australian Territories, ew 
Zealand , and the islands of the Pacific - but the 
company secretary insisted that there was no 'specific 
limitation' on exports other than the high cost of 
Au stralian production. In several cases of this kind 
it was not clear whether exports had been restricted 
at the initiative of the parent company or whether 
the d cision had be n taken locally . 
Even with these 14 companies eliminated, the pro-
blem of interpretation is difficult . In some cases, 
markets allocated to the Australian affiliate by the 
American company merely recognize the inability of 
the Australian company to compete on markets also 
s rved by the more industrialized countries of the 
world . One company, exporting mainly to ew Zealand 
and the islands of the South Pacific , explained that 
' if we could export to other markets our parent 
company probably wouldn't have any objection.' The 
firm's main difficulty was high freight charges on a 
ery bulky p roduct . Another company, in the chemical 
industry, indicated that it was free to export to 
ew Z aland only, but sin there were no customers 
for its p roduct in the S outh Pacific or in Australian 
Territories it was no disadvantag not to possess the 
right to port to th s mark ts . It had investi -
gat d th possibility of e porting to Indonesia but 
hOgh fr ight charg sand Indon sian currency difficulties 
had inh°bit d any trade . In oth r parts of Asia , 
J apan s comp tition mad porting impossible . 
Fr qu ntly, ven companies with a wide franchise 
ar unable to mak significant exports . Eight of th 
19 ompan s which °ndi at d that they w r free to 
port to all of th twel e areas enum rated , for 
ampl ,had ports who h a mounted to 1 ss than 1 
p r nt o f th ir sal s r e nu in 1962. Ther are 
oth r ors at w rk b sOd s ost of p rodu ction and 
fr ° ght . of a subsidiary in the 
cosmetics industry explain d that not only were 
Australian costs higher than British or American , but 
also Australian colours were usually not in demand in 
Asian countries . Several companies complained of 
import quotas against their products i n the ew 
J02 
Zealand market, while others were having such difficulty 
meeting local market demand that the possibility of 
exporting had not yet arisen . 
Yet other companies were free to export some pro -
ducts to any market of their choosing but others to 
only a limited number of countries. This situation 
usually prevailed when the Australian company was the 
only member of its family to produce a particular 
article . This could be the result of its being no 
longer produced by other affiliates or of its 
being produced by a previously Australian-owned company 
before the acquisition of the American interest . 2J 
At least one company had been chosen to supply all non-
American affiliates with one particular part of a 
larger item of equipment . The Australian company in 
turn assembled parts supplied by affiliates in many 
other countries . In such situations the question of 
' export franchise ' was rather irrelevant . In all the 
above cases, however, all the markets which companies 
were permitted to export to - even if permission 
extended to only a part of the company ' s product 
range - ha re been considered as part of that company's 
franchise . 
In a surprising number of cases, companies answered 
the question on export franchise in vivid awareness of 
the U.S . antitrust laws forbidding a wide range of 
h . t 24 E t' f' . market s arlng arrangemen s . ecu lves 0 SlX companles 
even r f rred to thes laws by name . Several of the 
compani s which were aware of the influence of American 
legislation on th ir e porting freedom seemed genuinely 
2J . Of th ight compani s which had be n completely 
Australian-own d and which provided e port figures for 
at 1 ast on year b for and after the acquisition of an 
Am r'can int r st, the ports of seven were higher (and 
in s v ral cases much higher ) after the American invest -
m nt than b fore it . 
24. For discussion of U. S. antitrust laws and inter-
national mark t s har 'ng arrang ments, se Enid Baird 
Lov 11, op. cit ., pp. J8-44 ; and Kingman Br wster, Jr ., 
Law and Unit d S tates Business in Canada (Washington : 
at'onal P lanning Asso iation ( U. S.A.) and P ri ate 
Plann'ng Association of Canada, 1960), pp . 9-22. 
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to be allowe~ a great deal of freedom, though usually 
ev n th se companies were directed to sell through 
affiliated companies in countries where the U.S. 
parent had other subsidiaries . But in a number of 
cases export freedom was actually strictly circum-
scribed. Two companies stated that ' technically ' or 
'officially ' they are p ermitted to export anywhere but 
' in practice we don ' t sell outside Australasia' . One 
company stated that d espite the freedom extended by its 
licensing agreement with its p arent company it is not 
allowed to export anywhere - even the ew Zealand 
market was recently acquired by the British affiliate . 
In all cases of this kind, the response included in 
Tabl s IX-9 and IX- 1 0 is not that provided by the 
company on its questionnaire but the probably ~ore 
accurate response conveyed to the writer verbally 
during the course of surv y interviews. 25 
It is obvious, therefore, that the data presented 
on export franchises must be treated with caution . 
Table IX-9 shows the number of mentions accorded 
each of the twelve areas by the 79 companies included 
in the tabulation . (The number of companies in each 
ownership class of the table is shown in Table I X- 10 . 
By way of e planation it should be added that when an 
Australian company enjoys an ' exclusive market' in, say, 
w Zealand this m rely means that other affiliates 
regard ew Zealand as the sales territory of the 
Australian company. I t does not, in all cases, mean 
that no other affiliate e ports to ew Zealand but 
just that when it does so it must pay the Australian 
company a commission on all sales in th area . The 
commission invol ed can range as high as 9 or 1 0 per 
c nt and is often at least 5 p r cent . On the oth r 
hand, of ours, wh n th Australian company e ports 
into th clusive market ' of another affiliate , it 
must pay th latt r a commission .) It is clear that 
almost all of th 79 companies wer fr to e port 
at 1 ast to Australi n T r itori s 0 erseas (mainly 
P apu a- w Guinea ), and that a larg majority of 
ompan s w r also fr to port to ew Z aland and 
25 . W"d sp ad e asion of th int ntion of Am rican 
ant" rust 1 gislation "n th"s fi ld must mak on 
s pti 1 of h pra t" al ff ct of oft n-suggest d 
Austr 1" n 1 g "sla "on to ' abol "sh ' su h port re-
stri 
TABLE IX- 9 : EXPORT FRANCHISE RESTRICTIONS - NUMBER OF TIMES EACH OF 12 MARKETS WAS INDICATED AS BEING OPEN TO 79 
AMERICAN - AFFILIATED COMPANIES IN 1963 , BY PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN OWNERSHIP , AN]) PERIOD IN WHICH MANUFACTURE 
BEGAN 
Market s open to the Australian company -Per centage of U. S . 
ownership and period 












(i) Manufa cture began 
before 1957 1 
(ii) Manufacture began 
in 1957 or 
subsequently 2 
50- 99'fo 
(i) Manuf a cture began 
before 1957 6 
(ii) Manuf a cture began 
in 195 7 or 
subsequently 4 
100% 
(i) Manuf'acture began 
before 1957 11 
(ii) Manufacture began 
in 1957 or 
subsequently 8 









































































































A: Companies whi ch en joy this market as an ' exclusive territory'. See text for explanation . There may be some degree of under-
statement in a few cases because of uncertainty a s to whether some companies had exc lusive or non- exclusive rights . When in 
doubt , companies were included in ' B' • 
B: Companies whi ch do not enjoy this market as an ' exclUSive territory'. All marke~s beyond ' Other Asia ' were non- exclusive for 
the companies in this table . 
(a) See Note (a) to Table IX- 2 . 
(b) Usually interpreted to include islands in the South Pa cific only . 
(c) Usua lly interpreted to include the area Qounded by Burma , Indonesia , and the Philippines . 
(d) All of Asia not included in ' South-East Asia ' . See Note (c) . 
NOTE : See Table IX- IO f or information on the number of companies within each ownership category . Also see text for cautionary 













other Pacifo~ islands (usually interpreted to mean 
'S outh Pacific'). Fifty-six of the total were free to 
export to at least parts of South-East Asia, but the 
number free to export into other parts of Asia was much 
smaller, at 33 . ot surprisingly, only 19 companies 
indicated that they could export to the U. S. and these 
are the companies listed in Table IX-10 as being free 
from all geographical restraint on exports . 
Only four companies are shown in Table IX- 10 as 
being forbidden to sell outside Austral ia a t all, 
though the exports of a further three companies were 
confined to Australian Territories. It is interesting 
to note that eight companies not exporting at all in 
1962 gave parental restriction as their main reason 
for this 'failure' . Six of these companies are included 
in the seven whose sales are confined to Australia or 
Australian Territories in Table IX-10 but the other two 
had had a change in their export franchise position 
between 1962 and the date of being interviewed in 
1963 . 
The number of companies permitted to export beyond 
Australasia into South-East Asia is surprisingly large 
- 56 of the total, as noted above . This contrasts 
favourably with the position found by the Department 
of Trade survey analysed by H.W. Arndt and D.R.Sherk 
in 1959, though the difference between the two surveys 
is certainly exaggerated by the inclusion of Australian 
companies working under licence to American companies 
26 in the Department's survey. Of the 102 companies 
with American affiliations examined by Arnd t and Sherk, 
the franchise of 79 (by coincidence) could be classi-
fied by area . Only 38 of these were free to sell in 
'Australia, ew Zealand, South Pacific Islands and 
Asia ' . It is understood that a survey conducted by 
th D partm nt in 1961-62 - embracing a somewhat 
wid r sampl of Am r O an-af ilOated ompanies than this 
study nd dOs inguishOng b tween thos ompani s op r-
ating a ubsid oari nd thos op rating only as 
2 . H. W. A ndt nd D. R . Sh rl , 'E po t Fran hOses of 
Aus r l Oan C mpan w Oth 0 rs as Af iliations ' , 
rd, XXV (19 59 ), 239- 42. As Arnd t and 
°t s n bl to pe t sub °diari s to 
ha po n hO s than omp ni s op rating 
und r ns ng m nt . ( p . 239· ) 
TABLE IX- IO : EXPORT FRANCHISE RESTRICTIONS - A CLASSIFICATION OF 93 AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES BY THE DEGREE OF MARKETING 
FREEDOM ALLOWED IN 1963 , BY PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN OWNERSHIP , AND PERIOD IN WHICH MANUFACTURE BEGAN 
NOTE : This t able should be read in co~ction with Table IX- 9 and the comments on both tables in the text . 
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licensees of foreign companies - indi ated an even 
lower percentag of companies free to export into 
South-East Asia than did the 1959 study. The reason 
for this discrepancy between the Department's later 
study and the present one is not clear, though a 
difference in classification, a difference in size 
of sample~ or a difference in period covered (at a 
time when, as suggested below, there 's evidence that 
export franchise restrictions were under close 
scrutiny by many companies) could all offer part of 
th xplanation. Because of the frankness of many 
qualifying comments, the writer does not believe that 
th responses actually tendered by participating 
companies in the present survey are s ubject to doubt 
as to their reliability. 
Som of the mo st op n comments cam from com-
pani s which contended that they are fre to export 
to any of the areas s u ggested . The exports of the 
majority were restricted in some way despite the 
absence of any overt restriction on markets. In 
some cas s, as mentioned earlier, this restriction 
took the form of a limitation of th range of 
products which could be xported; in others, the 
nec ssity to sell all exports through affiliated 
firms . One jointly-owned company was permitted to 
s 11 produ ts baring its parent's brandname in the 
Australasian ar a only, but could xport identical 
produ ts under anoth r brand to any country of its 
choosing. One wholly-American company could export 
to any country in the world provided it did not 
reduce its export price below 80 per cent of its 
Australian retail price. A third company could sell 
in any market provided it quoted an unvarying f.o . b . 
price at Melbourne for all exports and sold through 
affiliates wherever applicable . The company was 
quite free to price its ports on a marginal cost 
basis, provided the same price was charged in all 
foreign markets . Th onlye ception to the 'flat 
price' rule was in a situation wher the Australian 
ompany wa at a di ad an ag becaus of for ign 
ta 'ff pr er n ' n fa our of th Am rican article. 
Y t anoth r ompany - whos pa ent insist that it 
omp t on int rna ' onal marl ts for f ar of . S. 
nt'trust 1 gislat'on - always r f r port ord rs 
to its U . S. pa nt hough this is 'for ad ic rather 
J08 
than approval'. The Australian company is prevent ed 
from competing with other affiliates Qn price because 
of a world- wide agreement entered into by its parent 
and other international companies to maintain price, 
and its parent will not tolerate any competition by 
'unfair ' means. What this latter stipulation entails 
was vividly illustrated when the local company, after 
testing an improved form of packaging on the New 
Zealand market and deciding to use it in all fu~ure 
export sales, received a vigorous complaint from its 
parent against such a move . 
The median ratio of exports to sales of t h e 19 
companies which claimed no territorial limitat i on to 
exports was, at 1 . 1 per cent, not very much higher 
than the median for the group of 9J compani e s as a 
whole (0.5 per cent), though what part factors un-
related to parent company direction played in this 
situation is difficult to judge . 
The necessity to sell exports through affiliated 
companies is not, as is sometimes imagined, by any 
means always a disadvantage . It may, in fact, be of 
considerable assistance to the exports of the Aus t ralian 
company . P rovided the c . i . f . price which the Australian 
company can quote is competitive with that of other 
affiliates, the use of the distribution facilities of 
an affiliated company can provide the local firm with 
ready-made sales outlets. This appears to have been 
an important consideration in the growth in exports 
of American-owned companies in the motor vehicle, 
agricultural equipment, and earth-moving equipment 
industries, all fields where distribution facilities 
and after-sales ~rvice are of vital importance . 
Some companies appear to be allowed complete 
freedom in where and how they sell their products. 
Though the number of these seems to be small, they 
include some of the most substantial American subsid-
iari s in Australia. Executives of s veral companies 
mad comments indicat ' ng t hat no member of their group 
has an clusive market and that 'as soon as we get 
our costs down a bit more w '11 b taking th w 
Z aland market off th British affiliate lik a shot '. 
A ' usually r liable authority' has inform d the 
wr't r that at 1 ast on wholly-American company is 
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even exp ortiug to the P eople ' s Republic of China, 
though wh ether this reflects a large measure of market-
ing autonomy enjoyed by the local company or a deliberate 
attempt on the part of an American company to evade U . S. 
legislation forbidding trade with that country is not 
known . 
Because franchise limitations may so often merely 
reflect competitive conditions, it is difficult to 
form any clear impression of the above evidence . While 
it is obvious that because of high Austral ian cost 
structures relatively few American subsidiaries would 
have be n major exporters in 1962 even in the absence 
of parental restrictions, it is also abundantly clear 
that in the absence of such restrictions there are a 
number of companies which could have exported a consid-
rably larger fraction of their total output than they 
did . One jointly-owned company, the only overseas 
affiliate of an American company in the metal industry, 
was convinced that it could export economically to 
the West Coast of th .S. but because its parent 
feared that manufacturers in California might turn 
their attention to its own market in the Eastern States 
in such a situation, such sales were forbidden . Another 
jointly-owned company had, at the time of the survey, 
only just had its right to sell in the ew Zealand 
market recognized by the British affiliate and other 
affiliates 'preferred' it not to export into South-
East Asia . The executive interviewed explained that 
he felt embarrassed by this situation and felt rather 
sorry for the Australian Trade Commissioners who 
often referred Asian customers to the company for 
supplies . 'We have to think up some excuse to put 
the enquiries off politely - that we haven't got the 
capacity at the moment, that we can't meet their 
delivery dates, et . The writer was told by a senior 
official of one of Australia ' s recent ' trade ships' 
that one of the largest American subsidiaries here 
had planned to participat in this trad display in 
th Asian ar a but had b en compelled to withdraw its 
hib·t at th last minut b caus of pre ssure from 
its par nt . 
S om compan s, mor 0 r, would b in a better 
p osit·on to r duce th ir unit costs, and so justify 
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th ir 'right' to a larger market, if they could only 
~ a larger market . An executive of one large firm 
whose exports are currently confined to ew Zealand, 
the islands of the South Pacific, and small parts of 
South-East Asia commented that his company would be 
given more markets if its costs were lower - 'but we 
can't get our costs down without the increased volume 
we could get from exportingt' The executive anti-
cipated that in the relatively near future the 
Australian company would be given an export order 
to fill because of lack of capacity in some other 
affiliate -'and once we get a leg in they'll never get 
i t ou t again '. 
It is argued in Chapter XI that the effect on 
the Australian balance of payments of restrictions on 
the export franchise of American-affiliated companies 
is considerably less than is frequently implied in 
popular discussion of the subject . It nevertheless 
appears beyond doubt that some export franchise 
restrictions do have a detrimental impact on Australia's 
balance of paym nts and in addition they must act to 
stifle the initiative of subsidiaries. 27 
It is of interest to compare the position of 
jointly-owned firms with that of wholly-American ones 
in the export field . The empirical evidence is 
ambiguous , both in those tables showing export franchise 
restrictions and in Table IX-ll, which shows ratios of 
exports to sales in companies of different ownership 
patterns . Within each ownership group, the export 
perf.ormance of those companies which had been operating 
in Australia with an American affiliation for more than 
five or six years in 1962 was better than that of 
direct investments more recently established . If 
attention be confined to those companies which began 
manufacture in Australia before 1957, those with an 
Australian equity of up to 50 per cent seemed to do 
rather better than th wholly- American companies, 
while both groups did better than thos in which the 
Am rOcan quity was less than 50 per cent . But there 
simply ar not sufficient cases in which wholly-
Am r Ocan compani s an b compar d with joOntly- owned 
27 . ThOs point s mad by Brecher and Reisman, Op e cit . , 
pp . 144-5 . 
TABLE IX- ll : RATIO OF EXPORTS TO SALES IN 93 AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES IN 1961/62 , BY PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN OWNERSHIP , AN]) 
PERIOD IN WHICH MANUFACTURE BEGAN 
Per centage of U. S. ownership and 
period in ,which Australian 
manufacture began (a) 
25- 49% 
(i) Manufacture began before 1957 
(ii) Manufa cture began in 1957 
or subsequently 
50- 99% 
(i) Manufacture began before 1 957 
(ii) Manufacture began in 1 95 7 
100% 
or subsequently 
(i) Manufa cture began before 1957 
(ii) Manufacture began in 1957 
or subsequently 
Tot a l 
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ones of roughly similar size in the same industryro 
make any definite judgment from such evidence possible. 
Moreover, it is not the fact of sharing ownership with 
Au stralians which might be expected to exercise an 
influence on a company's freedom to export but the 
fact of sharing ownership with any other shareholder . 
And several of the companies classified as wholly-
American have two or even three major American share-
hold rs . 
A priori, one would expect companies which are 
jointly-owned to be allowed less export freedom t han 
those which are wholly-owned by one American company, 
and what little empirical evidence there is seems to 
support this view. One wholly-American company was 
allocat d the whole of the Asian and Pacific area as 
its export territory, despite the fac t that its 
parent has an affiliate in Japan . The reason for 
this, it was explained, is that the American int enest 
in the Japanese firm is less t han 20 per cent . On 
the other hand, an executive of an Anglo-American firm 
xplain d that, since there was no formal restriction 
inhibiting the Australian company's exports, it had 
rec ntly 'just started to export'. The company was 
sev r ly reprimanded for i t s action because both 
shareholders had wholly-owned subsidiaries which 
could supply the Asian area . Another jointly-owned 
company, this time one in which Australian shareholders 
have a substantial minority interest, was free to 
export products peculiar to the Australian company 
to any market of its choosing, but could not sell 
products associated with the parent company's 
brandname outside Australia. The parent company, it 
was stated, naturally serves foreign markets for 
thes products from the U.S . 'or from some other 100 
per cent own d company established in the area' . In 
on of th most remarkable cases, a company which had 
b en owned in partnership with a number of other 
shar hold rs hang d its position in the e port field 
wh n 't b am wholly-Am rican in ownership . Before 
th's, ports se m ha b n onfined mainly to 
w Z land, but wh n th Am rican par nt acquired 
compl t own rship it clos d its similar plant in the 
n't d I ngdom, doubl d th capac'tyof th Australian 
pI nt an~ at th tim of th surv y , p cted th 
Australian plant to export a large fraction of its 
output to the United Kingdom, Canad~ and Japan . 
J1J 
By extension, one would expect even jointly-
owned companies to have wider export franchises than 
wholly-Australian licensees, but the only concrete 
evidence for this view encountered by the writer was 
the comment of a licensee who was pr paring to make a 
larg share issue to the American licensor: 
Under our licensing agreement we can 't 
export outside Australia but there is a 
sort of gentleman ' s agreement that if 
we can get our volume up and our costs 
down we will be given more territory . 
And we will probably get more territory 
when they take up their equity . 
It is understood that the 1961-62 survey of the Depart-
ment of Trade on this subject revealed that, within 
each nationality of overseas affiliate, a significantly 
high r fraction of licensees than of financial affiliates 
were confined to Australia in their sales . 
To d igress briefly, there has been controversy 
ev r since Arndt and Sherk published their analysis of 
the Department of Trade's study in 1959 on whether 
British affiliates are more restricted in their export 
freedom than are American affiliates. The figures 
published by Arndt and Sherk showed American affiliates 
to have a much greater freedom in the Asian area than 
had British affiliates, and the difference was under -
stated , a cording to the authors, because of the higher 
proportion of licensees in the American figures than in 
the British . 28 The authors suggested that the reasons 
for this difference probably lay both in the greater 
frequency with which British parent companies might be 
expected to have established direct connections in 
the Asian area, and in the post-war dollar shortage 
which might be e pect d to have led American companies 
to channel Asian orders to their soft-currency 
Australian subsidiaries . If it is true that British 
affiliates in Australia are more often jointly- owned 
than are Am rican, this may provide another part of 
he answ r . Ob iously, the present study does not 
p rmit of omm nt on this matt r . It is understood, 
28 . Op e cit ., p p . 2J9-4l . 
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how ver, that the more rec nt survey of the Department 
of Trad , while showing a markedly greater freedom for 
both American lic ns es and Am rican subsidiaries to 
sell in th ew Zealand and South Pacific area than 
for British , showed only a small difference in the 
fre dom of affiliates of th two countries to export 
outsid the Australasian ar a as a whole. This could 
be xplained by a difference in ownership policy 
betwe n British and American companies, if such a 
difference exists, but may also be explained by the 
probably greater number of British investments in 
ew Zealand than of Am rican . 
In practice, most American-affiliated companies, 
wheth r wholly-American or jointly-owned, depended 
heavily on markets in ew Zealand, Australian 
T rritories, and the South Pacific - regardless of the 
export freedom they enjoyed. This is clearly brought 
out in Tables IX-12 and IX-1J . A significant fraction 
of total exports also went to Asia but, despite the 
substantial volume 01 unclassified exports, it is safe 
to conclude that the share of exports going to the 
Middle East, Europe, United Kingdom, and the Americas 
in 1961/62 was very small. 
Regrettably perhaps, no attempt was made to dis -
cover what fraction of total exports was channelled 
through affiliated companies overseas . Certainly, 
there was little e porting to American parents by 
the companies under study, though the unclassified 
e ports of at least two jointly-owned companies are 
known to have been primarily to the parent company . 
( Indeed, in one of these two cases the American interest 
in the Australian company had b en acquired in large 
m asur with a iew to its supplying th American 
company with a parti ular product not required by the 
latter in a volum larg enough to gi e it a cost 
adv antag .) Th r w re a number of other companies 
ngaged in the port to the U.S. of products not 
produ d by the par nt company, but thes firms 
w r mainly asso iat d with the e tra tion or pro -
ss ng f raw mat of on kind or another and 
hav not, v n in thos few ases wh n th y prov i d ed 
r 1 v nt figu r s, b n °nclud d in th pres nt 
t bu tOon. It s kno.n that at 1 ast on of thes 
mp n s stOll ls part of its output to its 
TABLE I X- 12 : DESTINKrION OF THE EXPORTS OF 93 AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES IN 1961/62 , BY PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN OWNERSHIP , 
AND PERIOD IN WHICH MANUFACTURE BEGAN 
£A( t housand ) 
Percentage of D. S. Exports classified by destinat i on - Uncla ss- Tot a l Tot al sa l e s 
owner ship and ified export s in 1962 
period in whi ch Aus t rali a n New Pa cific South- Other Middle Af r ica Continen- U. S. Canada South U. K. export s (e) 
Aust ralian manu- Territories Zea l and I s l and s East Asia East t al Amer -
f a cture began (b ) Asia (d ) Europe ica 
~ a 2 ( c) 
25- 4% 
(i ) Manufacture 
began before 
1957 13 184 (f) 43 140 11 25 416 31 , 697 





43 38 5 8 3 (f ) 56 153 9, 385 
(i) Manufa cture 
Qegan 1;>efore 
1957 1 161 268 86 38 6 651 1 , 211 33 , 162 




subsequently 68 71 7 30 4 3 8 189 11 ,914 
(i) Manufa cture 
began before 
1957 
(ii) Manufa cture 
555 4, 186 534 728 1 , 140 20 521 71 66 68 49 170 8 , 108 346 , 657 
began in 
1957 or 
subsequently 25 255 1 15 1 1 8 24 328 23 , 967 
~ (e) 637 4, 891 541 1 , 133 1 , 373 20 603 76 66 79 55 934 10 , 405 456 , 781 
(a ) See Note (a ) to Table IX- 2. 
~b) Usua lly interpreted t o include islands in the South Pa cific only. 
c) Usually interpr eted t o include the ar ea bounded by Burma , Indones i a, and t he Philippine s . 
(d ) All of Asia not included in ' South-Ea st Asi a'. See Note (c) . 
~ e~ Det ail may not add t o t ot a ls because of rounding . 




TABLE IX-13 : NUMBER OF COMPANIES ENGAGED IN THE EXPORT TRADE DEPICTED IN TABLE IX- 12 
Percentage of U. S. Number of companies which indicated export s going t o - Companies Total Potent ial 
ownership and which number number of 
period i n which Aust ralian New Pa cifi c Sout h- Other Middle Africa Cont i nen- U. S . Canada South U. K. l ef t some of co~ companies 
Aust ralian manu- Territories Zealand I s l ands Ea s t Asia East tal Amer- exports panies export i ng 
f acture began (b) Asia (d ) Europe i ca unclassi- ex-




1957 3 5 1 2 3 1 2 6 7 
(ii) Manufa cture 
began in 
1957 or 




1957 1 6 6 1 1 1 3 10 11 
( ii) Manufa cture 
began in 
1957 or 
subsequently 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 14 
10Cf}b 
(i) Manu:fa cture 
began before 
1957 7 20 10 12 7 1 4 3 2 2 2 4 24 28 (ii) Manuf a cture 
began in 
1957 or 
subsequently 2 10 1 3 1 1 2 1 14 24 
Tota l 14 48 14 26 13 1 8 6 2 5 3 13 67 93 
(a) See Note Ca ) t o Table I X- 2 . 
~b) See Note ~b) to Ta ble IX- 12 . w 
c) See Note c ) to Ta ble IX- 12 . r-' 
Cd) See Note Cd) t o Table IX- 12 . 0\ 
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parent at a price which is lower than it might wish, 
and one of the others was compelled to sell all its 
ou tput to 'ts parent at considerably less than world 
market prices until government intervention ended the 
practice towards the end of the forties. One manu-
facturing company is known to export at marginal 
cost to a tax-haven company in Hong Kong, from 
where the products are sent on to Japan at a sub-
stantially higher price. But becaus e of recent American 
tax legislation and the fact that so many of the 
exp orts of the companies under consideration are sent 
to ew Zealand and closely surrounding markets, it 
se ms unlikely that such tax evasion is significant . 
The spe d at which the exports of the companies 
und r study are growing is remarkable. This is shown 
only ' n part in Table IX-14, where the exports of 27 
companies which provided data fo r the three years 
1954/55, 1959/60 and 1961/62 are se n to have risen 
from £2 . 8 million in the first of these years to 
£7 . 4 million in the last. (The fall in exports which 
took place between 1959/60 and 1961/62 for both main 
groups of companies shown was due principally to a 
sharp contraction in the overseas sales of a small 
number of major companies which faced unusual conditions 
in their export market s: of the 63 companies covered in 
th table , 13 had no exports in either 1959/60 or 1961/62 ; 
of th balance, 13 perienced a fall and 37 a rise in 
ports between those yars.) ot all of the 27 companies 
provided production data for the same th ee years so 
that changes in th ratio of e ports to manufacturing 
output are known in only 19 cases. Two of these 
ompan s ported nothing in either 1954/55 or 1961/62 , 
but of the other 17, t n registered an increase in 
h 'r ratio of e ports to's lling valu of output ' 
wh'l only seven r gist r d a fall . Mor impressive 
was th hang wh'ch 0 curred b twe n 1959/60 and 
1961/62: of th 55 comparisons availabl , 11 compani s 
port d nothing in ith r y ar, 31 r gistered an 
incr as in th i ratio of ports to selling value of 
output, nd only 13 p ri nc d a fall . 
t is not su pr sing th n tha th ports of 
Am r c n-affil'a d mpani s app ar to b rising 
mu h mor rap'dly tmn th ir imports: th ports of 
th 21 omp n s wh' h pro id d data for both imports 
TABLE IX- 14: GROffTH IN THE EXPORTS OF 65 AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES , BY PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN OWNERSHIP 
Percentage of U. S. c omp/anies which provided export 
ownership _1~9_6~1~_~6~2 ____ ~~ __ ~~ 
Exports in -
1954/55 1959/60 
25- 4g;fo 108 225 
50-9g;fo 201 246 
100% 2, 792 8 ,350 
Total (a) 3 , 101 8 ,821 
£A ( thousand ) 
data f or 1954/55 , 1959/ 60 and Companies which provided export data f or 1959/60 




























54 , 063 
(a ) Detail may not add to tota ls because of rounding . 
NOTE : Twenty- seven companie s provided informat ion on their export activities for the three years 1954/55 , 1959/60 , and 1961/62 : 
six of these are classified in '2 5- 4g;fo', f our in ' 50- 9g;fo', and 17 in '100%'. Thirty- eight companies provided data for 




and exports for 1954/55, 1959/60 and 1961/62 rose by 
167 per c nt betwe n 1954/55 and 1961/62, compared 
with a growth of only 30 per cent in their imports . 
The xports of the 30 companies which provided data 
for both imports and exports for 1959/60 and 1961/62 
only fell by 13 per cent between the two years - but 
th ir imports fell by 26 per cent . 
319 
The number of companies which have recently 
started exporting is substantial . Of the 27 companies 
which provided data for the three years covered in 
Table IX-14, only 16 were exporting in 1954/55 - but 
25 were exporting in 1961/62. Of the 3 8 which pro-
vided data for 1959/60 and 1961/62 only, 18 were 
exporting in the earlier year as against 27 in the 
lat r . All but four of the 26 American-affiliated 
companies known to be not exporting in 1961/62 expected 
to b exporting in the future, and in a number of 
cases exporting was imminent . 
V ry many of the companies which were exporting 
in 1961/62 were anticipating substantial increases in 
their export sales. One company with exports of 
less than £4,000 in 1961/62 expected exports to be 'at 
least £50,000 ' in 1963/64 . Another firm, established 
only five or six years in 1962, sold exports worth 
only £2,000 in that year but exports worth over 
£20,000 in 1962/63. While most of these exports went 
to ew Zealand , the company had recently given the 
travelling representative of the American company in 
Asia an Australian price list to carry with him, and 
the Australian company anticipated sending its own 
representative into Asia in the near future . Yet 
another company (one not participating in the present 
survey) achieved a 320 per cent increase in exports 
between 1961/62 and 1962/63, to the point where 
exports were about 10 per cent of total sales~ 
Another small company with no exports in 1961/62 
expected to begin exporting to overseas affiliates 
on a large scale in 1965. Most of its affiliates 
sub-contracted the manufacture of th products made 
by th Australian ompany and most ontracts were due 
o p r n 1965. In a diff r nt industry, a company 
with e ports of £97,000 in 1961/62 mad ov rseas sales 
of 250,000 in 1962/63 . Cl arly 't would be over-
stat'ng th as t ' mply that th s amples ar typical 
of all the companies studied but the list of similar 
instances could certainly be extended considerably. 
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The great expansion of exports achieved by many 
American-affiliated companies has been well-publicized . 
At the time of writing, General Motors-Holden's alone 
claims that its exports in 1965 will earn Australia 
at least £10 million in foreign exchange, compared 
with a figure of only £3.7 million in 1962 . 29 The 
company has even developed a left-hand drive model of 
the Holden, especially for export markets, and Holdens 
are now assembled in no less than four overseas 
countries . Chrysler, too, despite very small exports 
in 1962 and the first part of 1963, announced early 
in 1965 that more than 10 per cent of its vehicles 
were xported in 1964. 30 In the electrical equipment 
industry, S.T.C . was stated to have increased the 
p rcentage of its -production exported almost six-
fold between 1961/6 2 and 1963/64.31 A company in the 
engineering industry with exports of less than £10,000 
in 1959/ 60 claimed that it had export orders of £600,000 
in 1962/ 63, £200,000 of the total being on account of 
Japanes custom rs. During 1964-65, at least two 
American subsidiaries secured export contracts worth 
substantially in excess of £1 million and one of these 
was termed by the Minister of Trade and Industry 'the 
biggest single sale an Australian manufacturer has 
made overseas,.32 Many similar cases could be cited 
and it is hardly surprising that American subsidiaries 
have figured prominently in recent years among those 
receiving awards for export achievement from the 
Associated Chambers of Manufacturers of Australia . 
The reasons for this sudden e pans ion are not hard 
to find . In part, it reflects a growing awareness 
throughout Australian industry of the importance of 
manufactured e ports in Australia ' s future growth, 
and the profitability of e porting even if this has to 
be don on a marginal cost basis. In part, it is a 
29 . Australian Financ'al Review, 26 May 1965, p 7 . 
30 . ~bid., 15 January 1965 , p. 17. 
31 . Australian, 19 March 1965, p. 12. 
32 . Sydn y Morning H rald, 30 January 1964, p . 9 . 
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dOrect result of he government's tax incentives for 
exports, which, of ourse , are partly responsible for 
th growth in export 'consciousness'. 0 102 companies 
which answered questions on export promotion and the 
use of government tax incentives and facilities, 60 
companies were engaged in some form of promotion. In 
the case of 21 of these companies this 'promotion' 
seemed to be largely market research but in other cases 
a more active approach was pursued. Eight companies 
specifically mentioned having a sales branch in at 
least one overseas country (usually ew Zealand, 
though in three cases Singapore or Hong Kong) while 
several of the nine companies with manufacturing 
subsidiaries in other countries (almost exclusively 
ew Zealand) sold considerable quantities through these 
outlets . Only eight companies used official overseas 
trade missions as a means of export promotion . Seventy-
three of the total of 102 companies used at least one 
of th government's export incentives or facilities: 
62 used payroll-tax rebates, 60 'market development 
allowances', and ten the Export Payments Insurance 
Corporation . (Surprisingly, only two companies made 
specific m ntion of help received from Australian Trade 
Commissioners, though since this was not one of the 
suggested 'government facilities' listed on the survey 
questionnaire the number of responses may be in no way 
representative.) How important these incentives are is not 
generally known but one company described the taxation 
rebates and allowances as 'the one thing that really 
makes exporting pay' • 
There are other factors encouraging the exports 
of American-affiliated companies. At least one company 
has peri nced a major breakthrough in exports because 
its 'Australian content' has reached the level needed to 
qualify it for BrOtish pr ferential tariff treatment in 
the ew Zealand market. Another company was able to 
displac its Briti s h affiliate in Asian markets as its 
unit os f 11 with th growth of 10 al sal s. A third 
firm was allocat d th Asian market because it is so 
much b tt r pIa d than th Ameri an company to giv 
pomp af r-sal s r On major ompany has 
pand d its port s sharply aft r a larg increas in 
s ar h sol ng a problem 
asso Oat d w Oth h Australian rna k t, it found it had 
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developed a product with considerable sales potential 
in th Asian area . 
Many relaxations in export franchise restrictions 
have undoubtedly occurred in recent years also . Some-
times this has been associated with a prior reduction 
in Australian unit cost but sometimes with other 
pr ssures . One non-American subsidiary in the motor 
vehicle industry, for example , is understood to have 
rec ived a much wider export franchis e i n recent 
years to enable it to expand its volume sufficiently 
to meet the Australian government's directives on 
increasing Australian content of vehicles - this 
factor may well have been at work in the case of some 
Am rican firms too . One large Ame rican company has 
sharply increased its exports in recent years because 
i t fears that the government may soon legislate to 
limit the imports a company may purchase to the value 
of its exports. The fruit of Government pressure on 
export franchises may be seen from the fact that, 
apart from the two companies wh ich indicated that no 
decision had yet be n made on their export franchise, 
no less than 20 of the companies interviewed in 1963 
stated that they were negotiating to have their export 
restrictions removed or reduced . 
In conclusion, there seems little doubt that a 
gr at many American-affiliated companies are rapidly 
assuming a major role in the expansion of Australian 
manufactured exports . The most hopeful sign for the 
future is that local management very often seems keen 
to expand Australian exports whatever the actual 
ownership of the company concerned. This 'internal' 
pressure is reinforced to an important extent by the 
threat of American antitrust action and measures taken 
by the Australian government to make exporting more 
profitable . 
Chapter X 
HOW PROFITABLE IS AMERICAN INVESTME T IN AUSTRALIA? 
The income earned by foreign-owned companies in 
Australia probably generates more widespread concern 
than any other single aspect of foreign investment . 
J2J 
In its most popular form , this concern is frankly 
mercantilist in its preoccupation with 'money flowing 
out of the country', while added to thi s fear is in-
dignation at the 'rapacious profits' which foreign 
companies are believed to earn in Australia . At a 
more sophisticated level, concern is usually expressed 
in terms of the effect which Australia ' s growing 
liability on account of international investment in-
come has, or will have, on the country's balance of 
payments . 
Wha t are the facts? Certainly, the total level of 
profits and interest accruing to foreign investors has 
grown rapidly in the post - war period. From only £26 
million in 1947 / 48, company income payable overseas 
expanded more than fivefold in the years to 196J/ 64 and, 
as Table X-I shows, the growth in income due to 
shareholders in orth America has been even more rapid 
than the average . The ratio of company income payable 
overseas to Aus tralia's total eternal receipts is also 
substantially higher at present than it was in the late 
forties, though it is interesting to note that the 
rapid rise in this ratio which took place in the fifties 
and which gave so much con~ to commentators at 
that time appears to have been at least temporarily 
halted. l Further discussion of the significance of 
changes in this ratio is deferred till Chapter XI 
(where an attempt is made to assess the overall impact 
o f foreign investment on the Australian balance of 
payments) and attention is confined for the moment to 
the p rofitability of American investment . 
Australian statistics make it impossible to make a 
precis calculation of the return on foreign invest-
m nt in Australia . The best available official estimates , 
1. 
- th 
for e ample, H.W. Arndt , 
w Mod 1 ' , Economic Record, 
' Overseas Borrowing 
XXXIII (1957), p . 251 . 
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recently p ublished by the Commonwealth Treasury (and 
rep roduced in Table X-2 ) , suggest that the average 
retu rn on foreign investment in companies has probably 
fluctuated between about 6 and 11 per cent over the 
peri o d under c onsideration . This is clearly not a high 
retu rn and i n several recent years has been l ower than 
the return on shareholders ' fund s in Australian public 
companies. 2 But the table does reveal that the , 
return on American investment has been considerably 
greater than the average, or, what is almost another 
way of saying the same thing, considerably greater 
than the return on British investment in Australia. 
Indeed, it seems likely that the return on American 
investment in Australia has on average been higher than 
that on American investment in almost any other developed 
country, at least during the fifties. 3 
Various explanations have been offered for the high 
profits earned by American investment in Australia in 
the fifties, and the apparent decline in these profits 
since the beginning of the sixties. Treasury itself 
offered three suggestions . First, it was suggested that 
discrimination against dollar imports into Australia 
up to 1959 enhanced the scarcity value of American-
designed products and so increased the profitability 
of producing these locally. Secondly, it was claimed 
that America ' s technological superiority over Australia 
and other countries was greater during the fifties than 
it has since become, 'so that North American firms 
operating in Australia at that time possessed initial 
2 . The Treasury lolhi te P aper noted that figures published 
by th Reserve Bank of Australia for a large group of 
Australian public companies ( excluding finance companies, 
those ngaged in mining or primary industry, and overseas 
companies) reveal a net return on shareholders' funds 
for the years 1959 to 1963 of 9 . 7, 9 . 3, 6 . 8, 6 . B-, ~a.n'd -)1\. 4 per 
c nt r spectively. (Supp lement to the Treasury Information 
Bulletin : P rivate Overseas Investment in Austra l ia 
( Canberra : Commonwealth Treasury, May 1965 ) , 'p. 19 . ) 
3 . Eugen A . Philipps calculated ear ings ratios (for 
th p riod 1950 to 1958) of 17 . 2 per c nt for American 
inv stm nt in Britain, 13.5 per cent in B 19uim, 11 . 9 
p r c nt in Germany, 10. 7 per cent in Italy, 1 0. 3 per cent 
in th therlands, and 10.1 per c ~t in France . The 
cal ulations w re bas d on U . S . Departm nt of Commerce 
data, though th m thod used may have b n somewhat 
diff r nt from that us d hr . ( Eugen A. Philipps , 
'Am rican Dir ct Inv stm nts in West G rman Manufactu ring 
Industr' s, 1945 to 1959 ' , Curr nt Economic Comment, 
XXII ( 1960 ) , o. 2, p . 36.) From calculations made by 
th wr't r for ew Z aland, bas d on ew Zealand statistics , 
th v rag r turn on Am rican investm nt in that country 
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TABLE X- I : ANNUAL INVESTMENT INCOME PAYABLE OVERSEAS BY COMPANIES , COMPARED WITH AUSTRALIA'S EXTERNAL EARNINGS 
Year ended Investment income payable to - Total Ratio of 
30' June - external investment 
U. S.A. and United Other Total earnings income to 
Canada Kingdom Countries earnings 
£A~Iili1~ion L £A(million) (per cent) 
1948 4. 4 18 .8 2 . 5 25 . 7 468 5 . 5 
1949 4. 6 15 . 5 2 . 6 22 . 7 591 3 .8 
1950 6 . 6 25 . 4 2 .8 34 .8 679 5 . 1 
1951 11.2 31.0 2 . 4 44 . 6 1 , 073 4 . 2 
1952 14 . 7 28 . 3 3 . 2 46 . 2 770 6 . 0 
1953 15 . 4 29 . 7 2 . 5 47 . 6 954 5 . 0 
1954 30 . 5 35.2 4. 1 69 .8 927 7 . 5 
1955 28 . 3 39 . 6 4 . 5 72 . 4 885 8 . 2 
1956 32 . 0 48 . 1 5 . 5 85 . 6 905 9. 5 
1957 32 . 9 49 . 6 7. 0 89 . 5 1 , 135 7. 9 
1958 38 .0 48 . 9 7.8 94 . 7 976 9. 7 
1959 48 . 0 56 . 0 10 . 7 114 . 7 977 11. 7 
1960 51.8 61.9 8 .8 122 . 5 1 , 117 11.0 
1961 49 . 7 54 . 7 12 . 4 116 .8 1 , 135 10 . 3 
1962 37 . 1 50 .8 9 . 6 97 . 5 1 , 292 7 . 5 
1963 44 . 9 70 .·2 11.5 126 . 6 1 , 300 9. 7 
1964 49 . 1 74 . 9 11.9 135 . 9 1 , 659 8 . 2 
SOURCE : Annual Bulletin of Oversea Investment : Australia 1963- 64 ; Aus tralian Nat ional Accounts : Nat ional Income and 
Expenditure 1948- 49 to 1962- 63 ; Balance of Payments : 1962- 63, 1963- 64 and first half 1964- 65 (Canberra: 





advantages over their competitors.' 4 Thirdly, 
American investors may have adopted a more discrimina-
ting approach to investment in Australia in the years 
when this was a relatively new field for their interest 
than did British investors. Some have offered yet 
another explanation of the greater profitability of 
American investment: British firms, the theory runs , 
only invest overseas when tariff barriers in their 
export markets compel them to do so, while American 
firms retain the initiative by actively s eeking out 
p rofitable investment opportunities. 5 
one of these explanations is entirely satisfactory. 
The last in particular, which suggests a different 
motivation for investment by British and American 
firms, seems quite unacceptable. As shown in 
Chapter III, trade barriers have been of major import -
ance in the decisions of American investors to manu-
facture in Australia. It is also a little difficult 
to accept that import restrictions on dollar goods 
wer a major factor in the profitability of American 
firms, since American-designed goods would have been 
available to a large xtent from American subsidiaries 
in the United Kingdom. On the other hand, it does 
s em likely that import restrictions in general played 
an important part in enhancing the profitability of 
American firms, as probably also of many Australian-
own d firms. It seems likely too that American firms 
wer not only sup rior to Australian and British firms 
in technology as narrowly understood but also in the 
whol rang of management skills needed for modern 
mass production. This at least is the view held by 
many of the Australian e ecutives interviewed during 
th pr s nt sur ey, and it seems to accord, at least 
sup rficially, with th record of American investment 
( r lativ to Bri ish investment) in other countries . 
This sup riority almost certainly still exists, thou gh 
its t nt may be d clining, and the recent fall in 
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TABIE X- 2: ESTIMATED ' EARNING RATES ' ON NORTH AMERICAN , UNITED KINGDOM AND TOTAL OVERSEAS INVESTMENT IN COMPANIES IN AUSTRALIA (a ) 
Year ended 
30 June -
Investment income payable a s per centage of t ot a l oversea s investment i n compani es in Australia f rom 
U. S. A. and Canada 
( per cent) 
United Kingdom 
( per cent) 
All oversea s countries 



















7 . 3 
6 . 9 
9. 4 
13 . 9 
14 . 5 
11. 7 
22 .8 
18 . 7 
16 .8 
14.8 
15 . 2 
17 . 3 
16 . 0 
12 .8 
7 .8 
8 . 2 
7.7 
7 . 7 
5 . 6 
8 . 2 
8 . 5 
7 .0 
6 . 6 
7 . 4 
7. 6 
8 . 4 
7. 7 
6 . 9 
7 . 3 
7 . 4 
5 .8 
4 .8 
6 . 3 
6 . 1 
8 . 0 
6 . 3 
8 . 7 
9 . 5 
8 . 6 
7 . 6 
10 . 7 
10 .1 
10 . 4 
9 . 5 
9 . 1 
10. 0 
9 . 6 
8 . 0 
5 . 7 
6 .8 
6 . 6 
Annua l est imates of the value of oversea s investment in companies in Australia were reached by adding estimates of annual 
capita l inflow t o an assumed value of private overseas investment at 30 June 1947 . In each case , the investment income 
payable has been compared with the value of investment at the beginning of the year in question . Because figures showing 
the domicile of the overseas invest or do not provide a classification of direct and portfolio investment , the above 'earning 
r ates ' refer to both types of investment combined . The approximate nature of the estimates is obvious even from figures 
shown for 1947/48 , where ' earning r ates ' for both North American and British investment are shown as being below the average 
f or all countries , despite the heavy preponderance of investment from those t wo areas . 
SOURCE : Supplement to 
Tr ea sury , May 




estimates is almost certainly the result not so much 
of an appreciable decline in the profitability of long 
established companies but of a number of recent invest-
ments, several of th m on a very large scale, which 
are not only not yet earning substantial profits but 
which are actually incurring substantial losses. One 
has only to think of American investments in the Altona 
p trochemical complex, in aluminium, in the food 
industry, and in new marketing networks for the dis-
tribution of motor spir't - and to recall the dimension 
of the losses incurred by these companies in the early 
sixties - to recognize that there is not yet much 
reason to suppose that the profitability of the re-
maining firms has undergone any substantial long-
t rm reduction. 6 There has probably been some 
reduction - but it is not of the dimension indicated 
in the Treasury Figures. 
There may be a further reason why American invest-
ment in Australia has appeared to be more profitable 
than British, a reason which bears no relation to the 
inher nt profitability of the respective investments. 
If American-affiliated companies tend to be wholly-
owned subsidiaries more often than do their British 
counterparts, there may be a tendency for a larger 
part of the 'profits' of British affiliates to accrue 
to their parent companies in the form of technical 
service fees, or profits on the sale of goods exported 
to the affiliate in Australia, than is the case with 
American affiliates. But the evidence necessary for 
generalization in this area is entirely lacking and 
any comment must be mere speculation. Lack of data 
also prevents conclusions being drawn from the 
probably different industry distribution of American 
and British investments in Australia . 
Calculations presented in Table X-J, based on 
data published by the U. S. Department of Commerce, 
show that it has been in the manufacturing sector 
that American-owned companies have secured the highest 
return on their investment, though the rate of return 
on th much smaller American investment in ' Mining and 
sm lting ' has not b n s'gnificantly lower. Moreover, 
th r lativ ly low profitability of American investment 
6 . In aggregat statistics of investm nt income payable, 
loss s ar subtract d from the aft r-ta profits of 
profitabl compan s. 
TABLE X- 3: ESTIMATED 'EARNING RATES' ON AMERICAN DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN AUSTRALIA , BY SECTOR (a) 
Ca lendar Investment income payable a s percentage of U. S. direct investment in -
y ear 
Manufa cturing Mining and Other (c) Total 
(per cent) 
smelting (b) 
( per cent) ( per cent) (per cent) 
1951 28 . 6 18 . 2 7 . 6 17 . 9 
1952 18 . 9 25 . 0 6 .0 13 . 3 
1953 26 . 5 14 . 3 9 . 1 18 . 2 
1954 28 . 5 40 . 0 7 . 3 20 . 1 
1955 25 . 4 15 . 0 7 . 1 17 . 2 
1956 17 . 5 20 . 0 7 . 5 13 . 0 
1957 20 . 9 17 . 2 7 . 7 14. 9 
1958 21.5 9 . 1 8 . 7 15 .4 
1959 20. 0 27 . 3 9 . 2 15 . 6 
1960 18 .8 29 . 6 5 . 7 13 . 5 
1961 12 . 4 24 . 2 2 . 9 9 .. 0 
1962 18 . 6 13 . 9 3 . 1 11. 7 
Unweighted arithmetic 
average : 21.5 21.2 6 .8 15 . 0 
(a) In a ccordance with the method used by the Commonwealth Treasury i n deriving the estimates in Table X- 2, the investment income 
payable i n each case ha s been compared with the value of U. S . direct investment in the industry at the beginning of the year 
in question . Ameri can data on overseas investment on which these estimates are ba sed are derived from actual book values of 
investment , however , and in this respect are unlike those used by Tr easury . 
(b) Becaus e the absolute dimension of income accruing to U. S . investors in this industry is small , 'rounding' in the raw data 
may a ccount f or part of the violent fluctuation in earning rat es revealed in the figures . 
(c) Includes ' Petroleum' , which is in fact substantially the largest category of investment within the total . Published 
figures do not make it possible to calculate the return on U. S. direct investment in this industry , but it is possible 
to arrive at close estimates f or at least the years 1958 and 1959 . In these years , the rates of return on U.S . investment 
in this industry were 7.4 and 8 . 2 per cent respectively. It is likely that the sharp falling off in the return on ' Other' 
investment after 1960 was due almost exclusively to a f all in the rate of return on petroleum investment. 
SOURCE : 1951- 59 , derived from data published in Balance of Pa ents Statistical Su Revised Edition (Washington : Office 
of Business Economics , U.S. Department of Commerce , 1963 • 
1960- 62 , derived from data supplied directly by Dr Samuel Pi zer of the Office of Business Economics of the U.S . Department 




in 'Other ' j.ndustries was primarily the result of 
the low return on American investment in the 
Australian oil industry, and this in turn was pro-
bably, at least in part, the result of the crude 
oil pricing practices referred to in Chapter IX . 
Ther appears to have been a downward trend in the 
profitability of American investment in Australian 
manufacturing over the period, but these data 
JJO 
support the earlier conclusion that, a ft er making due 
allowance for the 1961/62 recession, there has been 
no sharp reduction in the profitability of American-
affiliated companies in manufacturing since the end 
of the fifties . Certainly their profitability in 
1962 can only be d e scribed as very satisfactory, 
though because the figures are based on book values 
of investment there is undoubtedly some overstat.e-
m nt of the 'true' rate of profit. 
The present survey also sought information on 
profits. As mentioned in Chapter IV, some difficulty 
was experienced in securing consistent figures in 
this field . And ven if satisfactory profit figures 
were available, there would still remain the problem 
of what to measure them against . A comparison of 
profit with the par value of the paid-up capital of 
the firms concerned - the measure of profitability so 
beloved of Australian financial journalists - is 
obviously quite inadmissible since the paid- up value 
of the share capital of most American-affiliated 
companies grossly understates the value of the 
American investment. It does not even represent the 
value of the ' original investment', as noted in 
Chapter IV, though even if it did it would still have 
no value as a measure of profitability. More valid 
would be a comparison of profit with shareholders' 
funds , but even this significantly understates the 
book value of the parent company's investment in 
many cases by ignoring the frequently important ad-
vances made to the subsidiary on inter-company 
account . The best measure of profitability would 
appear to b a comparison of profit accruing to the 
U . S. shar hold r with the combined total of share -
holders' f unds du to him and credit e tended by him 
on int r-company ac ount . This is by no means a 
p rf ct m asure, sinc the book alue of the shareholders ' 
JJl 
funds of long established companies considerably 
u~derstates the real worth of the assets they represent. 
But it appears to be the best measure available, and 
provided the imprecise nature of the data being 
pre sented is borne in mind , some interesting observa-
tions may be made. 
Table x-4 presents ratios of profit to this 
estimate of total American investment, by percentage 
of American ownership. Seventy-nine companies are 
c overed in the table, and of these 62 were operating 
a t a profit in 1962 . The total income accruing to 
U.S. shareholders from the whole group was £J2 million , 
including aggregate losses of about £2 million . The 
table reveals a distinct tendency for companies 
established before 1957 to be profitable more often 
t han those established subsequently, which is 
scarcely surprising . Average profit rates also 
appear to reveal a tendency for wholly-American com-
panies to be more profitable than jointly-owned ones , 
at least if attention be confined to those established 
before 1957 . But the appearance is deceptive . The 
median profitability of the 17 jointly- owned firms 
established prior to 1957 was 10.4 per cent - as compared 
with 10.8 per cent for the median profitability of 
the 27 wholly-American firms established before 1957. 
If the considerable profitability of one very large 
company, General Motors - Holden ' s, be excluded from 
the average for all wholly-American companies 
established before 1957, the average for that group 
falls from 14 . 5 per cent to only 10.1 per cent - a 
level much nearer the averages of 8 .4 and 9 . J per 
cent obtaining for the two categories of jointly-
owned companies . The e planation of differences in 
th profitability of companies of different ownership 
patt rn is probably to be found in large measure i n 
th fa t that own rship patt rns oft n coincid 
with industry patt rns. All participating companies 
in the pharmaceut O als °ndustry, for ample , wer 
wholly American in 1962, and all but th smallest 
of th parti ipating companies in th motor vehicles 
°ndu stry w r al 0 wholly Am rican . As Table X-5 
shows , th s two industri s wer amon g th most pro-
fitabl for Am ri an in stm nt in Australia in 1962 . 
B c us of this on ntration of compani s of on 
TABLE X- 4: RATI O OF NET PROFIT TO TOTAL AMERICAN INVESTMENT IN 79 AMERICAN-AFFILIATED COMPANIES I N 1961/62 , BY PERCENTAGE OF 
AMERICAN OWNERSHIP , AND PERIOD IN WHICH MANUFACTURE BEGAN 
Percentage of U. S. 
ownership and period 
in which Australian 
manufacture began (a ) 
25-4% 
(i) Manufacture began 
before 1957 
(ii) Manufacture began 
in 1957 or 
subsequently 
50- 9% 
(i) Manufacture began 
before 1957 
(ii) Manufa cture began 
in 1957 or 
subsequently 
10<1% 
(i) Manufa cture began 
before 1957 
(ii) Manufacture began 
in 1957 or 
subsequently 
Tota l 
Companies Ratio of U.S. share in net profit to total American 
which investment (per cent) -
incurred 










































Number of Average 











( per cent) 
8 . 4 
10 . 9 
9. 3 
14.4 
14 . 7 
9.5 






8 . 4 




- 0 . 1 
11.4 
(a) The year in which manufacture began is taken to be the year in which an Ameri can equity of a t leas t 25 per cent was fir st 
acquired in the case of companies manufacturing previously as Australian- owned ventures . 
(b) A loss is denoted by a minus sign . 
NOTE : The U. S. share in after-tax profit has be en compared with the American share of shareholders' funds plus credit ext ended 
by the American company at the end of the year to which profits r efer . As elsewhere , not all companies gave figure s 





own rship pattern within particular industries, it is not 
possible to assess the relative profitability of com-
panies of different ownership patterns under approximately 
similar circumstances. 
The overall profitability of th whole group of 
companies, 11.4 per cent, was not nearly as high as the 
rat of 18.6 per cent shown in Table X-3 for the profit-
ability of all American investment in Australian manu-
facturing in 1962, though it was substantially higher 
than the Treasury estimate of 7.8 per cent shown in 
Table X-2 for the return on all orth Americanmvestment 
in Australia in 1961/ 62. The figures ar not directly 
comparable however. They cover different aggregates, 
refer to different time periods (at a time when the 
Australian economy was just emerging from a recession), 
and are based on differ nt methods. Companies in the 
pres nt survey were asked to provide profit figures for 
the year ended 30 June 1962 or their nearest accounting 
period, and a number of the largest firms in fact pro-
vided figures for the calendar year 1962. In this re-
spect, th figures presented here are more nearly similar 
to those collected by the U.S. Department of Comm rce, 
which are collected on a calendar year basis q But the 
profit rate for 1962 in Table X-3 was calculated by 
comparing the earnings generated in 1962 with the value 
of investment at the beginning of 1962, hereas the 
figures based on data collected in the present survey 
compare profit in 1961/62 with investment at the end 
of that year (for lack of other data). This difference 
in method certainly accounts for at least part of the 
differenre in the two profit estimates: had the profit 
recorded by the U.S. Department of Commerce as 
accruing to U . S. shareholders in 1962 been compared 
with the value of U.S. investment at the end of 1962, 
the profit rate would have been 16 . 2 per cent instead 
of 18.6 per cent . The source of the remaining 
difference is not known with certainty: there were 
some e tremely profitable companies which declined to 
participate in this survey and it is possible, in view 
of curr nt Australian sentiment on this matter, that 
on a rag non-participating companies w r more profitable 
n 1962 than wer parti ipating compani s . This, to-
g th r w"th th fa t that many compani s in th pr s nt 
sur y pro id d d ta for th y ar nd d 30 Jun 1962, 
TABLE X- 5: RATIO OF NET PROFIT TO TOTAL AMERICAN INVESTMENT IN 79 AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES IN 1961/62 , BY INDUSTRY 
Industry 
Plant , equipment , machinery 
Motor vehicles 
Meta l manufactures , n . e . i . 
Electrical equipment , instruments , 
etc . 
Food and drink 
Industrial chemicals and plastics 




(a) See Note (b) to Table X-4. 
Companies Ratio of U. S. share in net profit to t otal American in- Number of Average Average 
which vestment (Eer cent) companies ratio , ratio , all 
incurred 30 . 0 covered profit- companies 
a loss 0- 4 . 9 5 . 0- 9 . 9 10 . 0- 14 . 9 15 . 0- 19.9 20.0- 24 . 9 25 . 0- 29.9 and 
over 
2 2 5 5 1 
1 2 1 1 
2 2 2 
1 4 2 5 1 
1 2 1 1 
6 1 1 1 1 
1 2 2 2 2 
3 2 4 3 2 1 1 












(per cent) (per cent) 
7 . 5 
16 . 1 
8 . 5 
11.4 
10 . 9 
7 . 5 
19 . 0 
9.8 
13 . 4 
7 . 2 
16 . 1 
5 .8 
11.4 
10 . 1 
- 2 .3 
17.8 






may explain the remaining discrepancy . But it is 
impossible to be sure . It seems reasonable to assume 
that data published by the U. S. Department of 
Commerce are the most reliable available, if only 
because all American companies with investments abroad 
are obl iged to supply information on their activities 
to that Department . 
Whichever rate is accepted, it is clear that 
American direct investment in Australian manufacturing 
was considerably more profitable on average in 1962 
than was Australian enterprise: a large group of 
Australian-owned manufacturing companies surveyed by 
the Reserve Bank of Australia earned only 6 . 9 per cent 
on shareholders ' funds in that year . 7 Yet if attention 
b confined to data collected in the present survey, it 
appears that the proportion of American-affiliated 
companies earning a profit of more than 6 . 9 per cent in 
1962 was not startlingly large . Of the total of 79 
companies, only 43 earned more than 6 . 9 per cent on the 
valu of their American investment, though admittedly 
31 of the 44 which comm nced operations before 1957 did 
so . 
It is also interesting to note that if General 
Motors-Holden's be omitted from the table altogether , 
the rate of return on investment in profitable companies 
falls from 13 . 4. to 10 .0 per cent, and in all companies 
from 11.4 to 7.7 per cent . There can be little doubt 
that the high profitability of General Motors-Holden ' s , 
and the considerable size of the company even in rela-
tion to total American investment in Australian manu-
facturing, has be n an important factor contributing to 
the high profitability of that inv stmentthroughout 
th fifties . In sev ral years during that decade, the 
profits of General Motors-Holden's alone ceeded 40 
per cent of total U.S. earnings on direct i nve stments 
in Australian manufacturing . In several years, the 
company ' s n t trading profit ( after d preciation and 
ta ) eded 30 p r c nt of th parent company's 
t o t 1 in stment in Australia at th end of th year in 
qu st·on . 
Ind d, if th distribution of rat s of profit 
s hown ·n Table x-4 ·s typical , it would a ppear that 
p rhaps th most triking 1 atur of th arnin g rates 
of d ompani s is the gr at rang th y 
nt . 
S tatistical Bulletin : Compa ny 
1963 th arnin g rat was a 
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cover. General Motors-Holden ' s is undoubtedly a very 
profitable company, but it is by no means the most 
profitable American subsidiary in Australia. Twelve of 
the 79 companies in Table x-4 had a higher return on 
total investment in 1962 than did G. M.H . and in one case 
after-tax profit exceeded 100 p er cent of the total 
American investment. (This high profitability was, 
incidentally, not associated with substantial borrow-
ings from Australian sources .) At the other extreme, 
one company established in the early fifties incurred a 
loss in 1962 which exceeded in value the parent 
company's total remaining invest~ent in the firm at the 
end of the year. A total of 17 firms made a loss, and 
four of these had been operating for more than five or 
six years in 1962. Certainly, in two of the 17 cases, 
the loss incurred was entirely the result of very 
heavy advertising expenditure, manufacturing operations 
having been very profitable, but in the other cases 
the loss primarily reflected unprofitable manufacturing 
operations. Between these two extremes lay the great 
bulk of the firms covered, mainly earning from 5 to 15 
per cent on total investment . 
Of course it is well known that th~ profitability 
of some American-affiliated companies is not adequately 
reflected in their after-tax profit figures. The pro -
fits of the local enterprise may be considerably 
affected by the price paid for materials bought from the 
parent company, though as noted in Chapter IX it seems 
likely that, if oil companies be excepted,8 the profits 
of American- affiliated companies in Australia are 
inflated as often as they are deflated by this factor. 
At least one manufacturing subsidiary sells its output 
to the local sales branch of its American parent at a 
price which one company executive felt was designed to 
leave an important part of the profit in the branch -
again it is difficult to assess what meaning is to be 
attached to th~ profit figure of the manufacturing 
operation . 
An attempt was made, however , to e amine the import-
ance of int rest payments, royalties, technical assistance 
f s, ngoneering f es, and so on as mans by which 
Am r an par nt com~ani s r c iv a r ward on their 
8. Th profits of n ith r of th two major Am rican oil 
subsodiaro s op rating in Australia in 1962 are included 
in th fOgur s giv n in this chapter . On of the two did 
/337 
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Auffixa~ investment. 9 Of the 79 companies included 
in Tables x-4 and X-5, seven either declined to provide 
information on such payments or felt that their descrip-
tion on the questionnaire, as 'service charges', did 
not cov r the kind of payment made by their company.lO 
Ind ed, the problem of defining such payments is not 
easy . As mentioned in Chapter VI, som ompanies re-
gard payment of technical assistance fees as just 
anoth r method of transferring profit s , while others 
contend that their payments are only suff i cient to 
cover the actual cost to the American parent of passing 
on information to the Australian company. Several of 
the latter in particular declined to provide details of 
such payments because they did not regard them as 'service 
charges' 0 But if the higher return on direct invest-
m nt than on fixed interest borrowing is to be explained 
in t rms of the former's contribution of technical and 
managerial expertise, it seems reasonable to examine 
the total cost of such know-how, and not just disclosed 
profits. 
Of the 72 companies which did provide full informa-
tion on profits, interest payments, and royalties and 
technical assistance fees paid to their U. S. shareholder , ll 
nine declared no dividend and paid neither interest nor 
fee in 1962 (Table x-6). On the other hand, eight companies 
declared a dividend and made payment of both interest and 
(8) provide profit figures but these have not been in-
cluded because of the difficulty of interpreting such 
figures for an operation whicb includes very substantial 
marketing activities. 
9 . The Commonwealth Statistician includes interest pay-
ments in his published figures for investment income 
payable. The U.S. Department of Commerc~ does not 
include interest in figures on 'earnings' but does include 
it in figures on 'income' . either includes royalties 
or other fees in their published figures for earnings, 
though the U.S . Departm nt of Commerce does publish 
such figures separately for a small number of major 
areas of U.S . investment . 
10. In Chapter VI it was noted that 100 companies pro -
vid d information on the type of payment made for technical 
information . ot all of thes companies provided actual 
figur s, hower, and som of thos which did (often 
thos whi h cont nd d no sp cial payment was mad ) did 
not provid satisfa tory profit figur s, need d for com -
para i purpos s . 
11 . Royal i sand t hn'cal assistanc f es paid to 
non-affiliat d bodi s by a small number of compani s 
ha b n ignor d . 
TABLE X- 6: NUMBER OF COMPANIES PAYING DIVIDENDS , INTEREST , OR FEES TO THEIR PARENT COMPANIES AMONG 72 AMERICAN- AFFILIATED 
COMPANIES IN 1961/62 , BY PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN OWNERSHIP , AND PERIOD IN WHICH MANUFACTURE BEGAN (a) 
Percentage of U.S , ownership and Companies 
period in whi ch Australian which made 





(i) Manufa cture began before 
1957 
(ii) Manufa cture began in 1957 
or subsequently 
50- 99% 
(i) Manufa cture began before 
1957 
(ii) Manufa cture began in 1957 
or subsequently 
100% 
(i) Manufacture began before 
1957 
(ii) Manufacture began in 1957 
or subsequently 
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Only a Only Only a Dividend Dividend Interest Dividend , 
dividend interest fee (a) and and fee and fee interest , 










































(a ) The term ' fee ' is used t o include any kind of technica l assistance fee , contribution towards home office expenses , 
engineering fee , or royalty . The term 'dividend ' is used to include the remittance of branch profits . 





at least Oile se vice charge in that year . By percentage 
of American own rship, no clear pattern emerges, except 
that more jointly-owned than wholly-American companies 
paid dividends in that year. Remarkably similar 
proport·ons of both typ s of affiliate paid fees of 
on kind or another, and of themtal, 54 (or 75 per cent) 
paid som k·nd of fee . 
or did a significant pattern emerge from a re-
class·fication of the data in Tabl x-6 by industry, 
though it was int resting that eight of the nine 
companies in the industrial chemicals industry were pay-
ing a fee of som dimension, even though only three of 
the nine were operating at a profit in that year . 
Wh n the combin d total of interest paymrents and 
fe s which accrue to th u.s. shareholder (net of 
Australian taxation) is compared with the profits which 
accru to him, it is still not easy to s e any clear 
patt rn, either by the percentage of American ownership 
or by the industry in which the Australian company 
op rates . Table X-7 pr sents ratios of interest 
payments and fe s on the one hand to profit accruing on 
the oth r for the 57 companies in Table x-6 which were 
op rating at a profit in 1962 . But interpretation of 
the data is difficult, not least because the recession 
of 1961-62 caused a more abrup t contraction in the 
profits of some American subsidiaries in Australia than 
it did in the interest and fees they were required to 
remit abroad . On result of this is seen in the table 
where fiv companies, four of them wholly-American, 
r mitted more in int rest and f es in 1962 than accrued 
to th ir par nt compani s in after-ta profit - but only 
on of h compani s arn d a profit of more than J 
p r c nt on investm nt in that year . Similar influ nces 
aff d other compani s to a greater or less e tnt, 
and b aus of th doubtful meaning of these ratios n o 
lassi ication by industry is shown . Only two points 
may b made with saf ty . Th first is tha in the 
as of J4 of th 57 ompanies cov r d in the table, 
·nt r sand fe s a ruing to par nt ompanies amounted 
to ss than on - thi d of th p o· it a cruing to th m. 
S ondly, a f w ompani s appear d to b u s· ng s u h 
paym n S n an att mp to disguis an trem ly profitable 
o on n Austral·a. On wholly-Am ri an firm , for 
ampl , m d pr - t profit of J2 p r nt on sal s 
·n 19 2, nd p ·d oy It· sand manag m nt f s totalling 
J40 
a further :J per cen. A second wholly-American company 
made a pre-tax pro it equal to 28 per cent on total 
sales, and paid a management fee of a further 9 p r 
cent. (A jointly-owned company with pre-tax profits 
of 20 p r cent on sales remitted 'engineering fees' 
of 8 per cent to its American parent, but the motive 
for this was probably less associated with public rela-
tions than with th desire of the American parent to 
receive a reward for the technical know-how made avail-
able to the Australian subsidiary.) 
The most interesting feature of the aggregate 
figures on inter st payments and fees supplied by the 
72 companies under study is their total size, especially 
in relation to the total of dividends or profits re-
mitted by the same companies. This is clearly brought 
out in Tables X-8 and X-9. Total remittances of 
interest and fees, after Australian tax, at £4 . 4 million, 
were only fractionally below total remittances of divi-
dends and profits, arter withholding tax, by the same 
group of companies. In the case of wholly-American 
companies, remittances of interest and fees actually 
exceeded dividends and profits remitted. The same -was 
tru in several individual industries. But it is not 
possibl for such ratios or fees to dividends to hold 
true for foreign investment in Australia generally: 
whil 'nt r st payments are already included in the 
Commonw alth Statistician's figures for investment in-
com payabl , and royalties are not out of proportion 
to th total paid by Australia, the ratio of 
te hnical assistanc and oth r fees to dividends 
( almost 70 per c nt) indicates a level of fees, if it 
were applicable to all foreign in estment, substantially 
larger than any reI vant balance of payments dehit . 
The amount of Australian tax paid on interest 
paym nts, royalti s, and fees of all kinds is also of 
special interest . Wh n the survey questionnaires were 
sent to companies, the writer was not rully aware of 
th ta issues involved in this area, and it was only 
aft r discussions with a number of companies that some 
of th important points b gan to cla- ify. For this 
ason, no mention was mad of ta ation in that part of 
th qu stionnair d al ' ng with s rv harges . Most 
ompan s w r ask d about this matt r orally, but 
TABLE X- 7 : RATIO OF INTEREST AND FEES PAYABLE TO PARENT COMPANIES AFTER AUSTRALIAN TAXATION TO U. S . SHARE IN NET PROFIT 
IN 57 AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES IN 1961 62 BY PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN OWNERSHIP AND PERIOD IN WHICH 
MANUFACTURE BEGAN a 
Percentage of U. S . ownership 
and period in which 
Ratio of interest and £ees payable to U. S. share in net profit 
(per cent) -
Australian manufacture began -------------------------------------------------------------------------(b) Nil 
25- 49% 
(i) Manufacture began before 
1957 1 
(ii) Manufacture began in 1957 
or subsequently 2 
50- 99% 
(i) Manufacture began before 
1957 1 
(ii) Manufa cture began in 
1957 or subsequently 
100% 
(i) Manufa cture began ~efore 
1957 2 
(ii) Manufacture began in 1957 
or subsequently 2 








































6 . 8 
76 . 7 
28 . 0 
41.9 











(a .) The 57 companies referred to ,in this table are all the companies operating at a profit in 1961/62 among the 72 companies 
covered in Table X- 6 . See Note (a) to Table X- 6 for definition of 'fees ' . 




Australian tax paym nts by s ome companies (or their 
parents) had to b stimated from knowledg of the 
J42 
tax usually applied to particular kinds of remittances . 
It is not thought that the error involved is such as 
to invalidate the general impression conveyed by the 
tables. 
Broadly, cash dividends due to foreign residents 
from companies incorporated in Australia are subject 
to Australian withholding tax, equal to not more than 
15 p r cent in the case of shareholders resident in 
countries with which Australia has a double-tax agree -
ment ( including the U.S . and the United Kingdom).12 
R mittances of branch profits are not subject to any 
such tax however. Since it is the foreign shareholder 
who is liable to the withholding tax, he is able to 
claim a tax credit for this in the U S. 
In the case of interest payments to overseas 
lenders, however, it is the Au stralian company which 
is liable to company tax, and this means that the 
Am rican recipient of interest payments from an 
Australian source is not able to claim a tax credit 
for th amount of the Australian tax. IJ It is often 
better, indeed, for the parent of a wholly-owned 
subsidiary not to charge interest on advances to the 
Australian subsidiary at all, and to receive all 
r turn on its investment in the form of dividends. 
Th re ar circumstances, however, in which the 
Aus tralian company can avoid the payment of tax on 
int rest paid to a foreign resident: this is the case 
if the local subsidiary can prove it is obliged to 
pay th full amount of the interest, without any de-
duction on account of taxation , to the overseas 
resident, perhaps becaus the loanto the Australian 
subsidiary was n gotiated under the laws of another 
country. It is interesting that, as far as is known, 
only 11 of the 18 companies in Tables x-8 and X- 9 
paying interest abroad were being taxed on these amounts , 
12. Sto k divid nds, not being subj ct to American 
ta ,ar subj ct to a h avi r Australian withholding 
ta . 
IJ. For information on the Australian ta position 
r gard to int r st and royalti s paid to 0 er-
s s si d nts, s S tions 125, 255, and 256 of 
th ' Incom Ta and So cial S rvic s Contribution Assess-
m nt Act 19J6-1962', Commonwealth of Australia 1962 . 
TABIE X-8 : DIVIDENDS , INTEREST , AND FEES PAYABIE TO THE PARENT COMPANIES OF 72 AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES IN 1961/62 , BY 
PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN OWNERSHIP , AND PERIOD IN WHICH MANUFACTURE :BEGAN ( a) 
£A(thousand) 
Percentage of U. S. ownership U. S. share Dividends , interest , and fees accruing to the 
and period in which Australian in net U. S . -
Dividends, interest , and fees remitted 
to the U. S. (d) -
manufa cture began (b) profi t (c) --'----'----------------------- Tot al interest, royalties 
Dividends and fees 
gross net ( f) ~g~r~o-s~s~n~e~t~(~f~)------Dividends Interest Roya lties Other fees gross (e) gross net (f) gross net (f ) gross net (f) 
25- 49% 
(i) Manufacture bega n before 
1957 
(ii) Manufacture began 
or subsequently 
50- 99% 
(i) Manufacture began 
1957 
(ii) Manufacture bega n 
or subsequently 
100% 
(i) Manufa cture began 
1957 
(ii) Manufa cture began 
or subsequently 






(a) See Note (a) t o Table X- 6 . 
(b) See Note (a) to Table X- 4. 
624 354 41 25 
5 4 6 4 
3,287 2, 126 1 (g) 
(238) 63 26 15 
10,82:7 3,349 397 394 
(127) 328 5 3 
14 , 377 6 , 224 477 441 
140 110 61 61 216 184 191 147 
4 3 13 13 3 3 23 19 
43 39 201 192 1,731 1 , 470 246 232 
32 29 173 171 44 38 211 203 
969 646 2,079 2 ,078 2,899 2,555 3,410 3,084 
82 73 756 611 328 279 843 687. 
1 ,269 900 3 , 283 3 ,126 5 , 222 4,528 4,924 4, 372 
(c) Brackets denote a loss . Note that the l osses of unprofitable companies have been set off against the after- tax profits of 
profitable ones . 
(d) The difference between sums accruing and those remitted is , of course , the amount held in Australia , often on inter- company 
a ccount with the affiliated company . 
(e) No column shows dividends accruing to the U. S. net of Australian withholding tax because dividends held in Australia can 
sometimes avoid withholding tax by being paid t o a holding company registered in Australia. 
(f) Net of Australian taxation . See text for explanation. 
(g) Less than £500 . 




TABLE X- 9: DIVIDENDS AND FEES PAYABLE TO THE PARENT COMPANIES OF 72 AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES IN 1961/62 
£A (thousand) 
Industry 
Dividends , interest , and fees accruing to the 
U , S . share U, S., -
of net ~~-----------------------------------------------
profit (b) Dividends Interest Royalties Other fees 
gross (c) gross net Cd) gross net Cd) gross net [dl 
Plant , equipment , machinery 1 , 029 270 113 107 198 120 260 251 
Motor vehicles 5 , 083 800 141 141 4 3 1 , 289 1 , 289 
Metal manufactures , n . e . i . 2 , 029 1 , 383 20 12 4 3 36 36 
Electrical equipment , 
instruments , etc . 2 ,002 1 , 103 94 91 612 431 359 356 
Food and drink 854 389 15 12 232 232 
Industrial chemicals and 
plastics (655) 350 32 32 216 153 533 397 
Pharmaceutica l and toilet 
preparations 1 , 756 649 88 76 364 364 
Other industries 2, 279 1 , 280 62 46 146 114 210 201 
Tot al (f) 14 , 377 6 , 224 477 441 1 , 269 900 3 , 283 3 , 126 
(a ) See Note ~a) to Ta ble X_6. 
(b) See Note c) to Table X-B. 
(c) See Note ~e) to Table X-B . 
(d) See Note f) to Ta ble X-B . 
(e) See Note (d) to Ta ble X-B. 
(f) Detail may not add t o tota ls because of rounding . 
Dividends , interest , and fe es remitted 
to the U. S , ( e) _ 
Tota l interest , 
Dividends royalties , and fees 
gross net (d) gross net (d) 
263 240 570 476 
800 680 1 , 435 1 , 433 
1 , 383 1,176 41 39 
815 692 1 , 014 830 
389 356 248 244 
350 297 781 582 
649 600 452 440 
573 487 384 327 





and all those no t paying tax were wholly-American i n 
ownership. Because by far the greater part of total 
i n terest payments by the 18 firms was on account of 
wholly-American companies, the average rate of 
Australian tax on interest accruing to U. S. parent 
companies was very low. 
Royal ties are taxed in Australia in the hands of 
the recipient c ompany, and, as in the case of dividends, 
that company can claim a tax credit in the Uo S. for 
tax paid in Australia. In some cases, companies 
claim that a royalty ( or part thereof ) is p ayment for 
legitimate business expenses incurred in Australia, 
s o that the average rate of tax shown in the tables 
falls short of company tax rates in 1961/62. Indeed , 
of 20 pa r nt compani s receiving royalties from 
Australia in that year, only 17 are thought to have 
paid ta on them at all. 
Wh n attention is turned to other technical 
assistance fe s, contributions to home office expenses 
or to par nt company expenditure on research and 
de e lopment, the tax position is much more complex . 
Such payme nt s are usually exemp t from Aus tra l ian tax 
on the ground s that they represent expenditure on 
the purchase of technical or other information, and no t 
income from real property in Aus tralia as in the case 
of royalties . Bu t if the Taxation Commissioner can 
establish that such p ayments are in reality in lieu 
of royalties or in some other way attempts to avoid 
Australian taxation (and some executives frankly 
admitted that this is their primary function), they 
may be subject, at least in part, to Aus tralian 
company tax . Certainly, some parent companies are sub-
ect to Australian t ax on such payments but it seems 
that by and large they are tax exempt. Several 
companies mentioned that the tax posi tion with 
regard to these payments had recently undergone change 
(in the direction of an increased Australian tax 
liability) and this may reflect an increased effort 
on the part of the Ta ation Commissioner to levy 
th s amount s . It appears that, unless the payments 
can scape Am rican ta ation by means of a tax-haven 
country, such "ncr as d Australian ta has no detri -
m ntal ff ct on th r t urn received by American 
compani s on th ir in stm nt in Australia though the 
return to ~he American economy as a whole is clearly 
reduc d. 
But of course interest payments, royalties, and 
f es, though a debit on Australia's balance of pay-
ments, cannot simply be added to after-tax profit 
accruing to American shareholders to gain an idea of 
th 'tru ' p rofitability of their investment. For 
ven 'f not subject to Australian tax, such payments 
ar subject to American tax, unless channelled to a 
tax-haven country . Moreover, although the marginal 
cost of extending technical information or licensing 
a trad mark to an Australian company may be very low 
or negligible in many cases, in others the fee 
charg d to the Australian company is specifically 
design d to cov r only the marginal cost involved . 
Thus it is impossible to g t an absolutely accurate 
' dea of the 'true' profitability of American direct 
investments in Australia. The estimates shown in 
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Tabl s X-IO and X-II are, therefore, only approximations . 
Th y apply to the 72 companies shown in Tables x-B and 
X-9 and w re calculated by assuming the ' true net pro-
fit ' of the Aus tralian operation ( so far as the 
American shareholder is concerned) to be all the 
actual net profit, plus 50 per cent of interest pay-
ments net of Au stralian ta (where applicable) , plus 
50 per cent of royalties and other fees gross of 
Australian tax . 14 It is further assumed, as a very 
rough approximation, that there is no marginal cost 
to the American company of transmitting information to 
the Australian company, or licensing it to produce an 
American product . As before, the value of American 
investment is taken to be the American share in share-
holders' funds, plus advances by the American company 
on inter-company account. 
Though the inclusion of interest and fees in the 
calculus makes an appreciable difference to the recorded 
1 4. To the e t nt that part of the actual net profit 
is earned by branch op rations in Aus ralia (and so is 
subj ct to an additional American ta ) and another part 
's paid out in divid nds ( and so incurs Australian 
withhold'ng ta ), this procedur 0 erstat s the ' r turn' 
to th Am rican shar hold r. On th other hand, to the 
t nt hat 'nt r st, royalties and oth r f es can 
a oid h paym nt of American ta ( assum d for these 
purpos s to b 50 p r c nt), there is som understate-
m nt of h 'r urn' on th Australian in stment . 
TABLE X- I O: RATI O OF NET PROFIT, INTEREST, AND FEES TO TOTAL AMERICAN INVESTMENT IN 72 AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES IN 
1961/62, BY PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN OWNERSHIP , AND PERIOD IN WHICH MANUFACTURE BEGAN (a ) 
Percentage of U. S. ownership and Companies Ratio of U. S. share in net profit , interest , and fees to 
period in which Australian manu- which total American investment (per cent)(a) -
f a cture began (b) incurred 30 . 0 
a loss (c) 0- 4 . 9 5 . 0- 9 . 9 10 . 0- 14 . 9 15 . 0- 19 . 9 20 . 0- 24 . 9 25 . 0- 29 . 9 and 
over 
Number Average 
of ratio , 
com- pr ofit -




ratio , all 
companies 
(d)(e) 
( per cent)(per cent) 
25- 4% 
(i) Manufa cture began before 
1957 1 3 2 1 
(ii) Manufacture began in 1957 
7 9 . 9 (8 . 4) 9 . 9 (8 . 4) 
5 13 . 4 (10 . 9) 1.5 (0 . 5) or subsequently 1 2 1 
50- 9% 
1 
(i) Manufacture began before 
10 9 . 6 (9 . 3) 9 . 6 (9 . 3) 1957 3 1 2 
(ii) Manufacture began in 1957 3 
1 
or subsequently 6 1 1 1 1 10 22 . 3 (16 . 0) - 3 . 2 (- 5 . 9) 
100% 
(i) Manufacture began before 
1957 3 2 7 
(ii) Manufacture began in 1957 
or subsequently 4 3 4 
Tota l 14 9 18 
5 2 
1 










11. 7 (10 . 2) 
12 . 7 (10 . 1) 
11. 3 (10 .0) 
11.4 (9 . 9) 
1.2 (- 0 . 5) 
9 . 2 (7 . 9) 
(a) These ratios compare the U.S. share in net profit , plus 50 per cent of interest payments net of Australian tax, plus 50 per cent 
of royalties and fees gross of Australian t ax on the one hand , with t otal American invest ment on the other . See text for 
explanation . 
(b) See Note (a ) to Ta ble X- 4 . 
(c) The term ' loss ' is used here to indicate a negative return on investment , after taking into account receipts of interest , 
royalties , and other fees . 
(d) Figures in bra ckets show the ratio of the U. S . share in net profit t o total American investment , and are parallel to figures 
shown in Ta ble X- 4 . They permit an assessment of the importance of receipts of interest , royalties , and other fe es after 
a ll t axes . 





prof"tability of particular industries and companies 
of particular ownership, it is clear from both tables 
that the overall difference made by the inclusion of 
such payments is relatively small. For all the 72 
companies covered, the difference is only that between 
7.9 and 9.2 per cent, or about 16 per cent, and this, 
as noted above, is based on the assumption that there 
is no marginal cost to the American company of trans-
mitting technical information to the Australian 
affiliat . 
Th time taken by American-affiliated companies in 
Australia to reach profitable operation varies 
enormously from company to company. As shown in both 
Table x-4 and Table X-10, companies established before 
1957 were, in each cat gory of own rship, more profit-
able than those established subsequently. (That this 
was not true in general when attention is confined to 
the av rage earning rates for profitable companies is 
due partly to the establishment of a small number of 
particularly profitable companies in recent years and 
also to th fact that, as explained in notes to the 
tables, some companies which are taken to have begun 
manufacture 'in 1957 or subsequently' actually began 
operations prior to 1957.) In part the period of 
time taken to reach a 'reasonable' level of profitability 
depends on the industry in question: pharmaceutical 
companies which confine their Australian operations to 
forming fully-imported ingredients into capsules, for 
exampl , frequently can merely appropriate a part of 
the parent company's profit, and so may be in a position 
to make substantial profits from the ~ moment local opera-
tions b gin. On the other hand, chemical companies 
wh"ch must expand local demand for their product before 
conomic production is possible must often operate on 
(or b lOw) the rna gin of profitability for a number of 
yars . Th marketing policy adopted is also relevant: 
som ompanies with v ry profitable manufacturing opera-
tions ncur loss s only because of heavy advertising 
e p nditur d signed to e pand their mark t share or 
n, as in on ca ncountered, to sell products im-
por d f om th par nt company. 
M ny ompani s in th pres nt sur y provided informa-
t"on on t abl ncom for years b fore 1961/62 - a 
cons"d rabl numb r pro id d such information for ry 
TABLE X- ll : RATIO OF NET PROFIT , INTEREST , AND FEES TO TOTAL AMERICAN INVESTMENT IN 72 AMERICAN - AFFILIATED COMJ?ANIES IN 
1961Z62 2 BY INDUSTRY {a) 
Companies which Ratio of U. S. share in net profit~ interest , and - ~ses to tctaL~~umber of 
Industry incurred a loss American investment ~per cent2 ~a companies (b) 30 . 0 covered 
0- 4. 9 5 .0- 9. 9 10 . 0- 14 . 9 15 . 0- 19 . 9 20 .0- 24 .9 25 . 0- 29 . 9 and 
over 
Plant , equipment , 
machinery 2 1 5 4 1 1 14 
Motor vehicles 1 2 1 4 
Metal manufactures , 
n . e . i . 1 1 3 5 
Electrica l equipment , 
instruments , etc . 5 2 3 2 1 13 
Food and drink 1 2 1 1 5 
Industrial chemica ls 
and plastics 6 1 1 1 9 
Pharmaceutical and 
toilet preparations 1 2 1 2 2 8 
Other industries 2 5 1 3 2 1 14 
Tota l 14 9 18 12 7 2 4 6 72 
(a) See Note (a) to Ta ble X- IO . 
(b) See Note (c~ to Table X- I0 . 
(c) See Note (d t o Ta ble X- I0 . 
(d) See Note (e) to Ta ble X- I0 . 
Average Average 





~per cent)(per cent) 
9.8 (7 . 7) 9. 4 F·4~ 10 . 6 (9 . 4) 10 . 5 9. 3 
8 . 6 (8 . 5) 8 .0 (7 . 9) 
14 . 4 (11 . 4) 14 . 4 (11 . 4) 
12 . 4 (10 . 9) 11 . 6 (10 . 1) 
9.4 (7 . 4) - 1 . 0 (- 2. 5) 
22 . 6 (20 . 1) 20 . 7 (18 . 3) 
10 . 6 (9 . 9) 
11. 3 (10 .0) 
9. 6 
9. 2 
(8 .8 ) 





year between 1950/51 and 1961/62 . In the absence of 
balance sheet (or other) data for most years prior to 
1961/62, and because of the great difficulty involved 
in adding profit data over a period of years for 
companies which began manufacture at widely different 
times, these data have not been put to any detailed 
use . A profit series could in any case only have been 
an incomplete version of statistics published by the 
Commonwealth Statistician. The figures gathered do 
serve to illustrate the divergent experi ences of 
American-affiliated companies in Australia however: at 
the one extreme was a company which made a pre-tax 
profit of little more than £20,000 in 1950/ 51 but of 
substantially more than £1 million in 1961/62; at the 
other was the company which incurred losses in every 
year for eight years after its establishment in 
Australia . They also show that, though the profitability 
of many of the companies which provided data for 1962 
was affected by the recession in the Australian economy 
in that year, the absolut profit of almost two-thirds 
of those which provided data for both 1961 and 1962 
was higher in the latter year than in the former , and 
in many cases absolute profit was higher in 1962 than 
in any previous year in the company ' s history . 
Have the results of American-affiliated companies 
in Australia Ii ed up to the expectations of their 
par nt companies? Twenty-four firms which began local 
operations before 1957 were questioned on this point, 
and all but one felt that Australian results had been 
fully up to expectations. Ten of these felt that 
results had exceeded expectations . An attempt was 
made to compare the profitability of subsidiaries in 
ustralia with that of their parent companies in the 
U. S. by s eking information on relative profit margins 
on sal s in the two countriB. S ome individually 
int r sting e ampl s were obtained in this way but it 
pro d impossibl to gauge relative profitability on 
in stm nt, n wh n subsidiary and parent operated in 
a substantially similar manner . Th difficulty is 
d by th comm nts of two chemical compani s 
on h qu stion: on f It that profit margin on sales 
is high r in Austr lia than n th U. S. , but that this 
do s not r suIt in a high r rat of profit on in estment 
n Aus ral·a b aus th small siz of Australian opera-
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tions leads to disproportionately heavy investment per 
unit of outp ut . The other company felt that profit 
margin on sales is lower in Australia than in the U.S., 
but that because of the cheapness of capital equipment 
in Australia the rate of profit on investment is higher 
in Australia . 
As an alternative method of comparing the profit-
ability of American-affiliated companies in Australia 
with that of their parent companies, the ratios shown 
in Table X-IO for companies which began operation 
here before 1957 were compared with figures published 
in Fortune for return on the shareholders' funds of 
parent companies. 15 Such a comparison can only give 
rise to very approximate results, since some U.S. 
companies consolidate their overseas subsidiaries with 
th ' f ' 16 I elr own 19ures . naIl, 33 comparisons were 
possible . In 18 of these the profitability of the 
Australian company exceeded that of the U.S . parent, 
and in 15 it fell short of the American figure. 
Though profit ratios of the Australian companies 
cover d a much greater range than did those of their 
American parents, the median of both sets Qf ratios 
was identical, 10 .7 per cent . It is possible that the 
Australian ratios were affected to a considerable ex-
tent by the recession of 1961-62, and of course even 
if the average return on investment in Australia was 
below that in the U.S. it is not possible to conclude 
that the Australian investment is below expectations, 
or was not warranted, since the comparison must be 
between the return on a company's marginal investment in 
the U. S. and the return on its investment in Australia. 
But the impression is not without interest . 
Twenty- seven companies which began operations in 
1957 or subsequently were also as k ed how their re -
sults to date compared with e xpectations . Three 
felt that it was still too early to judge, seven that 
expectations had been exceeded, and ten that they had 
been met . Seven were disappointed . There were various 
reasons for this disappointment, though probably the 
most frequ ntly mention d factor was th 1961- 62 recession , 
15 . Fortu ne , July 1963 . 
16 . Ind d, in som cas s American companies include the 
alu of th ir inv stm nt in foreign subsidiaries in their 
books but do not in Iud arnings on this in estment cept 
to h t nt of actual re eipt of di idends . This clearly 
r suIts in und rstat m nt of th prof'tability of th 
Am rican compani s. 
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wh'ch caught some companies in their s ab1ishment 
per'od. Th removal of import quotas early in 1960 
also damag d the prosp cts of several companies, 
especially in the p trochemica1 indust y . A surprising 
number of compank5- at least five - explicitly critic-
iz d th market surv y which Americans from the parent 
company had made before stab1ishment here. One 
d scr'bed the pr - stab1ishment market s urvey as ' far 
too opt'mistic', and anoth r criticized th ' complete 
m'sconception on the part of the American c ompany of 
th sa1ab'lity ' of their products . The chief executive 
of a th'rd company stated that he had recently been 
talking to the managing director of the largest firm 
in their industry 'and we agreed that both our firms 
could fold up comp1et 1y and the industry would hardly 
noti the diff r nce'. An executive from this 
co~pany ' s American par nt had described Australia as a 
' goddam market', and neither men felt there had been 
an adequat market survey conducted before the original 
inv stment . Much criticism has been levelled against 
som m mbers of th Altona petrochemical complex for 
misjudging the growth in the Australian market for 
their products: an American in a related industry ex-
pr ssed the view that on part of the complex had been 
s t up ' almost intuitively', with a justification for 
th in estment decision being wo r ked out after the 
d cision had been taken. 17 0 er-estimation of the 
Australian market certainly appears to be a mistake 
to which som Am ricans are particularly prone, and 
though it is the Am rican shareholders who often have 
to pay th heaviest penalty for this, there may also 
be a cost to Australia if such error leads to pre -
mature investm nt, cons quent pressure for increased 
tariff protection, and misallocation of complementary 
Aust a1ian resour s . 
Many American compani s have withdrawn from 
op rations in Australia . It wa noted in Chap ter II 
that 26 Am rican-affi1iat d compani s lhich had 
ith r s v r d th ir Am ri an conn tions or been 
liquid t d b for 1962 w ncount r d during the course 
17. For stm nt d of 
J5J 
of th present survey. There must undoubtedly have 
b en others which escaped notice. Some of the better 
known ones are mentioned in Appendix B, but there 
were others, such as Westclox (Aust . ) Pty Ltd, makers 
of spring alarm clocks; Reichhold Chemical Inc. 
(Aust . ) P ty Ltd, chemical manufacturers; the Bon Ami 
Co . of Australia P ty Ltd, manufacturers of household 
cleansers; and Murfett Publishers P ty Ltd, engaged in 
th printing of greeting cards . Among the smaller 
firms were the A . C. Horn Co . of Australia Pty Ltd 
( building materials) ,18 Harris Calorific (Aust.) P ty 
Ltd (gas welding equipment), Australian P ackers Corpora-
tion Pty Ltd (food processing ), Muralo Co. (Aust.) P ty 
Ltd (wat r paints), Wah Chang (Aus t .) Pty L td (mainly 
chemical manufacture), Greenwich P ty Ltd (lead pencils), 
Australian P lexon Pty Ltd (plastic coating of fibre) 
Carpco Australasia P ty Ltd (mining equipment for the 
rutil industry), and YorkaliB P ty Ltd (air-conditioning 
equipm nt)~ 
ot all th American companies which sold interests 
in Australia befor 1962 did so because of the poor 
performance of the Australian company . o reason for 
th sale of the American interest is known in seven of 
th 26 cases e amined. In four cases it is known that 
the primary motive for selling the Australian interest 
was the urgent need of the parent company for funds in 
the U.S., a need which bore little relationship to the 
19 profitability of the Australian company . In another 
case, . an American company sold a minority interest at 
a ery good price to th majority shareholder simply 
b caus of the latt r ' s d sire for complete ownership . 
G n ral El ctric sold out of an Australian partnership 
in 1955 primarily b caus of American antitrust consid-
rations. Th 40 p r nt interest of another Am rican 
company was sold to p rmit the owner of th American 
18 . A .C . Horn· Co. of Australia Pty Ltd appears to 
n stablish d in 1959 as a joint nture 
b tw n n Am rican company and ew Z aland interests. 
Th Am rOcan int r st was sold in 1961 and th ompany 
b am wholly w Zealand owned . It was a quir d by 
oth r Am rican int sts on 1964 when the wholly-
Am rO an holding company, W. R . Grace Australia Pty Ltd, 
pur has d all th shar s in the company . 
9. on cas, for ampl, the Am rican parent was 
t s 11 °ts only two overs s subsidiaries 
s n Oor uti of the par nt company 
substantial funds in th U.S. 
holding comp~ny to consolidate his estate . In still 
another cas , an Am rican holding company sold its 
int r sts in a particular industry in th U.S. and 
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SO had to dOspos of parallel interests in Australia. 
But in ight cas s r p ated loss s or very low profits 
w r the primary r ason for sale and in three other 
cas sad terioration in growth prosp cts caused the 
sal In some of th s cases, comp anies were unable 
to m et import comp tition. One company was unable 
to s cur suffici nt import licenses; the p rincipal 
market of another collapsed unexpectedly. The 
r asons for sale were, in short, almost infinitely 
ari d . 
Th Am rican-affiliated companies operating in 
Australia in 1962 were not without their difficulties. 
Of 36 qu stion d on the adequacy of their protection 
against imports, 14 firms (six of them in th 
ch mical industry) felt increased tariff protection 
would b v ry desirable. Several companies complained 
of th small size of th Australian market and two 
obj ct d to th methods used by governm nt departments 
in 1 tting contracts . But with only one exception _ 
a company which f It its Am rican parent was worried 
by th political unr st to the north of Australia -
non of th complaints mad by American-affiliated 
compani s were peculiar to American companies . The 
great majority of American affiliates interviewed 
felt th ir futur prospects in Australia to be good or, 
in many cases, e 11 nt . 
n onclusion, it appears that ven were reliable 
statistics on th profitability of American-affiliated 
ompani s in Australia a ailabl , swe ping generaliza-
tions would b out of plac. It is cl ar that American 
dire t in stm nt on Australian manufacturing has, 
on a , b n c nsod rably mor profitable than 
Australian 0 British in stm nt .in that s ctor, 
but or most ompan s th rat of r turn has certainly 
not b n as high a is fr qu ntly implo d in popular 
dOs ussion . 
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Chapter XI 
Many of the most important questions which may be 
asked about foreign °nvestment have not yet been answered, 
though some of them have been alluded to . This is 
b cause, as so often in conomics, "they can not be 
finally answered from empirical observation alone . 
Whil laying no claim to providing definit ive 
solutOons, this chapter attempts to apply current 
th ory to some of the questions most often asked of 
for ign investm nt in Australia. The first section 
deals briefly with the immediate effects of the capital 
inflow; the second deals at greater length with the 
eff ct of th operation of the foreign-owned capital on 
Australian incomes and balance of payments; and the 
third outlines the policy conclusions which arise out of 
th theoretical discussion. 
I 
Short - t rm effects of foreign investment on the 
recipient country ' s economy have customarily been dis-
cuss d in terms of the transfer problem. This subject 
has been covered and re-covered in great detail in the 
theoret"cal literatur and for this reason no elaborate 
rep tition is needed here. l Two or three points of 
particular relevance may nevertheless be noted . 
Th first is that the pessimism prevalent during 
the forties concerning the e tent to which income 
changes will permit he transfer of an intern~tional 
capital movement finds little confirmation in Australian 
e perience with direct investment in the post-war years . 
The p ssimism was e pressed most forcibly by Metzler 
2 
and Machlup . Metzl r observed that income reactions 
to capital inflow would be insufficient by themselves to 
gen rate a balance of payments deficit of equivalent 
siz on current account unless (a) one of the two 
countrOes concern d in the transaction is 'unstable in 
isolation ' , on th sense of ha ing a marginal prop nsity 
1 . S 00 tnot 3 o Chapt r III. 
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to cons ume plus a marginal propensity to invest 
greater than unity, and (b) the unstable country allows 
the capital transfer to affect its income stream 
directly . He concluded that income reactions would 
rarely be sufficient to transfer capital movement be -
cause 'few countrie will have marginal prop en ities to 
consum and 'nvest larg nough to plac them in the 
unstabl class . ,3 Machlup r ached a parallel conclusion. 
But, as has been repeatedly no ted during the 
fifti s (particularly in d'scussions of I.B . R.D. loans 
limited to the direct foreign exchange requirements of 
a particular project), M tzler's view was too narrow . 
Foreign inv stment is in fact quite likely to create a 
, t f bl' , 4 , t t ' , ans er pro m ln reverse, or a Sl ua lon ln 
which a balance of payments deficit larger than the 
foreign capital inflow's generated . Metzler pro-
bably failed to see this both because he abstracted 
from changes in rates of interest and because , though 
he b gan his article with reference to 'analysis of 
capital mo ements ' , he was less concerned with genuine 
for ign investment than with a mere transfer of pur-
chasing power . 
Lea ing aside changes in the 'lending terms of the 
central banks ' ,5 he left out of account the reactions 
of the banking system of the country receiving the 
foreign cap ital to its increas d international reserves . 
It a pp ars that it was not until P olak introduced the 
onc pt of the ' pansion ratio ' in the year after 
M tzler publi sh d his article that it was generally 
r ognized that, sinc at least p art of the imports 
indu d by th initial transfer of purcha ing power is 
lik ly to b ffect d only after a period, the banking 
syst m of a count y in r ceipt of foreign capital is 
quit 





likely to ~-e pand credit facilities, with 
and th ational Incom 
Bla~ston Company! 1943 , 
X. 
of Int rnational Trad 
4 . For d i cuss 'on of this po ' nt, s ,for a mpl , 
Ch rl s P. Kindl b rg r , Int rnational E onomics 
(Hom wood, Ill. : R ' hard D. Irwin, 1958 dn .), pp . 
400-1; and H. W. A ndt, ' Ov rs as Borrowing - t h w 
M d 1 ', E onomi Rod, XXXIII ( 1957 ) , 247-61 , 
sp 'all pp. 253-4 . 
5 . 
p. 1 
in th ory of Int rnational Trad , 
357 
d'sastrous cons quenc s for the balanc 6 of payments. 
M tzler ' s failure fully to grasp the significance 
for the balance of payments of the fact that direct 
for ign investm nt usually involves th net creation 
of productive capacity in the recipient country was, 
if possible, still more important . Any increase in 
manufacturing capacity provides some stimulus to 
investment in other areas of the conomy, the extent 
of this stimulus varying with the amount of excess 
capacity already in xistence and with the importance, 
in t rms of linkages, of the initial investment . It 
would not be surprising to find that, in an economy 
already operating at near full capacity, the establish-
ment of a car industry by a foreign company would 
provide a very substantial stimulus to domestically 
financed investment. Metzler felt that countries which 
ar ' unstable in isolation' must certainly be rare. 
But seen in this light it would almost be surprising to 
find a country that is stable in isolation. Far from 
bing a fraction of the initial foreign investment, as 
Metzler assumed, domestic investment may well be a 
multiple of the foreign investment . (aturally, this 
conclusion only follows on the assumption that monetary 
and fiscal policies are not employed to pre ent the 
foreign investment resulting in a net addition to over-
all investment . This assumption is retained throughout 
the present discussion.) 
The effect on the balance of payments is the same 
if th increased 'dom stic investment' represents not 
in estment in industries complementary to that in which 
the for ign investment occurs but the mobilization of 
dom stic sa ings for us by the foreign company when 
th latter provid s only a part of the funds needed to 
establish the new proj ct. The greater the extent to 
which for ign companie rely on domestic funds for 
6 . J.J . P olak, 'Balance of P ayments P roblems of 
Coun r' s R constructing with the Help of Foreign 
L oans ' , Quart rly Journal of Economics, LVII (1943) 
repr'nt d in R adings in th Theory of International 
Trad , esp cially p. 467 . 
th ir °nvest.nent, covering only the direct foreign 
ch ng ontent of th investment with funds from 
abroad, th great r is the likelihood of the foreign 
investm nt creating a balance of payments problem. 
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If, as se ms probable under present-day conditions , 
direct for ign investment generates large amounts of 
dom stic investment, its shor -term eff ct on the 
balance of paym nts are lik ly to b e unfavourable. 
The argument that direct foreign investment in 
Australia should be ncouraged in times of balance of 
payments strain ( or that, were it not for the capital 
inflow, Australia would be confronted with a s erious 
balance of payments deficit) does not take fully into 
account the ' inv stment-multiplier' ffec t of direct 
for ign investment . On th contrary, it se ms probable 
that a cessation of direct investment would, in th 
short-t rm, have a beneficial effect on the balance of 
payments, unless of course foreign subsidiaries main-
tain d th ir dom stic investment programmes by borrowing 
funds locally . 7 
There is a second point which should b noted . The 
e pansion in domestic expenditure brought about by the 
foreign investment also represents an expansion in 
domestic factor incomes. Both profits and wages, taken 
over the economy as a whole, necessarily rise in the 
period when foreign investment is actually taking place . 
If, prior to the capital inflow , there had been consider-
able unemployment of labour , the increased wage payments 
would probably represent the payment of a largely un-
8 
changed wage rate to an increased number of workers . 
If labour had been fully employed prior to the capital 
7. This view is not inconsistent with the conclusion 
of Philip W. Bell that 'shifts in the flow of private 
cap ital, in p articular in U.S. p rivate capital fl owing 
o v erseas , have been a major cau se of our deteriorating 
balance - of-p ayments positi on since 1956 .' (Quoted by 
D. A. Snider, ' The Case for Ca p ital Control to Relieve 
the U.S . Balance of P ayments ' , American Economic Review, 
LIV (1964) , p . 353 .) It may be that the increase in 
imports generated by the receipt of U.S . foreign 
investment has the effect of increasing the exports of 
third ountries in th first instance . Howe er , Bell ' s 
conclusion could hardly apply to hat larg part of 
for gn in estm nt which is confined to ith r the re -
in stm nt of profits or the direct po t of equipment 
and mat rial. 
8 . Only ' 1 rg ly un hang d ' b caus it i probable 
that a marg Onal onomic in nti would b n ded to 
brOng about labour mo ment v n in a ituation of 
substantial un mploym nt. 
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inflow, incr ased wag s would take the form of increased 
mon y wage rates as industries feeling the impact of 
th new investment compet for labour, and there is a 
pr sump-t ion that dom stic prices would rise as a result. 
In such a situation, real wage rates also rise, for, 
though the rise in domestic prices means that the ris 
in r al wage rates does not fully parallel that of 
mon y wag rates , the relative stability of the prices 
of imports and exportables permits some increase in 
real wage rates . 
Finally, the short-term impact of a foreign capital 
°nflow is likely to involve a disproportionate expansion 
of 'home-trade ' industries o This is so for two distinct 
reasons . First, for ign direct investment is almost 
c rtain to create a r latively large increase in demand 
for goods which by their nature cannot be imported, 
principally factory buildings. And secondly, as has 
been noted recently by Hall, the increase in domestic 
costs as a result of expansion fostered by foreign 
investment tends to shift the relative profitability 
of investment away fr om international - trade sectors to 
those more remote from international comp etition . 9 
The effect of foreign investment in creating a 
'transfer problem in reverse ' has significance only for 
the short - term. But, as will be seen , the increase in 
domestic factor incomes and the expansion of capacity 
in home-trade industries have significance for the 
long-term. 
II 
To analyse th long-term effects of foreign invest-
m nt on the national income and balance of payments of the 
recipi nt country it may be h lpful to construct a 
simple literary mod 1. It is assumed initially that 
th r are only two countries, A and B, and that the 
sam t chnology prevails in both countries. A has four 
s ctors: an xportabl s s ctor, producing food und r 
condOtions of perf t comp tition ; a home-trad sector, 
9. A.R. Hall, The London Capital Market and Australia 
1870-1914 (Canb rra: Au tralian National Univ rsity, 
1963), p. 194 . 
· 
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assum d to b~ concerned principally w'th building; and 
two importables sectors, producing cars (which may be 
sold 'th r as short-life capital goods or as final 
goods ) and car parts r spectively. Sectors in B produce 
th sam products, which ar th only ones consumed in 
this two country world, though in B ' cars' and 'ca 
parts ' are the exporting sectors and 'food ' is the 
importables sector. It is assumed that the output of 
firms is highly comp titive within each s ector but 
non-competitive or compl e mentary between dilferent 
sectors . There i s no g overnment (and so no taxation) 
< 
and th re are no barriers totrade betwe e n A and B 
save transport costs. It is assumed that the exchange 
rate between A and B is fixed, as also is A 's labour 
supply. Any B companies which invest in A do so by 
s tting up new companies. They secure a marke t for 
th ir products by price competition. Foreign capital is 
's ctor-specific' in the sense that companie investing 
abroad confin their operations to the s ctor in which 
th y operate in their home country . 
ow assume that for some reason the marginal effic-
iency of capital is higher in A's car industry than in 
B ' s and that capital flows from the latter to t he former 
as a result . Assume also for the moment that B capital 
...,< 
flows to no other A sector . The impact of this invest-
ment during the 'construction phase ' will be of the kind 
discussed in the previous section. What will be its 
impact after the new factories in A's car industry have 
been completed and brought into operation? To permit a 
clear distinction to be made between the effects of the 
'construction phase' and the 'operation phase', it is 
assumed that the gestation period of the investment co-
incides with the period of capital inflow. 
As new factories are completed, the marginal effic-
iency of capital in A 's car industry falls nearer to 
that in B's and the capital inflow dries up. The 
profitability of dome sti~ capital in A's car industry, 
by definition, falls. lO In other sectors the return 
10. For an e cellen treatment on the way in which 
by fo ign apital redu e th prof'tability 
capi tal, se uru.l Islam., Foreign Capi tal and 
nt : Ja an, India and Canada (Tokyo: 
Co., 19 0 , pp. 150-6 . 
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to capital may rise, although this is not certain . 
The car industry ' s increased demand for inputs helps 
other A firms to secure economies of scale and lower 
car prices reduce equipment costs to user sectors in 
A. Tending to offset these gains , however, is the 
competition of the new foreign firms in the factor 
market. Their increased demand for labour may push 
up wages even in sectors other than the car industry . 
But any loss to domestic capital is a gain to 
domestic labour . Demand for operating labour is 
likely to rise in both the car industry and other A 
sectors supplying the car industry with inputs or 
benefiting from the reduced price of cars. Moreover, 
there is a further rise in real wages as a direct 
result of the fall in price of cars . 
There appears to be no doubt that the return to 
A factors, taken together, in sectors other than the 
car industry must rise . Labour income in the car 
industry must also rise . Could the fall in the return 
to locally owned capital in the car industry offset 
the rise in the return to labour in that sector and, 
if so, could this net fall in the return to domestic 
factors in the car industry offset the rise in the 
return to domestic factors in other sectors? The 
diagram which MacDougall applied to a whol e economy 
se ms useful at this point when applied to a single 
11 
sector. In Diagram I HJ represents the marginal 
productivity of capital in A' s car industry as a 
function of the capital stock . OD is the capital stock 
11 . G.D.A. MacDougall, 'The Benefits and Costs of 
Private Investment from Abroad: A Theoretical Approach' , 
Economic Record, XXXVI (1960), 13-35. The ssentially 
microeconomic concepts of perfect competition and 
diminishing marginal produc t ivity of capital seem quite 
inappropriat to the analysis of whol economies . Their 
us as simplifications could be justified only if they 
pointed in the right direction, which, it appears, they 
fail to do . Among writers to make the assumption of 
dim'nishing marginal productivity of capital in the 
conte t of foreign investment in r cent years are : 
Murray C . Kemp, 'For ign Investm nt and the ational 
Advantag " Economic Record, XXXVIII (1962), 56-62; 
A. E . Jasay, ' The So ial Choice B twe n Home and Over-
s as In stm nt', Economic Journal, LXX (1 960), 105-
13; G raId M. M i r, International Trade and Development 
(N w York : Harper e Row, 1963 ) , Chapter V - Meier bases 
part of this chapter on Ma Dougall's articl cited 
abov ; and J . Cart r Murphy, ' Int rnational Investment 
and th ational Int r st ', Sou thern Economic Journal, 
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Diagram I 
before foreign capital flows in, earning total profits 
of GXDO out of total output of HXDO. Labour receives 
HXG. OG is the marginal productivity of domestic 
capital b fore the foreign capital inflow, and OF the 
marginal productivi t y which companies in B's car 
industry are prepared to receive . In this situation, 
foreign capital inflow will equal DE and, after this 
inflow, total output will be HZEO. Of this, FYDO 
accrues to domestic capital, YZED to capital owned 
abroad, and HZF to domestic labour . If reality for 
one particular s ctor conforms approximately to this 
diagram, there must b a net gain to domestic factors 
ev n in that sector into which the foreign capital 
flows, th extent of this gain being XZY. The first 
increm nt of foreign capital earns, it may be supposed, 
only ·ts marginal product and does not alter the 
total incom accruing to dom stic factors, only its 
distr·bution b tw en labour and capital . But all 
(11) dropping th assumption of first order homogeneity 
may c ompl t ly ups t his conclusions . 
s ubsequ nt increm nts r duce the return on pre -
xisting units of foreign capital, as well as the 
retu rn on pr - existing dom stic capital, the reduction 
in capital ' s income accruing to labour . The extent 
of labour ' s gain clearly depends on the elasticity 
of d mand for capital, or the extent to which it can 
b s ubstitut d for labour . MacDougall , operating 
with a giv n capital inflow, obs rved that the gain 
to domestic factors would tend to b small because 
the elasticity of th d mand for capital is probably 
fairly high in 'Australia' . But by its nature the 
capital inflow is not ' given' independently of the 
marginal productivity of capital differential . When 
this is realized, the gain to domestic factors in 
the sector receiving th foreign capital would appear 
to be greater, the greater the elasticity of demand 
for capital. (This conclusion will be qualified later 
when discussing the impact of technological change.) 
Ther may be a further gain to A factors through 
the effect of th capital inflow on the barter terms 
of trad sinc th foreign investm nt occurred in 
a sector comp ting with th exports of B . This effect 
is unlikely to be large in the multi - country world of 
reality . 
What effect do s the capital inflow have on the 
balanc of paym nts after th transitional reactions 
associat d with the actual transf r of the capital 
hav worked thems lv s out? What effect does the 
operation of th new productiv capacity have on 
th balance of payments? It has been argu d by various 
writ rs that the crucial factor in gauging the effect 
of for ign in stment on th balance of paym nts is 
wheth r ° t is suffici n t ly biased in favour of export -
1 0 0 d t 0 12 0 th 0 gen rating or imp rt-r p aC1ng 1n us r1 s . n 1S 
crit rOon , the capital inflow into A' s car industry 
must hav a b n ficoal ffect on A ' s balanc of payments . 
But th r is no n c ssary pr sumption that invest -
m nt in import - r plac m nt or port - creation will 
12 . S , for 
H.W. Arndt , Op e 
ampl , J.J . P olak, Ope cit .; and 
cit . 
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mprov th 0alance of paym nts, nor that investment 
conc ntrat d on th production of non-traded goods 
and s rv"c s will worsen the balanc of payments . 1J 
This can b st be illustrated by taking the limiting 
case . Imagine, if possible, that a foreign c ompany 
establishe s a fully automated, fully integrated, 
operat i on ( i . e. u sing n ither Australian factors nor 
Aust ralian materials ) for the production of 'bricks' 
in country A. S till assume there is no taxation . In 
this situation all expenditure on the ' bricks ' pro-
duc ed by the foreign subsidiary accrues overseas and 
so is a debit on the balance of payments. But if 
total expenditure by A residents remains unchanged _ 
and there is no reason in the present example why 
it should not - the expenditure which has been 
diverted to the products of the foreign subsidiary 
must, at least in part , be instead of expenditure on 
imports and exportables . The decline in expenditure on 
imports and xportables produces some direct benefit 
to th balance of payments, which partly offsets the 
debi t arising from th foreign investment . Some of 
th xp nditure now devoted to the purchase of ' bricks' 
produc d by th for ign subsidiary would, presumably, 
ha e been div rt d from th purchas of oth r non-
trad d goods and ser ices . Such diversion produces 
no direct b n fit to the balance of paym nts, to be 
sur , but it does fr resourc s for production in 
s ctors which do hav a dir ct impact on th balance of 
paym nts . 
Th mov ment of th s factors may pose probl ms . 
For, on th assump ion that domestic factors were 
b i n g mploy d up to the margin of profitability in 
th trad d - goods se tors th for ign investment , 
th absorption of additional fa tors r quires not only 
factor mob "lity but also some impro m nt in the 
comp titi 
to invol 
lJ . S 
situation of th s secto s . This is likely 
som r du tion in dom tic fa tor incom s . 
If dom stic factor p ic s w re perl ctly flexible , 
and dom stic fac ors th mselves perfectly mobile, 
there is in principle no reason why foreign invest -
ment on th non-trad d s ctor should b incompatible 
with balance of payments equilibrium and the main-
tenanc of employment levels . But if factor incomes 
( esp cially wages ) tend to be inflexibl downwards, 
or if factors tend to be immobile, the maintenance of 
employment levels is likely to be incons istent with 
balance of payments equilibrium. In the c ase of 
foreign investment in the traded-goods sectors, fewer 
adjustments - both to the allocation of domestic 
factors and to their p r ices - are r equired if pre -
for ign-investment levels of dome s t ic factor employ-
ment are to be maintaine d in consistency with balance 
of payments equilibrium. To this extent there is an 
advantage in foreign investment in traded- as compared 
with non-traded sec t ors. 
Though not useful in assessing the processes of 
adjustment requir d in any particular situation, 
there is a fund am ntal sense in which the effect of 
foreign investment on the balanc of payments can be 
m asured by the basic quation of national income 
analysis: 
x - M = Y - E, 
wh r X is xports of all goods and services, M is 
imports 01 all goods and s rvic s (including profits 
accruing abroad), Y is incom accruing t o domestic 
factors, and E i s national expenditure. Any d crease 
in Y, with E bing unchanged, nec ssarily produces 
an in reased d fici t in the balance of payments, as 
on would e p c t . An ob ious corollary of t his 
quation is that, gi n total p ndOtur , h in-
stm nt which produ s the rna imum increas in 
dom sti incomes also produc s the rna imum b nefit 
for th balance of paym nts. 
n th situation d s rib d arli r, wher 
compan s from B ' s motor indu try inv s in A ' s motor 
( 13 ) Ch 
sp °fi 
his =I~n~t~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
appl O s this r asoning 
1963 d Otion of 
417 ) . 
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industry , th net return to all factors in A, taken 
together , is higher in th period after the capital 
inflow than before it . If consumption and investment 
expenditures were at tbe same levels after the inflow 
as they were before it, the higher level of factor 
i ncome s necessarily implies some improvement in A's 
balance of payments . 
But it is probable that total demand will be 
higher in the post-inflow period than infue pre-
inflow period . For to begin with, any increase in 
incomes is likely to produce some increase in consum-
ption expenditures, though this is usually less than 
the increase in incomes . Secondly, to the extent 
that the marginal propensity to consume out of wages 
is higher than that out of profits and to the extent 
that the operation of the new foreign-owned capacity 
produces a relative increase in labour's income, 
there is another reason to expect an increase in 
consumption expenditure in the post-inflow period . 
There may be a still further increase in consumption 
because of a ' demonstration effect ' - the influence 
foreign investment has on consumption through its 
introduction to local consumers of new products and 
consump tion standards . (This effect will be discussed 
at greater length below: under the assumption made so 
far that the foreign capital increases the capacity of 
an already existing industry, in which the output of 
each firm is highly competiti e with the output of all 
other firms , the possibility of this effect is assumed 
away . ) 
Levels of consumption are also likely to be 
higher after the capital inflow than before because 
of the effect of the inflow on factor incomes during 
the ' construction' or 'transfer' phase. As observed 
above when discussing the short-term impact of foreign 
inv stment on the recipi nt economy, the e pansion in 
domestic expenditure brought about by the foreign 
in estm nt also represents an e pansion in domestic 
factor incom s . If labour unemployment had been 
substantial before th inflow, the increase .in labour's 
incom may represent merely an increased employment at 
cons tant money wage rat s . If there had been very 
li ttle unemployment before the inflow , money wage 
rates ar likely to b pushed up sharply during the 
IIfY 




transfer phase . In both cas es, labour' total real 
incom is increased abov that in the pr -inflow 
p riod, and with th s in real incom is likely 
to go a rise in real consumption . Therein lies the 
difficulty . The operation of the well knO\~ 
Duesenberry ' ratchet effect ' implies that even after 
the transfer phase has ended, the level of consump-
tion is likely to remain higher than its level before 
the capital inflow. 
As noted above, the transfer phase may also 
create a structural disequilibrium in the economy by 
causing an over-expansion in the home-trade sector. 
To cure this may again involve increased expenditure. 
It is. not possible to be precise about the effect 
of the capital inflow on investment expenditure in 
general. Any 'above trend' investment during the 
transfer phase might lead to some reduction in invest-
ment after the inflow falls off. But it may be fair 
to say that in the medium- to long-term the divergence 
of the level of investment from its level before the 
capital inflow will be a function of the divergence 
of consumption from its level in the period before 
the inflow . Since there is ample reason to expect 
consumption expenditure to be higher after the foreign 
investment than before, it appears likely that invest -
ment expenditure also will tend to be higher after the 
inflow . tIf th foreign investment reduced the price 
of capital goods - as in this simplified example 
this also would end to encourage investment .) 
When all reI ant factors are taken into account, 
th r for , it is difficult to predict whether a 
for ign capital inflow will (in the absence of policy 
m asures design d 0 r strict e penditure) increase 
domestic incom s by mor or less than it will increase 
dom sti penditur s . The suIt will dep nd on 
th par icular cir umstanc s of each as. The out -
com s of paramount importance, hower, because if 
demand is pand d b more than incomes A's balance of 
paym nts must b ad ersely affected . Or, what is 
moth r way of saying the same thing, A's capacity to 
financ its own ap"tal formation is r duced . In the 
long-t rm, this en aff cts A's income, unless there 
is to b indefin"te relianc on foreign sa ings . 
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Does r laxat"on of the many assumpt"ons made 
a~ter in any significant way the general conclusions 
r ached so far? 
One of the most important assumpt"ons made was 
that foreign capital only flowed between the car 
industries of Band A . If capital is in fact free 
to flow from any sector in B to its corresponding 
sector i n A, several significant differences occur 
in the analysis . 
• First , B ' s total investment in A is likely to 
be greater than in the earlier situa~ion . The flow 
of capital from the car industry in B to the car 
industry in A is likely not only to enhance the 
return to capital in other A sectors, but also, to 
the extent that the investment in A ' s car industry 
is an alternative to one in B ' s and the increased 
business activity in A affects B's exports only with 
a lag, to reduce the return on capital in other B 
sectors . As a result, capital from other B sectors 
tends to move to corresponding A sectors. This flow 
tends to be self-reinforcing . But there is a ' ceDing ' 
beyond which the flow can not increase . As expansion 
in A pushes beyond the full employment of labour and 
wages rise, the profitability of the international 
trade sectors falls and at the same time B ' s exports 
benefit mor and more quicldy from the expansion in A. 
Combin d with appropriate movements in the ra te of 
int r st, th s forc s produ e a falling off in the 
rat of capital flow from B to A . 
Wh n capital can mo from any sector in B to 
its corr sponding sector in A the number of A sectors 
in which returns to domestic capital fall increases . 
But again loss to dom stic capital is gain to domestic 
labour . As b fore, total r turns to A factors taken 
tog th r must ris , as onsidera ion of MacDougall ' s 
diagram , appli d to th indiv"dual s ctors r c i ing 
for ign capital , shows . Th r ould b som deteriora-
tion in A' s n t bart rt rms of trade if too much of 
th n r as d in stm nt w r con entrat d in A' s 
port s ctor , but it s ms probable that this could 
do no mor than p rt"ally offs t th n rase in 
ncom r at d by th in r as d in stm nt its If . 
For any d lin in 
stm nt in th 
p rt pri s s a r suit of for ign 
port s tor would "ts lf bring about 
II 
a reduction in the flow of foreign investment into that 
sector, thus limiting the deterioration in the terms of 
trade . Moreover, if a deterioration in the terms of 
trade were due to an export bias in production by 
foreign capital in A, 'it is possible that the factoral 
and the income terms of trade might still improve even 
though the commodity terms worsen. ,14 
When foreign investment can occur in any of a 
number of sectors, the possibility arises that it may 
occur in a sector where it contributes less, in terms 
of its contribution to the total income of A factors, 
than a similar investment would contribute in another 
sector . First there is the familiar divergence between 
social and private marginal productivity. The foreign 
investor is not primarily interested in the extent to 
which his investment increases the returns to other 
factors in A, nor does he often take into account the 
possibility of his investment altering the terms of 
trade of A. But clearly an investment in A's car 
industry which, when in operation, not only utilizes 
the output of other A sectors but also assists A's 
terms of trade, is of much greater benefit to A than 
one which is engaged in A's export sector if the 
latter uses the output of few A sectors and causes 
some deterioration in A's terms of trade in addition. lS 
While both result in some net increase in A's income 
when in operation, their effects on A's income, and 
thus ultimately on A's balance of payments, are very 
different. 
There is a second factor to be considered also. 
Even if social marginal productivity were adequately 
reflected in private marginal productivity, under 
the very reasonable assumption that foreign capital 
is ' sector-specific' there is no reason to suppose 
that foreign capital would react in the socially 
desirable manner. For foreign capital of the direct 
14 . Gerald M. Meier, p. 99. 
15 . There is nothing logically inconsistent about 
assuming only a small terms of trade advantage to A 
from foreign investment in A's car industry but a 
potentially significant disadvantage to A from invest-
ment in A ' s export sector. It is quite possible in 
theory , and often occurs in practice, that A is a 
relatively large part of world supply for the goods 
it exports but a relati ely small part of world de-
mand for the goods it imports . 
f -
. 
investment variety tends to move from a particular 
sector in B to the corresponding sector in A, 
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induced by a profitable investment opportunity in that 
16 
sector. The fact that there may be a higher profit 
to be secured in some o t her A sector, or for that 
matter, in some other B sector, tends to be quite 
irrelevant to the investing decision . (If B companies 
have higher credit ratings in A's capital market than 
A companies, the risk of a sub-optimal allocation of 
the resources available to A is still fur t her increased 
to the extent that foreign companies supplement their 
resources by borrowing in A.) 
It appears certain that in almost any circum-
stances , under the assumptions used above, A benefits 
by a net increase in its income after a capital 
inflow . But this increase may well fall short of 
that optimally possible. If it also falls short of 
the increase in consumption and investment expenditures 
brought about by the foreign investment , A is likely 
to be plagued by recurrent balance of payments pro-
blems . 
There are other assumptions which must be relaxed . 
It was assumed that labour supply in A is fixed. It 
is obvious, as Cairncross observed in the case of the 
Atlantic economy,17 that a capital flow from B to A 
increases the return to labour in A and reduces it in 
B . This lncreases the incentive for labour to migrate 
from B to A (especially during the period of actual 
capital flow), or, where A was previously keen to 
encourage immigration fo r non-economic reasons, 
enables this additional labour to be absorbed without 
loss of incom to ' sting A labour . (Whether labour 
will actually move from B to A of course depends on 
the r lativ levels of labour income before the 
capital flow . If real wages were very high in B , 
relative to those in A, before the foreign investment 
in A, a small increase in A ' s wages is not likely to 
16. Paolo Sylos-Labini, in Oligopoly and Technical 
Progress ( Cambridg , Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1962 ) , has rec ntly provided an interesting theoretical 
discuss'on of how distortions can arise when technical 
innovations yi ld in reas d profits rather than re -
duc d product pric s. Wilfried Guth , in Capital Exp orts 
to Less Developed Countries (Dordr cht, Holland: D. 
R id 1 Publishing Co., 1963 dn . ), makes a parallel 





induc any oignificant labour migration in this two-
country world . In the multi-country world of reality, 
how v r, labour s likely to be attracted from other 
countries where real wages are nearer those in A. ) 
Th labour inflow has an effect on the capital 
inflow itself. On the supply side, it is likely to 
prevent some of the rise in wages in A associated 
with the capital inflow after full employment is 
reached: this reduces the cost-price s qu e eze for 
firms in international t rade sectors and so prevents 
some of the pressure leading to a decline in the 
profitability of capital which operated with a fixed 
labour supply . On the demand side, the increase in 
the labour supply is likely to expand the market for 
the output of each sector, thus increasing the 
marginal efficiency of capital with any given capital 
stock . It seems likely that dropping the assumption 
of a fixed labour supply in A has a tendency to in-
crease the total capital flow from B to A and to 
work in the opposite direction to the tendency for 
money wage rates to increase . 
ow drop the assumption of a constant and identical 
technology in both A and B and suppose firms in B's 
(16) of investment projects will not be made on the 
capital market through the "price" mechanism and there 
is thus no certainty that the most profitable invest-
ment will be financed with the capital available . ' 
( p . 34 . ) And J • • Behrman puts the point even more 
strongly: ' Investment does not necessarily move into 
those areas which constitute the comparative advantage 
of the host country. First, the comparison of returns 
by the investor is between returns in his own country 
and those in the host country within the industry in 
which he operates. It is seldom questioned whether 
returns would be greater in another pursuit - though 
they are frequently greater in another industry even 
within the United States . ' (op . cit . , p. 151.) He 
goes on ( p . 158 ) to quote the U.S. Department of 
Commerce as providing empirical evidence for this view, 
The explanation for this apparently perverse behaviour 
is to be found, of course, in the discussion on the 
motivation of private foreign in estment in Chapter 
III : manufacturing companies frequently invest abroad 
not primarily to exploit a profitable opportunity for 
the investment of capital as such but to exploit an 
opportunity to apply, at low marginal cost, a particular 
know- how which trade barriers prevent their exploiting . 
( 17 ) A.K. Cairncross, Home and Foreign Investment 
1870-191 3 ( Cambridge: Cambridge University P ress, 1953 ), 





car 'ndustry to be technologically more advanced than 
firms in A ' s, ' n th sense that they can produce a 
given output of cars at a lower cost in total inputs 
of both capital and labour than can firms in A's 
car industry . (Assume that B's technological superiority 
leaves the capital/labour ratio identical with that in 
A' s car industry and thus ignore for the moment the 
complication that B's technology may be biased in 
favour of either capital- or labour-saving investment. 
B ' s superiority could be either in the strictly technical 
field or in that of management skills.) In this situa-
tion, the incentive for the individual firm to invest 
abroad is on the one hand decreased by the fact that 
transport costs between B and A now take a relatively 
smaller part of profits earned in exporting from B 
to A, but, on the other hand, is increased by the aware-
ness that the profitability of investment in A ' s 
car industry is increased, thus increasing the risk 
that other B firms which have access to the ad¥anced 
technology will invest in A's car industry to avoid 
transport costs. If the latter influence outweighs 
the former , or if there nevertheless remains a positive 
inc entive to invest abroad even if it does not, B's 
inv estment in A 's car industry may result in greater 
loss to capitalists in that sector than in the previous 
situation. For where domestic companies are unable 
to secure access to the new technology, their profits 
are squeezed in price competition with companies 
having a marked advantage in their lower average costs . 
If domestic companies ~ able to secure access to 
the superior technology, the cost of doing this is 
still likely to be higher than the marginal cost 
incurred by B companies in extending their already 
dev eloped technology to A. 
The income earned by labour in A's car industry 
may also decline . Whether this does occur or not 
depends on the relative strengths of two opposing 
forces: first, the decreased need for labour in 
companies using the new technology, and secondly, 
the increased need for labour caused by the 0 erall 
expansion n car output. 
With the possibility of a net reduction in the 
inc ome of both labour and capital in A' s car 




for "gn inv stm nt causes a net decline in ncom 
accruing to all A actors. Dome stic factors in 
other A sectors still gain from decreas d car 
pric s and an increased demand for inputs for the 
J7J 
car industry. And if competition is v"gorous, the 
price reduction may be greater than in the case of a 
' constant technology'. There is also a further 
possibility of gain. It is possible, though certainly 
not inevitable, that other A sectors wi ll gain im-
proved skills and methods from the improved techno -
l ogy in use in the car industry. The extent to which 
other A sectors will benefit from the improved techno -
logy depends mainly on two things . First, it will 
depend on the proportion of their inputs which firms 
in the car industry buy from other A sources. This 
is s o because for any given improvement in technology, 
car c ompanies are likely to be more concerned with 
the technical tolerances achieved and manufacturing 
methods used by domestic supplying firms the higher 
is the proportion of their inputs purchased from 
these domestic firms. Secondly, the extent to which 
other A sectors will benefit from the improved 
technology in the car industry depends on the extent 
to which the new technology is peculiar to production 
of a particular type of output. From this point of 
view, it would appear that other A sectors gain the 
greatest benefit from an improvement in management 
skills in the car industry and the least benefit 
from an improvement in a manufacturing process 
peculiar to the production of cars. Indeed, this is 
true not only because of the greater applicability 
of management skills beyond the car industry but also 
because of the greater difficulty in maintaining 
secrecy around management skills because of personnel 
mo ement between firms, etc . Because of the potentially 
large gains to other sec t ors when foreign firms in 
A ' s car industry introduce new techniques, gains which 
are additional to those following from the reduced 
price of cars and increased demand for car parts, it 
seems improbable that t here could be a net loss to A 
factors as a whole e en in the e ent of a loss to 
dom stic factors in the car industry . 
Technical change in B may take the form not of 
an improvement in production methods but of an 
invention of a new product which supersedes existing 
products . In one sense, the in ention of a new 
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produ t m r ly represents a price r duction and in 
its competitive impact on domestic car firms this is 
lik ly to be its primary ffect . This will also be 
its eff ct from the point of view of its impact on 
final consumers, whose real wages are thereby increased . 
But the new invention may also increase the degree of 
substitutability between labour and capital in sectors 
which use cars (in this simplified example) as capital 
goods . With a given capital stock, t his would appear 
to reduce the return to labour in other A sectors 
below the level it would have reached in the absence 
of this effect, and conceivably below its level before 
the foreign investment itself. The situation may be 
visualized in Diagram I, where the greater substitutab-
ility of labour and capital produces a flattening of 
the line RJ, a decrease in the return to labour and an 
increase in the return to capital. But of course the 
conclusion that returns to labour must fall when 
capital can be substituted for labour more readily 
depends upon the assumption that the capital stock 
remains unchanged, and this assumption is not warranted. 
A change in the elasticity of demand for capital itself 
causes an alteration in the inducement to investment, 
by both domestic and foreign entrepreneurs, and so in 
the stock of capital. It is possible, especially 
if other A sectors are substantially monopolized and 
if capital indivisibilities are significant, that 
further investment by either domestic or foreign firms 
is inhibited, and the capital stock therefore remains 
below the level needed to prevent a fall in the return 
to labour in those sectors. This conclusion is miti -
gated, however, by the other influences which, by 
causing an upward shift in the demand curve for the 
output of these sectors, cause a bodily shift upwards 
of their marginal productivity of capital curves . 
Two other points should be made in connection 
with a change in technology . First, it may be that 
the technique introduced in the production of cars 
is particularly bias d in favour of, say, labour-
saving . The effects of such a bias are partly those 
describ d above: when the effect on labour income of 
increas d demand for car parts and of reduced car 
prices was disregarded, it was seen that an increase 






labour-saving change in technology made available from 
the car industry depended on a significant increase in 
the capital stock in those sectors. It was mentioned 
that th's might not occur if the barriers to entry in 
those sectors are very high . It should also be noted 
that it might not occur if current savings are not 
sufficient to create the additional capital stock or if 
for ign firms are not sufficiently aware of the 
profitable investment opportunities available in other 
A sectors . In other words, labour-saving technological 
advances in B, appropriate to a capital-abundant economy, 
may be quite inappropriate to A . This is especially 
true if A has, for non-economic reasons , an immigration 
policy specifically designed to increase A's population. 
Such labour-saving technology may nevertheless be 
introduced if the foreign companies in A uncritically 
imitate the technology used in B. 
Secondly, a change in technology which introduces 
a new consumer product is likely to have an effect on 
consumption through the demonstration effect . In the 
Australian context, it is difficult to believe that 
American investment has had a significant effect on 
consumption through this particular effect, since al-
most all the products produced here by American com-
panies were well known in Australia prior to the 
American investment, either through other domestic 
production, through imports , or through international 
advertising. 18 To the extent that the local subsidiary 
of a foreign company is more anxious to expand its 
sal s in Australia than a parent company is to e pand 
its exports to Australia, the demonstration effect 
may n erth 1 ss ha e som impact on consumption even 
in this coun ry. 
Only two diff renc s are made to the analysis 
by dropping the assumption that no barriers (e cept 
transport costs) imp de trade between A and B . 
F ' rst as seen in Chapt r III, it is likely to 
ncourag B ' s to al investment in A. Secondly, 
th i t nce of artificial trade barrier~ may encour-
ag for ign cap'tal to ar as wh re its social 
marginal produc i ity falls short of the optimum . 
18. In the s cond di ion of his International 
Economics, Kindl b rg r at ributed th alleg d 
stra'n wh'ch G neral Motors-Holden ' s has caused the 
Australian balanc of payments to a demonstration 
eff ct . (p . 397 .) 
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If foreign capital, encouraged into A's car 
industry by import barriers, makes a smaller con-
tribution to A' s total income (after making full 
allowance for all external economies) than the 
sam amount of capital would make if invested in, 
say, A's home-trade sector, A is economically 
poorer than it need be. This not only means that 
A incom s are lower than they need be (though 
they may well be higher than if no foreign capital 
had been forthcoming), it also increases the like-
lihood that the increase in A incomes will fall 
short of the increase in A consumption and invest-
ment expenditures brought about by the capital inflow 
itself. This in turn increases the likelihood that 
the foreign investment will create rather than solve 
a balance of payments problem. Of course this does 
not constitute an argument for no trade barriers, 
but rather one for their very judicious use. 
Par t of the reason why foreign investment 
in, say, A's car industry may contribute relatively 
little to A incomes may be a failure on the part 
of the foreign firms to adapt their production 
methods to A's market size. This failure, leading 
to an unnecessarily high price of cars, could be 
encouraged by trade barriers erected by A. But to 
the extent that the range of possible factor combina-
tions is very narrow, to the extent that the 
production method in any industry is a datum through-
out the world in any given state of technical 
knowledge,19 ' blame' attaches not to the foreign 
companies but to A's tariff policy. 
Other assumptions initially made can be 
dealt with quickly . Capital inflow may take the 
form not of the setting up of new companies but of 
the take-over of existing ones. During the 
' transfer phase ', the actual construction of 
investment goods may be somewhat less in this case 
than in the previous one, though this is by no means 
19 . W.P. Hogan quotes I . M.D. Little as making this 
point. ('The Impact of the Foreign Sector on 
Industrial Structure', a paper presented to Section G, 
Australian and ew Z aland Association for the 




certain. Some of the for ign capital spent on 
buying out the domestic shareholders may leak into 
consumption expenditure but the bulk of it seems 
likely to lead either fairly directly to other 
real investment (in the case, say, of a corporate 
shareholder with interests in many industries ) 
or indirectly to the same end through effects 
on bank liquidity (in the case of private share-
holders) . A foreign take-over has the beneficial 
effect, from the point of view of the shareholders 
of the acquired company, that they avoid the loss 
of profits which would have followed increased 
competition caused by the establishment of a new 
company in the industry. The take -over permits 
domestic capital to be withdrawn from its original 
sector and moved into other areas. These other 
sectors may be less profitable than the original 
industry and if so this constitutes part of the 
real cost to A of the foreign investment. The take-
over is likely to mean a smaller price reduction in 
the products of the original industry than if 
an additional firm had been established, but there 
is likely to be a price reduction in other sectors 
as a result of the movement of capital from the 
industry receiving foreign capital . 
The competition offered domestic fi ms by 
foreign-owned companies may not take the form of 
price competition. This is particularly likely in 
an environment like the Austral ian where any dis -
turbance to price maintenance is severely discouraged 
in a large number of industries . In this situation 
competition will presumably take the form principally 
of heavy promotional expenditure and product diff-
erentiation . There may be some pre- and after-sales 
ser ic competition in addition (~hich from the 
point of view of th analysis essentially involves 
price competition in that the benefit accrues 
primarily to users of the product ). Competi ion ia 
promot:onal exp nditur is likely to have essentially 
th sam effect on the profits of domestically o,~ed 
companies in the s ctor in question as does price 
comp tition. But while it b nefits fa tors employed 
in ad rtising ag nci s and to a lesser e tent also 
ompani s supplying the media of mass communication, 







could be as great as in the case of price reduction . 
P roduct diff r ntiation itself appears to bring very 
lim' ted benefits: it raises manufacturing costs (and 
so lowers profi ts ) while having few advantages for 
A consumers. 
Finally, taxation must be taken into account . 
It has been noted by many writers that taxation is a 
significant cause of international misallocation of 
't 1 20 capl a • If all profits earned in A are taxed by 
A' s government, it is clear that B entrepreneurs will 
compare the marginal profitability of capital in A 
after tax with the marginal profitability of capital 
in B after tax . But whereas the tax levied in B 
benefits other B residents, when it is levied in A 
it benefits A residents. Imagine the situation in 
Diagram I, where tax is levied in A at the rate t 
on all profits earned in A. Before the capital inflow 
A's total income is: 
HXG + (l-t)(GXDO) + t(GXDO). 
A's income after the foreign capital inflow is not 
only A labour income, A net profits, and taxation 
on profits accruing to A residents, but also taxation 
on profits accruing to foreign residents : 
HZF + (l- t)(FYDO) + t(FYDO) + t(YZED). 
The gain to A as compared with the previous situation 
without tax is t (YZED). MacDougall felt this tax 
revenue to be one of the most significant gains t o 
21 the capital-receiving country . 
III 
It should be ob ious that the discussion above 
leaves out of account a number of significant matters . 
On the credit side, for example, no mention has been 
made of the advantage to the capital-importing 
country if the foreign subsidiary goes bankrupt, 
lea ing a legacy of real assets behind it . This 
is the converse of Keynes' oft-quoted argument a gainst 
capital export by the United Kingdom. 22 Similarly, 
20. See, for e ample, J.E. Meade, The Theory of 
International Economic P olic y , Vol . II , Trade and 
Welfare (London : Oxford University P ress, 1955), 
Chapter XXV. 
21. Ope cit., p . 34. 
22. J.M. Keynes, 'Foreign Investment and ational 
Advantage ' , The liation and the Athenaeum, 9 Augus t 
1924, p. 586 . The passage to which reference is 
made in the te t has been quoted , for e ample , by 
/379 
379 
in times of war or international crisis , the formal 
ownership of productive capacity in a capital-
importing country is likely to be of small importance . 
On the d ebit side it is probable that a number of 
disadvantages could be added to those already listed . 
One such could be the possibility of foreign invest -
ment encou raging the undue proliferation of production 
units in a small market, a situation which could pre-
vent the reaping of economies of scale but which 
might not necessarily lead to greater competition 
in markets as heavily rationalized as are many in 
Australia . Another aspect not mentioned in the 
theoretical discussion is the controversial subject 
of ' control ' . Three points should be noted in this 
connection however . First, it is clear from 
Chapter V that the local subsidiaries of American 
companies are in many cases allowed a considerable 
measure of autonomy in most areas of management 
decision- making. Secondly, it is hard to see how 
even the strict control exercised in some fields by 
most parent companies could work to Australia ' s 
disadvantage . Investment decisions , those subject 
to the greatest degree of American control , are 
under normal circumstances likely to be governed 
primarily by local market conditions and prospects, 
and as such may differ little from the decisionB 
taken by a ' self-financed ' company of Australian 
ownership . If a foreign subsidiary adopts a 
policy o f high profit remittance at the insistence 
of its parent company , this can not ( again under 
normal circumstances) be rated a ' disadvantage ' to 
Australia except to the extent that all capital 
inflow ( including profit reinvestment) may be to 
Australia ' s advantage. In any case, it has been 
seen in Chapter IV that American control over the 
dividend policies ofmcal subsidiaries frequently 
means the adoption of a very conservative policy . 
Thirdly, and perhaps most important of all , ultimate 
control rests to an important extent with Australia . 
( 22 ) M.C . Kemp~ . op . cit . , p . 61 ; and J . Carter 





In times of seve economic crisis, the government 
c ould restrict or even prohibit profit remittance 
and capital repatriation . It could control import 
pr ' c s and even make it uncomfortable for those 
c ompanies not exporting . In an important sense , 
a foreign company investing in Australia submits 
itself to potential Australian c ontrol . 
Though not directly touching on any of these 
po ints, the the oretical discussion does highlight 
som matters of fundamental importance. The first 
is that the rec ipt of foreign investment (partic-
ularly on a continuing basis ) does involve a real 
economic cost , in addition to the sectional losses 
borne by those who find themselves in competition 
with foreign investment. This cost arises from the 
unpredic tability of private foreign investment . How 
unstabl e the flow into Australia has been in the pos t -
war period can be seen clearly in Table 1-1 . This 
instability not only enhances the difficulty of 
maintaining a stable rate of economic progress in 
aggrega te terms, but also imposes high1.y variable ,strains 
on particular sect ors . During the period of 
capital i nflow, it is the home - trade sector which tends 
to expand most rapidly, as seen, but if the inflow 
falls off (or even if its rate of growth slackens) 
this sector may suddenly find itself with unemployed 
labour and excess capacity . 
It should nev rtheless be observed that this 
i n stability of capital inflow and the probl ems 
which it generates are not very different from the 
ff cts of the instability o f export receipts . In 
combating this latter instability, the impor tance 
of maintaining substantial foreign exchange reserves 
i recognized and vigorou s attempts are made to 
div rsify the ~omp o sition of exports and the markets 
t o which they are s nt. Few would s u ggest t ha t 
the gains which aris fr om international specializa-
ti on and trad e hould be abjured simply because of 
the unpredic tability of export receipts and the 
sam conclusion s ems to be the most logical in the 
case of foreign i n stment . The instability pro-
bl m can be reduced t o s ome extent by the maintenance 
of adequate foreign e change reser es ( though this 
itself entails s ome cost ) . There may also be some 
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scope to diversify th sources of foreign investment 
in Australia - the growth in importance of American 
investment is its If a significant diversification 
from traditional reliance on the British capital 
market . When the domestic economy is operating 
near capacity there would seem to be every advantage 
in denying foreign subsidiaries the right to raise 
funds on the domestic capital market, while, when 
private foreign investment slackens temporarily, 
government borrowing abroad might be able to supply 
the foreign resources needed to avoid the structural 
adjustments which would otherwise be necessary. (It 
must be admitted that these theoretical possibilities 
may not be easy to put into practice.) 
The theoretical discussion also makes it plain 
that under most circumstances foreign investment 
results in a rise in the real income of Australians . 
At this point, reference may be made to the empirical 
observations made in Chapter VIII where the effects 
of Ame rican investment on Australian labour incomes, 
on Australian taxation revenue, on Aus tralian 
techniques of management and production, on the 
incomes of Australian suppliers, and on the prices 
paid by Australian consumers were discussed . The 
profits earned by American-affiliated companies are 
seen to be relevant only to the extent that the 
incomes of Australians are adversely affected as 
compared with their level in the absence of American 
investment. Indeed, provided no harm is done 
directly t o the incomes of Australians, the higher 
the profits of American-affiliated companies the 
better - because of the substantial equity in 
these profits enjoyed by the Australian Taxation 
Commissione r . 
On the o ther hand, it may well be that Australia 
could increase the benefit it receives from foreign 
investment, and ways in which this might be done 
ha e been suggested at various po ints in the presen t 
thesis. One such might be enactment of legislation 
similar t o that in force in the U. S. to deal with 
restrictive trade practices . Perhaps even more import-
ant might be the more judicious use of the tariff, both 





ing new ones . Another way might b a more igorous 
approach by the Taxation Commissioner to tax avoid-
anc , b o th through the pricing of imports and exports 
and through th payment of arbitrary ' service charges ' 
and ' engineering fees'. And if the employment of 
n on-Australians in foreign subsidiaries ever became 
a rious problem ( and it is clearly not a serious 
problem in most American-affiliated companies in 
Australia at present) the tax concessions now en-
joyed by many of them could be withdrawn . 
The fundamental problem is to ensure that 
foreign investment - indeed, all investment -
occurs in sectors where its social marginal product-
ivity is at an optimum. This points to the need 
for government guidance of some kind. But there 
are two important difficulties in the way of this, 
at least one of which seems insurmountable . The 
first and perhaps more intractable problem is that 
f oreign capital tends to be ' sector-specific' . 
This implies that for an American, say, soft - drink 
company, the choice is between investing in the 
Australian soft-drink industry or not investing in 
Australia at all . The fact that Australian authorities 
might prefer it to invest in oil exploration or 
chemicals production is likely to be entirely irrele-
vant to its decision . Australia can reduce the 
tent to which its own resources are 'mi allocated' 
by d nying the soft-drink subsidiary access to the 
Australian capital mark t but it would appear 
difficult if not impossible to re-allocate the 
for ign inv stment itself . 
Th s cond problem is that it is not easy to 
d cid what th optimal allocation of investment is. 
E n inv stment in soft-drink production ( used here 
b caus th industry is 0 oft n held up as an 
ampl of th kind of for gn inv tment Australia 
do s not want) may r duc prices below their level 
n th absenc of for ign in stm nt, increase wages, 
and b n fit ta nu. Moreov r, if the foreign 
inv stm nt through th acquisition of a dom tic 
ompany, 
otb s 
dom st ' c pital is r 1 as d for use in 
tors. ( Ind d , far from d'scouraging 
f o r gn tak -0 er in industri s wh r apacity s 
J8J 
already in over-abundanc , there would appear to b 
much to be said for encouraging th m, inasmuch as 
they fr e dom stic r sources for inv stment in 
s ctors where social marginal productivity may be 
higher. This may be one way to combat the 'sector-
specific ' problem.) It may be simpler to decide 
where investment is not required (for example, in 
industries likely to be heavily dependent on 
tariff protection for an indefinite period ) than 
to encourage it to sectors where it is r equired . 
But while it may not be easy to implement a policy 
of the type suggested in practice, the nature of the 
problem itself is clear . 
The final point highlighted by the theoretical 
discussion is that responsibility for the preserva-
tion of long-term balance of payments equilibrium 
rests primarily on domestic Australian authorities. 
The effect of foreign investment on the balance of 
payments in the long-term depends on the extent to 
which the investment increases domestic incomes in 
relation to domestic expenditures. This appears a 
very obvious statement yet it is very frequently 
overlooked. Even ignoring crudely fallacious argu-
ments which seek to assess the effect of foreign 
investment on the balance of payments by comparing 
'new capital inflow' with 'profit remittance', there 
is a considerable amount of misunderstanding on this 
subject. Attent ion has already been directed to the 
essentially incomplete views which have been expressed 
by Polak, Arndt, and others concerning the allocation 
of foreign investment between international-trade 
industries on the one hand and home-trade industries 
on the other. Preoccupation with the ratio of pro-
fit remittance to a country's external earnings can 
also be misleading if a rise in that ratio is too 
simply taken to indicate that foreign investment is 
2J 
causing a strain on the balance of payments. And, 
as Perkins has pointed out, e en concern ith 
restrictions on the e port franchise of foreign 
2J. It may be that the writer himself placed undue 
emphasis on this in es ment service ratio i n his 
New Zealand's Debt Servicin~ Capacity ( Christchurch: 




compan'es may well b 24 out of plac. For if for ign 
companies sellon th local mark t ' nstead of export-
'ng and if total dom s tic demand is giv n, the 
domest'c sales of the foreign companies must either 
bring about a reduction in imports or compel other 
Australian compani s to export their output. Only 
to the extent that the exports of Australian-owned 
companies face very inelastic foreign demand, Austra-
lian imports are in inelastic demand, and the economies 
of scale available to foreign companie s which expand 
their output by exporting are greater than those 
available to Australian companies which expand their 
output by exporting, is there a loss to Aus tralia 
through export franchise restrictions. It seems 
quite possible that export franchise restrictions do 
in fact reduce the benefit of foreign investment to 
Australia, but the reduction is by no means of the 
magnitude implied in most public discussion. 
The problem for Australian monetary and fiscal 
authorities is to keep the growth of total domestic 
demand within the growth of domestic incomes - and it 
is likely that foreign investment will increase both . 
In practice, if foreign investment involves a rela-
tive redistribution of income from capital to labour, 
as seems probable, the problem will be essentially 
one of scooping off some of the increase in labour 
incomes in the form of either savings or taxation . 
If this is not done, the balance of payments will be 
a recurrent source of trouble and, over the long-
term, Aus tralia will be ind~tely dependent on foreign 
capital . While this may have no pressing economic 
disadvantages ( as long as foreign capital is forthcom-
ing), it may not be a situation which Aus tra~ians 
would voluntarily choose . Nor would it seem to be a 
morally defensible position for a wealthy country in 
a capital-hungry world . 
24. J.O.N. P erkins, 'Some Fallacies about 0 erseas 
Borrowing', Australian Quarterly, XXXII ( 1960), 0.2, 




MANUFACTURING OPERATIONS OF PARTICIPATING COMPANIES 
Part II of th first questionnaire used in the 
survey of American investment sought information 
parallel to that supplied by all manufacturing establish-
ments to the Commonwealth Bureau of Census and 
Statistics . Considerable detai l was reque sted for 
the June year 1961/6 2 while information on the main 
aggregates of employment, wages, cost o f materials, 
value of output, value of land and buildings, and 
value of plant and machinery was sought for as many 
previous years as possible. Relatively few companies 
were able to provide data for a useful number of years 
before 1961/ 62 bu t 100 were prepared to provide sub-
stantially complete data for 1961/62 itself . Indeed, 
willingness to complete Questionnaire I was taken as 
evidence of willingness to participate in the survey as 
a whole, as mentioned in Chapter I. Of these 100 
replies, one has not been included in the following 
tables because the company concerned began manufacture 
in Australia only in the very last weeks of 1961/ 62. 
Information supplied by participating companies 
relating to their operations before 1961/ 62 is presented 
in part in the body of themxt . Some reference is also 
made there to the 1961/ 62 data , and the following 
tables present most of the material on which the 
discussion in the t ext is based. It is most important 
that they be read in conjunction with the numerous 
explanawry notes which follow them . 
E cept in Table A-2, unbracketed figures refer 
to the manufacturing establishments of the 99 participating 
companies included in the tables. Bracketed figures 
refer to total manufacturing operations in the industry 
mentioned, and are drawn from tables published by the 
Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics. 
~'. 
i .. ' 
~ .. 
~.- . 
TABLE A- l : AMERICAN- AFFILIATED COMPANIES , BY INDUSTRY AND NUMBER OF FACTORIES OPERATED AT 30 JUNE 1962 
Companies with -
Industry One factory only Two factories Three factories More than three 
only only factories 
Industria l chemicals 8 1 1 1 
Pharmaceuticals and toilet preparations 9 1 
Plant , equipmen~and machinery 17 1 2 
Electrical machinery , cables , and 
apparatus 9 5 
Motor vehicle construction and assembly, 
and motor bodies 2 1 2 
Motor accessories 5 
Other metal products 7 1 1 1 
Foundation garments 2 1 
Food, drink, tobacco 5 3 
Paper , stationery , printing, etc . 4 1 
Other products 4 2 1 1 
Tota l : 72 11 6 10 
(a) Note that in this table companies are classified , according to their main activity, by industry . 
all factories actually~perate in the industries ~ shown. 
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TABLE A- 2 : SIZE OF AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN- AFFILIATED FACTORIES , BY EMPLOYMENT 
Size of factories by American-affiliated factories All factories operating in Australian 
employment industry 
Number Employment Percentage Number Employment Percentage 
of total of t ot a l 
employment (a) employment 
1 
-
10 8 58 0.1 42,293 158,279 14 . 2 
11 
-
20 13 199 0.4 6,969 101 ,898 9 . 2 
21 
- 50 32 1,026 2.2 5,174 162,948 14.6 
51 
-
100 31 2,254 4.7 1,886 131,501 11.8 
101 
- 200 26 3,600 7.6 992 139,447 12 . 5 
201 
- 300 13 3,195 6 .7 320 78,110 7 . 0 
301 
-
400 6 2,146 4. 5 130 44,825 4 . 0 
401 - 500 6 2 , 665 5 . 6 86 38,347 3 . 4 
501 
- 750 9 5,722 12 . 0 118 72,437 6 . 5 
751 - 1000 2 1 , 513 3 . 2 46 39,779 3 . 6 
Over 1000 10 25 , 176 52 . 9 66 144,844 13 . 0 
Tota l : 156 47 , 554 100 . 0 58,080 1,112,415 100. 0 w 
co 
(a) Ten companies , which between them owned 34 factories employing 9,044 persqns, gave ' consolidat ed' data for their several -...J 
plants , thus making their classification Qy size impossible . Percentages shown leave the employment of these factories 
out of consideration . 
.~ 
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TABLE A-3: SIZE OF AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN-AFFILIATED FACTORIES z BY EMPLOYMENT AND INDUSTRY 
Factories employing -
~rom 1 to 50 From 51 to 100 More than 100 Not classifiable Total Size OI average 
Industry Eersons Eersons Eersons factory (persons ) 
Factories Persons FactoI~es Persons Factories Persons Fa ctories Persons Factories Persons 
Industrial chemicals 2 21 4 284 4 606 7 2,216 17 3,127 184 
(249) (2,847) (19) (1,301) (27) (8,100) (295) (12,248) (42) 
Pbannaceutica1s and 
toilet preparations .. . . 6 419 3 1,362 2 964 11 2,745 250 
(165) (2,048) (28) (2,020) (18) (3,846) (211) (7,914) (38) 
Plant, equipment, and 
machinery 9 255 2 168 12 3,518 3 229 26 4,170 160 (2,420) (26,4-47) (148) (1~,268) (176) (41,155) (2,744) (77,870) (28) 
Electrical machinery, 
cables, and apparatus 4 119 3 210 7 3,223 2 2,855 16 6,407 400 
(1,158) (11,532) (73) (5,169) (118) (36,469) (1,349) (53,170) (39) 
Motor vehicle cons-
truction and assembly, 
and motor bodies 1 30 1 51 14 23,820 16 23,901 1,494 
(2,143) (12,385) (23) (1,549) (34) (32,043) (2,200) (45,977) (21) 
Motor accessories 2 39 1 69 2 927 5 1,035 207 
(252) (2,318) (16) (1,169) (32) (8,803) (300) (12,290) (41) 
Other metal products 5 ll4 4 345 14 5,799 4 448 27 6,706 248 
(16,831) (105,881) (399) (27,934) (310) (i75,923) (17 ,600) (309,738) (18) 
Foundation garments 3 114 5 320 2 506 10 940 94 
(47) (625) (7) (495) (12) (2,867) (66) (3,987) (60) 
Food, drink, tobaoco 9 162 2 147 7 2,459 10 512 28 3,280 117 
(6,773) (50,044) (232) (16,318) (246) (63,754) (7,251) (130,ll6) (18) 
Paper, .stationery, 
printing, etc. 4 108 1 89 3 515 4 250 12 962 80 
(2,463) (28,049) (158) (10,965) (ll8) (35,007) (2,739) (74,021) (27) u 
<Xl Other products 14 321 2 152 4 1,282 2 1,570 22 3,325 151 <Xl 
Total: 53 1,283 31 2,254 72 44,017 34 9,044 190 56,598 298 
Total manufacturing: (54,436) (423,125) (1,886) (131,501) (1,758) (557,789) (58,080)(1,112,415) (19) 
t 1 
~ 
TABLE A-4: EMPWYMENT IN AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN-AFFILIATED FACTCRIES, BY INDUSTRY AND STATE (a) 
Not 
Industry N.S.W. Vic. Qld. S.A. W.A. Tas. classifiable (b) Total 
Industrial chemicals 265 553 2,216 
(6,847) (3,703) (414) (858) (c) (c) 
Pharmaceuticals and toilet 
preparations 
Plant, equipment, and 
machinery 
Electrical machinery, cables, 
and apparatus 
Motor vehicle construction 
and assembly, and motor 
bodies 
Motor accessories 
Other metal products 
Foundation garments 
Food, drink, tobacco 














































· . (5,950) 















· . (473) 














· . (c) 
· . (3,432) 

















































(a) Employment figures in this and succeeding tables differ from those shown in Tables A-2 and A-3. Figures in the latter 
tables are based on average employment over the period of operation of each plant, while those in the former have been 
converted to annual equivalents. 
(b) Four companies, each a.ming plants in more than one State, gave' consolidated' data for their several plants, thus making 
their classification by location impossible. 
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TABIE A 5: EMPLOYMENT m AUS'T'RALIAN AND AMERICAN-AFFILIATED FACTORIES! BY INDUSTRY % CATEGORY OF EMPLOYEE! AND SEX (a) 
Average number of persons employed -
Industry Male Female Total Managerial Chemists, Wages Total Managerial Chemists, Wages Total (b) 
and clerical draftsmen, staff (b) and clerical draftsmen, staff (b) 
staff etc. staff etc. 
Industrial chemicals 348 349 1,858 2,555 205 4 210 419 3,034 
(1,489) (958) (8,125)(10,610 ) (875) (10) (531) (1,481) (12,091) 
Pharmaceuticals and toilet 
preparations 308 108 1,014 1,430 405 51 859 1,315 2,145 
(125) (392) (2,395) (3,548) (116) (133) (3,443) (4,362) (1,910) 
Plant, equipnent, and machinery 101 204 2,111 3,622 395 15 136 546 4,168 (8,552) (2~525) (51,158)(69,263) (4,465) (U9) (3,508) (8,201) (11,464) 
Electrical machinery, cables, 
end apparatus 129 143 3,318 4,190 421 32 1,758 2,211 6,401 
(5,434) (1,500) (33,092)(40,522) (3,430) (U3) (8,801) (12,396) (52,918) 
Motor vehicle ~onstruction 
and assembly, and motor bodies 2,595 190 19,309 22,694 690 15 502 1,201 23,901 
(4,528) (936) (35,199)(43,191) (1,681) (19) (131 ) (2,549) (45,146) 
Motor accessories 111 24 101 836 51 1 141 199 1,035 
(1,461) (388) (6,980) (8,961) (814) (48) (2,313) (3,312) (1~,27'J 
other metal products 192 160 5,102 6,054 246 11 329 586 6,640 
(23,861) (5,188) (231,805 )(218,619) (12,648) (365) (15 ,949) (29,895)(308,514) 
Foundation garments 52 5 95 152 92 6 690 788 940 
(132) (6) (284) (431) (264) (6) (3,265) (3,550) (3,981) 
Food, drink, tobacco 210 35 2,009 2,314 164 9 186 959 3,213 (10,228) (1,584) (16,493)(92,182) (1,114) (493) (26,109) (35,808)(128,590) 
Paper, stationery, printing, etc. 101 16 526 643 69 4 246 319 962 
(6,115) (489) (46,042)(54,608) (4,950) (92) (13,921) (19,231) (13,839) w Other products 291 224 2,128 2,649 192 28 456 616 3,325 \() 0 
Total: 6,304 2,058 38,111 41,139 2,936 116 6,119 9,291 56,430 
Total manui'acturing: (86,594) (18,055)(102,991)(841,501) (53,831) (1,998) (201,362) (263,044)(1,lO4,551) 
(a~ See Note (a) to Table A-4. 
(b Figures for total employment shown in brackets include small numbers of working proprietors not separately shown in the 
table. It has been assumed that no American-affiliated companies employed persons falling into that category. 
11 
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TABLE A-6: WAGES AND SALARIES PAID BY AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN- AFFILIATED FACTORIES, BY INDUSTRY , CATEGORY OF EMPLOYEE , AND SEX 
£A(thousand) 
Industry 
Industria l chemicals 
Pharmaceuticals and toilet 
preparations 
Plant , equipment, and 
machinery 
Electrical machinery , cables, 
and apparatus 
Motor vehicle construction and 
assembly , and motor bodies 
Motor accessories 
Other metal products 
Foundation garments 
Food , drink , tobacco 
Wages and salaries paid to male -

































































3,595 Other products 
TotaH (a) : 
Total manufacturing : 
14,874 
(167,984) 
47 , 187 
(781,479 ) 
(a) Detail may not add to t otals because of rounding . 
(b) Excludes amounts drawn by working proprietors . 
T~:~r,}l:.-'- .. ;:'~-_'~::.; ~-~~ :<" -,~-' . . FJ~-:-~ ~. 
62 , 061 
(949,463) 
Wages and salaries paid to female -
Managerial and Wages staff Total (a) 








(} , 35-4) 
346 
(2 , 682) 
621 









































(5 , 616) 
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T ABLE A-7 = VARIOUS COSTS 2 VAlliE OF OUTPUT 2 AND VAIIJE OF PRODUCTION OF AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN- AFFILIATED F ACTORIES 2 BY INDUSTRY 
Va lue of output Cost of - Va lue of Ratio of 
U(thousand) production production 
Power , fuel Lubricants Tools re- Conta iners , All other mat - Tot a l mat- (a ) t o output 
Industry and light and water placed and packaging erials used erials , fuel U(thousanV (per cent) 
U(thousand) £A(thousand) r epa irs material , U (thousand) etc . used (b) 
t o plant etc . U ( thou sand) 
£A (thous- £A(thous-
and) and) 
Industrial chemicals 25 , 228 1, 940 135 790 406 11,950 15 , 221 10,008 39 . 7 
(96 , 711) (5 , 347) (415) (2 , 542) (2 ,890) (41 , 769) (52 , 962) (43 , 749) (45 . 2) 
Pharmaceutica ls and toilet 
preparations 28 , 088 158 19 180 3,098 7,193 10 , 647 17,441 62 . 1 
(59 , 512) (739) (58) ( 552) (7,327) (17 , 707) (26 , 383) (33,129) (55 . 7) 
Plant , equipment , and 
machinery 26 , 495 279 33 400 136 14, 258 15 , 105 11,390 43 .0 
(294 , 964) (3 , 274) (485) (4 , 551) (1 , 232) (142,681) (152,222) (142 , 742) (48 . 4) 
Electrica l machinery , cables , 
and apparatus 27 ,874 345 34 431 449 14,993 16 , 253 11, 621 41. 7 
(208 , 589) (2 , 581) (255) (3 , 087) (2 , 273) (107,377) (115,572) (93,017) (44 . 6) 
Motor vehicle construction 
and assembly , and motor 
bodies 90 , 231 1,836 266 3, 024 320 41, 605 47,051 43,180 47 . 9 
(188 , 044) (2 , 739) (378) (4 , 387) (340) (95 , 248) (103,092) (84 , 952) (45 . 2) 
Motor accessories 5, 246 112 28 181 45 1,760 2, 126 3, 120 59 . 5 
(45 , 407) (826) (133) (1 , 172) (505) (18 , 201) (20 ,837) (24 , 570) (54 .1) 
Other meta l products 58 , 693 2, 460 105 1 , 540 146 36,926 41 , 198 17,495 29 .8 
(1 , 243 , 752) (51 ,870 ) (2 , 477) (29 , 072) (5 ,051) (615 ,814) (704, 283 ) (539 , 469) (43 . 4) 
Foundation garments 3, 092 14 1 37 92 1, 094 1, 237 1 ,855 60 . 0 (11 , 181) (44) (5) (89) (243) (5 , 448 ) (5 ,829) (5 , 352) (47 . 9) 
Food , drink , toba cco 25 , 205 321 25 296 3, 224 10,812 14, 678 10 , 527 41.8 
(999 ,468) (17 , 539) (1 , 691) (15 ,061) (86 ,031) (581,415) (701, 738) (297 , 730) (29 .8) 
Paper , sta tionery , printing , w 
etc . 8 ,461 122 13 99 323 4, 082 4, 639 3,822 45 . 2 \0 I\) 
(322 , 383) (6 , 140) (526) (4 , 738) (2 ,805) (144 , 703) (158,911) (163, 472) (50 . 7) 
Other products 48 , 324 2, 031 101 1 , 371 1, 333 27 , 385 32 , 221 16, 102 33 . 3 
Tota l (b) : 346 , 938 9, 638 762 8 , 348 9, 571 172 ,057 200 , 376 146, 562 42 . 2 
Tota l manufacturing: (5 ,087, 231) (137 , 337) (9 , 670) (98 , 213) (140 ,810) (2 , 596,896) (2 , 982,926) (2,104 , 305) (41. 4) 
(a ) Value added in process of ;manufa cture i . e. value of output less cost of materials, fuel , etc . used . 
(b) Detail may not add t o t otals because of r ounding . 
l J 1 ·:4J!!~,5fJ,::_~,~·~.~. ,q -.t; ;'P • ~k g ~ 
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TABLE A-8 : VAllJE OF LAND , BUILDINGS , PLANT AND MACHINERY EMPLOYED BY AUSTRALIAN ANTI AMERICAN- AFFILIATED FACTORIES , BY INDUSTRY 
lndustry 
Industrial chemicals 
Pharmaceuticals and toilet ~re­
parations 
Plant , equipment, and machinery 
Electrical machinery, cables , and 
apparatus 
Motor vehicle construction and 
a ssembly , and motor bodies 
Motor accessories 
Other metal product s 
Foundat ion garment s 
Food, drink, toba cco 
Paper , stationery, printi~ , etc. 
Other products 
Total (c) : 
Total manufacturing : 
£A ( thousand) 
Land and buildings 
Additions 
and repla ce-







(5 , 673) 
319 
(2 , 510) 
2, 283 






( 66 ) 
56 
(9 , 717) 
391 
(3 , 736) 
3,371 
11,065 





























6 , 171 
(26 , 427) 
4, 056 
(14,544) 
6 , 527 
(74,008) 
5 , 220 
(46 , 008 ) 
27 , 947 
(52 , 990) 
1 , 228 
(12 , 369) 
1~, , 804 
(320 , 403) 
757 
(2 , 005) 
3, 727 
(172 , 357) 
2 , 001 
(85 , 219) 
7, 707 
1 , 672 
(12 ,929) 
79 , 145 
(1 , 150 , 930) 
Plant and machinery 
Additions 
and replace-
ment s during 
1961/62 
9, 947 




(8 , 327) 





(2 , 173) 
7,094 




(28 , 227) 
582 
(13 , 993) 
3 , 737 
32 , 526 
(248 , 791) 
Depreciation Value at 
allowed 30 June 
during 1962 (a ) 
1961/62 
2,458 
















(16 , 501) 
173 
(9 , 514) 
2 , 605 
13 , 768 
(123, 627) 











(14 , 348) 
23 , 457 
(374 , 165) 
129 
(534) 
3 , 522 





(1 , 203 ,405) 
(a) Depreciated or book value , including estimated value of rented premises , plant and machinery . 
(b) Less than £500 . 
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TABLE A-9: RATED HORSEPCWER OF ENGINES EMPLOYED TO DRIVE MACHINERY IN AUSTRALIAN ANn AMERICAN-AFFILIATED FACTORIES, BY INDUSTRY 
Rated horsepower of engines Rated horsepower Rated horsepower of all 
Industry and motors - of engines and engines and motors Ordinaril.f In :reserve or motors ordinarily (excluding obsolete 
in use idle (excluding in use per wages engines) per wages 
obsolete engines) employee employee 
Industrial chemicals 51,332 6,181 24.12 27.97 (159,222) (30,819 ) (18.39) (21.95) 
Pharmaceuticals and toilet 
preparations 6,228 378 3.33 3.53 (20,322) (3,588) (3.48) (4.10) 
Plant, equipment, and machinery 15,510 693 5.44 5.68 (296,100) (24,238) (4.88) (5.28) 
Electrical machinery, cables, and 
apparatus 9,110 779 1.81 1.96 (128,326) (9,556) (3.06) (3.29) 
Motor vehicle construction and 
assembly, and motor bodies 103,833 4,457 5.24 5.47 (152,105) (6,495) (4.16) (4.34) 
Motor accessories 6,848 527 8.08 8.70 
(48,947) (5,194) (5.23) (5.79) 
Other metal products 54,149 2,516 9.97 10.44 (1,786,090) (183,385) (7.04) (7.76) 
Foundati on garments 516 37 0.66 0.70 
(2,023) (530) (0.51) (0.72) 
Food, drink, tobacco 58,795 2,421 21.04 21.90 
(931,011) (149,262) (9.02) (10.47) 
Paper, stationery, printing, etc. 3,591 667 4. 65 5.52 
(418,360) (68,911) (6.98) (8.13) 
Other products 41,072 4,905 15.89 17.79 w 
\0 
~otal: 8.38 -+:-351,044 25, 621 1.8+ 
Total manufacturing: (6,000,529) (811, 527) (6. 64) (7.53) 
J95 
otes on the Tables 
(1) Scope of the Statistics and Period Covered 
(a) Of the 208 'eligible ' companies approached in 
this survey of American investment, 100 supplied answers 
to Part II of Questionnaire I . One of these commenced 
manufacturing so late in 1961/62 - the year for which 
information was sought - that details of its operations 
are not included in the preceding tables . Moreover, 
two companies supplied details for their main plants 
only and for this reason the figures in t he tables 
slightly understate the operations of even these 99 
firms. The understatement on this score, however, is 
negligible. 
(b) From data presented in Chapter I, it appears 
that the tables cover about three-quarters of the 
manufacturing activities of all companies operating in 
Australia in which there was an American shareholding 
of at least 25 per cent at JO June 1962. 
(c) The activities of the 99 American-affiliated 
companies are compared with total manufacturing opera-
tions in Aus tralia in the year ended JO June 1962. 
Figures for these latter are q~ved from Secondary 
Industries: Par t I. Factory and Building Operations, 
1961-62, published by the C-ommonwealth Bureau of Census 
and S tatistics, Canberra . Naturally, the figures 
shown for total Australian manufacturing operations 
include the activities of the American-affiliated firms . 
(d) As wi.th the figures supplied to the Common-
wealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, a small number 
of companies supplied information relating to some other 
accounting period than that ending JO , June. In addition, 
one firm declined to provide data for the 1961/62 year 
because of an industrial dispute in that year and 
provided figures for 1960/61 instead . The error thus 
caused is small. 
(2) Comparability of Data with that P rovided on a 
Company Basis 
Most of the data presented elsel,There were gathered 
on a company basis. Information in the above tables, 
how v r, r lat to manufacturing establishments or 
factor's. This r nd rs direct comparison of the two 
s ts of figur s imposs'bl and the following notes 
h'gh 'ght th main difficulti s: 
( a ) Th industr'al classificat'on us d in th 
tabl s dif rs from that us d to classify 
c mp ni s n th body of h t t. (S also ote (J}) 
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Moreover, in Appendix tables each plant belongs to only 
on industry, whereas in company tables each company is 
classified according to its main activity. 
(b) Many participating companies are engaged in 
some activity other than manufacture. The tables in 
this Appendix refer only to their manufacturing 
activities and, in contrast to the company data, ex-
clude employees engaged only in selling and distribution 
from mployment figures and sales of goods to which no 
value has been added by the factory in question from 
the figures for value of output. 
(c) Employment figures in this Appendix are based 
on average employment over a period of time, while 
most of those elsewhere were given as at one point of 
time. (See also ote (6).) 
(d) Since figures in the above tables refer to 
individual factories, companies operating plants at 
more than one stage of manufacture can have the value of 
the output of each plant addedmto the figures shown . 
Clearly, if the output of a plant at an early stage of 
manufacture is sold to a plant of the same company at 
a later stage, the sales of the company as a whole may 
fall short of the total value of the output of the 
plants taken together. This appears to be the situation 
with the operations of at least two of the companies 
included in the tables. 
(e) In accordance with the instructions of the 
Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, figures 
shown for the cost of materials used and for the value 
of output produced generally exclude the value of com-
ponents which are merely assembled by the factory in 
question . This factor is of major importance in such 
industries as the assembly of motor vehicles . 
( f ) Unlike figures given for company assets, 
figures shown in the above tables for the value of 
land, buildings, plant and machinery used in manufacture 
include an estimate of the value of rented premises 
and plant and machinery. 
(g ) A few companies included relatively small 
operations in ew Zealand in their aggregate figures : 
these operations ar naturally not included in these 
tables . 
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( h ) As m ntioned in ote (1), all the activities 
of one participating company and a part of the activity 
of two others are not included in the tables in this 
Appendix . 
( 3 ) Industrial Classification 
The industrial classification used in these tables 
is thought to coincide as nearly as possible with that 
used for factory statistics by the Commonwealth Bureau 
of Census and Statistics. For many purposes, this is 
not th most useful classification and, since the figures 
h re presented can not in any case be compared with 
company data, a somewhat different classification has 
been used in the body of the text. For purposes of 
comparison, 'however, the Bureau's classification has 
been followed as closely as possible for the factory 
statistics gathered. 
(a) It was intended that 'Industrial chemicals', 
' Pharmaceuticals and toilet preparations', ' P lant, 
equipment, and machinery', 'Electrical machinery, cables, 
and apparatus ' , ' Motor vehicle construction and assembly, 
and motor bodies ' , 'Motor accessories ' , and ' Foundation 
garments' be coincidental with Bureau classifications of 
similar or identical title. The classification 'O ther 
metal products ' represents the balance of the Bureau ' s 
'Industrial Metals, Machines, Conveyances' classification, 
after the four sub-industries of ' Plant, equipment, and 
machinery', ' Electrical machinery, cables, and 
apparatus', 'Motor vehicle construction and assembly, 
and motor bodies ' and 'Motor accessories ' have been 
taken out . American firms are widely spread through the 
sub-industries cov red by ' Other metal products ' and 
are active in such Bureau classifications as ' Extracting 
and Refining of other Metals; Alloys', ' Cutlery and 
Small Hand Tools ' , 'Agricultural Machines and Imple -
m nts ' , on- ferrous Metals - Rolling and Extrusion ' , 
'Sh t Metal Working, Pressing and Stamping', 'P ipes, 
Tub s and Fittings, Ferrous ' , ' Sewing machines' , 
'Wir less and Amplifying Apparatus ' and 'Other Engin-
ring ' . In all cases, so few participating companies 
were active in each sub-industr that separate dis-
closur of th e tent of American activities there was 
impossible . A similar difficulty applied to the ' Fo od, 
drink, tobacco ' and ' Paper, stationery , printing , etc .' 
a ... _ ......... oi •• _ .. ·....,. __ • ... _ •• ' 
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industries. The lassification 'Other products' 
includes two companies in the Bureau ' s classifica-
tion 'Glass ( other than Bottles )' , three companies 
in ' Oils, Mineral', and one in each of 'Treatment 
o f on-Metalliferous Mine and Quarry P roducts: 
Other ' , 'Plastic Moulding and P roducts', and 'Photo -
graphic Material ( including Developing and P rinting) '. 
(b) In some cases it was extremely difficult 
to decide to which of several industries a factory 
should be allocated. Multi-product factories supply-
ing only one answer to the questionnaire, and the 
very old classification still in use by the Common-
wealth Bureau, made this allocation subject to a wide 
margin of error. In particular, attention should be 
drawn to the possibil ity that two large companies 
classified here under ' P harmaceuticals and toilet 
preparations' are not so classified by the Bureau . 
( c ) It should be noted that some of the Bureau ' s 
classifications include activities other than those 
immediately apparent. For example, 'Plant, Equipment 
and Machinery, including Machine Tools ' appears to 
include the manufacture of domestic refrigerators, 
and 'Mo t o r Bodies ' the manufacture of trailers and 
caravans. The manufacture of sewing machines is not 
included under the classification 'Electrical Machinery, 
Cables and Apparatus', and appears here under 'O ther 
metal products '. 
(d) To facilitate comparison of the American-
affiliated factories with total Australian manufactur -
ing, the operations of plants engaged in the 'Heat, 
Light and P ower' industry have been excluded . 
(4) Definition of Factory 
The Commonwealth Bureau of Census and S tatistics 
defin s a 'factory' as ' an establishment in which four 
or mor persons are employed or where power (o ther 
than manual ) is used in any manufacturing process .' 
Wher two or more industries are conducted in the 
sam stablishm nt, however, and where separate returns 
are r ceived for ach industry, it a ppears that the one 
stablishm nt is nter d in the statistics as two or 
mor 
th 
' factori s' . Th 
abo tabl s in th 
same policy has been ad op ted i n 
thre cases in which companies 
pro ·d d mor than on reply to the qu stionnaire for 
op ra · ons conduct d at th one stabli hment . 
• ...... ... J •• _ __ ~..- ~ • 
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(5) Siz Classification 
The class intervals used in Tables A-2 and A-J were 
dictated by the need for comparability with those used 
by the Commonwealth Bureau. This explains the inadequacy 
of the classification in Table A-J: the Bureau provides 
no size classification of the kind used in Table A-2 by 
sub-industry. 
(6) Employment 
(a) As with figures published by t he Bureau, 
employment figures are shown on two bases . The first, 
used in Tables A-2 and A-J, is an 'aggregate of the 
average number of persons employed in each factory dur-
ing its period of operation (whether the whole or only 
part of the year).' The second, used in all other 
tables showing employment in this Appendix, 'is calcul-
ated by reducing the average number working in the 
factories (irrespective of period of operation) to the 
equivalent number working for a full year . ' 
(b) Only persons employed in the manufacturing 
activities of a factory are counted as factory employees . 
Those engaged in selling and distribution are excluded . 
(c) With reference to Table A-5, no American-
affiliated factories were asked to supply details on 
the number of 'working proprietors' employed . It was 
assumed that American firms would have no employees in 
this category. 
(7) Wages and Salaries 
All figures shown in Table A-6 exclude amounts 
drawn by working proprietors. 
(8) Cost of Materials, Value of Output, Value of 
P roduction 
(a) The costs enumerated in Table A-7 are by no 
means all the costs incurred in the manufacturing pro-
cess and the figures can not, therefore, be used to 
calculate profit or loss. Furthermore, as noted pre-
viously, the value of materials used generally does 
not include the value of articles or materials which 
are merely repair d or assembled in the factory . 
(b ) The Commonwealth Bureau defines the value of 
factory output as 'the alue of the goods man,factured 
or their valu after passing through the particular 
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pro ss o~ manufactur and includes the amount rec ived 
for r pa'r work, work done on commission and receipts for 
oth r factory work . The basis of valuation of the output is 
th s ll'ng value of the goods at the factory, exclusive 
of all delivery costs and charges and excise duties, 
bu inclusive of bounty and subsidy payments to th 
manufactur r of th finished article .' 
(c) The appar nt simplicity of this definition of 
output is deceptiv . In at least s'x different ways 
ompan'es misint rpreted the definition or gave figures 
which for some reason mean very little: 
(i) The most serious misinterpretation 
arose from an apparent ambiguity in the instruc-
tions supplied to all factories by the Commonwealth 
Bureau of Census and Statistics for the completion 
of their Factory Returns. On the Factory Return 
itself, factories are asked to give the 'Sell ing 
Value at Works (exclusive of all delivery costs 
or charges) .. , ,' but on the sheet of instructions 
which accompanies the Factory Return a note explains 
that what is required is the ' selling value at 
factory., . .. after deducting all costs of selling 
and distribution'. At least one company included 
in the present survey therefore regularly provides 
the Bureau with a figure for the value of its 
output \vhich is net of its very substantial advert-
ising bill . A more correct figure was obtained 
from the company concerned for use in this survey 
but no alteration was made to the Bureau's 
figures shown both to avoid disclosing the extent 
of the alteration and to avoid a 'double correction' 
if the Bureau has already made an alteration in 
its own editing process. The change makes a 
significant difference to the figures shown for 
on of the smaller industries. 
(ii) Two companies provided output figures 
which in fact represented little more than factory 
cost. Again alteration was made to the survey 
figures, but not to the Bureau figures, after con-
sultation with the companies concerned . 
(i'i) One small newly-established factory 
supplied a sales figure instead of a figure for 
alue of output, and this too was altered after 
consultation with the company concerned . 
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(iv) At l e a s t one of the ma jor American motor 
vehicle manufacturers appears to be mis interpreting 
the Bureau' s instructions on the method of exclud-
ing assembled components from cost of materials 
and value of output. Insufficient was known 
about this to make alteration possible and it 
should be noted that this misinterpretation may be 
causing some understatement of the value of output, 
and so of the value of production, of the motor 
vehicle industry. 
(v) 0 alteration was made in the figure 
supplied by one company which sells its entire 
output to an affiliated sales company at little 
more than nominal mark-up. 
(vi) One large factory in the 'Other prod-
ucts' industry included the value of materials 
processed by it in its figures for cost of 
materials and value of output for six months of 
the 1961/62 year but, following a company reorgan-
isation, excluded the value of such materials for 
the other six months. No allowance has been made 
for this in the figures shown. 
(d) No correction has been made to any of the 
figures shown in Table A-7 for the fact that a number 
of factories commenced manufacture only after the 
beginning of the 1961/ 62 year. Production per employee 
figures shown elsewhere are not affected by this because 
of the correction made to employment figures, but 
direct comparison of the value of the output of American-
affiliated companies with that of all manufacturing 
establishments is made more difficult. The error is 
only significant, however, where a considerable 
number of American-affiliated plants commenced opera-
tions during the year, as in the 'Industrial chemicals ' 
classification. 
(e) ' The value of production is the value added 
to raw materials by the process of manufacture . It is 
calculated by deducting from the value of factory 
output the value (at the factory) of the materials 
used, containers and packaging, power, fuel, and light 
used, tools replaced, and materials used in repairs to 
plant (but not depr ciation charges ).' 
I ' 
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(f) The exclusion of assembled components from 
th value of mat rials and the value of output tends 
to distort upwards the ratio of production to output 
for plants primarily engaged in assembly. 
(9) Value of Land, Buildings, Plant and Machinery 
As mention d in ote (2), figures shown in 
Table A-8 for the value of land, buildings, plant and 
machinery include an estimate of the value of rented 
premises and plant and machinery . The method used in 
arriving at these estimates was the same as that 
used by the Commonwealth Bureau. 
(10) Horsepower of engines employed 
(a) Bracketed figures include the horsepower of 
engines run on electricity generated in the factories 
concerned . Though this may give rise to some regrettable 
overstatement of the power available for use in the 
manufacturing process, it was made necessary by the 
failure to distinguish between such engines and those 
not so powered in the American investment questionnaire. 
In most industries the possible overstatement is small. 
(b) For the calculation of 'horsepower per wages 
employee' figures, 'whole year' employment figures had 
to be used because the Bureau does not publish 'period 




SURVEY OF AMERICA - AFFILIATED TO BE 
MA UFACTURING I AUSTRALIA AT 30 
Aggregate statistics provide a somewhat barren 
p'cture on their own . Though it has been deliberate 
policy to mention company names only on rare occasions 
to a oid disclosing information supplied on a confid-
ential basis, there would appear to be considerable 
advantage in providing some background to figures 
presented elsewhere by attempting to place individual 
American-affiliated companies in their industrial 
setting . This appendix is directed to that end . l 
Automotive and Related Industries 
By far the largest American investment in Australia 
is in the motor industry. And of the American companies 
in this industry General Motors-Holden's P ty L td stands 
out as the giant . In 1926, General Motors (Aust.) P ty 
Ltd established its first assembly plant in Melbourne 
and plants in all other mainland S tates quickly followed. 
At this stage, the company confined its operations to 
assembly, importing chassis and engines and buying bodies 
from an Australian company, Holden's Motor Body 
Builders Ltd. Despite this, more than 2,000 Australians 
2 
were employed by the company by 1929 . Two years 
later, General Motors absorbed Holden 's and General 
Motors-Holden's Ltd was born . This move was essentially 
defensive in character, designed to assure the American 
subsidiary of its supply of bodies in a situation where 
the prosperity of the Australian firm was seriously 
threatened by the d pression . The new company itself 
was soon in some difficulty, with a substantial 
accumulated loss by the end of 1932, and consideration 
was given in ew York to winding up the whole operation . 3 
1. \{h n company nam s are mentioned, the information 
disclosed is eith r already available to the public or 
has b en cl ared by the company in question before 
publication. am s us d are in most cas s tho e in 
use 'n 1962 and may differ, therefore, from those in 
us in arlier years or at the date of reading. 
2 . Colin Forster, Industrial D l~pment in Australia 
1920-1930 (Canb rra: Australian ational Uni ersity, 
1964), p. 47. 
3 . Th d bit balanc at th end of 1932 is r ported 
to hav b en £ 464,139, though th company showed a pro-
fit of £134,160 in 1933 . (Australasian Insurance £ 
/ 
L. 
But after a chang in management and an extensive 
reorganisation of the company in 1934, G. M.H. (as 
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the company became known throughout Australia) never 
looked back. A major new plant was constructed at 
Fishermen's Bend, near Melbourne, in 1936 and in 1937 
the company made a profit of a million pounds for 
the first time . 4 By the end of the thirties, the 
5 total employment of G. M. H. was 11,000. 
During World War II, G. M. H. was heavily pre-
occupied with production of the weapons of war. 
Indeed, even before 1939, the firm had been associated 
with a small number of other large companies in the 
production of military aircraft . 6 As the war drew to 
a close , increasing attention was given by the 
company to the possibility of complete car manufac-
ture in Australia , to replace the partial manufacture 
undertaken up to that time . The Federal Government 
had been keen to encourage such complete manufacture 
for some years, as had been shown in 1939- 40 with the 
passage of the Motor Vehicle Engine Bounty Act and 
the Motor Vehicle Agreement Act which together gave 
Australian Consolidated Industries Ltd substantial 
financial encouragement to manufacture motor vehicle 
engines and chassis . No manufacture was actually under-
taken by A . C.I . and the Ac~were repealed in 1945 . In 
1944, the Government sent a letter of invitation to all 
inter sted parties to submit proposals for car manu-
factur . The 1 tter contained the implied threat that 
if 'satisfactory proposals are not received as a re-
sult of the invitation to inrerested parties, the 
Government should set up a Corporation to manufacture 
a complete car . ,7 It was this challenge that G. M. H. 
took up . 
G.M . H. was not the only company to accept the 
Go rnm nt's challenge . Indeed, three other American 
( 3) Banking Record and Statistical Register, LVIII 
(1934 ) , p . 402.) Se also L . J. Hartnett, Big Wheels 
and Little Wheels (Melbourne: Lansdowne Press, 1964) , 
p . 50 . 
4 . L . J . Hartnett, p . 8J . 
5 . Ibid . , p . 75 . 
6 . Ibid ., pp . 8-98 . 




compani s also accepted it - Chrysler Australia Ltd, 
the Ford Motor Company of Australia P ty Ltd, and the 
International Harvester Company of Australia P ty Ltd . 
But while the last three planned to increase the 
Australian content of their vehicles over a period , S 
the plans of G. M. H. called for the almost complete 
manu facture of a car in one step . It can fairly be 
said that in successfully bringing these plans to 
fruition, G. M. H. d id more than any o t her single 
c ompany towards ·building the Australian motor vehicle 
i n du stry . In so doing, the company played a vital 
r ole - perhaps the most important individual role -
in the development of Australian industry in the 15 
years after 1945 . 
The company requested no additional tariff pro -
tection and no b ounty . While its staff were kept 
employed in the ma nufacture of household goods,9 
work on the design and tooling for the new car pro -
ceeded apace both in America and in Australia . The 
result: little more than four years after the Govern-
ment extended its invitation to the car companies to 
submit their proposals, the first Holden, as the new 
car was named, made its public appearance. The date 
was 29 ovember 1945 . Ini tially, only ten Holden&" 
were produced daily and by the end of 194 a total of 
only 1 63 had been produced . But e pansion was con-
tinuous. Daily output had reach d 100 by 1951 . Early 
in 1956 total production of the Holden reached 250,000. 
By 1962, when th millionth Holden was produced, the 
ompany had spent almost £75 million on the expansion 
of "ts faciliti s sinc World War II; it owned or 
1 as d 3,179 acr s of land and occupied plants which 
co r d mor than 7 million square feet of floor 
10 
spac; it was plann"ng further pansion which 
would rais Hold n produ ction to 730 ach working day 
( or 175 , 000 a y ar ) and total production, includi ng 
th ass mbly of other G neral Motors products, to 
11 200,000 v hi 1 5 annually. With a total mployment 
S. Ma 'Th Motor Industry ' , in The Economics 
d . Ale Hunter (M lbourn : 
ss , 1963 ) , p . 50 4. 
9. L.J . Hartn t , p . 1 6. 
1 0. G n ral Motors-Hold n's P ty . L td , 1962 Annual Re p ort , 
p. 7. 
11. P r ss stat m nt by Da id L. H -g l and, managing director 
o G n ral Motors-Hold n's P ty Ltd , 1 as d on March 
1 963. 
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of 21,607 at the end of 1962, th company was easily 
the second largest industrial employer in Australia . 
Though substantially the largest, the General 
Motors subsidiary was not the first American-controlled 
motor vehicle company established in this country . 
That honour belongs to the Ford Motor Company of 
Australia P ty L td. In October 1924 it was announced 
that Ford planned to establish five assembly plants 
and one body building plant in Aus tralia at an 
estimated cost of £1,400,000. 12 On Jl March 1925, 
the Geelong Adver tiser carried front-page headlines 
announcing the acquisition of more than 10 0 acres of 
land by Ford in the town . Geelong was to be Ford's 
Aus tralian headquarters and the Advertiser referred 
to the announcement as 'perhaps the most important 
statement that has ever been issued in connection with 
industrial undertakings at Geelong '. The , paper went 
on enthugastically: 
A link with America is indeed a great achieve -
ment, because at the present time it is amaz-
ingly p rosperous and has become the recognized 
barometer of the world's finance . . .. So serious 
has the accumulation of wealth in America be-
come that financial economists are busy 
speculating as to the right remedies to be 
applied to relieve the nation of the consequence 
of its embarrassment of riches . On the other 
hand it is one of the problems of Australia to 
secure capital to develop its resources.lJ 
P rodu tion of Ford's famous Model T began almost at 
once in a number of t mporary quarters including 
Dalg ty ' s old wool store at Geelong . By the end of 
1926 plants were op rating in all mainland S tates . 
In 192B, the company switched to the Model A, and in 
19J5 to the V-B. With the latter model Australia saw 
its f ' rst e ampl of all-ste 1 body building . After 
h war, as not d abo e, Ford Australia was one of the 
four compani s to acc pt th Governm nt's invitation 
to moork on ompl t motor vehicle manufacture though, 
unlik G.M.H., the company plann d to do this in 
stag s . From a p ak mploym nt in 1925 of only 776, 
th ompany gr w to ha an mploym nt of 4, 600 in 
1950,14 and of ,000 in 1963. 15 
12. Colin Forst r, op . it ., p . J • 
lJ . Quot d 'n Strong Grows t~ Fut ure: Ford ' s 25 Years 
in Aus~ralia (Ford Motor Company of Australia P ty L td, 
1950) . 
14. Strong Grows ~he Futur~ . 
15. Sydney Morning Herald, 24 Jun 196J, 'Motor 








The smallest of the American companies engaged in 
the manufacture of pass nger cars in Australia is 
Chrysl r Australia L td. In the twenties, there were 
two large Australian-owned motor body builders operat-
ing in S outh Australia: Holden ' s Motor Body Builders 
L td and T.J. Richards e Sons L td. The former was 
absorbed by General Mo tors (Australia) P ty Ltd and 
the latter eventually became Chrysler Australia Ltd . 
The first step in the transformation occurred in 1922 
whe n th South Australian d istributors o f Dodge cars 
gave T.J . Richards a contract to build car bodies . 
In 1936 , Chrysler Dodge Distributors (Aust.) P ty 
Ltd was set up and a controlling interest in T.J. 
Richards was acquired in 1939. 16 The company became 
Chrysler Dodge De S oto Distributors L td in 19 47 and 
Chrysler Australia Ltd in 1951 when the Chrysler 
Corporation of the U.S. first took up an equity 
interest in the firm ( 85 per cent) . Though the firm 
maintained p roduction capacity in military aircraft 
for a number of years after the outbreak of hostilities 
in Korea, its primary activity remained the production 
of motor cars and trucks . L ike Ford , Chrysler embarked 
on a plan to increase gradually the local content of 
its vehicles during the fifties . 
All the thre companies dealt with so far - G. M. H. , 
Ford, and Chrysler - sell trucks as well as passenger 
cars . But all these companies confine their operations 
for th most part to modifying imp orted engines to suit 
local conditions or to producing parts of the upper-
structur of th bodywork . The International Harvester 
Company of Australia P ty L td , however, incorporates a 
substantial Australian cont nt in the trucks it pro -
duc s . Establish d in Australia in 1912, Interna t ional 
Harv st r commenced production of trucks as an adjunct 
to its tractor op erations in 1949 . In so doing, it 
b am th s cond ompan in Austral'a to engage in the 
compl t manufactur of motor ehicl engines . By 
1962, th ompany h Id almost one - quart r of th whole 





Australian truck mark t. 
If the impression conveyed is that the Australian 
motor vehicle industry was entirely the creation of 
American companies, the case has been overstated. 
S·gnificant body building operations were being con-
duct d h re before American subsidiaries arrived in 
the f·e1d. But these activities were inherently un-
stable, being dependent on decisions made by foreign 
companies catering for markets many times the size of 
the Australian. Gradually two of the large st of 
these Australian firms became dependent on the orders 
of two American companies, while most of the others 
were squeezed out of the industry. British companies 
made no attempt to establish assembly plants in 
Australia before the war and a Tariff Board report of 
19J7 stated that at that time G.M. H. supplied J9 per 
cent of the vehicle market, Ford Australia about 22 
per cent, and Chrysler Dodge Distributors (Aust.) 
about 15 per cent, with a further 14 per cent of the 
market being held by chassis of American origin 
assembled by other importers . 17 After 1945 British 
companies increased their share of the market tempor-
ari1y because of the dollar shortage. But the currency 
restrictions on dollar imports which helped the British 
in th short-term cost them dearly in the long-term. 
Through lack of necessity or lack of foresight, they 
still failed to establish production facilities in 
Australia and soon lost their advantage to their 
Am rican rivals, who had been compelled by the diffic-
ulty of procuring supp1i s from dollar sources to 
embark on complete car manufacture in Australia. 
Maxcy has observ d that 'it was not until the mid-
fifti s that shipments of built-up vehicles from 
[ 1 · ] d t b . . f . t' 18 England to Aus ra la case 0 e slgnl lcan . 
Wh n th Tariff Board discussed the motor vehicle 
indus ry in 1957, th only companies it considered 
to b 
th 
properly ' manufacturing' in Australia w re 
. d· d b 19 four Am rlcan on S lscusse a 0 e. 
17. T~riff Board's Report on Motor Veh~c1es, 6 
S pt mb r 19J7, p. 12. 
18. G org Ma cy, op. cit ., p . 505 . 
19. Tariff Board's Report on Aut omotive Industry, 
1J Jun 1957, p. 11. 
. .. 
TABLE B-1: EmamTAGB ~ OF AMmICAH-AJ.1.FTI,TATlID CCBPABIES IN NEW vm:ICLE RIDISTRATIONS, 1960 TO 1963 
Cars and station 'Wag0llB Panel vans, utilities, Trucks and oomibuses C <m!p&lJ;,y hearses, ambu.lances 
'60 ' 61 '62 '63 '60 '61 '62 '63 '60 ' 61 '62 ' 63 
G.M.H. 44.8 4-9.1 «.0 4-5.1 53.8 56.3 4-9.1 51.9 30.0 33.9 34.0 31.8 
Pord 15.6 11.9 19.5 16.9 14-.5 11.4- 21.8 19.2 15.4- 12.3 il.O 11.9 
Chrysler 4-.5 2.8 5.1 6.8 2.3 2.0 1.5 1.4 6.3 6.0 6.1 8.2 
I.H. 
~. 1.9 2.0 3.1 3.5 22.0 22.0 21.0 19.2 
Wil..lys 1.3 1.3 0.5 0.4- 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.6 
Total (a) 65.0 10.4- 69.2 69.5 13.8 19.1 16.1 16.4- 14-.1 15.2 13.3 71.6 
Total reg:i.stratiOllB (thonssrvl )2~ 5 188 267 301 4-5 34- 39 « 20 15 11 22 
(a ) Detail may not add to total..s because of rounding. 
H<YrE: American vehicles imported by companies other than those listed above are not included in the t able. 
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Though they did not create the industry unaided , 
Am rOcan compani s must receive the lion ' s share of 
th credit . Th dominant position which they held 
4 1 0 
in th local industry in the early sixties is clearly 
°llustrated in Tabl B-1 . 
But not all the American- affiliated firms in 
the vehic l e industry have been as successful as the 
ones described . Willys Motors (Aust .) P ty Ltd , a 
jOint venture between Willys Motors Inc. of the 
U.S . and a number of Australian firms, mainly vehicle 
distributors, has been one of those to fare poorly . 
Established on a sUb-contracting basis in 1957, it 
began its own manufacturing in Brisbane in 1961 . 
By t h e end of June 1962, accumulated losses totalled 
more tha n £500, 000 and the company ' s market share 
was at a low ebb . P roducts of the firm are confined 
mainly to the jeep type of vehicle . ot very 
different has been the experience of a company on 
the periphery of the industry, Fruehauf Trailers 
(Aust .) P ty Ltd . This f±rm was formed in 1957 
also, and it too is a joint venture . By 30 June 
1962 , the production of trailers had earned the 
firm an accumulat d loss of more than £238 , 000 . In 
the cas of C. C.C . Carriers P ty Ltd , established in 
1959 for the production of specialized heavy-duty 
trucks and mobile crane carriers , progress was so 
dOscouraging that the firm was sold to Australian 
int rests in 1963 . Th total employment of these 
thr companies in. 1962 was less than 200 . 
The influence of the developing motor vehicle 
industry has been f It throughout the economy . ot 
unnaturally, Am rican compani s ha e b n among 
thos attract d into the supply' .of parts for the grow-
ing industry . Th Goodyear Tyre 8 Rubb r Company 
(Aust .) L td was on of th first of these . A 
company to distribut Goody ar products was formed 
in Australia as arly as 1915 and in 1927 , one year 
aft r Goody ar b am th largest rubber manufacturer 
in th world , th c mpany S t u p its first Australian 
ma n uf turing fa ilOtO s at Gran ille , in ew' S outh 
Wal s . By th nd of 1929, th ompan y ' s plant 
cov r d ight a r s and °ts p rodu tion was playing a 
significant 01 in m king Australoa almost complete l y 
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independent of tyre imports. 20 In the middle of 
1930 plant was installed for the manufacture of a 
range of industrial rubber products, including various 
kinds of belting and industrial hose. By 1952, when 
the company celebrated its silver jubilee of manu-
1 facture in Australia, the company's plant covered 172 
acres and annual production had expanded more than 
ten times above that of the first year of production . 2l 
Ten years later sales exceeded £20 million,22 and it 
was estimated that the company, with 26-27 per cent 
of the Australian tyre market, was the largest tyre 
manufacturer in the country . 2 3 
B.F. Goodrich Australia Pty Ltd, another company 
engaged in tyre manufacture, is a joint venture in 
which the B.F. Goodrich Company of the U.S. holds 
56 per cent of the equity and Ampol Petroleum Ltd 
most of the balance. Though production did not 
commence till 1960, the company was estimated to have 
secured 11-12 per cent of thetyre market by 1963. 24 
And Goodrich is not the last of the American tyre 
companies to establish operations in Australia: since 
this survey was conducted, U.S. Rubber has purchased 
a substantial minority interest in S .A. Rubber Hold-
ings Ltd of Adelaide and the company plans to embark 
on tyre manufacture. At the time of writing, there 
are rumours that still another of the American giants 
is cont mplating investment in the industry. 
Among th very arliest American-affiliated firms 
supplying parts or mat rials to the e merging car 
industry wer three firms either no longer in exist-
ence or no long r conne ted with th ir American 
partn r in 1962. On of hese was th nited States 
Light and Heat Corporation (Aust.) Ltd, one of the 
thr major Australian produc rs of storage batteri s 
dur'ng th tw nti s. Th company claimed in 1927 
Pneumat' 
1 0 July 
tyr s and tub s, alu d at £2 ,3 67 ,957 
n to £195,464 by 1929/30 and to 
(Tariff Board's R port on 
s and Tub s for Motor Vehicl s 
21. Celebrates 
22. Th f'gur of £20 mil on was cal ula t d from 
f' s shown in th mpany ' s Annual R por t 1961 . 
23. w, 17 S pt mb r 1963, p . 6. 
24. 
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to have capacity for the production of 120,000 car 
batteries per annum, 25 but it appears that operations 
ceased during the depr ssion of the thirties . In 
1928, Du P ont de Nemours and Imperial Chemical 
Industries of London jointly acquired a 40 per cent 
interest in British Australian Lead Manufacturers as 
part of an agreement under which the latter obtained 
Du Pont's duco rights, and a plant was erected in 
the same year to produce the newly discovered paint. 
One year later, Nobel Chemical Finishe s (Australasia) 
Ltd was formed as a joint venture between I .C.I. (51 
per cent) and Du Pont (49 per cent) to produce leather-
cloth and rubber-clo th, principally for use in car 
upholstery. Renamed Leathercloth P ty Ltd in 1930, it 
was acquired by I.C.I.A.N. Z. in 1935 . 26 
Most of the American companies now producing com-
ponents for the motor vehicle industry in Australia 
began operations after World War II. By far the 
largest of these is Borg-Warner (Aust.) Ltd. This 
company was formed in 1956 by the take -over of an 
Australian firm, Coote E Jorgensen Ltd, and now is the 
only independent producer of automotive axle 
transmissions and gears in Australia . Indeed, apart 
from G.M.H. ,the firm is the only producer of such 
items in Aus tralia. While the other American-affiliated 
firms in the industry are much smaller than Borg-
Warner in terms of employment, several of them occupy 
positions at least as important in the market for 
their own particular products . For example, Bendix-
Tecnico (Automoti e) P ty Ltd, in which the Bendix 
Corporation of the U.S. holds an indirect interest 
of about 42 per cent, has been ·the only manufacturer 
of carburettors in Australia since its establishment 
in 1958 and its share of the carburettor market was 
estimated at 'well over 80 per cent' in 1964 . 27 
Schrader-Scovill Co. P ty L td also is the only company 
manufacturing tyre valves in Australia and is believed 
to hold a substantial share of the total market . On 
25 . Tariff Board's Report and Recommendation: S torage 
Batteries, 10 September 1927, p . 4. 
26. Information supplied by Imperial Chemical 
Industries of Australia and ew Zealand Ltd, letter 
dated 21 January 1965. 
27 . Australian Financial Review, 18 September 1964, 
p . 19 . 
. 
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the other hand, the Champion Spark Plug Company (Aust . ) 
P ty Ltd, though holding a sUbstantial fraction of the 
total market for spar.k plugs in Australia , is one of a 
number o f manufacturers, all with overseas affiliations. 
Similarly, Trico Pty Ltd, engaged in the production of 
windscreen-wiper arms and blades and windscreen washers, 
and Steerings Pty Ltd, producing automotive steering 
gears, share their respective industries with several 
other firms . 
So far, attention has been paid mainly to those 
companies which are almost entirely geared to the 
motor vehicle industry. There are a number of others 
which, though catering to industry generally, lean on 
the vehicle industry for a significant part of their 
orders . Some of these are long established companies 
like the Carr Fastener Company of Australia Ltd, which 
was set up as early as 1928 and is currently producing 
a wide range of fasteners for the aircraft, automotive, 
radio, television, and clothing industries . And not only 
fasteners: among the products supplied to the motor 
vehicle industry by this firm are such diverse items as 
frames for headlights, window regulators, seat adjust-
ers, and gaskets for spark plugs . Since 1954, Bundy 
Tubing Co . (Aust . ) Ltd, in which the majority share-
holding is held by a predominantly British-owned 
firm, Tubemakers of Australia Pty Ltd, has manufactured 
the specialized small diameter tubing sold under the 
name of Bundyweld, and the automotive industry is a 
vital market . Australian Timken Pty Ltd, the only 
company to produce tapered roller bearings in Australia 
since it began production in 1958, sells the principal 
t h h ' 1 'd t 28 E part of its output 0 t e ve lC e ln us ry. ven 
Eng lhard Industries P ty Ltd, a company with substantial 
int r sts in the refining of precious metals, supplies 
microid starter and generator bushes to the industry 
whil th Sheffi ld Corporation of Australia P ty Ltd, 
though not strictly a supplier of components is heavily 
d p ndent for its existence on the motor industry ' s 
d mand for gauges and tooling in general. 
28. Tariff Board's Report on P recision Ground Tapered 





From the electrical equipment industry too come a 
wide range of parts. It is not surprising to find 
that Willard Australia P ty Ltd is closely associated 
with the motor industry since it produces automotive 
storage batteries . But many o thers also play an 
important role: Ai rcraft-Marine P roducts (Aust .) P ty 
Ltd, for example, supplies solderless terminals for 
electrical wiring, and Ducon Industries Ltd, in which 
P. R. Mallory e Co . Inc . had a minority interest until 
Ducon was tak en over by P lessey Co. Ltd of the U.K. 
in 1963, supplies ignition condensers. 
Electrical Products 
American investment in the motor vehicle and 
related industri es is clearly varied as well as 
substantial. But it is of course only one of the 
areas, albeit the best known, in which American 
capital in Australia is engaged . Reference has just 
been made to American firms in the electrical equip-
ment industry . Undoubtedly the largest firm in 
terms of employment in this industry is Standard 
Telephones e Cables Pty Ltd . This company began the 
production of telephone equipment on a small scale in 
the mid-twenties and in 1928 had an average employment 
of only 66 . Eve n this modest achievement was at least 
partially d e penden t on the assistance of the Postmaster-
General ' s Depar t ment . 29 But the company survived and 
prosper d and thirty years later was one of two 
companies supplying that Department with more than 80 
per c nt of its automatic switching equipment require -
m nts . 30 After 1945, S.T .C . also ventured into the 
home appliance mark t with the acquisition in 1946 of 
all th assets of Silovac Electrical P roducts P ty 
Ltd. Radio and tele ision r ceivers w re produced in 
th fifti s too, but, like so many others, the company 
withdr w from this mark t in th recession of 1961-62. 
Part of th firm's influ nce is wield d through 
Austral Standard Cable s P ty Ltd, a company in which 
S.T.C. holds a 40 p r cent inter st and the British-
29. Colin Forster, Op e cit., pp . 112-113 . 




controlled company, Metal Manufacturers Ltd, the 
balanc . The company was initially established in 
1948 as a 50/50 joint venture to acquire the existing 
telephone-cable manufacturing plant of Me tal Manu-
facturers at Port Kembla and the new plant being 
established at that time at Maribyrnong in Victoria. 3l 
S ince its inception, the company has effectively 
dominated the whole Australian market for underground 
cable and its annual capacity of 750,000 pair-miles 
of cable in the early sixties represented a capacity 
almost eight times that of Metal Manufac turers in 1945. 32 
Automatic Electric Telephones Pty Ltd appears to 
have been another company established in the 
Australian telecommunication industry at an early 
date but its parent sold the company to Clyde Industries 
Ltd in 1958. 33 It was never large. 
One of the very largest American-affiliated firms 
in the electrical equipment industry is no longer in 
existence - or rather has been resurrected in a very 
different form from that in which it died . This is 
Australian General Electric Pty Ltd. The company 
began operations in Australia in 1898 as a selling 
organisation only but moved into manufacture during 
the twenties. 'By 1929 the range of regular production 
includ d the following: traction motors, traction 
controllers and certain parts of control equipment , 
squirr 1 cage motors and star delta starters, Hotpoint 
electric irons and toast rs, air break sw'tches and 
c rtain str et l ighting fittings. ,34 British capital 
was introduced into the company in 1930 and the 
firm remained an Anglo-Ameri can venture till American 
antitrust action c omp 11 d the U.S. parent company to 
liquidat its holding in 1955. Und r the name of 
A.E.I. L t d, th local company remains a force in he 
lectrical goods industry, though after a period of 
Anglo-Australian own rship the company is now wholly 
British-own d. ot unti l 1961 did the American company 
31 . Tariff Board's Re port on Covered Cable and Covered 
Wire classifiable under Tariff Item 181 (A)( l )( a) , 
11 Mar h 1955, p. 6. 
J2 . Australian Financial Review , 21 July 1964, p . 2 . 
33 . The par nt company of Automatic El ctric Tele -
phon s P ty Ltd, the Automatic Electric Company of 
Chi ago, sold 'ts very small interest in Telephone 
£ El ctrical Indus ri s Pty L td . in th same year . 







re-enter the Australian market . When it did so, 
manufacturing operations were initially a compara-
tively small part of its interest, though the company 
did establish a minority holding in James N. Kirby 
Manufacturing P ty Ltd and set up Australian General 
Electric (Appliances) Pty Ltd to produce small home 
appliances in Victoria. 
More American companies are operating in the 
home appliance section of the electrical products 
industry than in any other. Almost certainly the 
best known of these is Sunbeam Corporation Ltd, 
which has been manufacturing in Australia since 19J4. 
The company now produces a wide range of appliances 
including toasters, frypans, beaters and mixers, irons, 
electric kettles, shavers, electric clocks, hair-
dryers, electric lawn-mowers and electric hedge 
trimmers. In several products, such as domestic 
electric clocks, the firm is the major local manu-
facturer . It was among the earliest, if not the first, 
to manufacture electric shavers in Australia in 1952 
and was closely followed in that industry by another 
American company, Remington-Rand (Aust.) Pty Ltd. J5 
The latter increased its sales of shavers by 1,000 
per cent in the decade after its establishment here J6 
and in 1962 was thought to head the electric shaver 
market, just on place ah ad of Sunbeam. J ? In third 
place came a Dutch company and in fourth another 
Am rican, Ronson Pty Ltd, but though both these 
compani s conduct d som manufacture of shavers in 
AustralOa in th lat fiftO s, both ceased production 
after import con rols on shavers were lifted in 1960,J 
1 aving the manufac uring side of the industry to 
Sunbeam and R mington. 
In the fi ld of larg r appliances, th name of 
Hoov r has b com almost synonomous with acuum cleaners: 
produ tion of th s b gan from substantially import d 
parts n 1954 and th company is now 'by far the 
J5. Tariff Board's Report on Electric Shavers, 6 
D mb r 1962, p . 5. 
J6 . Commerce, th 
Chamber of Comm r 
p. 8 . 
official journal of the American 
in Australia, July-August 196J, 
J? Australian Financial Review, lJ D cember 1962, 
p . 49 . 
J8 . Tariff Board's Report on Electric Shavers, p . 8 . 
I 
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larg st Australian manufacturer / assembl e r,J9 of these 
products . It is al s o a major producer of washing 
machines and steam irons. The only Am rican-affiliated 
company engaged in the production of radio and tele-
visi on receivers at the time of writing is James 
Kirby Ma nufacturing. 40 Marketing its products under 
the G neral Electric brandname since 1961 , the comp any 
caus d a considerable stir in the industry in 1964 by 
introducing the p ortabl mlevision r eceiver to Australia . 
The company ' s success in p roducing o t h er a p pliances, 
s u ch as refrigerators and washing machines , has also 
been such as to encourage General Electric to increase 
its minority holding of 1961 to a controlling interest 
in the company in 1964 . G . M. H., in addition to its 
p roduction of cars, is a major p roducer of home 
a pp lia nces ma rketed under its F rigidaire brand, while 
the names of S inger and Black e Decker, in the fields 
of sewing machines and portable electric tools re-
spectively, are as well known in Australia as they 
are throughout the world . 
Other American firms are scattered widely through 
the electrical products industry . In one section of 
the industry is IBM Australia P ty L td . This company 
was incorp orated in Australia in 19J2 but did not 
beg"n manufacturing h e r e till 1949 . In that year , the 
firm b gan the local assembly of 'tim systems ' , a 
company e pr ssion u d to d note erything from 
el ctronic master clocks to attendance recorders . In 
1957 IBM Australia b gan the assembly of electric 
typewriters and in th following year the first 
Australian assembly of complex data processing equip-
m nt. In anoth r section of the industry, the Lincoln 
Electric Company (Aust .) P ty L td markets a wide 
rang of welding quipm nt and electrodes . Two small 
c ompani s , Arro w Swit hes (Aust .) P ty Ltd and H inemann 
El ctric (Aust .) P ty L td , p rod uce 1 ctric switching 
J9 . Ta~iff Board's Re p ort on Vacuum Cleaners and 
Fl oor P olishers, 27 0 tob r 1961, p . 6 . 
40. Admiral o f Australia P ty L td, a jOint Australian-
Am r an nture, produ ed televisi on receivers from 
1955 to 1961 ( wh n th American int rest was sold ), 
h owe v r, and Th omas Electronics of Australia P ty L t d, 
a c ompa n y p r od u cing catho d ray p ictu re tubes f or 
t 1 sion recei rS,was wholly American-o \vn d fr om 




gear of various kinds. Every television-receiver 
manufacturer in Aus tralia drew supplies of capacitors 
from Ducon Industries L td in 1962,41 and the company 
was also a major supplier of o ther kinds of capacitors, 
potentiometers, and electrical porcelain . Bendix-
Tecnico Pty Ltd supplies aircraft electrical equip-
ment, Cannon Electric (Aust.) Pty Ltd highly technical 
electrical connectors, and Westrex Australia Pty Ltd 
communications equipment. British companies dom-
inated the early years of the Austral ian gramophone 
record industry, but today three well known companies 
have American affiliations: the Austral ian Record Co. 
Ltd, associated with Columbia Records Inc.; Festival 
Records Pty Ltd, jointly owned by the Ampar Record 
Corporation Inc. and a large Sydney newspaper chain; 
and the long established RCA of Australia P ty Ltd. 
Five companies with American affiliations pro-
duce b tween them a wide range of controls - from 
thermostatic controls for domestic appliances to 
flowm ters for the control of giant oil refineries. 
Aus tralian Controls Ltd, in which Ranco Inc. holds 
a minority interest, is substantially the largest 
of those engaged in th production of domestic thermo -
stats and supplies these for incorporation in refriger-
ators, air-conditioning units, stoves, washing machines, 
etc . Texas Instruments Austral ia Ltd, too, is in the 
broad field of thermostats for domestic appliances but 
the company tends to concentrate on providing for the 
needs of 'table-top ' appliances. Moreover, an 
important part of th company's activities is in the 
non-ferrous metal rolling industry . Robertshaw 
Controls (Aus t .) P ty Ltd, on the other hand, is more 
directly in competition with Australian Control~ but 
the company again has an alternative interest, in the 
manufacture of LP-gas equipment. Engaged in the pro-
duction of process control equipment in Australia are 
Taylor Instrument Companies of Australia P ty Ltd and 
Fischer E Port r Pty Ltd. 
Other Metal Industr~es 
The number of Am rican companies in other parts of 
the Australian m tal-working industry is so great as to 
41 . Australian Financial Review, 28 August 1962, p . lJ . 
The Tariff Board's Report on Capacitors, dated 19 
December 1962, called the company ' the largest local 
manufacturer of capacitors . ' (p . S .) 
, 
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defy adequate description in short compass. In the 
extraction and refining of non-ferrous metals, Mount 
Isa Mines Ltd is by far the largest American interest. 
For some years the company has been mainly concerned 
in the production of copper, though it is also engaged 
in the mining of lead, zinc, and silver. Its importance 
to Australia is apparent from the fact that during the 
industrial dispute at Mount Isa in 1964-65 it was 
estimated that Australian copper production fell by 
42 75 per cent. The same dispute was estimated to 
cost Australia a net £1 million a week in overseas 
earnings . 4] It is not only the existence of the Mount 
Isa township of 14,000 people which is completely de-
pendent on the activities of the company: it has even 
been claimed that much of the economic viability of 
Queensland itself s tied to its fortunes. 44 Apar t 
from the ore smelters operated by the parent company 
at the pithead, one subsidiary operates the largest 
copper refinery in Australia at Townsville, while 
another mines coal in the far north of the State . 
Only two companies at present produce aluminium 
from bauxite in Aus tralia and both are affiliated with 
Am rican firms. Comalco Industries P ty Ltd, in 
which the Kaiser Aluminium £ Chemical Corporation of 
th U.S. and the substantially British-owned Conzinc 
Riotinto Australia Ltd share equally, is one of 
th s . It is the holding company for three main 
op rating compani s, Commonwealth Aluminium Corpora-
tion Pty Ltd, Comalco P roducts P ty Ltd, and Comalco 
Alum'nium (Bell Bay) L td, in which th Tasmanian 
Gov rnm nt has h ld a minority interest ince the 
facilit' s of thi company w re sold to Comalco by 
th Ta manian and F d ral Go ernm nts in 1961. The 
Comalco group draw bau ite from its own leases at 
W 'pa, 
sm Its 
in Qu nsland, r fines its own alumina and 
, , B ' T ,45 d 
'ts own alumln um at B 11 ay n asmanla , an 
o mb r 1964, p . ] . 42. 
4] . 
44. 
Ibid., 11 D c mb r 1964, p. 7 . 
b ' d . , 15 Januar 196], p. 1 0. 
45. alumina capacity is 'nad quat, howe er, the 
1 importing alumina whil its 
, n a 0 'at ' on w ' th Al an of Canada and 
P y of Fr n on tru t a as 600,000-tOll re -
at Gladston in Qu nsland. 
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fabr·ca es a significant part of this aluminium in 
ew South Wal s . The oth r company ·n the industry is 
Al oa of Australia P ty Ltd which, though not in pro-
duct·on at th time this survey was conduct d in 1962, 
began production ·n 1963 and is now a major producer . 
This company is 51 per cent American , with three 
Australian mining companies holding the balance of the 
e quity . The firm draws its bauxite from deposits in 
the Darling Ranges , Western Australia, refines it to 
alumina in a 2l0 ,000-ton refinery at nearby Kwinana, 
and conducts its smelting and fabricating operations 
at Geelong, Victoria . These two companies, the scope 
of whose operations span every Australian State but 
one, together had an estimated capacity of 92,000 tons 
of primary aluminium at the end of 1963, more than 
enough to meet the estimated Australian demand for the 
metal in 1968 . 46 
Engaged in the refining of metals of quite a 
diff rent kind and on a much smaller scale is Breckett 
P ty L td . This highly profitable firm specializes in 
the recov ry of steel from slag dumps and operates 
und r ontract to the Broken Hill P roprietary Company 
Ltd . It is jointly own d by the Harsco Corporation of 
th U.S. and th locally-owned Brambl s Industries L td . 
In the agricultural equipment industry, American 
irms again playa significant role. The Australian 
tra tor mark t is dominat d by foreign-owned companies: 
th larg st app ars to b the Canadian company, Ma sey-
F rguson Holdings (Aust.) Ltd, but the next two in 
o d r of size are both American-owned: International 
Harvest r and Ford . International Harvest r, howev r, 
app ars to b th only on of th thr e engag d in 
tra tor manufactur prop r, as distinct from the 
ass mbly of import d parts, and it has b n the 
larg s omp any in thO field ver since it b gan 
tr ctor production ·n 194. The firm also produc s a 
wid r ng of agri ultural impl ments . On a much 
sm 1 r aI, J.I. Ca (Aust .) P ty Ltd, ew Holland 
(Aus ralasia) P ty L td, Oliv r Australasia P ty Ltd, 
Ralph M J ay L d (in whi h Borg-Warn r has a minority 
·nt r st ) , Bu kn r (Australasia ) P ty Ltd and Gr nacres 
4 . 
3 
port on Aluminium Ingots, etc ., 
F ming Equ·pm nt Pty Ltd all produc a variety of 
agr · ultu al rna hin ry and impl m nts, ranging from 
th i rlgat · on sp inkl produ ed by Buckner to 
th d · cs mad by Ralph McKay . 
L Tourn au-W - tinghouse P ty L td has been a 
1 ader in he eartb-moving equipment industry since 
its stabli hment at Rydalmere, ew South Wales, 
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in 1941. In that year the firm b gan the manufacture 
o~ d awn scrapers and by 1945 had widened its field 
of production to include tractor-scrapers . In 196J it 
was report d to be producing 22 type of earth-moving 
and construction machinery. 47 Later on the scene was 
Ca erpillar of Au tralia P ty Ltd. This company was 
incorporated in 1955 and now produces a variety of 
c awl t actors, front-end loaders, rippers, bulldozers 
and grader. Like Le Tourneau, however, the company 
imports sUbstantial sections of the units it sells, 
such as the engine and the transmission. 48 In 1958 , 
International Harvester, too, entered the earth-
moving quipment industry, after the company had 
acquired the ass ts of Fowler Engineering P ty Ltd, 
while mak·ng up the complement of American companies 
significantly ngag d in this industry in 1962 were 
Clark Equ·pment Australia P ty L td and Alli -Chalmers 
Australia P ty Ltd. All three companies, however, had 
important ·ntere ts out ide th earth-moving equip-
m nt · ndu ·ry Though the primary concern of Allis -
xampl , was the production of motor Chalm .fo 
g ad r for highway construction th firm had 
di r ifi d 0 such an t nt that in 1964 it claimed 
to ha 
ingl 
produced th kiln for Australias largest 
ment-making unit. 
ot u pri ingl , th two companies upplying 
t npin bowling equipm nt in 1962 w re both associat d 
with Am r · an f·rm . One, American Machine e Foundry 
Co. (Aust o) P Y Ltd, wa form d in 1959 by the take -
o o~ tb Au tral · an firm , S erling Indu tries P ty 




Comm r e, March-April 196J, p. 
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of bakery machin ry and it was on this foundation that 
the tenpin bowling activities were built. The company 
is now a 50/50 joint venture with the predominantly 
Aust alian-owned British Tobacco Company (Au st. ) Ltd: 
it continues to produce both bakery machinery and 
tenpin bowling equipment and indeed has even ventured 
forth into such novel fields as the production of a 
bowling machine for use by cricketersl The second firm 
in the industry, originally named Brunswick of 
Aus tralia Pty Ltd but renamed in turn Brunswick Bowl-
ing Equipment P ty L td and now Blacklock Industries 
Pty Ltd, is affiliated with the other great name in the 
American tenpin bowling industry, Brunswick Corporation. 
Thi s company has only a small minority interest in 
Blacklock, though Hoyts Theatres Ltd, the Aus tralian 
subsidiary of another American company, also holds 
an interest. 
In the field of sheet-metal working, Armco (Aust.) 
P ty Ltd specializes in the production of pre-fabricated 
steel buildings and steel culverts for drainage pur-
po It has grown little, however, since its 
stablishment before th S cond World War . Much more 
sp ctacular has b en the growth of Rheem Australia 
Indu tries P ty Ltd, which was also established in the 
thirtie 0 The company is probably best known for 
it widely sold domestic water-heating appliances but 
its main activity is undoubtedly the production of 
drums (and the reconditioning of old ones) for the 
petrol urn industry . Th company has long made steel 
contain s 'of all sizes, from giant 150-cubic foot 
or containers to small fuel tank for outboard motors, 
bu th early i ties aw a diversification into 
oth r forms of packaging, notably plastic squeeze tubes 
and bubbl pack . By 196J, the company' total employ-
m nt ubstantially c d d 2,000. In harp contra t 
wa th brief n of a company ngag d in a 





ca t iron crap: Met t rs-Clow P ty Ltd. 
ompany's plant did not comm nc manufacture til~ 
nd 0 961 and, d spit th con id rable 
a so iat d with it offic'al op ning by the 
of Vic 0 ia n F b ua y 1962, had b n sold to 
omp ti or b 1964 . 
... 
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Both the Am r'can-affiliated compani s producing 
hand tools in Australia dominate the market for their 
particular product. Wiltshire File Co . P ty Ltd began 
production of a wide range of engineers ' and saw files 
in early 1940 as a joint venture primarily owned by 
two Australian companies, the Broken Hill P roprietary 
Company L td and McPherson ' s P ty Ltd . The company 
claimed that its plant was capable of supplying 
files in 160 to 170 types, si z es and cuts, represent-
ing 90 to 95 per cent of the total Australian file 
market, and that its factory was capable of dealing 
with at least 800 dozen files daily . 49 It was not 
until shortly after the Tariff Board made it clear 
that the company could expect to supply the great 
bulk of Australian file requirements that the ichol-
son File Company of the U.S . , which had previously 
been supplying a substantial portion of the Australian 
market by exporting from Canada, took up a large 
minority interest in the Australian firm . icholson 
is the largest file manufactur~in the world and is 
no doubt at least partially responsible for Wiltshire's 
claim to have the most mechanized file works for its 
s 'ze in the world . 50 It is not only the Australian 
fil market that Wittshire dominates: in 1950, the 
company branched out into the manufacture of forged 
cutlery and lat r fu ther widened its activities to 
includ kniv s made from stainless steel strip. By 
1962, the company, op rating through Wiltshire 
Cutlery Co. P ty Ltd, was still the only local manu-
factur r of forged stainless steel table, dessert 
and st ak kni es . 5l 
H.K. P ort r Australia P ty L td b gan operations 
in 1914 under th nam of Henry Disston e Sons Inc . 
(Australa 'a ) Ltd. At th's time it was the subsidiary 
of Henry Disston e Sons Inc . of th U. S . and was 
ngag d in th production of circular saw blades , 
n r knives and plan r kniv s . In 1958, following 
49. Tariff Board ' s R~ort on Files, BeinR Hand To ols 
of Trade - Tariff It~m 2l9 ( c ) , 15 March 1940, p . 4 . 
50. Tariff Board's Report on Files, 23 October 1953 , 
p. 3· 
51. Tariff Board's Re p ort on Knives with Forged 





th acquisition of its parent company by H . K. P orter 
Co. Inc . of P ittsburgh in 1955, the company was sold 
to an Australian firm, Commonwealth Engineering Co . 
L td . But, in what is surely the only case in 
Australian industrial history of a foreign company 
buying back a subsidiary it has earlier sold, all 
the shares in Henry Disston e Sons Pty L td were re-
purchased by H .K . P orter Co . Inc. at the beginning 
of 1962 and the company renamed shortly afterwards . 
It is now Australia's principal manufa cturer of hand 
saws. 
More than a dozen companies which are either 
wholly or substantially American in ownership produce 
what can loosely be termed 'machinery'. Otis 
Elevator P ty L td was one of the first of these to be 
established . It began the manufacture of its lifts 
and escalators in the twenties . Ingersoll-Rand (Aust . ) 
Pty Ltd was another early arrival, this time in the 
field of compressed air equipment, and before the 
S econd World War it had been joined by another 
American company, Consolidated Pneumatic Tool Co . 
(Aust . ) P ty Ltd . Though neither company manufactures 
domestically its entire output, the two companies 
are among the largest in the Australian industry. 
Gilbert e Barker Manufacturing Co. (Aust . ) P ty Ltd 
b gan the production of petrol pumps for service 
stations in 1930 and is now substantially the larger 
of th two Australian producers of these. I t is also 
a major manufacturer of such items as industrial 
lubricating equipment airport refuelling equipment, 
paint r ticulation systems, and dom stic and industrial 
oil-burning heat rs. Since 1945 many more American 
companies have nt r d into the product'on of plant 
and ma hin ry on Australia. In 194 , F . M.C. (Aust . ) 
Ltd was born wh n th American F.M.C. Corporation 
acquir d a two-thirds inter st in the old established 
Australian firm, Austral Otis Engine ring Co. Ltd. 52 
Th ompany curr ntly produces a wide range of food 
pro ssing machin ry, tog ~her with packaging equip-
m nt, or hard spray rs, irrigation ystems and e en 
hydr ul' brak pr ss s. Following the acquisition of 
D.W. B Ongham e Co . Pty Ltd, food andmilk machinery 
ngin r , in 1961, th ompany was judg d to be 'by 
far th la g st in its fi ld in Australia' . 53 Wallace 
52. F.M.C. was originally known by th nam Food 
Ma h n ry (Aust. ) L d. 
53. Australian Financial Review, 25 January 1962, p.12. 
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c Ti rnan P ty L td b gan the production of chlorinators 
'n 1957 and is one of only two companies engaged in 
the local manufactur of these items . 54 The company 
also produces a variety of other engineering products, 
p articularly specialized chemical pumps . In quite a 
d ifferent field, Joy Manufacturing Co. P ty L td is the 
maj o r manufacturer of mining equip ment in Australia , 
while Cummins Diesel Australia is one of the few 
man ufacturers of large diesel engines . Even mechanized 
cattle feeding equipment is made in Australia by an 
American firm, Keith Engineering (Aust.) Pty L td . In 
1 9 62, the manufacturing activities of Addressograph-
Multigraph of Australia P ty Ltd were confined to the 
rebuilding and repair of the office machines it sold 
but the assembly of several of the company's products 
was already being planned and this commenced in 196J. 
American-affiliated companies hold a position of 
particular importance in the production of forklift 
trucks . Of the four largest names in the industry 
in 1961, three were closely connected with an 
American firm . 55 One, Towmotor, was produced at that 
time under licence from the Towmotor Corporation of 
Cleveland by Freighters L td, an Australian firm, and 
distributed through Towmotor (Aust.) P ty Ltd . 56 A 
s cond, Hyster, was originally produced under licence 
by another Australian company, Sonn rdale Ltd and 
di tribut d by an Australian-American venture, Hyster-
Sonn rdale Ltd, but aft r incurring heavy losses, 
Sonn rdale sold out its interest and manufacture has 
b n und rtaken since 1962 by Hyster Australia P ty 
Ltd, a wholly-American company . The third well 
known nam is Clark, produ d by Clark Equipment 
Australia P ty Ltd, a joint venture betw n the 
Am rican Clark Equipm nt Company and the Australian-
own d Tutt Bryant group. 
Comparati ly f w of the Am rican companies in 
h m tal-working industries apart from thos engaged 
54 . Tariff Board's ~port on Chlorination Regulators 
and Controllers, lJ May 1960, p. 4 . 
55· Tariff Board ' s Report on Work Trucks, Mechanically 
Prop~ll~d, Jl August 1961, p . 5. 
56. In 1965, how r Towmotor (Aust. ) P ty Ltd 






in th production of electrical goods, produce goods 
for dir ct sale to the consumer . Th re are some 
which do however. Outboard Marin Australia P ty Ltd, 
for xampl , sells chain saws and outboard motors, 
and the familiarity of the Johnson and Evinrude brand-
nam s among boating enthusiasts testifies to the 
c ompany ' s success. Even better kno\~ are the products 
o f Gillette (Aust.) P ty Ltd : by 1962, the company had 
been manufacturing its famous razor blades in 
Australia for five years, though the razors themselves 
are still imported?7 In other fields Ronson P ty L td 
produces cigarette lighters and lighter accessories, 
Aladdin Industries P ty Ltd kerosene lamps and stoves, 
and Hobart Manufacturing Co. P ty L td a variety of 
equipment for food preparation and dishwashing . 
Sporting Arms L td, in which Omark Industries Inc . 
had a minority interest in 1962, produces 'consumer 
g ood s ' in the form of sporting firearms but since the 
acquisition of the American interest in the company in 
1958, the firm has also moved into the production of 
fastening equipment for the construction industry . The 
only other company engaged in th production of powder-
actuat d fastening equipment in Australia, Ramset 
Fasten r (Aust.) P ty L td, publicly claims to be ' the 
largest manufacturer in th field' - it too is 49 per 
c nt own d by an Am rican company, the Olin Mathieson 
Ch mical Corporation . 
S till the supply of Am rican-affiliated companies 
in th Australian metal-working industries is not ex-
haust d. Fenner Dodge (Aust . ) P ty L td is engaged in 
th production of pow r transmission equipment 
particularly th manufactur of taper lock pulley . 
Unbrako (Aust .) P ty Ltd, a company jointly owned by 
th S tandard P r ss d S te 1 Company of h U.S. and 
McPh rson ' s Ltd of Australia, produces specialized 
s r ws. Vickers-D troit Hydraulics P ty L td manu-
factur s a wide rang of hydraulic controls for use in 
th production of arth-mo ing quipm nt, forklift 
·t u ks, and machin ry of many diff r nt kinds, while 
th Lindb rg Engin ering Company (Aust .) P ty Ltd 








produ ces industrial furnac s for use by the automotive 
and other engin ering industries . One of the main 
companies engaged in the production of iron and steel 
chain in Australia is P itt Waddell Benn tt Chains 
P ty Ltd, which, since March 1962, has been o'~ed to 
the extent o f 43 per cent by the Columbus McKinnon 
Corporation of the U. S . 58 In a n o t too dissimilar 
field, the P. e M. Company (Aust.) P ty Ltd has been 
engaged in the production of specialized metal forg-
ings for rail anchors and scaffold fittings since 
the twenties . 
Another early arrival was the British United Shoe 
Machinery Company of Australia P ty Ltd which, despite 
its name , is associated indirectly with what must 
sure l y be the world's largest manufacturer of shoe -
mak i n g ma chinery , the United Shoe Machinery Corporation 
of Bost on. B . U. S. M. not only supplies the bulk of 
the shoe - making machinery used in Australia but has 
also branche d out into other fields such as the pro -
duc tion of nails , tacks, and pins . An associate 
company, Tucker Industries P ty L td, was one of the 
four companies producing eyelets in Australia in 1962 
and , like B . U . S.M . itself, the company also produces 
a range of metal pressings . Another of the four com-
pani s in the ey 1 t industry in 1962 was Carr 
Fast n r, a company m ntioned earlier in connection 
with the motor ehicle components industry . This 
company app ars to b th only Australian manufact -
urer of snap fasten rs, principally for use in the 
clothing indu try . Th ompany began this activity 
in 192 and now claims to offer ' a complete range 
of brass snap fas en rs, not matched by any other 
singl organization in th world. , 59 Also engaged in 
th produ tion of light m tal pressings in 1962 was 
American Flange e Manufacturing Co . Inc., a firm 
sp cial"zing n the manufacture of drum closures . 
5. Tariff Board's Report on Iron and Steel Chain, 
4 April 1963, p . 5 . 
59 . Tariff Board Report on Snap Fasteners and Eye-
lets, 31 August 1962, p . 4 . 
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In 1959, ~ £ H. Power Cranes and Shovels P ty Ltd 
was established as a joint venture between the 
Am rican Harnischfeger Corporation and the locally-
owned firm, Industrial Engineering Ltd. The company 
still produces truck cranes and excavators, as its 
name adequately explains, but early in 1963 it was 
announced that the Australian shareholder had been 
60 bought ou t . Others also have changed their owner-
ship patterns recently. Richardson Scale Co. (Aus t. ) 
Pty L td exchanged rts majority American shareholder for 
a majority Canadian one when the latter took over the 
former in 1963, while since the middle of 1962 the 
indirect American interest in the Walter Kidde 
Company (Aus t .) P ty Ltd, a subsidiary of Wo rmald 
Brothers Industries L td engaged in the production of 
fire extinguishers, has been exchanged for an interest 
in Wormald Brothers itself . 
Reference has already been made to the production 
o f refrigerators by James N . Kirby Manufacturing and 
G.M.H. G.H. S tuart P ty Ltd , in which the Hill Corpora-
tion of the U. S. holds a minority interest , is engaged 
in the same industry but caters only for the commercial 
refrigeration market. 
Food and Drink 
American investment in the Australian food and 
drink industry probably ranks second only to that in 
th motor v hicl industry in its capacity to generate 
controv rsy over th whole question of foreign invest -
ment in this country . In 1963, the Deputy Prime Minister 
and Leader of the Country Party , J. McEwen, tabled in 
Fed ral P arliament a list of 34 Australian food 
compani s which had be n acquired by foreign concerns 
h d o f 61 d it 0 th 0 t during t e pr c 1ng ew years an 1S 1S aspec 
- the tak ~over of established Australian companies 
in an industry wher , it is felt , th technology of 
th in ad rs is little b tter than that of the local 
compan s - which has aroused the greatest popular 
fe lOng . The ext nt of American in olvement in this 
60. Sydney Morning Herald, 20 February · 1963, p . 18. 
61 . Commonwealth of Aus tralia Parliamentary Debates , 








take - over movement is considerable and has been care-
fully noted . On one occasion , a financial editor 
commented that 'it would take an expert dietician now 
to show us how to keep body and soul together without 
helping to send dividends abroad , and especially to the 
United S tates . , 62 
One of the a reas most u nder the domina tion of 
American- c ontrolled comp anies is the breakfast cereal 
mark et. In the ' ready- to - e a t ' section of that market , 
t h e name o f Kellogg (Aust . ) P ty Ltd has been well known 
sin ce the firm began manufacturing at its plant in 
Sydney in 1926 . Following the pattern established by 
its American p arent, Kelloggs almost certainly holds by 
far the largest single share of this market . American 
i n terests in this industry were further widened when 
the Nati onal Biscuit Company of the U. S . p urchased 
Purina Grain F oods P ty Ltd in 1960 and formed Nabisco 
P ty L td. Under such names as Vita Brits and Weeties, 
this c omp any too is a major force in the industry . 
While the company plans an assault on the Australian 
biscuit market - as none who witnessed the firm's vain 
struggle for ownership of Swallow and Ariell L td in 
1964 is soon likely to forget - for the moment its main 
activity is in the prepared breakfast cereal market . At 
the time of writing, the last American firm to enter 
this market is Ralston Purina , which acquired the 
Australian firm Robert Harper e Co . Ltd late in 1962 . 
In the same year that the .ational Biscuit Company 
was making its entry into the Australian prepared 
c real market , the Quak r Oats Company entered the rolled 
oat market with th take-o er of Creamoata Ltd . With 
its acquisition, Quaker Oats has become One of the largest 
suppli rs in this field . 
P arsons G n ral Foods P ty L td, a company created 
by th acqu isition of th l o cally-o wned Parsons Foods 
P ty L td by G neral Foods Corp oration in 1961, also 
produ s br akfast c r als but this a p p ars to be b _ 
oming 1 ss significant part of the firm's operation 
follow "ng th introduction of a numb r of Qeneral Foods ' 
products t o its range. Th most "mportant of these 
62 . Sydn ey Morning H~rald, 2 S e p t mber 1963 , p . 1 0 . 
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is undoubtedly Maxw 11 House coffee with which the 
company claimed to have secured almost 20 per cent of 
the Australian instant coffee market by 1964. 6J 
In the Australian soup mark t, the most recent 
American arrival at the time of writing is Campbell ' s 
Soups (Aust.) P ty L td. This company acquired the food 
division of Kia Ora Industries Ltd late in 1959 and has 
since built a large plant at Shepparton, Victoria. In 
addition to the product lines it acquired by the pur-
~e of part of Kia Ora Industries - Kia Ora soups and 
cordials - the firm has made some inroads under its own 
brandnames, Campbells and V-B. But the company is sub-
stantially smaller than the first American company in 
the Australian soup industry, B . J . Heinz Co. P ty Ltd. 
This firm was established in Australia as early as 19J5 
and currently dominates the market for canned soup with 
an estimated share of 40 per cent in 196J . 64 Its share 
of the total market, for canned and packaged soup, has 
been estimated at 27 per cent. 65 
H.J. Heinz is also dominant in another section of 
th food industry: that of baby foods. The company 
pioneered the manufacture of strained baby foods in 
Australia and estimated its market share in 1964 at 
about BO per cent, with the balance shared between an 
Australian company selling under the American brandname, 
Gerber, and a Swiss-owned company , the estle Co. 
(Aust .) Ltd. 66 
An American company which has an important place 
in h Australian process d cheese market is Kraf t 
Holdings Ltd . This firm was born in 1926 as Kraft-
Walk r Ch ese Company, a joint venture b twe n an 
Am rican firm and F. Walk r, an Australian who had been 
produCing an unpast uriz d che s previously . In 1950, 
th nam of th fO m was hanged to its pres nt title 
and th company mad its first publi share issue . The 






h had b n issu d at par had r ach d J6 / J. 67 But 
Australian, 11 0 mber 1964, p . lJ . 
Australian Financial Review, 16 May 196J, p . 10. 
Ib od., 2 Jun 1964, p. 6 . 
Ib Od., lB D c mb 1964, p . 7. 
67. John A. Bushn 11, Au~tralian Company M~rgers 1946-
1959 (M lbourn : M lb u n Uni rsity P r s 1961 ) , p . 2l4 . 
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the Australian shareholding was bought out in 1959 by 
exchanging the 32 per cent Australian holding in the 
local company for shar s in the American parent company, 
ational Dairy Products Corporation. By the beginn-
ing of the sixties, Kraft Holdings was a major producer 
of both processed and natural cheeses,68 of sandwich 
spreads such as Vegemite of canned and frozen veget -
ables , and of mayonnaise and salad dressings . In 
September 1961, the company acquired the fish canning 
business of Green ' s Products Ltd, the largest canners 
of tuna fish and salmon in Australia, and three months 
later purchased the capital of Dewcrisp Products Ltd, 
a company engaged in the freezing and canning of peas 
and in the dehydration of a number of other vegetables. 
Even before the company's entry into the markets for 
peanut butter and jam in 1962, Kraft was thus a major 
force in the Australian food industry. 
Two other American companies have interests in 
the Australian dairy products industry. The main one 
so involved is the Carnation Company Pty Ltd, a firm 
well known since the early fifties for its production 
of condensed milk, while the other is Swift Australian 
Co. (Pty) Ltd, a company with small interests in 
cheese manufactur . 
By far th most important activity of Swift 
Australian, however, concerns the m at industry, 
wh r Swift has long be n one of the three largest 
m at porting compani s in Australia. Indeed, Swift 
Australian began th proc ssing of m at for e port 
b fore the First World War, and ev r since, that has been 
its major int r st. The take-over of the domestically 
ori ntat d Mayfair Hams Ltd late in 1963 may herald a 
chang in this mphasis . Th only oth r Amer" can 
in stm nt in th Aust al·an meat industry app ars to 
b W"lson Mats Pty Ltd, a ompany incorporat d in 1935 
I 
und th title of Brisbane Whol sale M at Pty Ltd. 
Th ompany is curr ntly ngag d in th processing of 
m at or port, but th firm is very much smaller 
than Swift Austral"an. 
6. Th 
sal s of 




On the fringe of the meat industry are four 
American companies engaged in the production of sausage 
cas ngs. Little is known about these firms because of 
the secretive and closely-knit nature of the industry 
but all except one of them appear to have begun opera-
tions prior to World War II . Their names are British-
American Bye-Products Pty Ltd, the Oppenheimer Casing 
Company of Australia Pty Ltd, Pacific By-Products Pty 
Ltd, and Sayer E Co. (N.S.W.) P ty Ltd. All appear 
small. 
There has been very little American investment in 
the Australian confectionery industry. What there has 
been, however, began early. It is not clear when Life 
Savers (Australasia) Ltd began life in Australia but it 
must have been early in the century since it is reported 
that it was in 1926 that MacRobertson Pty Ltd bought 
out the American interest in the company for £J6,000 . 69 
Similarly, the Wrigley Company P ty Ltd was incorporated 
In ew South Wales in 1919 and seems to have begun manu-
facturing operations in the twenties. 70 The company 
currently enjoys a dominant position in the chewing- gum 
market . 
Three American-affiliated companies were engaged 
in the production of food mixes at the time t his survey 
was conduct d in 196 2. One was Downyflake Food Corpora-
on Pty Ltd, an Am e rican-Australian enterprise whose 
main interest is the supply of food mixes for the 
Arm d S rvices. The company b gan operations in 1948 . 
Swift Australian has had an interest in the production 
of pastry and scone mixes for some years, but its 
opera t ions in this fi ld ar relatively small. Th 
third ompany is White Wings Pty Ltd, a firm in which 
the P illsbury Company of the U.S . purchased a 50 per 
cent interest from its former sole owners, Gillespie 
Bros. Holdi~s Ltd, in 1961 . White Wings is a 
significant suppli r o~ s If-raising flour , especially 
in w South Wal s, and was stimated in 19 6 2 to hold 
mor than half th Australian ake-mi market. 7l 
Th firm also produces pudding mi es. 
69 . Sydney Morning Herald, 29 January 1964, p . 12. 
MacRobertson (Aust. ) Ltd sold this interest for £1 ,044,000 
at th beginning of 1964. 
70 . Colin Forst r, Ope cit ., p. 2Jl . 
71. Australian Financial Review , 16 Oc tober 1962 , p. 8 . 
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Both the American cola giants, Coca-Cola and Pepsi-
Cola, are repr s nted in Australia and both hav re-
markably similar types of investment. Both produc 
part of the concentrate from which their drink is made 
in wholly-owned plants; both have most of their bottling 
carried out by Australian-owned licensees; and both own 
one bottling plant. The Coca-C ola Export Corporation 
supervises the larg r of the two operations : Coca-Cola 
products, including those sold under the Fanta name, 
were reported to hold 25 per cent of the Sydney soft 
drink market in 1963, compared with a share of 11 per 
cent by P epsi - Cola products. 72 Coca- Cola began its 
operations in Australia in the late thirties by 
establishing a number of bottling plants but all 
these had been sold by the company by the end of 1950. 
The company turned its attention to the production of 
concentrate, in line with world- wide policy to encourage 
local shareholders to own the bottling plants . In 1954 , 
however, the company repurchased the Sydney bottling 
plant and this is still a majority-owned firm, Coca-
Cola Bottlers (Sydney) P ty Ltd. In 1962, it was the 
only one of 29 Coca-Cola bottling plants throughout 
Australia which was American- owned . Pepsi-Cola of 
Austral ia Pty Ltd began local production only in the 
early fifties and it also devotes attention primarily 
to product promotion and the supply of concentrate, 
whil ncouraging local investors to own bottling 
facilit·es. In 1962, only one P epsi bottling plant 
was own d by Americans, that of the Pepsi-Cola 
M tropolitan Bottling Company Inc . in Sydney, and it 
was stated company po Ii y that this plant would be 
sold, at least in major part, to Australian investors 
as soon as it was properly stablished . The plant was 
built following the take-over of th former Sydney 
bottl r of P psi products, Consolidated B verage Co . 
Ltd, by Tara Drinks Holdings L td in 1961 . 
Ch R lated P roducts , except pharmaceuticals 
and cosmeti s 
In few Austral'an industrie has foreign capital 
pI y d a mor promin nt rol than in th ch mical industry . 73 
72. Ibid. , 31 0 tober 1963 , p . 20. 
73. Th Australian Chemical Industry Council, in public 
vid nc submitt d to th Tariff Board in 1964, estimated 
th wight d a erag for ign o1vnership of th Australian 
h m'cal indust y t 61 p r cent . (Indu trial Chemicals 
and Syn th tic Resins, Vol . I, public i denc e pr ented 
by h A. C.I . C., 7 Sept mb r 1964, p. 10 .) 
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And though the industry is dominated by the s ubsidiary 
of a British company, Imper'al Chemical Indust~ies of 
Australia and ew Zealand Ltd, American capital has 
been of vital significance. 
The first American company to be established in 
the Australian chemical industry, and indeed probably 
the first to be established in any industry, was the 
National Ammonia Company of Australia, to which re-
ference has been made in Chap ter II.74 Of the 
companies still in existence in 1962, the two with 
claims to have been the first in operation in 
Aus tralia are Australian Cream Tartar Pty Ltd and 
Stauffer Chemical Co . (Aust.) P ty Ltd. Both companies 
stem from the formation in 1926 of the Aus tralian 
Cream Tartar Company P ty Ltd to under take the manu-
facture of cream of tartar and tartaric acid. At 
that time, the company was only about one-quarter owned 
in the U.S., by the Stauffer Company, while Kemball 
Bishop e Co . Ltd of London and T .J. Edmonds Ltd of 
ew Zealand also held about 25 per cent each. The 
balance of the shares were held in Aus tralia . The 
company began manufacturing early in 1928 and widened 
its field of production to include citric acid in 19J5. 75 
Over the years various minor changes in ownership occurred 
and by the fifties Stauffer held J4 per cent of the 
ordinary shares in the company, Kemball Bishop 27 per 
c nt, and T.J. Edmond s about 22 per cent. When in 
1959 Charles P fizer Inc . of ew York acquired Kemball 
Bishop , the total Am rican interest, both direct and 
indir t, ncr a s d to 61 per c nt . This move was 
followed by a major r 0 ganization n 1961 in which 
th ass ts of th Au tralian Cr am Ta ar Company Pty 
Ltd which were ngag d in th production of cr am tartar, 
tar ari acid and it ic acid w re sold to the P fizer 
Corporation . Pfiz r sold ' ts int rest in th Australian 
Cr am Tartar Company P ty Ltd to S t auff r and formed 
anoth r company, Australian Cr am Tartar P ty Ltd, to 
acquir the ass ts bought from th original company. 
74 . Control ational Ammonia Company of 
Au tralia and an a il ' a e, the Vi toria Ammonia Company 
P y L td , stablish d ' n 1912, pass d in 192 from Du 
Pon ( which had a qu ' d a majority int t in them 
by t k'ng 0 r th 'r p nt omp ny in th U.S.) to 
mp r'al Ch mi al ndu~ tries of Australia and ew 
Z aland L d . In ormation s uppli d by I .C~I.A .. Z. L d , 
1 t dat d 21 Janua 1965 . 
75. 
Acid 
port on Citri Acid, Tartaric 
19 April 1962, p. 5 . 
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This new company remains the only Aus tralian producer of 
tartrates . Stauffer, which now held 61 per cent of 
the shar s in th original company, renamed it Stauffer 
Chemical Co. (Aust.) P ty Ltd . This company is now 
the holding company for four operating subsidiaries, 
most of which were formed before the change in company 
structure : Chrome Chemicals (Aust.) P ty Ltd, Wesco 
P aints Pty L td, Hunter River Chemicals P ty Ltd, and 
P acific Chemical Industries P ty Ltd. The first was 
formed in 1940 while the last commenced production 
only in 1962. P roducts manufac tured include carbon 
bis~ide, paints, chrome chemicals, and fluoro-
carbons. 
Three other major American chemical companies be-
gan operations prior to World War II. One of these, 
the smallest of the three , is Dewey e Almy P ty Ltd. 
The company commenced local operations in the middle 
of the thirties and now produces a variety of products 
including sealing compounds, soldering crystals, 
construction chemicals, and plastic packaging materials . 
In 1961, its American parent formed another subsidiary, 
this time in partnership with an Australian firm, 
W. J . Manufacturing Co . L td . The new firm, Wara tah 
Chemicals P ty Ltd, manufactures phenolic resins . 
Another of those with pre - war origins is Monsanto 
Chemicals (Aust.) Ltd, which began life as a 50/ 50 
partn rship with icholas Pty Ltd . of Melbourne in 
1929. The company was initially known as the Southern 
Cross Chemical Company but its name was changed 
shortly after formation. As th company grew~ the 
Australian shar holding gradually diminished and 
before 1962 the last Australian-own d ordinary share 
had b n sold. At that time , Monsanto had become one 
of the four larg st chemical producers in Aus tralia 
and suppli d a very larg range of both chemicals and 
plast'c raw materials . P art of th company's recent 
growth has tak n th form of the take-over of two 
Australian firms in 195 , D. H . A. (Chemicals ) P ty Ltd . 
and B tl -Elliott P ty Ltd , both subsidiari s of 
Drug Houses of Australia Ltd . Be tl -Elliott had in 
turn be n acquired only two y ars pre iously by D.H .A. 
and was at that t'm 
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moulding powders . 
a major manufa tur r of plastic 
Anoth r par t of Monsanto ' s growth 
76 . John A . Bushnell, op . cit ., pp.1JJ-4 . 
I '~ 
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has tak en the form of th stablishm nt of joint ven-
tur s with other companies: in 1960 Australian 
Fluorin Chemicals P ty Ltd was set up in association 
with Consolidated Zinc P ty L td (now Conzinc Riotinto 
Australia Ltd ) to manufacture fluorocarbons and the 
company was still one of only two in that industry 
in 1964.77 Also in 1960, Monsanto entered a partner-
ship with P etrochemical Hold ings L td in the formation 
of Australian P et ochemicals P ty Ltd, a company produc-
ing styrene monomer for use by Monsanto itself in the 
production of polystyrene . 
Union Carbide has been represented in Australia 
since 19J4, when Eveready (Aust .) P ty L td was acquired 
from its British owners . For more than 20 years after 
that , Eveready specialized in the production of dry 
batteries and zinc strip but in 1957 the company began 
an era of major expansion by merging with the Australian 
chemical company, Timbrol L td . 78 The company , renamed 
Union Carbide Australia Ltd, remains the only Australian 
producer of dry cells and in addition manufactures a 
considerable number of basic industrial chemicals includ-
ing xanthates, bisphenol A , and chlorine products. 
Early in 1962, th company further widened the scope 
of its operations by bringing on stream Australia's 
s cond low-density polyethylen plant, at Altona, 
Victor·a . 
Th Altona p trochemical comple , as the group of 
p tro h mical plants at Altona is widely known, is 
almost entirely th fruit of Am rican initiative. 79 
When th first unit came into operation in August 1961, 
Australia saw its fir t large-scale petrochemical 
capacity . The whol group of plants is built around 
that of the Altona P trochemical Company P ty Ltd, a 
company initially own d by the Vacuum Oil Company P ty 
Ltd and now, sinc th di ision of that company ' s 
77 . Tariff Board's R port on Fluorocarbons, IJ April 
1964, p . 5. The only other manufactur r wa Pacific 
Ch mi al Indu tri P ty Ltd, the S tauffer subsidiary 
m nt'on d arlo r. 
Shar hold rs of Timbrol r tain d a 40 per c nt 
r s in th n w company . 
79. It should b tr d that th followin g d scrip tion 
of th Altona compl f rs to't stru ture in the 
p r' d 1962-6J. At tim of wr ing , th construction 
of s ral oth r pl in the area is rumou red or planned 
th most significant b ng a high-d nsity po l yethylene 
p l n to b constru t d by a major G rman firm . 
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ass ts in 1962, owned equally by Mobil Oil Australia 
P ty Ltd and Esso S tandard Eastern Inc . , a wholly-own d 
subsid'ary of S tandard Oil Co . ( . J .). By steam 
cracking a heavy petroleum fraction, A .P .C . produces 
two chemicals, ethylene and butadiene, which form the 
bas's for the rest of the complex . Ethylene is piped 
in part to the polyethylene plant of Union Carbide 
already mentioned,and in part to the Altona plant of 
C.S . R .C . -Dow P ty L d. This company, a 50/50 part-
nership between the American Dow Chemical Company 
and the Anglo-Australian firm , C. S . R . Chemicals Pty 
L td , uses ethylene to produce both ethylene dichloride 
and styrene monomer. Part of the latter is converted 
to polystyrene by C.S . R.C . -Dowls plant at Rhodes, ew 
S outh Wales, making the company one of only two pro -
ducers of that material in Australia. (The other, of 
course, is the Australian P etrochemicals-Monsanto 
group to which reference has already been made. ) Ethylene 
dichillride is used in the production of vinyl chloride 
monomer and P. V.C. resin by a fourth member of the com-
plex, B . F. Goodrich-C.S. R. Chemicals P ty Ltd, a 
company in which the American share interest is 60 per 
cent . As in the case of polyethylene and polystyrene, there 
is only one other producer of P .V.C . in Australia . 
Th other basic chemical produced by A . P .C., butadiene, 
is piped to Australian Synthetic Rubber Co . Ltd, which 
produces styrene butadien rubber (SBR synthetic rubber) 
with th help of styrene monom r drawn from C. S . R.C . -
Dow. At the time of writing, thi company is still the 
only manufacturer of synthet ic rubber in Australia 
though this situation appears certain to change with 
th immin nt establishment of Phillips Imperial 
Ch micals Ltd a company jointly owned by I . C.I .A • • Z. 
and Ph'llips P trol urn Company of the U . S. to produce 
poly-butadien rubber. The ownership of Australian 
Synth ti Rubber is shared betwe n thr American or 
Am ian-own d compan ' s: Esso S tandard Oil (Aust .) 
L td, Goody ar Tyr e Rubb r Co . (Aust . ) L td, and Mobil 
P rol um Inc. 
Unconn t d di tly with h Altona comple 
' ts If bu on a sit n a b is Au tralian Carbon 
Bla k P ty Ltd . Th' firm b gan production of arbon 
bla k in 1959 and in 1964 was still th only firm in 
th Aust alian indu t y. 
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Whil compar d with th massiv apital °nflow 
r p r s nted by nt Am rican °nv stment in the 
Au stralian p tro h mical indust y they we v y 
s mall , th re w re at 1 ast four other American-
affilOat d ch mical companies in existence in 1962 
which had been s t up in Austral ia sinc Wo ld War I I . 
Th first of th se was a manu factu rer of m tal lic 
p ain t driers a nd fungicides , u odex (Aust . ) P ty Ltd , 
a c ompany set up as a joint Australian-American 
venture in 1949 . The second was Divers ey (Australasoa ) 
P ty L td, set u p in 1953 f o r the p roductlon of 
industrial bactericides and detergents. The third 
and fourth, P rimal Chemical P ty L td and Hercules 
P owder Co. (Aust .) P ty L td, engaged in the production 
o f acr ylic emu lsions and rosin- based p r oducts re -
s p ectively , both began production early in 1962 . At 
that time , the former was a wholly-owned subsidiary 
of Rohm e Haas Company of Philad~hia while the latter 
was a joint venture between the American Hercules 
P owder Co . Inc . and the ~n predominantly Australian-
owned Australian Chemical Holdings Ltd . 
On the fringe of the chemical industry proper , in 
what th Commonwealth S tatistician terms the ' Inks , 
P olish s , etc .' industry, at least six American firms 
ar activ. Four of th se produce adhesives . P erhaps 
th first on the Australian scene was Bos ik Australia 
P L td, a m mb r of th British nited Shoe Machinery 
group which was incorporated in Australia und r the 
nam of Boston Black Ong Co . of Australia P y L td in 
1915. Th compan la r changed its nam to B . B . 
Ch mi al Co o of Au s t l Oa P ty Ltd and again to its 
p r s nt title On 1962. Th fO m produc industrial 
adh SO sand saling compounds for a ari t of 
°ndustry . Anothe old tablished company in this 
i n dustry is P abco P rodu t P ty Ltd . Thou gh thi 
comp any was s abli h d n Au s ralia during th thirti s 
o r h bi um on u -roofing market, it ha l ong 
b n m jor supp l o of adh s to h floor-coY ring 
ndu try . Th comp ny is a l so w 11 kno ,\l1. fo it anti -
corr p aints. In 19 49, Cas o Adh s P ty Ltd 
wa st blish d for th p odu ction of adhe i e and 
g u s fr m cas n . Lat th fO m hang d its nam 
t o Sw Oft e Bord n Ch mical Co . P ty Ltd and wi d n e d it 
r ng f produ s . In 1962, th o mpany \ a till a n 
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Austral'an-Am rican v nture but one year later he 
Australian interest was sold and the company's name 
was again chang d, to Borden Chemical Co. P ty L td . 
S 'dn y Cooke (Print'ng Inks) P ty L td , in which an 
American firm has a minority holding, is also engaged 
in the s upply of adhesives, thougb print ing inks and 
industrial coatings make up a significant part of the 
firm' s production. 
Ferro Corporation (Aust.) P ty L td first began 
operations in Australia in association with Armco 
Int rnational Corporation but shortly afterwards the 
80 company set up its own facilities in Sydney. 
Since this beginning late in the thirties, the company 
has diversified from its principal product, porcelain 
enamel , into the production of enamelling equipment 
and other related lines, and has even entered the 
P .V .C. compounding industry . In quite a different 
field is S.C. Johnson e Son P ty L td . This company , 
which began production in Australia in 1929, is now 
widely known for its domestic and industrial polishes . 
Cyanamid Australia P ty L td, established in 
Australia under tbe name of T itan P ty L td when an 
Australian firm of that name was acquired in 1~5l, is 
engag d in th production of tennis gut and surgical 
sutures from b f int stin s. De spite th scope of 
Cyanamid's op rations in the U.S . , this activity was 
the only on belonging to the company which was 
actually manufacturing in Australia i n mid-1962 . Later 
that y ar, however, th f rm ntation of broad spectrum 
antibiot'cs, particularly tetracyclin drugs, was 
start d by another ubsidiary, Cyanamid-D.H.A . P ty Ltd . 
Pharmac 
Am rican-own d companies playa particularly 
ital rol in h Au tralian pharmaceutical industry . 
L'k n stm nt in oth s ctors, how ver, this is 
no n w d v lopm n . The large t American firm i n 
tb industry, and on of th two larg st firms in the 
' ndust y a a whol , is Park, Da is e Co . This firm 
b gan op rations 'n Au t alia a arly as 1902 and set 
up manufacturing acil'ti s at Ros b y in 191 . 
In 195 4, op rat'on w r mo d to n w pr mis s a Caringbah 
~~~~~~~~~~~==~~~~w, 19 Jun 1962, p. 2 
und r th nam Ferro-
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and th ompany now p oduces a very w Ode range or 
pharmac uticals and v t rinary pr pa atOons . In 1960 
it was stat d that the ompany was then producing 
abou 350 diff rent produ ts, including the import-
ant ant Obiotic , chloramphenicol. 81 Ste lOng 
P harmaceuticals P ty Ltd is another large American 
company which had it origins in Australia before 
World War I, in th establishment of F ederick 
S tearns e Co . in 1910 . When the American parent of 
Fr derick Stearns was bought out by Sterling Drug 
Inc . in 1944 , the local operation also changed hands. 
S terling Drug had had another interest in Australia 
for a number of years, through a 50 per cent equity 
with a German firm in Bayer P harma Pty L td . This 
firm was set up in 1935 for the compres ion of aspirin 
tablets from ingredients imported from Germany but on 
the outbreak of war the German shareholding was ac -
quired by the Controller of Enemy P roperty from 
where it eventually passed , in 1958, to Sterling Drug . 
S inc that time, he manufacture of Bayer products in 
Au tralia has been conducted by S terling Pharmaceuticals. 82 
The whole group, through its three main operating divi-
sions, yal Company, Winthrop Laboratories, and G1en-
brook Laboratories, produ es a very consid rable 
numb r of pharmac uticals, both thical and proprietary . 
Abbott Australian Holdings P ty Ltd too, commenced 
op rations many y ar ago . The firm wa e ~ tablished 
und r the nam of Abbott Laboratorie ' Pty Ltd in 1936 
and through it ~ op ating subsidiaries now produces 
not only pharmaceutical products but also eterinary 
preparations and a ange of basic chemicals used in 
th manufacture of pharma utical products. Thi last, 
th production of th ba ic chemicals u d in drug 
produ ti n, was stil rath r rar in h Au tralian 
°ndu try in 1962 . Mo t Am rican-own d plant , like 
thos of oth r na ion liti s , import d h great bulk 
of h i drug r qu ° r m n But th re wer ase oth r 
try 
2. compan appar ntly w nt to onsiderabl pains 
o hid fact, a he r c nt a of Bayer P harma 
P ty L td rsus H H. York e Co. P ty L td tartlingly 
shows . For on w of th cas ,se ation, 2 May 
196 4 , pp . 9-11 . 
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than that of Abbott where companies d·d engage in basic 
ch m·cal manufactur for the pharmaceutical industry. 
Monsanto Chemicals, for example, had been manufacturing 
the hemical u sed in asp · rin manufactur for very many 
years and by 1962 was also producing a range of sulpha 
drugs . Another example was Merck Sharp E Dohme (Aust. ) 
P ty Ltd which since 1956 had produced the cortico -
st roid hormones in Australia. The company, which 
began Australian operations in 1953, is understood to 
be engaged also in the manufacture of t hiabendazole, 
a chemical used in the treatment of parasites in farm 
animals. The firm specializes in the supply of 
ethical pharmaceuticals and veterinary products. 
(R eference has already been made to the production of 
tetracycline drugs by Cyanamid- D. H. A. p ty Ltd , but 
this commenced after 30 June 1962 .) 
Fi e more American companies are engaged primarily 
in the supply of ethical pharmaceuticals. These are 
Smith Kline E French Laboratories ( Aust . ) Ltd , Eli 
Lilly (Aust.) P ty Ltd, Upjohn Pty Ltd, Wyeth Pharma-
c ut·cals Pty Ltd, and Andrews Laboratories P ty Ltd . 
Wyeth and Andrews, however, are intimately conn cted 
with companies whos main interest lies outside the 
thical fi Id. 
Som companies blend operations in both ethical 
and proprietary field 0 P ark Davis, S terling, and 
Abbott hav already be n not d in this regardo The 
P f·z r Corporation b gan s pharmac utical manufact -
ur·ng op rations in Aus ralia in 1960 with primary 
mphasis on antibiotic, part·cularly the '-mycin' 
group, but has sinc ntered the volatil market for 
popular slimming ag nts. Charles cDonald-Mead 
Johnson P ty L td, a company form d by th acqui ition 
o~ th Australi n f·rm CharI s McDonald P ty Ltd in 
1960, is mainly d in the production of ethicals 
but nt red the mark t for slimming ag nts at the time 
~ th Am rican tak -0 r . Though th·s debut.a not 
a sting succ ss, th ompany continu to upply a 
numb r of oth r prop~t ry lin s, in luding d· t 
upp m nts . Mu h long r ha b en p ri n of 
W n r-Lamb rt P ty L d, on of th r firs Am rican 
mp s stabl· h d n Austral· aft r th turn of 
th ntury . Wa n r-Lamb t is now th holdi ompany 
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~or thr e op rating subsidiaries, one of which pro-
duc s thical pharmaceuticals, one proprietary pro-
duc and one the w 11 known range of Richard Hudnut 
b auty preparations. International Home P roducts 
(Aust.) P ty L td, which operated or many years under 
th name of Whitehall Pharmacal Company, produces a 
range of propri taries, but its associated company, 
Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, is in the field of ethicals . 
Vick P roducts (P ty) Ltd, long known for its prop-
ri tary products is also engaged in the supply o~ 
ethicals and veterinary products. (The firm i now 
renamed Richardson-Merrell Pty L td.) 
E . C . De Witt e Co. (Aust . ) P ty Ltd, on the other 
hand, appears to concentrate principally on the manu-
facture of proprietary medicines while Watkins 
P roducts Inc. produces toilet preparations and grocers' 
sundries in addition to proprietaries . 
Johnson e Johnson P ty Ltd is one of the most re -
markable firms in the industry, though many of its 
products can only with difficulty be termed 'pharma-
ceuticals' . Th company was formed in Australia in 
19J2 and has b en a household word almost ever since . 
It is the only Australian manufacturer of plaster 
dr ssings and holds a dominant position also in the 
local market for bab pawd r. Under its various 
brandnam s, the firm is an important supplier of uch 
d'v products a bandag s, sanitary napkins, surgical 
sutur s, ontracepti s, and tooth brushes. A t the be-
ginning of the sixties, th company purchased a majority 
shar holding in th locally-owned Andrews Laborato ie , 
m nt ' oned abo , and ther by mad a significant entry 
into th rna ket for thlcal pharmaceuticals . 
Th Australian toothpaste rna ket i entirely the 
prov'nc of for ign- own d ompanies, and the dominant 
f ' rms ar Am rican. s ral of th pharmaceutical 
comp n ' es alread men ion d produc th ir own brand 
Int national Hom P roducts, S rling Pharmaceutical , 
and P ark Da is , for ample, produc Kolynos, aI , 
and Euthymol P ti el - but th main American 
bands ar Ipana and Colgat The form r i produc d 
b Br ' stol-My rs Co. P L d, a ompany which s t u p 
manufa turing op rations in Australia at th beginning 
of th tw nti s. Though h comp any ha di rsifi d 
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into the manufacture of deodorants, shaving cream 
and other toilet articles, the company was estimated 
to hold about 25 per cent of the whole Australian 
toothpaste market in 1962. 83 At that time, this was a 
share exceeded only by Colgate , which, however, was 
estimated to hold roughly half the market . Colgate-
P almolive P ty Ltd began Australian manufacture at 
about the same time as Bristol-Myers and is also a 
large supplier of toilet requisites. Its P almolive 
toilet soap has long been fully as well known as its 
Colgate toothpaste. The company also manufactures 
A jax cleanser, introduced to the Australian market in 
1956, and Fab detergent, introduced in 1960 to 
challenge the near-monopoly position held in the 
washing-powder market up to that time by the British 
group, Uni1ever. In 1964, Colgate-P almolive claimed 
that 98 per cent of Australian homes used at least one 
84 of the company ' s products regularly. 
On a very much smaller scale, Cuticura P ty Ltd 
has been engaged in the production of toilet soap , 
ointment and talcum powder, while Purex Australia P ty 
L td, an associate company, produces household cleansers . 
Purex was established in Australia many years ago under 
the name of Old Dutch Pty Ltd . 
In the Australian cosmetics market, almost all 
of the names which spring speedily to mind are 
American: Revlon, Helena Rubinstein, Max Factor, 
Elizabeth Arden, Richard Hudnut, Toni, Coty, Cutex, 
Mum, P ond ' ~ Dorothy Gray, Odo-ro-no - all are the 
products of American-owned firms currently operating 
in Australia and the list of brands could doubtless be 
tended . One of the odd quirks about the American 
domination of the industry is that one of its two 
w"dely-accepted 1 aders, Helena Rubinstein P ty L td, had 
its origin not in the establishment of a local subsid-
iary by a large American corporation but in the genesis 
83. Australian Financial Review, 27 March 1962, p . 10 . 
4. Ibid . , 14 July 1964, p . 3 . In 1963, Colga e 
c aim d to hold 50 p r cent of the Australian market 
for toilet soap, 50 p r cent of the toothpaste market, 
60 p r cent of the scouring cleans r market , and 45 per 
c nt of the hous hold det rgent market . ( Ibid . , 2 July 
1963, p . 16 .) 
, 
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of the Helena Rubinste'n organisation itself . For Miss 
Rub'nst in established h r first business in Melbourne 
and Helena Rubinstein P ty Ltd was formed soon after-
wa d in 1909 . 85 Though the company is now wholly 
owned in the U . S . , affiliated companies in the Rubin-
ste n organisation seem to bear a sisterly relation-
ship towards each other rather than one of the p arent-
child variety . 
In all other cas s, however, the relationship is 
of the traditional kind . With Helena Rubinstein, a 
recent survey of the industry placed Max Factor € Co. 
in a position of leadership,86 followed closely by 
Re Ion (Aust. ) Pty Ltd and Eli zabeth Arden P ty L td. 
All four companies produce a wide variety of cos-
metics . Chesebrough-P ond ' s International L td and 
Coty (England) Ltd are also major producers . The 
former established manufacturing facilities in 
Australia in 195J and further widened the scope of 
its operations by the take-over of the local branch 
of the ortham Warren Corporation in 1959-60, at the 
sam tim that its parent was absorbing the ortham 
Warr n Corporation itself in the U.S. Coty ( England) 
Ltd, as its nam betrays, has a British company as 
its immediate parent . 
In the field of hair preparations, the name of 
Ri hard Hudnut has already be n mentioned in connec -
tion with Warner-Lambert . The company produces other 
cosm tics also but i probably best known for these . 
G'll tt (Aust . ) P ty L d is prominent in the market 
for hair cosm tics, too, because of its production 
of goods sold under th Toni name . Wa al Thermal of 
Aus ralia P ty L td spe ializ s in the supply of profession-
al hair wa ing mat rials. 
At the m of wr't'ng, it app ars that two more 
Am r an nam s ha nt r d th local industry since 
JO Jun 1962, H 1 n Curt ' s (Aust .) P ty Ltd and A on 
P rodu ts P t Ltd. Both compan ' es app ar to ha e b gun 
manufactur sin mid-1962 while a third, Dorothy 
Gr P ty Ltd, s m to b in th distribution phase . 
85. Australian F'nancial Review, 
6. b'd. 
25 June 196J , p . J . 
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A ompany lit 1 known to th public but on 
whi h produces a s ubs tantial part of h lipsti k 
produ d in Austr l ' a ' s Kolmar (Aust.) P ty Ltd. 
Th company's outpu i s unde stood to be sold und r 
veral of the eading brandnames . 
Oil Products 
To thos familiar with the Australian oil 
industry 'n mid-1962 it may come as a surprise to 
1 arn that this s ction describes the activitie of 
no f wer than five American-affiliated ompanies. 
Th of them are very large firms engaged in he re-
f'ning end of th indus try, with names well known to 
all, wh le two of them are very small. 
One of the large companies is Mobil Oil Australia 
Pty Ltd, with i ubsidiaries P etroleum Refineries 
(Au~t .) P y Ltd and Emoleum (Aust.) Ltd. Thi group 
operated under the name of Vacuum Oil Co. P ty Ltd 
for many years and, through the S tandard-Vacuum Oil 
Company of the U.S. was jointly owned by S tandard Oil 
Co. ( ew Jersey) and Socony Mobil Oil Co. As men-
tioned previou ly, the assets of S tandard-Vacuum were 
divided between its two shareholders in March 1962 and 
Mobil Oil Australia is now owned wholly by Socony 
Mobil 0'1, through Mobil Oil P etroleum Co . , Inc . 8? 
Th origins of th group in Australia go back before 
the turn of th cen ury but at that time distribution 
of k ro s ne and other oil products was the main concern. 
Th bl nding of lub ication oil and grease began at an 
a t ag but it wa not until after World Wa r II tha 
th company establi h d ,oil refin ' ng facilitie. In 
1949, 't first oil efinery came on stream at Altona 
and th' was gr atly pand d during the fiftie . In 
1960, th ompany purchas d the small Au tralian firm, 
Emo1 um, a ompany manu fa turing bitum'nou mul ions, 
but much more 'mportant was the h avy in tment at 
th t tim in h Altona ' p troch mical comple and the 
n w 0'1 r finery near Ha1letts Co , South Australia. 
Wh n tb 1a ter cam on tream in arch 196), th 
Mob ' 
a 
g oup ontrol1ed more than 24 p r cent of total 
Som of Vacumn 0 ' 1' original as et , howe r, 
now control1 d by S tandard Oil Company ( . J .) : 
n e ha be n mad to its in er st 'n the A1 ona 
p t 0 h mical comp1 , and in addition th firm ha 
a 26 per eent int est in P etroleum Refineries (Aust .) 
P L d. 
Au -tral an crude 011 t:' ° ° 88 l.lnlng capaclty. Th company 
aloha t n iv investm n t in mark ting fac010ti 
explo at ° on. and n oi 
Th se ond and thi d of the three large companoes 
to which refer nce was initially made are affiliated . 
On of th m, Australian Oil Refining P ty L td, i a 
wholly-own d subsidiary o f the Ca l ifor n ia Texas Oil 
Co poration of the U. S ., a company representing the 
°nte ests of both S tanda d Oi l o f California a nd 
Texaco, Inc . In 1962, this firm owned t he largest 
°ngle efinery in Australi a , a plant with capacity 
qual to almost 26 per cent o f the Australian total . 
It output is ma rketed through the wholly-American 
aff oliate , Caltex Oil (Aust . ) P ty L td a n d the pre-
dominantly Australian-owned firms , H.C. S leigh L td 
and Ampol P etroleum L td. 89 The o ther major American-
affiliated firm in the industry is Bitu men e Oil 
R fineries (Aust . ) L d, or Boral Ltd as it is now 
known. The Caltex group held a 40 per cent intere t 
in this company at its inception in 1946 b u t this had 
d clin d to only 26 p r cent by mid-1962 . S inc that 
m , the Am rican interest has fallen ven furthe . 
Though th company has wide and ever- growing intere ts 
ou °d the oil industry - in coal mining and quarry-
ing, for e ample - its pr Omary acti ity still remains 
h i nOng of crud oil. Compared with hos of 
oth r p oducer , both it r f Oneri ( one at Matraville o 
w Sou h Wal s, and on at Hamil t on, Queen ~ land) a e 
rna 1. 
In th shadows of th giant corporations grow 
two r mall firms d aling in oil product . Both 
b g n manufac t u °ng op ration in 1961. On, 
Lub izol Aust al oa, p oduces oil additiv s whil th 
otb , Wynn' s Frktion P roofing (Aust. ) P ty L td, 
m nUl tures lub ° ants. 
S On 1962, two mo e Am rican-affiliated firms 
h mad 
89· C t 
mpani s . 
n ~ m nt On 0 °1 r fining, Australian 
an e timated Au tralian 
ing units - c ude di -
17 , 0 1 0 , 000 ton 
ha a s mall inan °al int r st n both 
Lubr ' cat'ng Oil Refin ry P ty L td and Amoco Australia 
P ty L td . The former, as its name i mpl'es, is engaged 
'n th production of lubricating oil and when 't 
came on stream in March 196 4 it was declared to be 
the larg st plant of its type in the southern hemi-
ph re. 90 H.C. Sleigh L td and Ampol P etroleum Ltd 
each hold 25 per cent o f the equity while the Caltex 
group holds the remaining 50 per cent. Amo co 
Australia is a wholly-owned subsidiary of S tandard Oil 
of Indiana . Its Brisbane refinery is due to come on 
stream early in 1966. 
Miscellaneous P roducts 
In a multitude of other industries American capital 
has made its impact felt. The paper products industry 
i one of these. St . Regis-Williams P ty Ltd, in which 
the St. Regis Paper Company of the U.S . has a 50 per 
cent int erest, holds a substantial share of the market s 
fo multi-wall paper bags and S isalkraft building 
mat rlals through its two operating subsidiaries 
Bat (Aus t ralas ia ) P ty Ltd and Australian Sisalkraft 
P ty Ltd. The latte r company began operations in 1932 
and the former was started even earlier. Kimberly-
CIa k of Australia P ty L td also began operations in 
th hir ti s and its paper tissue products Kleenex, 
Dawn, and Kot x are now widely known. Also engag d 
in th production of tissu products is Bowater-
Sco t t Au s t alia Pty Ltd, a joint v nture b tween he 
giant British group, Bowater P ap r Corporation Ltd, 
and S ott P ap r Company of the U. S. This firm 
app ar d on the Australian scene n th late fifti s 
but aIr ady two of it ~ brandnames, S cotties and Sor-
b nt, ar well known . Th company is ngaged in th 
produ tion of ti u pap r as well as 'n its con-
er on. L'ly Cups L d, lhich began Australian opera-
i on - by 
Ii n ~ e , 
't b d b 
acquiring the pap r cup di ision of 
John 11 Ltd ( or Kia Ora Industr ' es 
n known), in 1961, cat rs for h 
it form r 
Ltd, a 
~ p ' aliz d 
mark t or di posabl up. One ompany whos pro-
du l ' ttl n by the general public is 
Con s and Tub P y L td . Thi firm stem 
f om n I d abl' h d Au tral'an fam'ly nt rp 
M e W lk r P y L td which in 1947 join d with 
no h r Aus t alian firm and two fo ign ompani to 
r m th p s n omp ny. In 1962, h ompan wa 
90. Sydn 24 March 1964 , p 23 · 
one b rd owned by Sono 0 P roduct Company 0 the 
U.S., and in addition to supplying a Iwide range of 
indus ial con aine made rom paper wa the only 
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Australian manu acturer of paper cone for the x-
ti e ' ndus try.9 l Au t alian Inhibito Paper P ty 
L d is ano her jointly-owned c ompany: it produces 
anti-corrosive paper on a small s cale . 
One sec ion of the paper products indu try, h 
mark t for pape dress patterns, is ef~ectively 
dominated by hree American companies: Butterick 
Publishing Co. P ty Ltd (which also owns the Vogue 
rademark), McCall Publishing Co . (Australa ia) P ty 
L td, and Simplicity P atterns P ty Ltd. All three 
irms ha e been operating in Australia for more than 
wenty years, though it appears that none produce in 
Au alia the actual tissue p aper fr om which the 
patterns are cut. 
The Australian abrasives market is very largely 
th province of American-affiliated companie . 
Australian Abrasives P ty Ltd is by far the largest 
p oducer of bond d abra ives and has been ever since 
comm ncing production in 19 40 . Though there are 
mall Australian and British shareholdings in the 
ompany, it is predominantly owned by two American 
fi m , the 0 ton Company and the Carborundum Company . 
Both these American companie also ha e subsidiaries 
op rating in th Australian market for urrace-coa ed 
ab a i e. orton Australia P ty Ltd or Behr-Manning 
(Au .) P ty Ltd a it was known till 1963, set up a 
plant imm diat I 
tion of pre su 
aft r World War II for th 
ben itiv tape ( old unde 
produc -
the B ar 
b and) and th con r ion of impor d rolls of 
s to flni hed produ ts . Inl952, th company 
t nd d its manufa turing acti it ' s to include the 
p odu tion of ab roll ~ fr om ' mp orted grains, 
nd until 1961 ma n d th only compan p oducing 
th ~ in Aust al1.a . 
omm n d th on 
91. 
Tub 
Ca borundum Au t alia P ty L d 
ion of impo t doll to fini h d 
on P ap , Bobbin 
p. 4 . 
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P odu t n 1956 and t he production of ab asive 011 
th m_ v s ' n 1962 . A ,h 'rd Am can company in b 
s u 
-coat d abra ve ' ndust y began convers on 
op ation b or Carbo undum, n 1953, but did not 
omm nc production of rolls till 1963. This wa~ 
M'nn ota Mining 8 Manufactu ing (Aust .) P ty L d, a 
company , like orton, also engaged in the manuractur 
o pr ssur sensit ' v tapes. In 1962 the e wa~ only 
on oth major company in the Australian indu t y, 
and that was Br'tish-owned . 92 
Four American-aff ' liated compan ' es produce 
foundation garments in Australia . The largest firm 
in th industry is Australian- owned, though several 
o i s main products are made under licence to 
Am ican firms . In the second largest firm, however, 
on stimated to hold between 20 and 25 per cent of 
th total market,93 there is a substantial American 
minority holding . This is Dowd Associates P ty L td, 
which markets the Hickory brand . Formfit of 
Aus alia Ltd until recently known as Merica 
Foundations Ltd, is also regarded as one of the major 
produc rs and sinc 1959 a ma jority of the company's 
har s have been held by an American firm . The most 
cent a rival at th time of writing is the Lovable 
B re Compan (Aust.) P ty L td, another Australian 
Am rican jOlnt entur , which wa claimlng from 121 2 
15 P r cent of the bra iere market within three 
a s of it comm nc ment of manufacture in Au~ tralia 
'n 19 61 . 94 The fou tb American firm in the industry 
H. W. Go sard Co . (Aust. ) P ty Ltd, was incorporated in 
Au tralia as early a 1931 . It i the only wholly-
Am rican firm of th four, but it is very mall. 
At 1 ast tbre oth American firms ha e made 
0 
n tm nts in th Au tralian cloth'ng indu tr but of 
h s only on r main d ' n 1962 . Th sur i or wa 
Jantz n (Aust .) Ltd, a f'rm in'tia1ly ~ormed 'n 192 
o p cializ in th p odu tion of port w ar and 
92. T iff Boar~s 
p . 5 · 
93· 
9 4 . bid . , 28 0 tob r 1964, p . 5 . 
15 June 1962, 
19 Ma h 1964, p. 2 . 
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swim s uits. Both the other firms were ngaged in th 
manufacture of lingeri. One, Julius Kayser (Aust . ) 
P ty Ltd, was fo · m d in 1929 by Julius Kays r e Co. of 
th U.S . and three local firms, Aus tralian Knitting 
M~s Ltd, Yarra Falls Ltd, and Marks e Saulwick Pty 
Ltd. 9 5 It became wholly-American in ownership during 
the thirties but was sold in 1953 to a British 
company which itself had been formed by Julius Kayser 
'" Co . 96 v The company now operate s under the name of 
Kayser Pty Ltd. The other American firm in the 
industry, Holeproof Hosiery Co . (Aust . ) Pty Ltd, 
was established at about the same time. It, too, was 
a jointly-owned company, this time with the Aus tralian 
firm of Staley e S taley Ltd ,97 but the American 
int rest was sold a few years later . 
American interest in the Australian textile 
industry has been very small . The Aberfoyle Manu£act-
uring Company (Aus t.) P ty Ltd was established as a 
wholly-American subsidiary in the thirties to mercer-
ize cotton yarn but before the end of June 1962 the 
company had been acquired by an Australian firm, 
Qual itaire Mills P ty Ltd. Much shorter was the life 
of Textured Yarns (Aust. ) P ty Ltd. This firm, in 
which there was in any case only a m~nority American 
holding, operated for only a few years in the mid-
fifties and was never large . Burlington Inc. of the 
U. S. held an interest whi~h fell substantially short 
of 25 per cent in Burlington Mills (Aus t .) Ltd when 
that company began operations immediately after 
World War II but even this small investment was re-
patriated early in the fifUes . 98 The only American 
dir ct investm nt in the Australian textile industry 
at 30 June 1962 appears to have been a minority 
holding in Artflex Fabrics Australia P ty Ltd, a small 
company producing knitted lastic fabrics for the 
foundation garm nt industry . 
95. Colin Forst r, Op e it., p . 97 . 
96. J.H. Dunning, Am~rican Investment in British 
Manufacturing Industry (London: All n E Unwin, 195 ), 
p. 72 . 
97 . Colin Forst r , Op e cit ., p . 97 . 
9 . Information s upplied by Bradford Co ton Mills 
L td, 1 tt r da d 0 mb r 1964 . 
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Another industry in which Amer" can "nter st has 
b n n glig "bl is th plastic products "ndust y. 
Only thre small compani s had substantial American 
shar holdings in 1962: Dentsply (Al~St.) P ty Ltd , 
a firm producing artificial teeth; Amalgamated P lastics 
( Holdings ) Pty Ltd, producing plastic products for 
household use ; and U.K . Optical Bausch E Lomb P ty Ltd, 
producing frames for both sunglasses and spectacles . 
In no case was the American interest more than 15 
years old in 1962 . 
In the production of Australian furnishings, too, 
American companies have played a small part. Simmons 
Bedding Company began operations here in 1958 with 
the acquisition of John Lawler E Sons P ty Ltd and is 
now a growing force in the mattress market . The 
only other American firm in the furnishing industry 
appears to be Hunter Douglas Ltd . This company 
dominates the venetian blind market and has in recent 
years diversified into the production of aluminium 
awnings, aroustic ceilings building materials and 
insect screens . The firm was established in 
Australia in 195 4 and merged with an Australian firm , 
Mello-Lite Ltd , in 1961 . Even before the merger , 
Hunter Douglas was reporte d to be Australia's largest 
single consumer of aluminium . 99 
Dominating another industry is Kodak (Australasia) 
P ty Ltd. This company was formed in 1908 to merge 
th int r sts of an Au tral "an firm , Baker E Rouse, 
with those of the Eastman Kodak Company. Baker E 
Rous had been manufacturing sensitized materials in 
Aus ralia sinc 18 6 and by 1906 claimed to supply a 
substantial port"on of th Australian d mand for bromide 
and oth r s nsitiz d pap rs at th am prices as 
~ " m " lar pap rs w r old in Britain . Th Australian 
p tn rs w re v n engag d i n th production of dry 
plat s, though th 
otal m rk t. 100 
uppli d only a small part of th 
W"th th impo ition of high r 
t r Oll on ilms in 1907, Bak r i it d th Ea tman 
Kodak C mpany f r whom h had b n h Au ral"an ag nt 
mb 1961, p . 16. 
for some years, and in the following year, as men-
t'on d, the two groups merged their interests with 
th American firm holding a bare majority of the 
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equity in the new company . The production of sensitized 
film was begun almost at once and within a few years 
the company claimed to supply 80 per cent of the 
A t I , k ,101 h us ra lan mar et for fllms . Ever since t at 
time, Kodak has dominated the Australian photographic 
market, though in recent years the company has been 
under increasingly severe pressure from imported pro-
ducts . In 1957, the company diversified into the 
production of box cameras and by 1962 was still one 
f 1 t d d ' A t I' 102 o on y wo pro ucers so engage ln us ra la o ow, 
however, the Australian shareholding is only nominal . 
In the glass industry, Corning Glass Works 
commenced the local assembly of glass env lopes for 
the cathode ray tubes in television rec ivers in 
March 1959. The Tariff Board estimated that in 1960 
Corning supplied about 50 per cent of the Australian 
market for these television bulbs, wi t h the great 
majority of the remainder being imports . l03 By the 
time of the Board's 1964 Report, Corning was one of 
two producers but was much the larger of the two . l04 
Indirectly affiliated with Corning is Australian Fibre 
Glass P ty Ltd . This firm was initially formed by 
Australian Consolidated Industries Ltd under the name 
of Glass Fibres (Aust.) P ty Ltd but since 1959, when 
the name was changed to its present form, 40 per cent 
of the equity has been held by the Owens-Corning Fibre 
Glass Corporation of the U.S. The company is the only 
Australian producer of fibre glass wool and the con-
tinuous filaments from which fibre glass textiles are 
105 produced. 
In the market for writing instruments, the pro-
ducts of P arker-Eversharp (Aust.) P ty Ltd, Scripto 
Pens of Australia P ty Ltd , and W.A. Sheaffer P en Co. (Aust . ) 
P ty Ltd are well known . As far as manufacturing is 
10 1 . Inter-State Commission of Australia. Tariff 
Investigation : Miscellaneous Group VI. Report, p . 65 . 
102 . Tariff Board's Report on Roll Film Box Type 
Cameras, 29 Jun 1960, p . 4 . 
103. Tariff Board ' s Report on Cathode Ray Tubes and 
Parts Ther~of, 29 Jun 1960, p . 8 . 
104. Tariff Board's Report on Glass Envelopes for 
Cathode Ray Tubes, 20 May 196 4 , pp . 4-5 
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onc rned P ark and Scripto ar ma Only ngaged in 
th assembly 01 ball p ns, whol Sh affer appears to 
conc ntrate more on p ns and prop lling p ncils. All 
thre ompanies began Australian op ations during 
the fifties . 
Th re was only one American firm with an 
investment in the Australian footwear industry in 1962 . 
This was the International Sho e Company, which ac -
quired a 60 per cent interest in P erry Sho es P ty 
L td in 1960. Since 1962, International Shoe has 
acquired interests in two more Australia firms but 
its interest in P erry Shoes has been sold to the 
Australian shareholder, Bedggood e Co. P ty Ltd, which 
clos d down the plant in 196J. A much more significant 
American inv stment in this industry occurred at the 
very b ginning of th thirties when the S elby Shoe 
Company of the U.S . established S lby Shoes (Aust .) 
P ty Ltd in conjunction with the Sydney retailer, David 
Jones L td . This company prospered and flourished but 
the American equity, which was never more than 40 per 
c nt, was sold to David Jones in 1959 . In the related 
field of orthop~dic appliances, S choll Manufacturing 
Co . P ty Ltd has been active since soon after World War 
II . The company is indirectly 51 per cent American, 
with an Australian firm, Associated Leathers L td , 
holding the balance of the shares. 
The activities of the three companies which re-
main to be described cover widely different industries. 
A .G . Spalding e Bros. (Australasia) P ty Ltd, which be-
gan Aus tralian manufacture in the by nties, produces 
a wid range of sporting goods, and P earls p ty L td, an 
Australian-Ameri can company established in 1956, pro-
duc s cultured p arls . Philip Morris (Aus t .) L td, 
th last of the thr e, commenced cigarette production 
n 1955 and by 1965 claimed to have won almost 10 
p r nt of th fi rcely comp titiv cigar tte mark t. 106 
105. Tariff Board ' s Report on Glass Fibre and Glass 
Fibre P roducts, ll~ S pt mb 1962, pp . 6, 8 . 
106 . Australian Financial Revi ew, 6 Ap il 1965, p.ll. 
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App ndox C 
SOME CORPORATE 'PORTFOLI O' INVESTME TS IN AUSTRALI A 
COMPA IES 
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As explained in Chapter I , the primary purpose 
o f this survey was to examine American direct invest -
m nt in Australian manufactu ring industry. Inevitably, 
however, a number of companies were encountered in 
which the American equity fell short of 25 per cent . 
Though lack of time prevented their be i ng visited, 
most of them compl ted a brief questionnaire on their 
American association . This appendix sets out the 
information gained. 
In all, JJ such firms were encountered. It is 
unnec ssary to list them all but the names of som of 
th more important ones illustrate their industrial 
div rsity : Amalgamat d Wireless Valve Co . P ty L td, 
Automotive Components L td, John Beith Holdings Ltd, 
th m mbers of the Bradford Insulation group, 
Bradford K ndall L td, Commonwealth Engineering Co . 
L td, Consolidated Milk Industries Ltd , Freighters 
Ltd, Frigrite Ltd , Gibson Ke l ite Chemicals Ltd, 
Hanimex Corporation L td , Ernest Hiller Holdings Ltd, 
Pacific Oxygen L td ( acquOred since 1962 by Commonwealth 
Industrial Gases Ltd ) , and Unique Sash Balance P ty Ltd . 
The 28 firms which p rovided emp loyment figures 
for 1962 had total employment of 17,296 in that year 
and the employment of the whole group was probably 
about 19,000 . The mallest had mployment of only 8 
and the largest of J, 016 . The 2J companies which pro-
vided sales figures for 1961/ 62 had total sales of a 
little more than 6J million . 0 accurate estimate 
can be made of the sales of th whole group but 
sinc those which pro id d sales figur shad employ-
m nt of 14,452, it may b surmised that th sales of the 
whol group w r in the region of £ 0- 5 million . 
Th Ameri an shar holdings varied b tw en 0. 1 per 
c nt and 24 .0 P r c nt of ordinary apOtal. Only four 
holdings c d d 20 P r c nt how r, and 19 fell 
sh rt f 10 P r nt . Th m an holding was 9.4 p r 
c nt and th m dian only 7 . 1 per nt . Of the otal 
ord on ry shar °ssu d by h whol grou p of companies, 
most 22 mill oon har On all, Am ri an ompani s 
- - _.""- ..... J 
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held little more than 6 .3 per cent . ine of the 
companies had preference shares outstanding, but in 
only one case did the American company hold any - and 
this holding was quite negligible. 
All companies were a s ked to state when and how 
t he American sharehold ing had been taken up . Unfort-
unately , only 17 companies gave a date f o r the 
American acquisition, po ssibly because th wording of 
the question made it easy to overlook this aspect. 
Of th se 17 holdings, one dated back to 1935 , one to 
1941, and one to 1953 . All the balance had been 
taken up in 1955 or subsequently, and , indeed, seven 
holdings did not go back before 1960 . The apparently 
rapid acceleration of such investments confirms the 
imp r ssion arising from data presented in Chapter II . 
Thirty compani s indicated how the American 
shareholding had been acquired . The majority, nine-
te n, stated that shares had been issued to an 
American company in xchange for technical information, 
pat nts, and/ or marketing rights . Thr e more explained 
that while some shares had been~sued for cash, others 
had been issued in exchange for technical information 
and pat nts. In only eight cases had the shares been 
issued entirely for cash ( sometimes with royalties 
du to the American company) or the supply of plant 
and machinery . (Sometimes of course, ven the share 
issues for cash were made at prices below ruling 
mark t 1 vels in return for access to American know-how 
or patents.) Almost always the i sue of shares by the 
Australian compan was made as part of a licensing 
agre m nt with the American c ompany . 
The influenc which American shareholders 
rcOs d on local manag ment i not known. Even had 
a d tail d sur y of this aspect been made, it would 
hav on olved a stud of th influence of licensors 
rath r thar.. of that of shar hold rs . l C rtainly only 
a minority of the d Or c ors of th companies studied 
1 . Som licen rs hold ery con ide able a u thority 
o r th ir li ns und r c rtaon cir umstanc The 
wrOt r was told of on cas wh r th Am rOcan 
1° nsor, who h Id non of h rdOnary shar in th 
Austr lOan compan , was abl 0 dismiss th ntir s nior 
m nag m nt of th 1 ° ns wh n th latt r got into 
1 0 nan ial difli ulti s. 
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w re American: the 29 companies wh och provided 
°nformation on the nationality of theOr dOrectors 
had a total of 160 directors, of whom only six were 
Americans (two of them on the same Board ) . On the 
other hand, the influ nce which quite small equity 
holdings, in conjunction with a licensing agreement, 
can have is clearly illustrated by the failure of 
th proposed merger between John Beith Holdings L td 
and Jordan Chemicals L td in 1961-62. Somewhat more 
than 20 per cent of John Beith's ordinary shares 
were held in the U.S. in 1962 and the company also 
had significant, though smaller, corporate share-
holders in the U.K. Jordan Chemicals had agreements 
with at least two American companies in that year, 
but the American shar holding seems to have been 
quit small . Despite this it was reported that the 
m rger was ' postponed because of conflicting interests 
h ° ° ,2 of t e overseas prlncipals of the two companles. 
The American influence on the management technigues 
of the companies studied was not great . Only two of 
the JO companies which answered this question felt 
that their overall management techniques had benefit d 
strongly from the influ nce of their Am rican affiliate, 
and only 14 f It they had benefited ' mod rately' . The 
balance felt that U.S. influence in this area had been 
negligible . (It is interesting to oompare this evi-
d nce with that presented for direct-investment 
enterprises in Chapter V: it was noted there that the 
greater the level of American equity, the more sig-
nificant to the local operation did American managerial 
know-how become . ) 
On the other hand, technical information re -
c i d from the U.S. was of much greater °mportance . 
SO compani s stated that such information was ' vital' 
and anoth r four that °t was vital in th production 
of lic nsed products. S v nt en f It it was of 
' mod rat ' importanc , an answer which may well have 
m nt ' ital On th production of a r lati ely small 
part of our turnover'. Only three compani f It 
2 . Jobson ' s In~estment Digest : Year Book 1964 , 
p . JIJ. 
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that technical information from the American affiliate 
was of only marginal importance, and two of these 
qualified this by saying that they expected such informa-
tion to be of greater importance in years to come . 
Perhaps surprisingly, 21 of the 30 companies 
which answered this questionnaire paid a royalty or 
technical assistance fee based on sales of licensed 
products to their American associate. In other words, 
the share issue made to the American company was often 
in addition to a service charge of the more conventional 
kind, though presumably the latter was lower than it 
would otherwise have been because of the share issue . 
Two of the 21 companies paying a royalty or fee based 
on sales also paid a fixed sum annually. othing is 
known about the general level of royalty: only two 
companies provided information on the rate of royalty 
paid, and one of these paid 1 per c nt and the other 
5 per cent. 
Of the nine companies not making any special 
paym nt in 1962, one expected to start making such 
payments at a later dat • 
At least one of th companie not making any 
special payment 10r technical information or mark t-
ing rights had a licensing agreement which provided 
for the reciprocal exchange of all technical informa-
tion without charge. This is perhaps the most desira-
bl of all relationships if the Australian venture 
und rtakes enough r search or product development to 
make the arrangement of mutual benefit. 
B ause a significant number of direct-investm nt 
nt rpris s diff rentiat d in conv rsation betwe n 
wh r th y wer 'th or tically ' allow d to e port and 
wh they might 'actually' e port, the writt n 
answ rs r ceiv d from th compani s currentl under 
discu sion must b tr a ed with onsiderable aution . 
Mo r, these ompani s w e only asked to indi ate 
th t nt of port franchi restriction if any, 
and no information wa ough on a tual port 
p formanc. For hO r ason it is pos °ble that a 
numb r of ompani s wh O h il1.dicat d that th y w r not 
r stri t d On th ir port fr dom mOght in fa t ha 
b n ngag d On th p oduct Oon of CommodOtO s th port 
of whi h was onomi ally ou of th qu stion . As it 
• ···'t·.~-'''4'.t. 
"\-vas, two of the 29 companies which answered this 
qu stion stated that exporting was ' not relevant ', 
though one added that restrictions might exist if 
exporting were f asible . With these serious re-
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se vations in mind, 't may be no ted that 11 companies 
indicated that they were not restricted in any way 
n their freedom to export. S ixteen stated that 
th export of licensed products was restricted to 
certain specified areas, and twelve of these indicated 
th areas concerned. E ight of the twelve could not 
sell outside Austrahsia ( and one of these indeed 
was confined to Australia and its overseas territories ) 
and two of the balance were not permitted to export 
beyond parts of Asia and Africa . The evidence is 
clearly not reliabl enough to call into serious 
question the view xpressed in Chapter IX that 
licensees are likely to be more restrict d in their 
xport freedom than are subsidiaries, but the need for 
further study of this aspect is obvious. 
· .'"- ........... 
App ndix D 
'PARTICIPATI G COMPANIES' A D THOSE WHICH SUPPORTED 
THE SURVEY FINANCIALLY 
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The following list of companies includes both those 
tak n to be 'participating' in the present survey and 
those which responded to an appeal by P rofessor Sir 
John Crawford, Director of the Research School of 
P acific Studies in the Australian ational University, 
for finance to conduct the proj ect . In fairness it 
should be added that a number of comp anies not 
included in the list did provide information for the 
survey: they have not been listed either because they 
did not feel able to answer at least the first main 
questionnaire used in the surveyor because they were 
not manufacturing at 30 June 1962 . (See also 
Chapter I for further discussion of what constitutes 
a 'participating company ' . ) It should also be made 
clear that not all the companies listed were approached 
for financial support. 
Addressograph-Mul tigraph of Aus tralia P ty Ltd 
Aircraft -Marine P roducts (Aust.) P ty Ltd 
Al tona P etrochemical Co . Pty L td 
American Machine and Foundry Co . (Aust . ) P ty Ltd 
Armco (Aust.) P ty Ltd 
Austral Standard Cables P ty L td 
Australian Abrasives P ty Ltd 
Australian Carbon Black P ty L td 
Australian Controls L td 
Australian Cream Tartar P ty L td 
Australian Fibre Glass P ty Ltd 
Australian P etrochemicals P ty L td 
Australian Synthetic Rubber Co . Ltd 
Bendi -Tecnico P ty Ltd 
B ndi -Tecnico (Automotive ) Pty Ltd 
Black and D cker (Australasia ) P ty Ltd 
Bla klock Industries P ty Ltd 
Boral Ltd 
Borg-Warn r (Aust .) L td 
Bowater-S ott Australia P ty Ltd 
B istol-Myers Co . P ty Ltd 
Bundy Tubing Co. (Aust. ) P ty L td 
C.S.R.C.-Dow P ty L t d 
Cannon El ctric (Aust .) P ty Ltd 
Carborundum Australia P ty L td 
J.I. Case (Aust. ) P ty Lt d. 
x Caterpillar of Australia P ty L td 
Champion Spark Plug Co . (Aust.) P ty L td 
Chrysler Australia Lt d 
x Coca-Cola Export Corporation 
Colgate-Palmolive P ty L t d 
Comalco Industries P ty L t d 
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Consolidated Pneumatic Tool Co (Aust .) P ty Ltd 
Corning Glass Works 
Cummins Diesel Austral ia 
Dowd Associates P ty Ltd 
Ducon Industries L td 
F . M. C. (Aust.) Ltd 
Fenner Dodge (Aust .) P ty L td 
Fischer and P orter P ty Ltd 
x Ford Motor Co . of Australia P ty L td 
Formfi t of Australia Ltd 
Fruehauf Trailers (Australasia ) P ty Ltd 
General Motors - Holden ' s P ty L td 
Gilbert and Barker Manufacturing Co . (Aus t . ) P ty Ltd 
x Gillette (Aust.) P ty Ltd 
x 
x 
B . F. Goodrich-C.S.R. Chemicals P ty Ltd 
H.J. Heinz Co . P ty L t d 
Hercules P owd r Co. (Aust.) Pty Ltd 
Hoover (Aust.) Pty Ltd 
Hunter Douglas L td 
IBM Australia P ty L t d 
International Harvester Co. of Australia P ty Ltd 
Jantzen (Austo ) Ltd 
Johnson and Johnson P ty L td 
Joy Manufactur ' ng Co. P ty Ltd 
James . Kirby Manufacturing P ty L td 
Kodak (Australasia ) P ty Ltd 
L Tourneau-West 'nghouse P ty Ltd 
Eli Lilly (Aust .) P ty Ltd 
Lindberg Engine ring Co . (Aus t .) P ty Ltd 
Lovable Brassi re Co . (Aust .) Pty L td 
Lubrizol International S.A. 
McCulloch of Austral ia P ty Ltd 
Chas . McDonald-M ad Johnson P ty L td 
M tt rs -Clow P ty L td 
Mob'l Oil Australia P ty Ltd 
Monsanto Ch micals (Aust .) Ltd 
Mount Isa Min s L d 
abisco P ty L td 
, 
uodex (Aust .) P ty Ltd 
Oppenh imer Casing Co . of Australia P ty Ltd 
Outboard Marine Australia P ty Ltd 
P arke , Davis and Company 
P arker-Eversharp (Aust .) P ty Ltd . 
Parsons General Foods P t y Ltd 
P ep si-Cola Co . of Australia P ty Ltd 
P epsi-Cola Metropolitan Bo ttling Co . Inc . 
x P fizer Corporation 
x Rheem Australia Indu stries P ty Ltd 
Robertshaw Controls (Aust .) P ty L td 
Ronson Pty Ltd 
St Regis-Williams P ty L td 
S chrader-Scovill Co. P ty Ltd 
S cripto P ens of Australia P ty L td 
Sheffield Corporation of Australia P t y Ltd 
Singer Industries P ty Ltd 
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Smith Kline and French Labora tories (Aust . ) Ltd 
Sporting Arms L td 
x Standard Telephones and Cables P ty L td 
Steerings P ty Ltd 
S terling Pharmaceuti cals P ty Ltd 
G. H. Stuart P ty L td 
Swift Aus tralian Co . (P ty) L td 
Taylor Instrument CO& of Australia P ty Ltd 
Texas Instruments Australia L td 
U.K. Optical Bausch and L omb P t y Ltd 
Unbrako (Aus t .) P ty Ltd 
x Union Carbide Australia Ltd 
Vick P roducts (Pty) Ltd 
Vickers -Detroit Hydraulics P t y Ltd 
Wallace and Tiernan P ty Ltd 
White Wings P ty Ltd 
Wiltshire File Co . P ty L td 
D not s compani s which s upported the project financially . 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
The works cited in the following list are mainly 
those referred to in the text of the thesis, While 
some books which have not been referred to directly 
are included, a number of other wor~s (such as text 
books, several confidential papers, and some Tariff 
Board reports ) read during the course of research 
have been omitted . 
(A) Books 
Australian Chemical Industry Council. Industrial 
Chemicals and Synthetic Resins, Vols. I and II. 
Public evidence submitted to the Aus tralian 
Tariff Board, 7 September 1964 . 
Avramovic, Dragoslav and Gulhati" Ravi . Debt 
Servicing Capacity and Postwar Growth in 
International Indebtedness . 
Hopkins Press, 1958. 
Baltimore : Johns 
Bank of New South Wal es . Establishing a Business in 
Australia . Sydney, 1961. 
Barlow, E .R. Management of Foreign Manufacturing 
Subsidiaries . Boston : Graduate School of Business 
Administration, Harvard University, 1953. 
Barlow, E.R. and Wender, Ira T . Foreign Investment 
and Taxation . Englewood Cliffs : P rentice-Hall, 
1955. 
Blainey, Geqffrey. Mines in the Spinifex: The Story of 
Mount Isa Mines . Sydney: Angus e Robertson, 1960 . 
Bloomfield, Arthur I . Capital Imports and the American 
Balance of Payments 1934-39. 
of Chicago P ress, 1950. 
Chicago: University 
Brash, D.T. New Zealand's Debt Servicing Capacity. 
Christchurch : University o f Canterbury, 1964. 
Brecher, Irving and Reisman, S.S. Canada-United S tates 
Economic Relations. Ottawa: Royal Commission on 
Canada ' s Economic P rospects, 1957. 
Brewster, Jr ., Kingman. Law and United States Business 
in Canada . Washington : ational P lanning Associa-
tion (U.S.A.) and Private P lanning Association of 
Canada, 1960 . 
Bushn 11, John A . Australian Company Mergers 1946-1959 . 





Cairncross, A .K. Home and Foreign Investment 1870- 1913 . 
Cambridge: Cambridge University P ress, 1953 . 
Cairncro ss, A.K. Factors in Economic Development . 
London: Allen e Unwin , 1962. 
Caves, Ri chard E. Trade and Economic Structure: Models 
and Methods. 
P ress, 1960, 
Cambridge, Mass .: Harvard University 
Commerce Clearing House, Inc. Revenue Act of 1962 with 
explanation . Chicago, 1962 . 
Dunning, J . H. American Investment in British Manufact-
uring Industry. London: Allen e Unwin, 1958 . 
Fanno, Marco. Normal and Abnormal International Capital 
Transfers. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1939 . 
Forster, Colin. Industrial Development in Australia 
1920-1930. 
1964. 
Canberra: Australian ational University, 
Friedmann, Wolfgang G . and Kalmanoff, George, (eds.). 
Joint International Business Ventures. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1961 . 
Gates, Theodore R . and Linden, Fabian . Costs and 
Competition: American Experience Abroad . ew 
York: ational Industrial Conference Board, 1961 . 
Gordon, Lincoln and Grommers, Engelbert L. United 
States Manufacturing Investment in Brazil : 
The Impact of Brazilian Government P olicies 
1946-1960 . Boston: Graduate School of Business 
Administration, Harvard University, 1962 . 
Guth, Wilfried. Capital Exports to Less Developed 
Countries. Dordrecht, Holland : D. Reidel 
Publishing Co., 1963 . 
Hall, A.R. The London Capital Market and Australia 
1870-1914. Canberra: Australian ational University , 
1963 . 
Hartn tt, L.J. as told to Veitch, John. Big Wheels 
and Lit tle Wheels . M Ibourn Lansdowne Press, 
1964 . 
Hunt r, Al x (d.) . The Econumics of Australian Industry . 
Melbourn : M lbourne Univ rsity P ress, 1963 . 
464 
Islam, urul. Foreign Capital and Economic Develop-
ment: Japan, India and Canada. Tokyo: Charl s L. 
Tuttle Co., 1960. 
Karmel, P.H . and Brunt, Maureen . The Structure of the 
Australian Economy . Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire, 1962. 
Kindleberger, Char£es P. The Terms of Trade : A European 
Case Study. ew York: John Wiley e Sons, 1956 . 
Kindleberger, Char~es P. International Economics. 
Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1958 and 1963 
edns. 
Kindleberger, Charles P. Economic Development. New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1958. 
Lewis, Cleona assisted by Schilltterbeck, Karl T. 
America's Stake in International Investments. 
Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1938. 
Lindeman, John and Armstrong, Donald. Policies and 
Practices of United States Subsidiaries in Canaqa. 
Washington: National Planning Associa tion (U.S.A.) 
and P rivate Planning Association of Canada, 1960. 
Lovell, Enid Baird. Foreign Licensing Agreements , 
Vols. I and II. ew York: ational Industrial 
Conference Board, 1958 and 1959 . 
Machlup, Fritz. International Trade and the National 
Income Multiplier. Philadelphia: The Blakiston 
Company, 1943. 
Manufacturing Industries Advisory Council. Oversea 
Investment in Australia. . p., 1960. 
Marsh, D.B. World Trade and Investment. New York: 
Harcourt, Brace e Co., 1951. 
Marshall, Herbert, Southard, Jr., Frank A., and Taylor, 
Kenneth W. Canadian-American Industry: A Study 
in International Investment. 
University P ress, 1936. 
ew Haven: Yale 
Meade, J.E. The Theory of International Economic 
Policy, Vol s . I and II . London : 0 ford University 
P ress, 1951 and 1955. 
M i r, G.M. International Trade and Development . ew 
York: Harp r e Row , 1963 . 
M ' r, G.M. and Baldw ' n, Rob rt E. Economic Development . 
w York: John Wil y e Sons, 1957 . 
465 
Mik sell, Raymond F. (ed.) . U .S. P rivate and Government 
Investment Abroad . 
Oregon Books, 1962. 
Eugene, Oregon: University of 
Mill, John Stuar t . P rinciples of P olitical Economy . Vol . 
II . Boston: Charles C. Little e James Brown, 1848 . 
Myrdal, Gunnar. An International Economy: P roblems and 
Prospects. ew York: Harper e Bros, 1956 . 
urkse, Ragnar. P roblems of Capital Formation in 
Underdeveloped Countries . Oxford: Basil Blackwell , 
1953. 
Ohlin, Bertil. Interregional and International Trade . 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University p ress, 1933. 
Phelps, D.M. Migration of Industry to South America. 
ew York: McGraw-Hill Book Co . , 1936 . 
Reitsma, A.J. Trade P rotection in Australia . Leiden: 
H.E. Stenfert Kroese . V., 1960 . 
Robinson, Harry J . The Motivation and Flow of Private 
Foreign Investment . Menlo Park, Cal . : S tanford 
Research Institute, 1961 . 
Southard, Jr., Frank A. American Industry in Europe. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co ., 1931. 
Sylos-Labini, Paolo . Oligop oly and Technical P rogress . 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1962. 
Viner, Jacob. Canada ' s Balance of International 
Indebtedness 1900-1913,. Cambridge, Mass . : 
Harvard University P ress, 1924 . 
Viner, Jacob. S tudies in the Theory of International 
Trade . ew York: Harper e Bros., 1937 . 
Wilson, Roland . Capital Imports and the Terms of 
Trade . Melbourn: Melbourne Uni ersity Press, 
1931. 
( B) Articles, Newspapers, Theses , etc . 
Abramovitz, Moses. 'E conomics of Growth ' , A Survey of 
Contemporary Economics, Vol . II, ed . Bernard F. 
Hal y . Hom wood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1952. 
~, M Ibourn , Augu t 1963 . 
Arndt, H. W. 'A Sugg stion for S implifying the Theory 
of International Capital Mov ment " Economia 
Internazionale, VII, 195 4, 469-79. 
..... ---.~ 
466 
Arndt, H.W. 'External Economies in Economic Growth ' , 
Economic Record, XXXI, 1955, 192-214. 
Arndt, H.W. 'Overseas Borrowing - the ew Model' , 
Economic Record, XXXIII, 1957, 247-61 . 
Arndt, H.W . and Sherk, D.R . ' Export Franchises of 
Australian Companies with Overseas Affiliations' , 
Economic Record, XXXV, 1959, 239-42 . 
Australasian Insurance e Banking Record and Statistical 
Register, Melbourne, Vol . LVIII, 1934 . 
Australian, Canberra, 1964-65 . 
Australian British Trade Association. United Kingdom 
Investment in Australian Industry: Precis of 
Submissions to the Committee of Economic Enguiry. 
Melbourne, 1964. 
Australian Financial Review, Sydney, 1961-65 . 
Australian P etroleum Information Bureau. Oil and 
Australia: The Figures Behind the Facts, 1962. 
Ball, R.J. 'Capital Imports and Economic Development: 
Paradoxy or ~hodoxy?', Kyklos, XV, 1962, 610-23 . 
Balogh, Thomas. 'Some Theoretical P roblems of P ost-
War Foreign Investment P olicy ', Oxford 
Economic Papers, VII, 1945, 93-110. 
Balogh, Thomas and Streeten, P.P. 'Domestic versus 
Foreign Investment', Bulletin of the Oxford 
University Institute of Statistics, XXII, 1960, 
213-24 . 
Bastow, S.H. 'Research in the Manufacturing Industry 
in Australia', unpublished paper presented to 
the annual conference of the Australian Institute 
of Engineers, Canberra, 1964. 
Behrman, J. 'Foreign Associates and their Financing' , 
'Foreign Investment and the Transfer of Knowledge 
and Skills', and 'E conomic Effects of P rivate 
Direct Investment ', U.S . P rivate and Government 
Investment Abroad, ed . Raymond F . Mikesell. 
Eugene, Oregon: Univ rsity of Or gon Book, 1962 . 
B nn tt, F . tTh Pattern and Significanc of 
United Stat s Dir ct Inv stments in Australia ' , 
unpublish d B.Ec. ( Hons .) thesis for th University 
of Sydney, 1961 . 
,c 
467 
Berrill, K . E . 
' Foreign Capital and Tak -Off ' , The 
Economics of Take -Off into Sustained Growth : 
P roceedings of a Conference held by the Inter-
national Economic Association, ed . W. W. Rostow. 
London : Macmillan, 1963. 
Blainey, Geoffrey . 'Technology in Australian History' 
Business Archives and History, IV, 1964 , 117-37 . 
Blyth, C.D. and Carty, E . B . 'Non-Resident Ownership 
of Canadian Industry', Canadian Journal of 
Economics and Political Science, XXII, 1956, 
449-60. 
Brown, H.P. 'Three Aspects of the Australian Retail 
Price Indexes', Economic Record, XL, 1964, 576-9 . 
Business Week, ew York, 20 April 1963. 
Chakravarty, S. 'A Structural Study of International 
Capital Movement', Economia Internazionale, 
XIV, 1961, 377-404 . 
Commerce, the official journal of the American Chamber 
of Commerce in Australia, 1963- 65 . 
Corden, W.M. ' The Tariff', The Economics of Australian 
Industry, ed . Alex Hunter . Melbourne : Melbourne 
University P ress, 1963 . 
Daily Mirror, Sydney, 3 October 1963 . 
Domar, Evsey D. 'The Effect of Foreign Investment on 
the Balance of Payments ', American Economic Review, 
XL, 1950, 805 - 26 . 
Donovan, Francis P . ' Australia ' , Legal Aspects of 
Foreign Investment, ed . Wolfgang G. Friedmann 
and Richard C. Pugh . London : S tevens e S ons, 
1959. 
Dunning, J . H. ' Capital Movements in the 20th Century ', 
Lloyds Bank Review, April 1964 , 17 - 42 . 
Encel, S. ' Financing Scientific Research in 
Australia ', SCience , 28 July 1961 , 260- 6 . 
Finch, D. ' Investment Service of Under- developed 
Countries ' , I . M.F . Staff Papers, II, 1951 - 52, 
60-85. 
Ford, Harold and P dri 1 , William H . ' International 
Business P robl ms: American Investment ln 
Australia ' , unpublished s ries of papers for 
instructional us at th University of Melbourn 
Law School . 
468 
Ford Motor Company of Australia Pty Ltd. Strong 
Grows the Future: Ford ' s 25 Y~ars in Australia . 
. p . , 1950. 
Fortune, July 1963 . 
General Motors-HOld n ' s Pty Ltd . 1962 Annual Report . 
Gen ral Motors-Holden ' s Pty L td . Behind the Millionth . 
Melbourne, [1962 J . 
Goodyear Tyre 8 Rubber Co. (Aust.) Ltd. The First 
Twenty-Five Years : Goodyear Celebrates its 
Silver Anniversary of Manufacturing in 
Australia, 1927-1952. Sydney, 1952. 
Goody ar Tyre 8 Rubber Co. (Aust.) Ltd , Annual 
Report 1961. 
Gott, K.D. 'Open for Business ' , Australian, 
4 March 1965, p. 9. 
Grant, J. McB. 'The P etroleum Industry', The 
Economics of Australian Industry, ed. A~ex 
Hunter . M lbourne: Melbourne University Press, 
Hampton, P eter . ' Foreign Investment and the Theory 
of Economic Growth, examined within the frame-
work of Canadian Economic Development', unpub-
lished Ph.D. thesis for the University of 
Ottawa, 1963 . 
Harrod, R . F. 'Desirable International Movements of 
Capital in Relation to Growth of Borrowers and 
Lenders and Growth of Markets ' , International 
Trade Theory in a Develop ing World: P roceedings 
of a Conference held by the International 
Economic Association, ed . Roy Harrod and Douglas 
Hague . London : Macmillan, 1963 . 
Hecksch r, Eli. ' The Effect of Foreign Trade on the 
DistributIon of Incom ' Ekonomisk Tidskrift , 
XXI, 1919; reprinted in R~adings in the Theory 
of International Trade, London: Allen 8 Unwin, 
1950 . 
H'nshaw, Randall. 'For ign In stm nt and Am rican 
Employment ' , Am~rican Econom~c Review, P a p ers 
and P roceedings, XXXVI, 1946, 661-71 . 
469 
Hocking, D.M. 
'The Contribution of Overseas 
Companies to Australia ' s Po st -war Industrial 
Development', unpublished paper presented to 
Section G, Australian and ew Zealand Association 
for the Advancement of S cience , Melbourne, 1955. 
Hocking, D.M. 'Research - the Economic Implications ', 
Journal of the Australian Institute of Metals, 
III, 1958 , o . 1, 23-30. 
Hogan, W.P. 'Economic Aspects of the Chemical 
Industry', Proceedings of the Royal Australian 
Chemical Institute, XXVIII, 1961, 431 - 44 . 
Hogan, W.P. 'The Impact of the Foreign Sector on 
Industrial Structure', unpublished paper 
presented to Section G, Australian and New 
Zealand Association forthe Advancement of SCience, 
Sydney, 1962 . 
Horner, D.T. ' U.S . Direct Investments in the Po st -
War Period'. Economic Monograph, No. 241, March 
1962, of the Economic Socie ty of Australia and 
New Zealand, ew Sou th Wale s Branch. 
Hunter, Alex. 'Restrictive Practices and Monopolies 
in Australia', Economic Record, XXXVII, 1961, 
25-52. 
Hunter, Alex. '''Relative Mildness" of Barwick 
Proposals', Sydney Morning Herald, 18 February 
1963, p . 2. 
Hunter, Alex and Webb, L.R . 'The Chemical Industry', 
The Economics of Australian Industry, ed . Alex 
Hunter . Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 
1963. 
Hunter, J.M. 'Long-term Foreign Investment and Under-
developed Countries', Journal of Poli tical 
Economy, LXI, 1953, 15-24. 
Hutton, John. 'An Ana tomy of Manufacturing Industry' , 
unpublished paper presented 0 Section G, 
Australian and ew Zealand Association for the 
Ad ancement of S cience, Canberra, 1964. 
Ingram, James C. 'Growth in Capacity and Canada's 
Balance of P aym nts', American Economic Review, 
XLVII, 1957, 93-104 . 
Jasay, A. E. 
' The Social Choice Between Home and 
Overseas Inv stm nt ' , EconomAc .Journal , LXX, 
1960, 105-13 . 
Kahn , A.E. ' Investm nt Crit ria in Development 
P rograms', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
LXV, 1951, 38-61 . 
Kemp, Murray C. ' Foreign Investment and the 
National Advantage ' , Economic Record, XXXVIII, 
1962, 56-62 . 
Kemp, Murray C. 'The Benefits and Costs of P rivate 
Investment from Abroad: Comment' , Economic 
Record, XXXVIII, 1962, 108-10 . 
Keynes, J.M . ' Foreign Investment and ational 
Advantage', The Nation and the Athenaeum, 
9 August 1924 , 584-7. 
470 
Knapp , John. 'Capital Exports and Growth ', Economic 
Journal, LXVII, 1957, 432-44 . 
Kraft Holdings Ltd . 1962 Annual Report. 
Lary, Hal B. 'The Domestic Effects of Foreign 
Investment', American Economic Review, P apers 
and Proceedings, XXXVI, 1946, 672-86. 
MacDougall, G.D. A. ' The Benefits and Costs of Private 
Investment from Abroad: A Theoretical Approach ' , 
Economic Record, XXXVI, 1960, 13-35 . 
Maxcy, George. 'The Motor Indust~, The Economics of 
Australian Industry, ed . Alex Hunter. Melbourne: 
Melbourne Uni ersity P ress, 1963 . 
Meier, G.M. 'E conomic De elopment and the Transfer 
Mechanism: Canada, 1895-1913', Canadian ~ournal 
of Economics and Political Science, XIX, 1953, 
1-19. 
Me tzler, Lloyd A. ' The Transfer Problem Reconsidered ' , 
Journal of Political Economy, L, 1942~ reprinted 
in Readings in the Theory of International Trade , 
London: Allen e Unwin, 1950. 
Metzler , Lloyd A. 'The Theory of International Trade ' , 
A Survey of Contemporary Economics , Vol. I, ed . 
Howard S. Ellis. Hom wood, Ill. g Richard D. 
Irwin, .1948 . 
; 
471 
Mundell, Robert A. 
' International Trade and Factor 
Mobility ' , American Economic Review, XLVII, 
1957 , 321-35 . 
Murphy, J. Carter . ' International Investment and the 
ational Interest', S outhern Economic Journal, 
XXVII, 1960, 11-17 . 
Newsweek, 10 August 1964. 
urkse, Ragnar . 'International Trad Theory and 
Development Policy ' , Economic Development for 
Latin America : Proceedings of a Conference held 
by the International Economic Association, ed. 
Howard S . Ellis and Henry - C. Wallich. London: 
Macmillan, 1961. 
Pazos, Felipe. 'Private versus Public Foreign Invest-
ment in Under-developed Areas', Economic Develop-
ment for Latin America: Proceedings of a Conference 
held by the International Economic Association, ed. 
Howard S. Ellis and Henry C. Wallich. London: 
Macmillan, 1961. 
P enrose, Edith Tilton. 'Foreign Investment and the 
Growth of the Firm ', Economic Journal, LXVI, 1956, 
220-35. 
P erkins, J .O . ' Some Fallacies about Over seas 
Borrowing', Australian Quarterly, XXXII, 1960, 
o . 2, 74-88. 
Philipps, Eugene A. 'American Direct Investments in 
West German Manufacturing Industries, 1945 to 
1959', Current Economic Comment, XXII, 1960, 
29- 44. 
o. 2, 
P olak, J.J. 'Balance of Payments Problems of Countries 
Reconstructing with the Help of Foreign L oans ' , 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, LVII, 1943 ; 
reprinted in Readings in the Theory of International 
Trade, London: Allen e Unwin , 1950 . 
Ros nberg , W. 'Capital Imports and Growth - The Case 
of ew Zealand - Foreign In estment in ew Zealand 
1840-1958', Economic Journal LXXI 1961, 
93-113 . 
Ros nst in-Rodan, P o ' P robl ms of Industrialization 
of East rn and South-Eastern Europ " Economic 
Journal, LII , 1943; r pr'nt d in The Economics 
of Underdevelop ment ed . A . . Agarwala and S . P. S ingh 
Bombay: ° ford Univ rsity P r ss, 1958. 
Sadie, J.L . ' Foreign Capital in South Africa II 
Its Burden', Finance and Trade Review , III , 
1958, No . 1, 67-79 . 
472 
Safarian, A.E. ' The Exports of American-owned Enter-
prises in Canada', American Economic Review, 
Papers and Proceedings, LIV, 1964, 449-58. 
Salant, Walter S. 'The Domestic Effects of Capital 
Export under the P oint Four P rogram', American 
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, XL, 
1950, 495-510 . 
Samuelson, Paul A. 'International Trade and the 
Equalisation of Factor Prices', Economic Journal, 
LVIII, 1948, 163-84 . 
Samuelson, Paul A. 'International Factor-Price 
Equalisation Once Again', Economic Journal, 
LIX, 1949, 181-97 . 
Singer, H.W . 'The Distribution of Gains Between 
Investing and Borrowing Countries', American 
Economic Review, Papers and P roceedings, XL, 
1950, 473-85. 
Snider, D.A . 'The Case for Capital Controls to 
Relieve the U. S . Balance of Payments', American 
Economic Review, LIV, 1964, 346-58 . 
Sydney Morning Herald, 1962- 64 . 
Thomson, E . J. 'Oversea Investment - the Lengthening 
Shadow '. Economic Monograp~, o. 242, May 1962, 
of the Economic Society of Australia and New 
Zealand, New South Wales Branch . 
Viner, Jacob. 'Relative Abundance of the Factors and 
International Trade', Indian Economic Journal, 
IX, 1962, 274-88, 
Wheelwright, E. L. 'Overseas Investment in Australia', 
The Economics of Aus tralian Industry, ed. Alex 
Hunter . Melbourne: Melbourne University P ress, 
Williams, B.R. Industrial Research and Economic 
Growth in Australia: The 30th Joseph Fisher 
Lecture in Commerce. Adelaide : Griffin P ress, 
1962 . 
Williams, John H. ' The Theory of International Trade 
Reconsid r d ' , Economic Journal, XXXIX, 1929 ' 
r printed in Readings in the Theory of International 
-
, 
Trade, London: Allen £ Unwin, 1950. 
Zeidler, D.R. 'Some Research and Development 
P ossibilities', Pro ceedings of the Royal 
Aus tralian Chemical Institute, XXVIII, 1961, 
452- 67. 
( C) Official Publications 
Australia 
( 1) Commonwealth Bureauof Census and Statistics 
Annual Bulletin of Oversea Investment : Aus tralia 
196J-64. 
Australian National Accounts: National Income and 
Expenditure 1948-49 to 196J-64 . 
Registrations of New Motor Vehicles, Australia 
(1960-6J). 
47 J 
Secondary Industries: Part I . Factory and BUilding 
Operations, 1961-62 . 
(2) Department of Trade 
The Australian Pharmaceutical P roducts Industry, 1960 . 
British Manufacturers in Australia, 1960. 
Canadian Investment in Australian Manufacturing 
Industry, 1959 . 
United States Investment in Australian Manufacturing 
Industry, 1957, 1959, and 1960 . 
Directory of United States Investment in Aus tralian 
Manufacturing Industry, 1962 . 
(J) Commonwealth Treasury 
The Australian Economy 1965 . 
Overseas Investment in Australia, 1960. 
Supplement to the Treasury Information Bulletin : 
Private Overseas Investment in Aus tralia , 1965. 
(4) Tariff Board and related authorities 
( a) Royal Commission on Customs and Excise Tariffs, 
Minutes of Evidence , Vol. VI. 
( b) Inter-State Commission of Australia. Tariff 
Investigation: Miscellaneous Group VI . Repbrt, 
( c ) Tariff Board Reports 
Ab~asive Cloths and Papers, 1959 . 
Abrasives, 1962. 
Aluminium and Aluminium Alloys, 1962. 
Aluminium Ingots, etc., 1964. 
Automotive Industry, 1957. 
Capacitors, 1962. 
Caterpillar Tractor-Scrapers (By-Law), 1964. 
Cathode Ray Tubes and Parts Thereof, 1960. 
Chlorination Regulators and Controllers, 1960. 
~4 
Citric Acid, Tartaric Acid and Cream of Tartar, 1962. 
Covered Cable and Covered Wire classifiable under 
Tariff Item 181 (A)(l)(a), 1955 . 
Electric Shavers, 1962. 
Files, 1953. 
Files, Being Hand Tools of Trade - Tariff Item 2l9(c), 
1940. 
Fluorocarbons, 1964 . 
Glass Envelopes for Cathode Ray Tubes, 1964. 
Glass Fibre and Glass Fibre Products, 1962. 
Iron and Steel Chain, 1963. 
Knives with Forged Stainless Steel Blades, 1963. 
Motor Body Panels, 1935. 
Motor Vehicles, 1937. 
Paper Cones, Bobbins, Tubes, etc., 1962. 
Petroleum Refining Industry, 1959. 
Pneumatic Rubber Tyres and Tubes for Motor Vehicles, 1935. 
Portable Electric Hand Tools, 1963. 
Precision Ground Tapered Roller Bearings, 1962. 
Refined Pe troleum Products, 1961 . 
Roll Film Box Type Cameras, 1960 p ' 
Snap Fasteners and Eyelets, 1962. 
Storage Batteries, 1927. 
S tyrene Monomers, Po lymers and Copolymers, 1962. 
Synthetic Rubber, 1962 . 
Tractors, 1955. 
Vacuum Cleaners and Floor Po lishers, 1961 . 
Vinyl Chloride P Olymers and Copolymers, 1963. 
Wo rk Trucks, Mechanically Propelled, 1961 . 
( 5) Other Australian official publications 
Commonwealth of Australia, 'Income Tax and Social 
Services Contribution Assessment Act 1936-1962' . 
Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, 
Vols. H. of R . 39-41 ( ew Series). 
Group News, February 1963. (Published by the 
Australian Joint Committee for P roductivity Group 
Promotion and supported by the Department of 
Labour and ational Service.) 
Reserve Bank of Australia, Statistical Bulletin: Company 
Supplement, February 1965 . 
United States 
(1) Department of Commerce 
American Direct Investments in Foreign Countries, Bureau 
of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Trade Information 
Bulletin o. 731, 1930 . 
American Direct Investments in Foreign Countries - 1936, 
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, 1938. 
Balance of Payments Statistical Supplement, Revised 
Edition, Office of Business Economics, 1963 . 
Factors Limiting U.S. Investment Abroad, Office of 
International Trade, 1953 . 
Investment in Australia : Basic Information for Uni ted 
S tates Businessmen, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, 
1956. 
Overseas Business Reports, Bureau of International 
Commerc , various dates. 
Survey of Current Business, Office of Business Economics, 
monthly . 
U.S. Business Investments in Foreign Countries, Office 
of Busin ss Economics, 1960 . 
( 2 ) Tr asury D partm nt 
Census of American-Owned Assets in Foreign Countries , 





Department of H alth, Report of the Special Committee 
on Pharmaceutical Benefits, 196J. 
: 
